THE ECOLOGY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
THE ECOLOGY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

F. W. RIGGS

Issued under the auspices of
The Indian Institute of Public Administration
New Delhi

ASIA PUBLISHING HOUSE
BOMBAY • CALCUTTA • NEW DELHI • MADRAS
LONDON • NEW YORK
FOREWORD

With the attainment of independence and the advent of planning in a number of countries of South East Asia, they have been faced with the problem of reorganizing and adapting their administrative organisation and practices to the demands of new, varied and expanding tasks, particularly of a developmental character. Here, one of the major difficulties for reformers and planners has been that the administrative concepts and techniques evolved in the context of the social, economic and political conditions of Western countries are not as such fully valid and applicable in our area. Though some progress has been made in recent years in building up conceptual administrative themes which are culture-free and of universal application, the comparative study of public administration in so far it concerns under-developed areas and regions in their ecological setting is still in its infancy.

In the three lectures on “The Ecology of Public Administration”, which are published in this monograph, Prof. Riggs successively deals with “American Administration: An Ecological View”; “Thailand: Reflections on the Traditional Ecology”; and “Administrative Change in the Philippines and Thailand”. He examines in detail the administrative ecology of the latter two countries in the context of their transitional phase from an agrarian to an industrial society, and against the wider background of a multiplicity of sociological, political and institutional factors. Prof. Riggs’ new administrative model, called the “Prismatic Society”, is certainly an interesting attempt to improve our previous conceptual framework for understanding the dynamics of administration in developing and semi-developed economies, though one may not necessarily agree with all the characteristics he identifies. The application of model-building to administration has just begun and as it gets more refined and varied it will not only help in a rethinking of basic administrative concepts and principles in their application to a parti-
cular phase of development, but also open out before us many new administrative vistas of great value. I am sure that Prof. Riggs' lectures will be of immense interest and profit to all scholars and practitioners of administration.

V. K. N. Menon
Director

 Indian Institute of
Public Administration
New Delhi, April 30, 1961
CONTENTS

I. AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION: AN ECOLOGICAL VIEW 1

Economic Factors—Direct Influence on Administration—
Indirect Influence on Administration—Social factors—
Association as a Way of Life—Associational Character of
Public Administration—Administrative Use of Associa-
tions—The Class Structure—Separation of Class Values
—Implications of the Theory of Public Administration—
Administrative Impact on Class System—The Commu-
nications Network—National Community and Administra-
tion—Symbol System—Consensus and Administrative
Authority—Authority and Popular Sovereignty—Equal-
ity and Administration—Political Framework—Power
and Administration—The Basis of Non-Bureaucratic
Power—The Basis of Bureaucratic Weakness—Power
and the Administrative Model

II. THAILAND: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRADITIONAL
ECOLOGY 59

Economic Structure: Redistribution—Social Structure:
Particularism—Communications Network: Unmobilized
—The Symbol System: Sacral—Power Structure—Arbi-
trary but not Effective—Power and Decision-Making—
Formal and Substantive Structures—Formal Political
Model—The Archaic Political Model—Decisional and
Ordering Functions—Ancient Siamese Politics: Archaic
and Ordering—Modern Thai Administration—Hetero-
geney, Formalism and Overlapping—A Scale of Com-
parison—Some Qualifications

III. ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE IN THE PHILIPPINES
AND THAILAND 98

Formalism—Constitutional Formalism—The Crisis of
Authority—Formalism in the Philippines—Administra-
tive Aspects of Formalism—The Attainment Orientation
—Academic Formalism—Heterogeneity—Bazaar-Can-
CONTENTS

teen: Heterogeneity in Economics—The Intelligentsia and Counter-élites—"Clects": Prismatic Groups par excellence—Overlapping—Price Indeterminacy and Rank—Administrative Efficiency and Development—The "Sala" Prismatic Administration—Politics in the Sala—
—The Genetic Problems—Conclusion

Index
CHAPTER I

AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION: AN ECOLOGICAL VIEW

I have been asked to speak rather informally about administration in the United States, Thailand and the Philippines; the United States because it is my own country, Thailand and the Philippines because I have just come from a visit of one year in each of these Southeast Asian countries.*

How can one associate the administrative systems of three such different countries? Some of my colleagues would surely say that they are not "comparable"; each is distinctive and unique to such an extent that it can only be studied or approached as something apart, as sui generis. Yet I think that we can find common elements in these three countries, or at least common variables, in terms of which they can be compared, just as we can compare, for example, an automobile and a bicycle in terms of their price.

The juxtaposition of disparate elements is impressed upon a traveller visiting this great city of yours. As one moves from the spacious, park-like areas of New Delhi with its new buildings, tree-lined avenues and grand vista from the India Gate, through the crowded markets of the old city, to the storeyed chambers of the Red Fort and the historic prospects from the Qutab Minar, including the antique and astonishing figure of the Iron Pillar, one experiences at first a kaleidoscopic sense of heterogeneity, of contrasts in time and space. Gradually the parts begin to fall into place as one forms an image of modern India that encompasses all of its present, intermingled with and enriched by all of its great past.

And similarly, when one thinks of administration, his mind wanders from the image of Rashtrapati Bhawan and the Central

*The lectures published in this volume were delivered at the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi on July 15, 16, and 20, 1959.
Secretariat to the pillared throne in Fatehpur Sikri and a village panchayat. Perhaps within India itself are to be found united all the varying patterns of administrative action that one comes across as one moves from America through the Philippines to Thailand. The significance of each pattern lies in its setting.

How do such differences in social, cultural, historical or architectural environment affect the way in which administration is conducted? And how, in turn, does administrative action affect the society in which it plays its part? These questions relate to the ecology of administration, the topic to which I propose to direct my remarks.

In a well-known lecture, Professor John Gaus of Harvard University stressed the importance of ecology in explaining administrative behaviour.† Unfortunately few students of the subject have followed Professor Gaus's advice, and we still lack an adequate theory of the inter-relations between administration and environment. To the extent that American specialists in administration have studied this subject, they have largely limited themselves to changes in the domestic scene, variations expressed in time and space, i.e. historically and geographically. Thus, we have some ideas about how the great depression and the world wars affected administration, and about the differences between, let us say, governmental practices in a northern and in a southern state.

These internal variations, however, do not explain how our system of administration is related to what is continuously and everywhere American, what remains constant between 1900 and 1950, and between East and West, North and South. To understand this pervasive element in the American ecology, of course, it is necessary to look at administration in a different environment, and the more striking the contrasts, the more sharply do the distinctive features of the characteristically American scene become etched. The situation is similar to that of the person who could not appreciate the fact that his daily speech was "prose" until, one day, he discovered "poetry".

The difficulty does not lie in unfamiliarity, for I suppose

everyone is familiar with the everyday facts of his own environment. Indeed, we know too much about the setting which is our everyday experience. The problem arises, rather, from the difficulty of sorting out the essential and necessary from the irrelevant and unimportant. Are we to attribute our administrative system to the peculiarities of the American temperament, our liking for "hot dogs" and baseball, our distinctive racial and religious mixtures, the climate and character of the landscape? How can we sort out the influential from the uninfluential; the more significant from the less significant?

Here is one source of our failure to develop a theory of administrative ecology. Moreover, so long as the audience to whom we addressed ourselves was almost exclusively our compatriots, they all understood and accepted what was, indeed, common knowledge, so that to describe the American setting appeared a dull and foolish labour. It is only lately when we find ourselves confronted with administrative problems in strange settings—strange, that is, to us but not to you to whom, of course, we may appear strange—that we have suddenly had to think about our own society in order to explain it to others.

And this very need to explain has also given us, inadvertently, the means needed to make the explanation, for in confronting other peoples, we have had to examine their systems of government and their social arrangements. Thereby the differences and the significant elements become more apparent. After all, if we share some characteristic with you, then we can scarcely attribute the differences between our administration and yours to this characteristic. To explain, therefore, we must look for ecological differences.

Moreover, by comparing societies we begin to discover whether any particular environmental feature is regularly accompanied by some administrative trait. In this way we can sort out from the hundreds or thousands of familiar and possibly significant elements in our American civilization those few which have important consequences for our administrative system.

I should add that a good deal of attention has been devoted to the relation between the general structure of our system of
government, and our organization for public administration. It is fairly apparent that governmental setting is one of the fundamental determinants of administrative behaviour, and I have no intention of belittling its importance. However, I think I may be excused from explaining the American constitutional structure, our separation of powers, federal system, political parties, etc. because these have already been well described and their relationship to administration is indicated in the standard text books on the subject.

I should rather, therefore, turn to other features of the American scene which also condition administration and, indeed, affect the political system as well. I shall also attempt to show how these characteristics of American—or even, more broadly, of Western society—have affected the way in which we have studied, written and taught about public administration. This discussion ought to prove instructive, not only in helping you to understand us, but also in giving you some clues about the possible relevance, or limitations, of our administrative theories and practices to your own situation.

In dealing with this subject, I have decided to focus attention on five aspects or elements in American life, namely, the economic, social, symbolic, communicative and political. No doubt other aspects equally deserve examination but I cannot deal with all relevant considerations in a single lecture, and these five should illustrate some of the more significant relationships. I beg you to bear in mind, also, that I am talking about a subject on which most Americans would have opinions, but concerning which little scholarly work has been done and certainly no generally accepted theory exists. Strangely enough the best writing on this topic has perhaps been by foreign observers, and few have surpassed Alexis de Tocqueville in his great work *Democracy in America*, published over a century ago.

*Economic Factors*

Perhaps the most obvious characteristic to impress even the most casual observer of American society is its economic productivity. Americans, on the average, produce and consume more
material goods than do any other people in the world today, or in any past time for that matter. I say this without pride or shame because it is simply a fact, and a fact that includes both good and bad aspects, by almost any standard of judgment that you may choose. My reason for mentioning it is simply its relevance to our system of administration, although this relevance has not often been pointed out.

No doubt there are some who think American productivity is due to "hard work", "Yankee ingenuity", "racial superiority", "morality", or some other trait of personality or character. In my opinion such explanations are too simple, and probably quite irrelevant. There are hard working and moral people whose level of productivity and consumption is not high, and if there are differences in average income by race in America, this can be explained by historical and social reasons. Moreover, there are plenty of individuals in each racial group who are as productive as those in the others.

If we are to explain the American economic system, we must think rather in terms of a particular kind of institutional arrangement which permits, indeed encourages, individuals to work in such a way as to increase productivity. This arrangement involves the use of "rational" criteria for the use of scarce resources so as to maximize the attainment of tangible goals which, in turn, are moderately well defined and ranked as to importance.

The institutional arrangement favoured in America for this purpose—while not the only one for maximizing output—is a price-making market system through which millions of individuals can make free choices in the allocation of means—i.e. to sell goods and services to the highest bidder; to buy what they wish at the most advantageous prices; to make profits or increase their income as a desirable goal. The primary criterion for utilization of available means has been, accordingly, the increase of wealth rather than, for example, the maintenance of social harmony, aesthetic delight, divine service, or some other norm.

This way of thinking about how to use resources is called "utilitarian" and "rational". No doubt it has many unfortunate consequences, but it also leads to a great increase in the
output of goods and services. As a concomitant it involves the treatment of many social values as though they were "commodities" which could be bought and sold in a market. Thus land, human labour, money, even time, come to be regarded as marketable in a society which, to an unprecedented degree, orients itself about the market as a central institution.

This marketization of American society has had both direct and indirect influences upon our system of administration. Let us consider first the direct influence.

Direct Influence on Administration

If labour is considered a commodity, then its "price" is the wage or salary to be paid for it. Not only the factory worker but the civil servant, not only the farm hand but the bureau chief, are to be regarded as selling their services for cash. Now, one of the economizing features of the market is that it measures the relative "value" of commodities in terms of price—items possessing the same value are supposed to sell for the same price. No doubt prices fluctuate, and the value of some commodities rise while others fall, but at any given time, the price for a given item is, ideally, homogeneous in a given market.

On this principle, the work of a bureaucrat is a commodity which he offers for sale. The amount paid, i.e. the "salary", is supposed to vary with the value of the labour. Hence the characteristic norm of personnel administration: "equal pay for equal work". Not, of course, that this norm is, or ever can be, fully realized. What we must understand is that this foundation stone of administration rests on a market orientation. Political, social, humanitarian, or other considerations are, in principle, ruled out. In practice, of course, they are not eliminated. Seniority counts, for example, and in the army or the university, a senior man receives more than his junior, even though he may be doing the same work. Nevertheless, the principle of equalizing the prices for bureaucratic labour is deeply ingrained in American personnel administration.

Consider another example: freedom of choice. In the market, one is ideally free to accept or reject any commodity offered for
sale. One may buy from one store today and from another tomorrow. No one is supposed to feel offended if a customer shifts his patronage to take advantage of the lowest prices, to buy the preferred goods.

The same outlook is transferred to personnel administration. An employee sells his services in exchange for the best offer. If he finds that he can better his position, he moves to another employer. If the employer, for his part, finds that he no longer needs the services of a man, or thinks that he is not getting full value for the wages paid, he may discharge the employee. Applied with ruthless thoroughness, such concepts can dehumanize work relationships, but the underlying principle, with some qualifications, is accepted in public administration. Each government agency, through examinations, seeks to find the best qualified person for each position, without regard to social, family, religious or racial background. The position is thought of, not as an attribute of the incumbent, as a status or right to which he may lay claim, but rather as a set of duties to be performed, as a “slot” in a machine which must be filled in order for the required output to be produced. Should an official fail to perform the needed work satisfactorily, he may be discharged, and if an agency’s budget is cut, members of the staff may be “laid off”.

Again, these principles are modified in practice. Concepts of loyalty to an agency, and principles of “tenure” or “security”, inhibit full marketization of the public service. An established member of the bureaucracy is normally given preference over an outsider in filling a position, if he is properly qualified. The concept of a “career service” carries overtones of protectionism as well as professionalism. Nevertheless, the principles of the open market shape employment in the public service according to the principle, “the best man for the job”.

Another fundamental pillar of the market as an institution is the right of contract. According to this right, everyone is free to enter into contracts with others to provide or purchase specified goods and services, in accordance with conditions agreed upon by the parties. Such contracts may be enforced in law, and contain provisions for their termination or expiration.
The contract principle is, accordingly, extended to the relationship between employers and employees, including the government and its servants. Both the bureaucrat and the employing agency consider the relationship to be specific in scope, governed by the terms of a contract, with provision for termination of the relationship should either partner become dissatisfied.

We recognize exceptions to this principle, of course, as in conscription for military service, especially during war-time, but as a model it pervades the bureaucracy. Note that the contract may specify loyalty to the goals and value-system of an employing agency so long as the relationship persists, but Americans are conditioned to transfer their loyalties to a new bureau or employer whenever a change in employment status is made. Just as a salesman who appears fanatically dedicated to the virtues of the Ford car may suddenly adhere to the superiority of the Chevrolet on re-employment, so a government official switches his allegiance from one bureau to another, or from a public agency to a private firm, and back again, even where their objectives appear to be in conflict with each other.

So natural does this apparently mechanical transfer of loyalty appear to Americans that they can scarcely conceive of a different system, yet it is probably true that in most societies group allegiance is considered a permanent trait. A man who would transfer it from one organization to its rival must be faithless and unscrupulous. Yet such facile transference of loyalty is not only a necessary condition for the American market system, but an essential characteristic of our administrative structure.

Market principles apply also to financial administration as much as to personnel, though with serious modifications. Taxation, for example, is related to the cost of services provided. Thus tax payments may be considered the price paid for governmental outputs. Sometimes the rates are directly related to services, as in water rates, or a gasoline (petrol) tax which is used for road construction, and varies with the rate-payers use of the roads. The preferred principle of taxation, however, is “ability to pay”, as measured by income or property. Here a
concept of social justice or equity, rather than the market, prevails. Whereas land rent, for example, may rise in proportion to the productivity and corresponding demand for the land, even to the level of ruin for the cultivator, land taxes cannot rise beyond the level of consent without risk to political and social order. Nevertheless, tax rates can be computed only on the basis of “assessments” which, in turn, rest on market determination of land values. The most characteristic American tax, based on personal income, is collected as a deduction from wages. Obviously such a tax structure depends on the extensive marketization of society, and the “sale” of labour services.

In budgeting, the market system is beginning to make a strong impact in the form of “performance” budgeting. Here the unit cost of “output” for each agency is calculated, and estimates are based thereon. Thus the allocation to a university might rest on its enrolment multiplied by the cost per student; a hospital’s estimate would be framed in terms of cost per bed.

All aspects of public administration are similarly pervaded by a market orientation. Planning, communications, public relations, management, line and staff organization: in each instance the administrative bureau is viewed as a kind of “market” in which the participants seek to maximize the attainment of specified goals—the implementation of public policy—with the most “efficient” use of scarce available means. In general, then, the administrative bureau is a counterpart of the formal economic market. Both are utilitarian, rational, maximizing institutions for making choices in a situation where means are scarce.

To say this is not, of course, to say that in practice American public administration always corresponds to this self-image. I say only that the American market society seeks to apply in the administrative sphere the same basic values that apply in the market. Moreover, despite the incomplete actualization of this model, the practice is sufficiently close to the norm for it to be useful as a guide to action.

This helps account for the vague line in American writings on public administration between statements of what ought to be and of what is. The so-called “principles” of public adminis-
tration are often ambiguous in that they seem simultaneously to assert a practice and a goal. In stating the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, for example, one may be either trying to describe what has been, in part at least, approximated in practice, or setting forth an ideal goal to be striven for.

While this confusion between what is and what ought to be has some disturbing consequences in the study of American administration, it is obviously even more confusing when applied to situations in which the reality deviates even more strikingly from the formal, rational model of administrative behaviour. To this I shall return later in speaking of Thai and Philippine public administration.

**Indirect Influence on Administration**

Meanwhile, I wish to speak about the indirect relationship between market and administration in America. Although the market is sometimes spoken of as “self-regulating”, it is apparent, on reflection, that the market can persist only on condition that innumerable controls and facilities are provided from outside the market. Consider the enforcement of contracts, the fundamental nexus of market behaviour. Suppose one party to a contract has misrepresented the item offered for sale, or a party fails to fulfil obligations undertaken, what recourse has the offended party? If it is only direct action, the market would quickly become a battle-ground. Thus the market requires a “market-master”. No doubt in a traditional or peasant market, an elder of the community can perform this function. But as the market becomes more complex and integrated, reaching over vast areas of space, and involving obligations which extend for long periods of time, the tasks of policing the market become extremely complex and difficult. Participants in the national market often do not see each other, and their activities involve innumerable intermediaries, whether one thinks of mail orders, the use of bank cheques, purchases of shares in corporations, establishment of foundations, enrolment in a university, admission to a hospital, taking an airplane ride, or buying a theatre ticket.
How many regulations and services are necessary to make such a system workable! We might speak of the establishment of weights and measures, securities and exchange regulations, fixing of rates for public utilities, licensing of merchants, automobiles, radio stations—the list would be so long that to mention but a few examples seems quite unrepresentative.

Perhaps a rather human example better illustrates what I have in mind. A student from Southeast Asia once completed his training at an American agricultural college, but felt that something remained unfinished in his education. He asked, therefore, to spend several months in the home of a “typical” American farmer so that he might observe how techniques he had learnt in the classroom could be put into practice. Despite some doubts about his proposal, it was eventually arranged that he should stay with a Vermont farmer in a remote valley.

Upon the termination of his residence, he was asked if he had learned anything useful that had not been taught him in his academic programme. He replied that he had learned many such things. For example, no one had thought to teach him about the existence of “Rural Free Delivery”, by means of which the Post Office daily brings mail, newspapers, and order catalogues to the farmer’s home. By mail and cheque the farmer can order and have delivered to his door new seeds, fertilizer, equipment, technical information. Moreover, he can make such purchases in this way only because he has received an education at the public school, because roads have been built near his farm, because government inspection prevents fraudulent persons from victimizing him through the mails, because an agricultural extension agent is available to explain new techniques of cultivation or soil conservation.

The whole pattern of highly productive agriculture in America can be attained only because a multitude of regulations and services are enforced and furnished by government. The growth of public administration, in other words, is one of the requisites for the expansion of a market system and heightened productivity. The content of American public administration is, in large part, determined by the economic needs of its market society.
Moreover, administrative institutions are shaped by these requirements. It is apparent that government cannot conduct schools, build roads, regulate the use of mails, provide extension services, etc. without using the services of a host of individuals with special training and qualifications. The administrative system would quickly collapse if it were unable to find and use the services of such persons; in other words, if a high standard of technical proficiency were not made the basis of recruitment to the public service.

Equally important, these public servants must be paid at rates commensurate with those of the market. This means that government must have a large treasury. It cannot rely on rich men who volunteer their services, nor on officials whose income depends on fees and other direct payments from their "clientele", for men so employed could not be supervised closely enough and directed to perform the complex and difficult tasks required in an industrialized society.

By tracing this chain of related requirements, we see that the American market system and its high levels of productivity would not be possible without the payment of substantial sums of money into the public treasury, and without the training of a large number of persons possessing numerous skills and a great deal of knowledge. Since our economic system also produces much wealth, it enables us to finance a gigantic public budget, and to provide an army of highly trained technical and professional public servants.

The interdependence between a marketized, industrial society in America, and the system of public administration should, therefore, become apparent. The economy could not survive without the administrative system, and the system is itself determined in many respects by the requirements of the economy. Moreover, the administrative system could not survive were it not for the productivity of the economy supporting it.

These relationships are possibly taken for granted by many Americans so that, as already noted, they scarcely appear in text books on public administration. It is only when we look at countries which are too poor to support adequate administrative services that we see the connection between this simple
fact and the difficulty the country experiences in raising its level of economic production.

I do not want to imply that a high level of productivity can be achieved only through a free market system. The example of the Soviet Union clearly shows that, through a state owned and operated economy, great increases in national production can be achieved. However, the cost of administration under a state enterprise system is by no means less than under a market economy. The state managers who run factories need to be controlled just as much as private owners need to be regulated. If anything, the administrative costs of public enterprise, in addition to the costs of production and distribution, are probably greater than in a market-oriented society, but I lack the time to present evidence in support of this view. In any case, it is not crucial to my general argument since, I am sure, you will agree that the managed economy needs roads, schools, mail services, banking facilities, fire inspectors and safety regulations just as much as a market economy.

Moreover, the concepts of rationality and efficiency of "cost accounting" and technical skills, are just as important for the conduct of an administrative bureau in a regimented industrial state as in a liberal one, if it wants to sustain a high level of productivity. We conclude that the state and public administration provide alternative means to the market for making choices among scarce means in an industrially developed society. Although America relies heavily on the market as its primary institution for the allocation of goods and services, it could not dispense with a heavy investment in public administration as a necessary and important counterpart and supplement to the market. The Soviet Union, while relying primarily on administrative institutions for its allocation of scarce resources, also makes very substantial use of market mechanisms, though admittedly in a secondary capacity.

What must be generally true of any industrially developed society, then, is reliance upon a utilitarian and rational institution for the support of its economy. Both the market and the bureau are essential structures of an industrial society. I offer the conclusion, therefore, that it is not so much the market
per se, but industrialization which makes the establishment of a rational, achievement-oriented system of public administration both possible and indispensable.

Social Factors

In order to understand any society we must also learn something about its social structure. By this I mean such things as how groups form, whether we talk about families, religious sects, political parties, business corporations, or social classes. Such matters also affect the system of public administration. In particular, we shall obtain a clearer image of American administration if we understand the place of associations and the nature of class structure in the United States.

From the time of Alexis de Tocqueville visitors to America have been impressed by the way its citizens form all kinds of voluntary associations, clubs, societies, and leagues for the furtherance of shared objectives. Perhaps the fragmentation of old family and local connections in the European homeland, following immigration to the "New World", was in part responsible. Whatever the reasons, the fact of associational life is what I wish to emphasize here.

Association as a Way of Life

To illustrate, I belong, together with others in my field of interest, to the American Society for Public Administration, as well as to the American Political Science Association. Most political scientists in the US think it both desirable and necessary to join the Association, to read its Review, and to participate in its regional or national meetings. Doctors belong to the larger and more influential American Medical Association; lawyers to the American Bar Association; personnel administrators to the Civil Service Assembly. A full list of American professional groups would fill a book.

But professional societies are merely one type of association. Workers form trade unions; co-religionists band together in denominations or "churches"; sports enthusiasts join each other
to promote tennis, horse racing, or baseball; the politically minded create parties; college alumni and war veterans have their leagues; and business men get together to advance their commercial and industrial interests.

With all their diversity, these associations have several characteristics in common. First of all, each association has a fairly specific function or set of objectives. It may be to develop a profession, to enjoy a sport, to make money, to worship together, to improve public morality or change a law—but we will rarely find associations that combine all these objectives. Indeed, this is a criterion for an "association" as distinct from other kinds of organization; its "functional specificity".

If an association is formed to promote a particular objective, its leaders normally want to obtain as much support as possible, so they welcome into membership anyone who shares its aims, or meets the appropriate standards relevant to its goals. Thus in principle, any political scientist may join the APSA, any worker may join the union appropriate to his trade, and any citizen may join the political party of his choice. If we extend the meaning of the word "recruitment" to cover the means of admission to any group, and "universalistic" to refer to a norm or standard which applies equally to everyone who satisfies a given definition or requirement, then associations typically recruit members universalistically. Indeed, this becomes another defining characteristic of associations.

If membership is based on a specified objective or qualification, then one who ceases to share the goal, or loses the qualification, would also give up, or be deprived of, membership in the group. Hence an association also provides for the resignation or expulsion of members.

Associational membership is also basically "contractual", members entering into a contract with each other, or with the representatives of the group, under which specified rights and privileges are acquired in exchange for agreement by the member to perform certain duties, such as to pay dues, attend meetings, live up to given standards of conduct, promote a cause, etc. The contract usually runs for a limited period of time, or contains provisions for its abrogation. We see here the close connection
between the various associations and the market orientation.

Associations can be contrasted with groups, like the family, which are quite non-associational. The goals of a family are "diffuse", which is to say they may include economic, political, educational, religious, recreational, and many other purposes or activities. Membership in the family is highly "particularistic", which means that only a few persons, chiefly those born into it, belong, and one can scarcely "resign" or be "expelled". The relationship is not based on contract, but rather on "status".

No doubt both families and associations can be found everywhere. Obviously there are families in the United States, as well as associations. The point I wish to make is that associations play a dominant role in American life, especially in government and the economy, in contrast to the less important role played by families as political, administrative or economic units. In contrast, there are many societies in which families play a dominant role in these respects, while associations are weak or almost non-existent.

The typical association may be thought of as having two parts. One part consists of the "membership", this is the part we have been thinking of so far. But there is also another part. In order to carry out the work of an association, it may be necessary to employ someone to serve as a staff, to be the "agent" of the organization. A small group, like a debating club, may simply elect one of its members to be the "secretary-treasurer" or, as you say, "honorary secretary". But in a large group, like the American Medical Association, a considerable staff may be employed.

When such a staff is enlarged, we think of it as a "bureaucracy". Of course, you would probably not call a staff of one or two persons a "bureaucracy". Let us simply say that every association must have an agent or "agency", which, when sufficiently large and professionalized, can be called a bureaucracy. Then every association is composed of a membership and an agency, the agency often becoming a bureaucracy.

The relative size of the membership and agency can vary considerably, but it will help us to understand organizational behaviour in America if we keep this simple distinction in mind.
When we start looking for associations with large bureaucracies, we think immediately of the business corporation. The "members" here are the "share-holders" who band together to pool capital in order to go into business. They elect a "board of directors" which, on behalf of the members, appoints managers and a large staff to use the capital for productive purposes. Hence the employees of a corporation, including especially its "managers", may be thought of as the "bureaucracy" of an "association". They are, at least in theory, responsible to the "membership" to use the capital so as to maximize returns on investment in the form of dividends to the share-holders. This, then, provides the specific goal toward which the company's employees are expected to direct their efforts.

The family business, of course, may participate in markets as well as impersonal corporations, and many still do so in the United States. Family-oriented markets are more numerous in the world than associational. The important fact for understanding America is that there the corporation, i.e. an association, has become the dominant pattern of organization for participation in the market.

We can see, therefore, why the association as a social structure is integrally related to market institutions as they have developed in America. Moreover, the relationship to administration now becomes apparent. The corporation bureaucracy is under the same kind of obligation to manage limited resources to achieve specified goals that the public bureaucracy is under. Of course, the goals of the corporation may be thought of as being set by the market, whereas those of the bureau are set by the political system, but internally the criteria of "rationality", "utilitarianism", and "efficiency" are equally applicable.

The principles of administration are, in private or business administration, directly derivable from the pattern of associational organization, as well as from the market. The same principles apply also to public administration. Recognition of this is shown by the fact that in some American universities, "business administration" and "public administration" are taught in the same school.

Indeed, we may think of the nation as a whole as a single
association, and the government service as its bureaucracy. The basis of governmental association is also a "contract", formulated in a constitution which sets forth the joint aims of all members. Admission to membership is likewise, in principle, universalistic, insofar as anyone who agrees with these goals and meets specified requirements may become a "naturalized citizen", and is normally free, also, to surrender his citizenship if he chooses to transfer to another country.

In contrast many traditional societies, under monarchical rule, regarded the people as "subjects" rather than "citizens", admitted to membership only those born to the right and denied the possibility of surrendering it. The formal principles of association, therefore, although not applying in many countries, do apply to the United States and citizenship therein. Hence the governmental bureaucracy bears to the population the same formal relationship that a corporation bureaucracy bears to its stockholders.

This parallelism in the way that Americans think of their government, business corporations and professional societies is not surprising. After all, once a given set of values becomes deeply instituted in a society, matters can scarcely be organized according to a different set of values.

**Associational Character of Public Administration**

It should not be hard to see how the associational pattern affects public administration, just as it affects business administration. In each case the bureaucracy is considered the agent of the membership, its performance is measured by its ability to satisfy the limited objectives specified in the contract for associational membership, as elaborated by its governing board or legislative body. Bureaucrats are recruited on the understanding that they will promote these objectives and be discharged for failure to do so, just as members themselves join and leave the association according to their degree of participation in its goals and standards. The public bureaucracy spends the taxes of the citizen-member, just as the corporation bureaucracy spends the capital of its share-holding member, and the
professional society or trade union bureaucracy spends the dues of its members. Political responsibility of the state to the citizen becomes a special case of the agent's responsibility to his association's membership.

Further parallels between the model of administrative and associational behaviour could be mentioned, but I think enough has been said to show that the structure of associational logic has been transferred to public administration just as has the market model. But we cannot leave the subject of associations without also tracing another, and perhaps even more important, link between association and administration in America, namely, their practical impact on each other.

It is characteristic of associations that they may be enlarged to gigantic size. In contrast the family, however large it may grow, could scarcely include millions of citizens in a nation. When an association becomes large, it can interpret to the government the interests or aims of a great many persons who share common objectives. The AMA, for example, can speak on behalf of all American doctors and thereby give the medical interest a voice which it could never have if the doctors lacked such an association, and could speak only through the thousands of families to which they belonged, or only as individuals. In other words, associations make it possible to "aggregate" interests, and to "articulate" them to find out what wants or demands are shared by a large number of people, and then to give effective public expression to these demands.

The association, then, becomes a vehicle through which many kinds of specific interests are mediated from the citizen to the government. Public administration is, in a large measure, divided into specialized agencies and units charged with duties corresponding to the interests of one or more associations. Hence associations enter into close relationships with their corresponding bureaucratic units. Indeed, the units often owe their very existence to private associations which were instrumental, through political processes, in securing the adoption of laws and budgets establishing the units. Furthermore, in carrying out the law, government units are often in daily communication with these associations.
It is convenient to think of the citizens whose behaviour is most directly affected—served or regulated—by a government agency as its "clientele". Associations formed among an agency's clientele, then, often constitute the source of influence or power which directly or indirectly controls—rewards and punishes—the agency. Bureaucrats who faithfully execute a law and provide the satisfactions desired by a well organized and powerful association, can expect to be suitably rewarded, through proper channels. For example, their budgets may be increased, they may receive honour, recognition, and promotion, and desired amendments or new legislation may be obtained. The ways in which associations directly affect the administration of government in the United States has become the subject of a considerable literature, and I need not, therefore, dwell further on it.²

Administrative Use of Associations

However, another aspect of the relations between administration and associations has received less attention. From the viewpoint of any agency, a major problem is how to secure the cooperation of the public which is necessary if its stated objectives are to be accomplished. However severe the sanctions for violation of a regulation, an enforcement agency will fail unless the majority of its clientele can be induced to conform to the regulation without the need to impose the sanction. If a service is to be offered, the agency cannot succeed unless its clientele finds the service acceptable.

Consequently government agencies often find it convenient, and even necessary, to rely upon associations to which their clientele belongs to assist them in carrying out their programmes. The Public Health Service, for example, may call upon the AMA, upon associations of nurses, hospital administrators, and pharmacists to assist it in a campaign to inoculate the public

²A convenient introduction to this literature is provided by the September 1958 issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science devoted to "Unofficial Government: Pressure Groups and Lobbies".
against polio, to educate the people, or eradicate hookworm. The Department of Labour may similarly rely upon trade unions for assistance, and the Department of Commerce looks to chambers of commerce and trade associations for help.

Naturally the process of being influenced and of influencing are inter-related. An agency which responds faithfully to the demands of an association can expect that association, in turn, to help carry out a programme which, in any event, is in accord with its own declared aims. Thus the inoculation campaign which the Health Service calls upon the AMA to help carry out may be one which was, in the first instance, proposed by the organized doctors.

The character of public administration in America, then, can only be understood if one views it, to a considerable degree, as a link in a chain of organized interests which flow from thousands and millions of individuals through hundreds of associations to bureaucrats organized in hundreds of agencies, and then back again from the agencies through the association leadership to the “rank and file” memberships.

This characterization should not lead one to imagine that the American bureaucracy is nothing but the passive instrument of organized interest groups. First of all, it should be remembered that in any given field there may be competing associations, even groups with incompatible and mutually hostile interests. Those who deal with labour-management problems will be under contradictory pressures from organized labour and organized management. Those concerned with tariff rates are subject to cross-fires from manufacturers demanding protection and importers demanding lower duties. Hence the public official—and, of course, the legislator and judge—also often serves as mediator or umpire in controversies between rival groups.

More than that, the bureaucrat is often guided by his opinion of the “public interest”, whether that be a just assessment of how administration will affect the general welfare, or merely a rationalization for his purely personal convenience or prejudice. In any event, the public servant often enough contributes an independent ingredient to the decision-making process in government, so that he cannot be regarded as a mere puppet of the
associations. But neither can we afford to ignore the all-pervasive framework of associations as a fundamental factor in shaping the administrative pattern.

The consequences of the linkage with associations are of the utmost importance. On the one hand, a system of insistent pressures keeps the administrator alert and responsive, providing him with information and making him ever conscious of the clientele audience which stands ready to condemn or reward. Conversely, associations provide the administrator with a weapon of incalculable power to assist him in the implementation of government programmes. Without them, he would often stand helpless, whereas with them, he can often, through a telephone call or a letter, mobilize thousands or millions for "voluntary" participation in carrying out a government programme. Thus the associational pattern, while fundamentally shaping the conduct of administration, serves also to multiply its effectiveness.

In closing this discussion of associations, let us refer briefly to the Soviet Union. Under the rule of a monolithic Party, it might appear that associations have no role to play. The true situation is quite the contrary. Although there may not be as many associations in Russia as in America, many of them are more gigantic in size. Their primary function is different, however. Whereas American associations sprang up largely in response to the demands of their members, the Russian associations have been created to meet the needs of the state for "transmission belts"—to use Stalin's apt phrase—for carrying the demands of the Party and the Government to the people. The Soviet experience, then, helps to emphasize the dual character of associational relations with government—influence may be transmitted in either, or both, directions. And, indeed, one cannot believe that the Russian associations channel influence only in one direction. There must be, however limited in scale, some return flow, some sensitivity of government leaders to the fact that their wishes will be better met if they, in their turn, respond somewhat to the aspirations which, however faintly, they perceive through the channels created by the associations.

In short, the associational pattern in America is distinctive in that it provides especially powerful means for the aggrega-
tion and articulation of specialized interests, and hence a mechanism which tends to keep the bureaucracy responsive to clientele demands. But in a larger sense, the associational pattern is necessary for any developed industrial society, whether free or regimented, since it provides a way to secure responsiveness of government to the needs of specialized populations, as well as a way to assure clientele conformity with programmes of the government designed to sustain the social and economic processes of an industrial economy.

The Class Structure

Whereas groups involve relatively well structured interaction patterns, social class is a more amorphous category. We may think of a class as any aggregate of individuals in a society who share some characteristics regarded by other members of the society as of considerable significance, such as prestige, wealth, power, education, skill, etc. Because of a tendency for highly valued characteristics to "agglomerate", that is for individuals who are powerful to enjoy wealth, prestige, and education also, we cluster at the top of a social class scale those who are most fortunate in their possession of all these characteristics, and at the bottom of the scale those who are least fortunate, others being graded at intermediate points in between. Some such class system is probably universal, or nearly universal, in all societies. I wish to distinguish two variables which may be used to differentiate various class systems from each other. The first variable is the degree of mobility between classes, and the second the degree of separation between the criteria of class standing. A third variable, the degree of access of individuals in one class to persons in other classes, could be added, as well as several other variables, but we shall content ourselves in this discussion with the first two.

If it is virtually impossible for anyone to change his class position, i.e. if he must remain throughout his life in the class in which he happened to be born, we may say the class structure is "closed". The traditional caste system, for example, can be considered a closed class structure. On the other hand, if it is
easy and usual for a person to move up and down in class status, the system may be called "open". Probably no real class system is ever completely closed or completely open, and all possible degrees of openness or closure between the hypothetical extremes might be encountered. Let us call the degree openness of a class system its "mobility". The more open a system, the more mobile; the more closed a system, the more immobile.

Now we can say that the class system in the United States is relatively open or mobile, although, of course, it is not completely so, and certainly some obstacles are placed in the path of individuals seeking to climb the social class ladder, the obstacles being greater for certain racial and religious minorities than for others. We must distinguish also between the ideal image, or what Americans in general think ought to be the case, from the actual practice, the ideal image being more open than the actual practice. Nevertheless, with all of these qualifications, the class structure is relatively open, and certainly far from being closed.

Public administration is affected by the way in which the bureaucracy fits into the class system. Sometimes the bureaucracy is considered a class by itself, especially if the class structure is relatively closed. A feudal aristocracy as a ruling group, for example, both performs administrative functions and constitutes itself the leading class. Often the bureaucracy is segmented into a number of ranks, the top bureaucratic levels, the "officers", being identified with upper class strata, while lower bureaucratic levels, the ordinary functionaries, clerks, or employees, are classed with middle and lower class strata.

A basic characteristic of the bureaucracy in the United States is that it forms part of the open class system of American society. Thus the bureaucracy can scarcely be thought of as having any definite class position as a whole, nor can it be neatly divided into segments, each having a specific class position. Rather, one must think of bureaucrats as an aggregate of individuals, many of whom are highly mobile, whose class standing parallels the class system as a whole but does not correspond with any particular class.
As a result, when civil servants deal with the public, one cannot predict that an official will typically have a higher class position, or a lower one, than the non-official with whom he deals. All possible similarities and differences in class standing would be quite usual. Moreover, positions at the top of the bureaucracy are intentionally held open to potential entry by anyone with sufficient ability and energy, no matter how low on the official ladder may have been his starting position. Thus there is no system for recruiting favoured "administrative officers" who are automatically destined to hold top positions by the end of their careers. Of course, in practice, the man who enters with a university education and strong professional qualifications has an advantage over the man lacking such preparation, but the person who enters without this advantage may, if he has the "drive", complete his formal education by taking "extension" courses, and by practical experience also, thus catching up with and even overtaking a rival who entered on a higher rung of the ladder. Perhaps the most that can be said of generalization about the bureaucratic ladder as compared with the general class system is that those who stand lowest on it are not quite so low as the lowest social strata, and those who stand highest on it do not quite attain the highest positions in the general social system.

If the open class system helps to explain the pattern of recruitment and promotion within the bureaucracy, public administration also helps to maintain a mobile class structure. First of all, opportunities for promotion within the bureaucracy provide an important channel for class mobility. An able and ambitious man of humble origins may substantially improve his social position through public service. The use of lateral "entry" and separation from government service reinforces social mobility. By this I mean that it is possible for a private citizen to enter government service at any stage in his career by competing for a given post with candidates already inside the service. Moreover, an official who thinks he can better his social status by leaving the service for private employment, is free to do so. Naturally, some restrictions are laid upon this freedom of lateral movement, but the possibility is always present, and creates
further opportunities for mobile individuals to use the bureaucracy as a means of rising in class standing.

In a broader sense, the programmes carried out by government also reinforce an open class system. The maintenance of a competitive market system, requirements for the registration of corporations and voluntary associations, the provision of public schooling and attempts to eliminate segregation, programmes to promote non-discriminatory practices in private employment, etc. may be viewed as measures which, at least incidentally, help to keep open the channels for social mobility. We would have to look closely to find any government programmes which deliberately set out to maintain or perpetuate a closed class system, with, perhaps, some important regional exceptions, as in our South, where local governments, through segregation practices, are fighting a rear-guard action against the national trend towards de-segregation.

There is also another sense in which an open class system affects American administration, namely its contribution to “universalistic” recruitment practices. In an industrial society, where the kind of work performed by government is highly complex and technical, many persons exactly suited to their positions by temperament and training are required. If admission to such position, were restricted by social standing, it might be impossible to find candidates with suitable qualifications. The difficulty would be even greater if we bear in mind that many, if not most, well trained persons think of careers outside the government as perhaps more desirable than public employment. Hence proper staffing of the bureaucracy requires that the doors be opened to every possible candidate who possesses the necessary training and experience.

At the same time, the example of public administration and, to some extent, the regulations and examination standards set by government, result in the spread of objective testing methods to all the professions and to employment in the business corporations. Universalistic recruitment methods in government, then, reflect the existence of an open class system in American society, and this characteristic of public administration reinforces universalistic recruitment in non-public employment, and
hence helps to maintain or strengthen mobility in the general class structure.

Separation of Class Values

The second variable affecting class structure to which I have referred is the degree of separation between the criteria which establish class standing. This variable has received relatively little attention in our literature but has, I think, the most profound significance. We have spoken so far as though to have high class standing meant always to be at the same time powerful, rich, prestigious, well educated, much loved, etc. Let us, however, imagine a situation in which some people are wealthy but not powerful, some powerful but not wealthy, and again others command great respect but lack both power and wealth. In order to deal with such a situation, we have to use some novel expressions, since our commonsense language has not clearly anticipated this possibility. If one enjoys great power, but does not necessarily have the other advantages, we may say he belongs to the “elite”. Those who enjoy much prestige are the “select”, much wealth, the “wealthy”, and much learning, the “informed”.

The various things, such as power, wealth, prestige, etc. which are valued are sometimes called “values”. However, since this word has other important uses, I shall call the valued attributes, “weal”. Although the word is used mainly in the expression “weal and woe”, the Oxford Dictionary defines it as “welfare, wellbeing, happiness, prosperity”. The degree to which one has weal is his value position, the word “value” being used to measure differences of degree, as on a scale. Just as we measure degrees of temperature, so we may measure values of weal.

---

3 This terminology is taken from Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950), p. 72. Other terms used by Lasswell and Kaplan are the “righteous”, “popular”, “fit”, and “able” for those, respectively, with much “rectitude”, “popularity”, “well-being”, and “skill”.

However, I think it is unnecessary for us to use these terms in the present discussion.
We have defined the "elite" as those with most power in a society, whether or not they have a high value position for other types of weal. I wish now to distinguish a situation in which the elite also have other kinds of weal (agglutinated) from one in which the elite have power only, and other forms of weal are possessed to a greater degree by different groups (separated). When all forms of weal are monopolized by the elite, they may be called the "elect". The elect is, then, identical with the "upper class".

However, when forms of weal are separated, the elite (power-holders) may be called the "rulers", and those with other forms of weal, the "eminent". The eminent, of course, might be further sub-divided into the select, the wealthy, the informed, etc. Here the upper class is segmented into the rulers and the eminent. It cannot be considered a single class or strata, but must be regarded as a set of upper class groupings.

It is probably true that in most societies throughout history weal has been monopolized by an elect, although no doubt variations occur in the kind of weal which is most decisive in attaining elect status—wealth, power, valour, etc. So much has this been true that we still think of single "upper class", or "aristocracy" as typical for any society's class structure.

It is possible, however, for weal to be distributed between rulers (power) and the eminent (other forms of weal). At least, I believe, such is the situation, to a very considerable extent, in the United States, and also in some other Western societies. Of course, this is not to say that separation is absolute, since the rulers certainly share in the other kinds of weal—wealth, prestige, and learning—but not to the same extent as the eminent. The eminent, also, share in the possession of power, but not to the same extent as the rulers. If this statement about the American class structure can be substantiated, I think it has great importance in helping to account for administrative behaviour.

The separation of the upper class into distinct ruling and eminent groups means, of course, that fairly early in life each individual who aspires to rise must choose between the various kinds of weal available to him. If he chooses wealth, he will
specialize in business; if power, he will enter politics; if learning, he will take up an academic career; if prestige and popularity, he might choose acting or sports; if "rectitude", he could become a clergyman. This does not mean that it is impossible to transfer from one type of weal to another. A business man may, later in life, switch to politics; a clergyman to acting, etc. but the risks of failure are considerable, and much sacrifice of "eminence" may be necessary in order to become a "ruler".

The structure of public administration is patterned after this separation of "upper class" segments. The different branches of government tend to be organized not only around programme objectives, but they are also heavily oriented to professional and technical specialities. A public health programme, for example, will generally give preferred positions to doctors; public works to engineers; education to teachers and scholars. This method of arranging matters seems so natural and unavoidable to Americans that they are likely to say, "But how else could administration be organized?" Yet probably other ways are more usual, even in the Western world, and certainly outside the West. One "other way", of course, is to give top positions in the bureaucracy to an "administrative" or "generalist" elite, an officer corps.

Preparation for such "elect" positions, of course, does not involve the study of public administration as a process or technique, but rather the inculcation of basic values and skills—the classics, languages, horsemanship and duelling, etc. depending on the cultural setting—which qualify one for "upper class" status. Normally, also, only sons of upper class families could take such training. The ruling element in the bureaucracy, the "officers", are supposed, then, to be the "superior men", the "gentlemen", the "natural aristocracy". The technicians and professional types, while important in the public service, would serve under the direction of their "superiors", who would not only have the power, but they would also excel in prestige, wealth, learning, the various other types of weal.

In the American orientation to a segmented upper class, it is considered unjust for any single group to monopolize these values. Hence the top positions in the bureaucracy ought to go
not only to men who had worked their way up through the ranks—i.e. an “open” class system—but should also be awarded on the basis of competence in each of the separated or specialized fields of work.

Every field of specialization, accordingly, has its own set of honours to give. This has contributed to a fantastic proliferation of specialized fields. Consider the academic field, as an example, where the “informed”, the scholars, constitute one branch of the “eminent”. The honours sought, however, are not primarily recognition as a “scholar” in general, but rather, to become acknowledged as a leading physicist, chemist, sociologist, psychologist, political scientist, etc. Each discipline has its own ladder of advancement, and accords its own rewards. To attain eminence as a geologist, for example, is to be well known and much honoured within a limited circle, but perhaps to be completely unknown outside that circle.

In the same manner, each branch of the public service establishes its own ladder of recognition, its own path to the summit. As often as not, the specialized bureaucratic ladder is aligned more closely with a non-bureaucratic ladder than it is with other bureaucratic ladders. Professors in public universities, for example, participate in the same professional societies, and compare their achievements with scholars in private colleges rather than with fellow bureaucrats—indeed, they would feel offended even to be classified as “bureaucrats”. Similarly doctors in public hospitals and government health agencies identify themselves with private practitioners rather than with other officials. With important exceptions, the same principle applies wherever one moves through the public services.

The ruling element is, then, not provided by any group within the bureaucracy itself, but specifically by non-bureaucratic “rulers” whose road to power lies outside the “career services”, namely the politicians. These men compete for public office through election, and through patronage appointment as “political officials” based on loyalty to, and support of those who win elections. Thus the power holders, as a special class segment, acquire rulership through the representative process, rather than through “recruitment by examination”. The structure of public
administration here again mirrors the separation of ruling class segments just as it also mirrors open class stratification, the market system, and the associational pattern.

Implications of the Theory of Public Administration

It is worth noting that the teaching of public administration in this context takes on a different function and meaning from what it might in a bureaucracy with an "elect" officer or administrative class. In America, administrative learning can be justified only if it can be regarded as a "technique" or "profession" in the same sense as engineering, medicine, or the law. It should be something which qualifies one for admission on examination to a low position in the hierarchy, with the prospects of rising "in the field" to the top, on the basis of equal opportunity with those in other "fields", the lawyers, doctors, and engineers.

According to this view, although the specialist in administration should have an equal opportunity with other kinds of specialists to reach the top of the ladder, he should not have a preferred position. How different this is from the more widespread, traditional viewpoint in which the "officer" is the administrative generalist ruling, as a matter of course, over the technical and clerical services!

The implications of this view for the content of study and instruction are, of course, profound. When the administrator is the ruler (elect) then his training must be based primarily on the inculcation of the values which qualify him to make decisions affecting the public welfare and, incidentally, also qualify him for membership in the upper class. If, on the other hand, the administrator is a technical specialist, then what he must learn is not to make but to implement decisions; not to rule, but to carry out efficiently policies made by others, i.e. the politicians. Hence the subject of "public administration" comes to be the "POSDCORB" complex, planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting.

Broadly interpreted, these functions might include policy making, as in practice they often do. But in principle, these
are the implementing and executing functions. They have come
to be established largely as the "staff" and "auxiliary" services
intended to assist the executive and the operating "line" units
which, characteristically, are composed of professional and tech-
nical specialists in other fields. This may help to explain the
stress on the technical, professional, and instrumental in our
writings on public administration, and why the normative or
value content relates to the administrative goals of efficiency
and rationality, rather than to social goals of public policy.

There has, however, developed an interesting division in the
evolution of administrative training between the content of
academic and "pre-entry" education for a "professional" career,
and the content of advanced, post-entry, or "executive develop-
ment" training. In the latter, stress is laid on problems of
decision-making and value judgment involving broad social
issues.

But the recipients are here quite a different class. These are
the men of all professions, the engineers, doctors, lawyers,
agronomists, foresters, etc. who have already made their way
up to positions near the top. They will, therefore, soon be, de
facto, helping to make policy. But they will remain in the
bureaucracy, and hence their roles must still be defined as
"administrative", not "executive" or political. Note that in
the American setting "executive" refers to the function of our
President, the "Chief Executive", rather than to the imple-
menting role as performed by the British "Executive Class". Much
of what the British Administrative Class does is a func-
tion of the political official in America, and our idea of "admin-
istration" is what the English Executive Class performs. "Execu-
tive development" then, is called administrative training be-
cause those who take it are "bureaucrats", but it goes beyond
administrative technology to the kinds of value and policy-
making problems which, in our class orientation, properly belong
to the political sphere. In so far as such questions are raised at
the academic "pre-entry" level, they are considered more legi-
timate for the Ph.D. programme, i.e. for those who plan to
teach and do research, than for the M.A., i.e. for those who
expect to enter the bureaucracy as practising administrators.
Just as American public administration reinforces the market, associations, and the open class structure, so it also strengthens the separation of eminence from rulership in American society as a whole. As I have already mentioned, many members of the bureaucracy derive their personal career satisfactions from their identification with "reference" groups outside the service. Hence it is to their interest to strengthen and stabilize these separate social ladders to eminence. An engineer in government service, for example, finds it to his advantage to reinforce those tendencies which honour and protect engineering as a professional road to "success". This gives him the additional advantage of friends and job opportunities should he decide to leave the government service.

Moreover, many government programmes have as their stated objectives policies which reinforce the relative autonomy of separate ladders to achievement. The market, for example, is protected as an institution by rules enforced by administrators which safeguard the main road to wealth as a way of life. That such need not necessarily be the case can be seen if we examine, on the one hand, those forms of socialism which virtually impoverish the entrepreneur through heavy taxation, or, on the other, governments where weakness in the "rule of law" makes it possible for administrators to exploit their position in order to impose arbitrary exactions upon business men.

Other administrative activities safeguard the sphere of civil rights, academic liberty, freedom of the press, etc. Again, in many societies, arbitrary acts by bureaucrats, or oppressive legislation, curtail these freedoms which protect separate ladders to success through learning, the mass media, and voluntary association. Similarly, institutionalized separation of "church" and "state" safeguards the religious career as an autonomous road to respect and prestige. Indeed, the line to be drawn between safeguarding "liberty" and preventing "license" is one of the crucial value issues in American society.

It may seem to you that these programmes dedicated to the protection of autonomous spheres in American society—the
market, civil rights, separation of church and state, academic freedom—reflect political rather than administrative processes. This is correct, except for the fact that it is the bureaucracy which is charged with responsibility for the enforcement of these policies, and in so doing many opportunities arise for bureaucrats to abuse their authority. Hence, perhaps the most fundamental aspect of administration is a strict code of responsibility imposed upon the public official, and policed through the law courts, an alert public opinion and internal administrative controls, which restrains bureaucrats from freely abusing their powers.

Here again we see an aspect of administration which is often taken for granted, it being assumed that officials would not, naturally, trespass beyond the authority legally vested in them. A survey of many contemporary and historical systems of government, however, shows that such self-restraint can by no means be taken for granted. It is not only the laws which safeguard spheres of autonomy which permit disparate elements to climb their separate ladders to eminence, but also the safeguards which inhibit bureaucratic excesses that protect a social structure of separated upper class segments.

The existence of an upper class well divided between rulers and diverse types of eminence is, then, not a "natural" condition, but an "achievement", and a precarious one at best. Its existence has profound effects on the character of American public administration, but administration in turn plays a crucial role in maintaining this type of class structure.

The Communications Network

Most Americans take for granted certain facts about the communications situation which nevertheless have great importance for public administration. For example, we scarcely examine the implications of our common use of a single language. We have, of course, small minorities brought up to speak other languages, but they almost always know English also. We consider it strange that in other countries people often speak a mixture of languages, and government may even be conducted
in a language which is not native to the people. Those who are familiar with the complexities of life in a poly-lingual society can readily appreciate the relief one feels in a homogeneous linguistic environment.

The situation may be compared with, let us say, the need for air. Most of us probably take for granted the availability of fresh air with adequate oxygen content. We do not consider this an important factor for analysis. Only when we go to live on a high plateau where the oxygen supply is low, or when the air is contaminated by dense smoke and gases—a condition called "smog"—do we suddenly become aware of the critical need for air. The fact is, of course, that linguistic homogeneity is more unusual in the world than poly-lingualism.

We also take it for granted that everyone can read. Illiterates in America are regarded as unusual. If one searches for them, they can be found, just as one can find the tiny linguistic minorities, but the average person is scarcely aware of them in everyday life. Consequently we consider it almost as "natural" to be able to read as to breathe, or, indeed, to speak English.

Literacy and the use of a common language are aspects of a more general phenomenon, namely the high degree to which Americans can communicate with each other. The widespread availability of telephones, for example, means that almost the whole population can be quickly reached by wire. The significance of this is also not appreciated by Americans until they visit a country where most of the population lacks telephone service, and where even the telephone facilities which have been established work poorly, so that one often cannot complete a call, or make out what the party on the other end of the wire is saying after a connection is put through.

Radio and television services, the cinema, and the press combine to make most Americans literally "neighbours" or members of a single community. From day to day we talk about the same events. Millions worry about the marital problems of a popular actress, discuss the prospects of a favourite baseball team, become concerned about the possible menace to health of an insecticide used on cranberries, the consequences of a steel strike, or the pros and cons of capital punishment.
“Public opinion”, under these conditions, becomes a real force. We must not go too far in explaining governmental behaviour as simply a response to public opinion, and we must remember that public opinion is often deeply divided, that many people are apathetic, and either lack opinions or refrain from expressing them. Nevertheless, public opinion can sometimes be sufficiently strong to impel government toward particular policies, and perhaps more often it imposes restraints on what government can do.

In more formal terms, these aspects of communication can be analysed in terms of two variables, “mobilization” and “assimilation”. By mobilization we refer to the degree to which the population has joined or participates in a large-scale communications net. Obviously the spread of literacy and the mass media facilitates mobilization. Urbanization and frequent movement of people on new means of transportation also contributes to mobilization. Societies vary in the degree to which their populations are mobilized, and we can see that the American population is relatively highly mobilized.

The second variable, assimilation, refers to the extent to which a population shares the same symbols, identifies with the same basic values and goals, as the elite. Obviously language is the main vehicle of assimilation for, if everyone speaks the same language, they can receive the messages sent out by the elite, and they in turn can communicate more readily with the elite. Through this sharing of ideas or symbols, this mass “conversation”, the rulers and the ruled gradually come to think alike on major issues, the structure and goals of government, the basis of legitimacy, etc.

Religion is another vehicle of assimilation. To the extent that the whole population shares the same religious faith, they can be readily assimilated, whereas differences in basic belief tend to separate a population in separate communities. If religious creeds vary in a population, assimilation requires that they be reduced to a secondary social role. Political creeds, like

---

4 For a full discussion of these variables see Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (N.Y., Wiley, 1953).
religion, may also be important in laying a foundation for assimilation, or in disrupting it.

It is important to realize that mobilization and assimilation do not always take place simultaneously. If a population begins to become mobilized, its members may form rival communities, each with its own sub-elites or leaders, its own language, religion, and way of life. Thus, whereas it is not too difficult to unify and control an unmobilized population because the people lack the knowledge and means of organization, those who become mobilized begin to formulate their ideas and make demands, resisting control unless their ideas are in relative agreement with those of the government. When a mobilized population is not assimilated, we may say it has become “differentiated”. I think you will recognize that this process of differentiation has taken place quite widely in many countries. The rise of nationalist “independence” and “autonomy” movements illustrate the process.

One of the distinctive characteristics of the United States and of a few other modern countries, is that to a very considerable degree it has become assimilated as well as mobilized. When this happens, we can call the result a “national community”. A people which is differentiated, or mobilized but unassimilated, is a “poly-communal” or “plural” society. (American society is “pluralistic” but not “plural”—i.e. it has many associations and interest groups, but not differentiated communities.)

The fact that America enjoys, relatively, a national community, is not only a matter of the greatest intrinsic importance, but it has profound consequences for administration.

*National Community and Administration*

The most obvious connection, I suppose, is that communication between the population and officials is facilitated to the extent that both share the same language and value system. It is easier to trust each other, to gain access and acceptance for ideas, to express thoughts, to explain situations and needs. Of course, communication within the administration is also made easier to the extent that national assimilation has been achieved.
I would not say that full assimilation was a reality in America, and there is no doubt that there is a good deal of misunderstanding and difference of values between groups, but as compared with many other countries, the relative case of communication within the bureaucracy, and between officials and public is striking.

In so far as the administrative problems to be solved are quite complicated and involve the exchange of a lot of information, much of it difficult to express, the existence of a national community is a favourable factor of great significance. It means that diverse interests in the society can readily pool information about their wants, formulate their “public opinion”, and transmit their demands and supporting facts to the officials concerned, or to the politicians, if necessary. When administrators consider how to implement legislation, or what policies to recommend, from the continuous inflow of information they are able to make fairly reliable estimates of the alternatives open to them, and their probable consequences.

The execution of law also requires that officials tell the public what is expected of them, the services that are available, etc. This also requires a large volume of communication, which is possible because of the existence of a national community.

There are other, more indirect, consequences. For example, recruitment of personnel by universalistic criteria, i.e. solely with regard to competence, is possible only to the extent that extraneous considerations can be eliminated. In a “plural” or “poly-communal” society, where rivalry and mutual suspicion prevail between diverse linguistic and religious communities, it may be necessary to use a “quota” system to insure equitable representation of each community, or else to practise outright exclusion of one or more of the communities. In either case recruitment is handicapped, and a major source of friction and misunderstanding enters administration.

Similarly, in programme execution, either some communities are deliberately discriminated against, thereby incurring their hostility and resistance, or an attempt is made to treat each community justly, in which case much attention must be given to the equitable allocation of rights and duties, in addition to
spending time and energy to allay suspicion and deal with those who imagine they are being unfairly treated. These and other administrative costs of poly-communalism are spared American administration to a considerable degree, although they arise, to some extent, with regard to the Negro population, our most distinct sub-community.

The other aspects of American society which I have already discussed—the economic and social—are also closely related to the existence of a national community. Consider, for example, the formation of associations representing functional interests. Where poly-communalism exists, interest groups form predominantly along communal lines. Instead, for example, of having a general medical association, or a trade union for all steel workers, there would be an association for each language group, for each religion or those who oppose religion, for the adherents to rival and incompatible political doctrines. The administration, instead of being able to deal with one set of spokesmen for each particular kind of economic and specialized interest, would confront a series of rival and mutually hostile groups, each claiming to represent the same kind of functional interest. Although this would strengthen the relative power of the bureaucracy, it would impede effective programme execution.

Perhaps the most important kind of association for American government and administration is the political party. Here we see the most dramatic illustration of a phenomenon made possible by a national community, namely the “two-party” system. Under poly-communalism a dominant party in power suppresses all legal opposition, or permits only the existence of fragmented extremist parties which cannot effectively challenge the rule of the elite. Alternatively, the government is formed from an uneasy coalition of mutually suspicious parties, each representing a distinctive ideology or community.

The national community, by contrast, permits pluralistic party formations which can compromise diverse interests precisely because these interests are not too far apart to start with. Moreover, the existence of a “loyal opposition” is also possible only because the basic tenets and aspirations of the opposition are compatible with those of the party in power, however great the
difference of opinion may be between Government and Opposition over specific issues of policy.

Similarly, the openness of the class structure which, as we have seen, has important consequences for American administration, can exist in a mobilized society only under conditions of national community. Where communalism prevails, each community has its own intra-communal class structure, which may be open or closed, but it is difficult for mobility to occur from one community to another, the difficulty increasing, of course, with the degree of tension and hostility between communities. Thus a differentiated society has, virtually by definition, a closed class system.

I believe there is also an essential relationship between the viability of a national market and the existence of a national community. The competition inherent in market situations leads easily to conflict unless it is carefully regulated. Thus the market, while stimulating economic development, puts a strain on social cohesion. For this reason the extension of a market system threatens the solidarity of a society unless powerful social and political forces can be utilized to maintain national integration.

Such familiar conflicts of interest as labour-management and rural-urban tensions grow out of marketized relationships, and in their extreme form appear as “class conflicts”. When poly-communalism prevails, such functional economic tensions become entangled with inter-communal conflict, thus further jeopardizing social order. To preserve society it may be necessary to curtail the operation of the market system. Thus we can see that the existence of a national community facilitates control of the inherent tensions of a market society, which, even so, sometimes threaten to get out of hand.

Symbol System

American intellectuals with a superficial knowledge of foreign system of government often ridicule our political party system. It is said that the two major parties, the Republican and Democratic, are as “alike as two peas” in a pod. They are contrasted,
for example, with the numerous French parties, each of which is said to stand firmly for definite political principles. Thus the voters are given a choice among several parties, each offering a different programme and reflecting a distinctive point of view. The difficulty with the French system was that, although each party stood for an ideology, that very distinctiveness made it impossible for them to agree on a coherent programme of national action until, finally, in desperation, the French people abandoned the Fourth Republic and gave full power to General de Gaulle.

There are other Americans who concede that, although our party system is illogical, at least it seems to hold the country together in some unaccountable way and, in any event, it provides a good show at every national election.

Yet it is my opinion that our two-party arrangement reflects a profoundly significant fact, and one which has the utmost importance for our administrative as well as our political system: namely, the relatively high consensus that exists in America concerning our basic political symbols. These include our "myth", "formula", and "code". By "myth" we refer to whatever symbols and doctrines are used to characterize the ultimate source of sovereignty, the nature and destiny of man, his rights, duties and essential relationships. By "formula" we mean the set of rules which determine the structure of government, how the rulers shall be chosen, and what their duties shall be. Laws or regulations are examples of the "code".

In many countries basic agreement on ultimate myth and formula is lacking. The French, for example, have not been able to decide, since their great Revolution, whether they really wanted a republic, a monarchy, or an "empire", what role the Church should play in government and education, and how power should be shared between business men, farmers, and workers. This accounts, of course, for the sharply contrasting ideologies of their variegated parties.

In America, by contrast, the doctrines expressed in the "Declaration of Independence", and the "Constitution", together

---

with certain important papers, such as Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address", provide a myth and formula upon which nearly all Americans agree. This helps to explain the "conformity" and "monotony" which many observers complain of in American life.

At a different level, however, there is great variety and even conflict in America. Pursuant to the constitution, the President and Congress are called upon to decide many matters of "policy", whether we should have high or low tariffs, whether farmers should be protected by having the price of wheat subsidized, whether foreign aid should be extended and taxed for, and what kind of national defence should be established. Such questions do not affect the basic myth and formula, but relate rather to the "code". They find expression not only in laws and regulations, which may be adopted, amended, and repealed from time to time, but also in established policies, practices and customs. The maintenance of the American system depends, then, on achievement of a primary level of agreement, reflecting fundamental satisfaction with the system of government and its main goals, but also on a secondary level of disagreement, in which competition over a policy is permitted and even encouraged, every group seeking to attain marginal improvements in its position or satisfactions, even at the cost of marginal deprivations for its competitors.

The political parties, then, do not reflect any basic disagreement on the primary level, and in this respect they are quite alike. It is on the secondary level that differences in viewpoint arise but, because the policy issues change from year to year, these are not so much permanent differences in ideology as variations in platform that follow historical developments. In general, whatever party is in opposition takes advantage of issues on which it thinks a majority of the population may reject the policies adopted by the party in power, hoping thereby to attract enough votes to win an election.

Consensus and Administrative Authority

The basic importance of consensus is that it confers on the acts of the administration a high degree of "authority". This
word is used in so many ways that I must explain what I mean by it here. Whenever power is exercised in accordance with a political formula, it is "formal power" or "authority". Thus if a man who expects to become the President were to start giving orders, they would lack authority, but after election and inauguration, the instructions of the same man would become authoritative. Of course, a man without authority might have a lot of power, as in the case of a mob leader or a "city boss", while a man in authority might lack power, as was the case with the Japanese Emperor during Tokugawa times.

We see, then, that merely to possess authority is not enough to insure obedience. The effectiveness of authority varies with the degree of consensus of the population on the validity and obligation to obey authority. When a high degree of consensus exists, we may say authority is "legitimate". Authority becomes illegitimate when people stop believing in the right of those who claim authority to rule. We can see, therefore, that consensus in America legitimizes governmental authority.

Now legitimacy is essential for effective administration, the more so the more complex the patterns of behaviour subject to administrative control. Suppose that a law is enacted requiring everyone to pay a sales tax, or to attend school up to the age of 16. If a tax collector and probation officer with arrest warrants had to wait on everyone to compel him, by threat of violence, to obey the law, enforcement would be virtually impossible. However, if most of the population obey simply because they feel that it is obligatory to obey "the law", then the tasks of enforcement can be cut down to manageable proportions, including the use of sanctions on a small minority of dissidents. In other words, authority is the cheapest and most effective means of control, especially when large numbers of people are involved in the enforcement of complex regulations. Although sanctions are normally prescribed in American public administration, the observer may be impressed with the relatively minor part they play, and the great extent to which "voluntary" compliance is relied upon.

When a system of administration is established which requires a high level of voluntary compliance based on authority, forces
are set in motion which reinforce this pattern. Administrators know how important the maintenance of legitimacy is, and hence they act to strengthen it, or not to weaken it. For example, the more responsive they are to clientele demands, the more willing the clientele is to accept the obligations imposed on them. Moreover, so far as possible, the administrators do not press their clientele too far in making demands upon them, and they make it easier to accept authority by mingling services and advantages with regulatory acts. "Public relations" techniques are used to interpret rules and duties to the population affected by them.

Some will think that such measures reflect a weakness of authority, a tendency to rely on other means to secure conformity with governmental decisions. However, I think it is more accurate to consider such behaviour a reflection of the need to preserve and safeguard authority, to rely on "mere authority" as little as possible, and to strengthen the legitimacy of government by reinforcing the basic myth that government is instituted to serve the people, not to be their master.

Authority and Popular Sovereignty

We see now, that the degree of consensus is much influenced by the content of the myth and formula. In many countries, particularly in former times, the basic myth ascribed sovereignty to a divine or supernatural power, whom men were called upon to serve. The ruler, as king, emperor, or "chief", was a divine surrogate, whose authority was based on a sacred mandate, and whom the people obeyed as they would their God. Authority established under such a myth would be reinforced by issuing commands as from a higher power, rather than by appearing to reflect public opinion.

In the American myth, by contrast, sovereignty is said to rest with the people themselves, and hence authority can only be derived from the people, as symbolized in the electoral process. This is why administrative responsiveness to public opinion confirms and strengthens authority—it reinforces the basic myth. Administrators must continually demonstrate that they are truly
“public servants” rather than “officials” exercising power from above. Naturally, I do not want to imply that in practice every American agency fully lives up to this image of “public service”. Indeed, we have our share of high-handed and arbitrary administrators. Their behaviour, however, always stirs public resentment, and pressures arise to restrain and modify such tendencies. The general picture, I believe, remains valid, namely that consensus on the “myth” of popular sovereignty and responsible government creates a pattern of administration that has to rely, in large part, on willing compliance with official policies, and hence must act to reinforce the consensus and myth by a high degree of responsiveness to clientele demands.

A paradox may occur to you, namely, that if administrators are to be responsible, they should all be elected, just as politicians are elected. Yet we know that American civil servants are recruited in large measure through an examination system. American history shows that, especially in local government, a large number of officials were formerly elected. Moreover, especially from the Jacksonian period, the introduction of the “spoils” system meant the democratization of administration by enabling the elected party to appoint officials, thereby removing strongholds of bureaucratic power and privilege, and subjecting all officials to the direct power of the people.

As American society became more industrialized and complex, however, it became apparent that the “spoils” system could not provide personnel with sufficient training and experience to staff very complicated modern services, nor could elected administrators be adequately coordinated. The problem was eventually solved, at least to some extent, by the introduction of “technical” examinations for the public service. You must realize that the British type of examination, which recruits for an “Administrative Class”, and the Indian Civil Service examinations which preceded it, essentially seek to discover men of superior talent and capacity for ruling positions in the bureaucracy. Historically this concept had its prototype in the Chinese examinations for the mandarinate, based on the Confucian idea that the rulers should be the “superior men”.

In the American view, there can be no "superior men", since popular sovereignty in turn rested on the basic postulate of human equality, clearly expressed in our Declaration of Independence. Hence we could not establish an administrative class without violating a basic tenet of the American political myth. It was generally admitted, however, that technical competence could be acquired without any imputation of general or innate superiority or inferiority. If I want a house built, I turn to a carpenter to do what I admit I cannot do for myself, but this does not mean that I elevate the carpenter to a higher status than myself. Similarly I call on the doctor, engineer, lawyer, plumber, teacher, etc. to do in each case what he is specially trained to do, without any imputation of essential superiority or inferiority.

The civil service was founded on this view. It was admitted that in the public administration there are specialized tasks which can be best performed by those with suitable training and experience. Officials so recruited do not, in consequence, possess any inherent authority to give orders or to command others. They are regarded as servants, not only in the general sense of serving the public, but in the more specific sense of serving the legislators and chief executives who have been elected by the people, and who have made the crucial decisions about what policies are to be followed.

In so far as a civil servant does make decisions, the American views his acts as he would a doctor's decision to "order" a patient to stay in bed. The order is based, not on a higher authority of the doctor, but rather on the patient's own desire to get well, and his belief that the doctor knows best how to insure his recovery. Thus, so far as possible, American administration is based either on direct implementation of politically determined policies, or on technical decisions made in the light of the requirements of the "situation". Public administration writers often tell us to study the situation for the answer to problems. (The whole "scientific management" outlook is based on the idea that, if goals are clearly defined, study of the situa-
tion will indicate the "one best way" in which the goal can be accomplished. Hence the choice of means is emptied of value judgment for or against this group or that, this official or that, this method or that, because all such choices are value neutral: they must be technically determined to maximize "efficiency" in the attainment of prescribed goals.

Again, I do not say that this picture fully, or perhaps even in large part, corresponds to administrative reality. Obviously civil servants do make decisions involving value judgments, as our case studies so clearly reveal. But this does not contradict the main point, namely that the structure of American administration—its mode of recruiting, promoting, and organizing—reflects this underlying political myth.

To take one more example, the notion of popular sovereignty rests, as I have said, on the idea of "human equality". It is apparent, however, that large-scale administrative organization requires hierarchical, bureaucratic structure. The notion of "chain of command" is basic to our administrative doctrine. How can this idea be reconciled with the idea of equality. The answer is to depersonalize the command structure. Commands are not given in the name of individuals, but on behalf of the organization, the President, ultimately the "People". Hence to accept a command is not to accept the superiority of the person giving the command, but only to accept the obligation to serve the collectivity in whose name a particular individual happens to be authorized to speak.

This distinction is not always easy to keep in mind, and higher officials may easily fall into the habit of thinking that they personally have a right to rule, to command others. Hence—perhaps as a protective reaction—there has grown up in American administration a second level of "personal" relationships superimposed on the official and impersonal. On this level everyone is regarded as "equal", a fact which is symbolized by the private uniform of the "white collar" worker, rather than an official uniform, the use of personal, even first names, rather than formal titles in much office intercourse, concealment of salaries, a jocular familiarity in style.

Writers on American administration have commented on the
indirect symbols of status—the telephone, private secretary, office rug, etc.—which serve to distinguish the higher from the lower official. To the observer of administration in societies where the civil servant retains all the direct status symbols, the rank titles and uniforms which the military service still keeps, the American bureaucracy seems to be strongly equalitarian in emphasis.

The mere symbolization of equality, it may be objected, is, after all, a superficial phenomenon. The essence of the "chain of command" is the more telling, substantive fact. But I think even here the American equalitarian myth has important administrative consequences. Respect for the technician or specialist, even though subordinate in rank and organizational status, is real. A superior who frequently tries to over-rule a staff specialist in the sphere of his technical competence will soon be in trouble. In a real sense, the supervisor becomes not the ruler of his tiny domain, but rather the "captain" of a "team". His task is to coordinate and shape into an effective working group a number of men and women, each with his own distinctive contribution to make to the collective enterprise.

The proud independence of the subordinate, conscious of his "equality" as a human being with his administrative superior, is reflected in other administrative patterns, such as the stress on delegation of power. The ability of an administrative system to decentralize appears to depend not only on the clarity of policy and the willingness of superiors to delegate, but on the readiness—even eagerness—of subordinates to accept responsibility. After all, responsibility is not always desired, since it carries risks and burdens. But the desire of American subordinates in administration to demonstrate their "equality" leads them, in considerable measure, to demand more and more power from their superiors.

Although the common complaint in America is that power is overcentralized, especially in Washington, I dare say comparative analysis would show that it is actually more decentralized and dispersed than any other government of similar size and complexity of programme activities. This dispersal, whether
we think of it in terms of delegation of authority to subordinate and field offices within administrative agencies, or the devolution of powers from central to state, and local governments, and the further separation of functions between various branches, departments, and special boards, commissions, and authorities, is truly a distinctive feature of American administration, traceable, in part at least, to our passion for equality.

Just as, in other aspects of American society, we have seen that ecological forces—the market, associations, class structure—have not only made their impact on administration, but have been, in turn reinforced by administration, so the characteristic myth and formula of American government is strengthened by administrative practices. Equalitarianism in administrative symbolism, for example, confirms equalitarianism in the popular mind. Indeed, governmental equalitarianism is often ahead of popular practice, as in the case of racial de-segregation.

Administrative equalitarianism affects the public in another important way, namely the application of equalitarianism in dealings with the public. Any evidence of “favouritism” by government officials is deeply resented. The “queue” psychology is deep-seated. The idea that the public should be treated on a “first come, first serve” basis is so strong in America that any other basis can scarcely be conceived. One has only to observe administration in a society where the principle is “service first to those of highest rank” to realize that it is by no means the only rule. When preference is given in order of rank, everyone strives to establish his hierarchical position vis-a-vis others, so that administrative procedures reinforce rank orderings in society. The queueing routines, by contrast, reinforce equalitarian sentiments. I believe we can find other ways in which administrative practices reinforce the American political myth and formula, but perhaps it is unnecessary to labour the point further.

*Political Framework*

The relativity of ideas is clearly visible in the way we talk about political forces as they affect public administration. The most
frequent topic in contemporary American discussions of the political aspects of administration is the dichotomy between democratic and totalitarian systems. I do not, of course, want to suggest that this distinction is not of the utmost importance, but it is certainly not the only important distinction to be made.

In both the democratic and totalitarian systems it is assumed that the bureaucracy is an instrumental apparatus under the control of the political organization. No one questions the domination of the Communist Party over public administration in the Soviet Union and, in so far as full subordination of the bureaucracy to political control in America is questioned, it is generally in discussions of how to assure more complete responsiveness of the civil servant to political direction. A few writers have spoken also about the influence of bureaucrats over policy, but even in this context it is assumed that bureaucratic interests are concerned with the accomplishment of their agencies' programme objectives, rather than with what might be called the "self-interests" of bureaucrats.

It is only when we broaden our range of comparative observation that we realize how difficult it is to assure bureaucratic subordination to non-bureaucratic power centres. In traditional civilizations we can scarcely draw any line between the roles of officials as "politicians" and as "administrators". They held power, they made and implemented policy.

Most contemporary states have established, by written constitution, a formal distinction between political and administrative organs, but in many cases the distinction remains formalistic—the "politicians" are not fully effective in framing policy, and the "administrators" are scarcely the mere "neutral" instruments of policy execution.

Is it to be wondered at, after all, if a group of officials in whose hands are placed all the main weapons of government—administration of the public treasury, control over military and police weapons, supervision of schools and means of transport

---

and communication, the power of appointment to the most highly prized posts—should be tempted on occasion to use these weapons in their own self-interest? I think most people would agree that the temptation for bureaucrats to abuse their powers could be overwhelming. If, then, a bureaucracy is brought under the control of non-bureaucratic political machinery, this is not something to be taken for granted but something to be explained.

*Power and Administration*

Let me point out, too, that an increase in bureaucratic power by no means assures improvement in administrative efficiency. Quite the contrary, it is only when non-bureaucrats are powerful enough to control and reward officials for faithful performance of their duties, when policies to be implemented can be clearly prescribed, that we expect a high level of administrative output to be reached. If officials are free to determine their own tasks, would we not expect them, as ordinary human beings, to take advantage of the opportunity to do as they please, to oppress the public, to give themselves as many advantages as possible, such as security of tenure, easy working conditions, high prestige, etc.? I have argued elsewhere that the rise of bureaucratic power means a decline in the rule of law and of administrative efficiency; it results in intra-bureaucratic rivalry or "politics", and attempts by some branches of the bureaucracy to gain control over the others. In such struggles, victory is likely to go to the military arm, since their weapons can triumph, in the short run, over the weapons controlled by the other branches.

Against this perspective the extent to which a vast and pervasive bureaucracy in America, including a well-disciplined army and other military formations, have nevertheless remained substantially under political control throughout our history is an important fact for examination. We cannot explain it simply in terms of a constitutional provision for "separation of powers", since we know of countries in which formal declarations of this type have not been implemented. Nor can the "American tem-
perament” explain it since we, too, have many swashbuckling military men.

The Basis of Non-Bureaucratic Power

I believe the reasons for this phenomenon lie much deeper in American society, and are related to all the subjects that I have discussed so far. For example, the existence of a market system is associated with the growth of a powerful business class and, more recently, with the emergence of large-scale trade union organizations. The existence of autonomous business and labour organizations creates powerful non-bureaucratic centres with their own specific interests and ability to organize effective political demands upon the government. (Obviously by “non-bureaucratic” I mean outside the government bureaucracy, for these organizations also have their own “private” bureaucracies.)

The existence of business and labour organizations is, of course, merely one example of the formation of associations, another general phenomenon which I have already discussed. We may say that the existence of numerous associations outside the government—including the political parties—provides a primary base for the creation of non-bureaucratic power. Associations are able to “aggregate” interests and then to “articulate” them in such a way as to help form the governmental “policies” which become the foundation for public administration. Without them, attempts to build modern administrative machinery are like efforts to construct a skyscraper without first having a foundation on which to build.

It is notable that commentators on associations often assume that the “interests” which they represent are always, at base, economic. This reflects not only the Marxian view of the state under capitalism as an instrument of the dominant economic class, but a more pervasive and widely held opinion that property ownership is always the primary basis of power, a view popularized in the saying, “He who pays the piper, calls the tune.”

In fact, however, a more widespread condition in human history has been one in which the man of power—whether feudal
lord or bureaucrat—keeps the insecure merchant or businessman dancing to his own tune, forced to pay tribute for the privilege of survival. The development of economic power—a rather special condition which appeared particularly under feudal conditions in Western Europe—was made possible only as a rising burgher class in the towns was able to impose upon the Church and feudal aristocracy a rule of law that protected contract and property rights. Thus property means power only when the rulers are limited by law in the arbitrary exercise of power, and when the law specifically safeguards property rights. We seem to have forgotten the once revolutionary significance of the slogan, "life, liberty and *property*".

We have also come to take the rule of law so much for granted that we are scarcely conscious of the rather special conditions which were needed, historically, to make it possible. European Feudalism provided these conditions by fragmenting political, including bureaucratic power to an unprecedented degree, while autonomous power grew in remarkable ways. The rise of burgher power in the Medieval towns reflected the increasing demand of a feudal aristocracy for imported luxury goods which could only be obtained by protecting the merchants who knew how to obtain them. Many of these goods, incidentally, came from Asia, especially from India, a fact every schoolboy should realize if he asks why Columbus and Vasco da Gama were so determined to discover a way to India that would by-pass the routes controlled by Venice, and thereby enable new cities to share the wealth of the Indian trade.

But burgher power was only one facet of the rise of autonomous power in feudal Europe. The autonomy of the Church was another major factor, especially where the Church was unable to monopolize power but was strong enough to resist becoming a mere tool of State power. We have seen examples of both situations, religions subservient to government, and governments brought under theocratic control. The imposition of law upon government was facilitated by a unique—indeed precarious—balance between religious and secular power struck in Medieval Europe.

The universities in Europe also developed autonomy at an
early period which helped, however precariously, to nurture the growth of academic freedom, and the quest for learning as an enterprise that brought its own rewards and need not be continually at the mercy of a ruler's self-interest. On this foundation developed the scientific knowledge which lies at the basis of modern technology and industrial development.

Even so traditional a form of power as the landed aristocracy need not be taken for granted. In many empires bureaucracy destroyed the power of landed estates which always challenged the control of a central ruler. In Western Europe, national unification proceeded slowly without the pulverization of hereditary aristocratic families, a fact symbolized by Magna Charta, and the rights of primogeniture and entail. But neither did the landed interest monopolize power, as it has in many landlord-ridden societies.

In America, centres of autonomous power—with the Church separated from State, educational autonomy, free farmers, and especially an independent business class—were transplanted, in somewhat modified form, from their European, and especially their English, homeland. The frontier created new forms of autonomous power and provided a safety valve for suppressed elements in the East who could always hope to better their lot by making the long trek West. On these foundations, the separated pattern of upper class segments appeared. Eminence became possible, independent of rulership.

The passage was by no means an easy one, and America suffered its share of perils. The risk of domination by a slave-owning planter aristocracy was overcome only at the cost of a devastating civil war, followed by a struggle against the rising power of a business oligarchy which may only have been won in the present century.

The Basis of Bureaucratic Weakness

The maintenance of non-bureaucratic control over the bureaucracy, then, has been institutionalized in a rule of law and a constitutional pattern of separation of powers which, in turn, reflects the existence of centres of autonomous power organized
around the market, church, schools, associations, class structures, etc. But even this has not been enough to safeguard society against a potentially overpowering bureaucracy. Bureaucratic weakness has been institutionalized by its spectacular fragmentation, a fragmentation which may be considered from both a territorial and a functional perspective.

Territorially, the bureaucracy is divided between the federal services, the completely separate bureaucracies of the fifty states, and the indefinitely large number of small bureaucracies of cities, towns, villages, counties, special authorities and other units of government. Proponents of "rationalization" or greater efficiency often advocate the unification of these localized services. Instead of separate local and state police services, plus a variety of federal police units, would not a single national police organization, consolidating all of these services, be more efficient? Yet, however "efficiency minded" we are, most Americans would probably be alarmed at such a proposal, fearing the abuse of power by a national police service more than they welcome whatever increase in efficiency it might provide.

In addition to the territorial fragmentation, the bureaucracy is further dispersed functionally into hundreds of disparate programme agencies and centralized "overhead" (staff and auxiliary) units. Such a dispersal of administration into functionally specialized units is, no doubt, a necessary condition for any modern government in an industrialized society. However, it is not necessary for technical specialists to direct the work of each department. We could have established a superior administrative service with cadres of general administrators who could rotate from agency to agency, serving in each case as supervisors and coordinators. The same elite group could also take successive assignments in the federal, state and local services, thereby providing a cohesive force to unite the innumerable fragmented portions of our bureaucracy, or rather "bureaucracies".

I have already mentioned one reason for not favouring such a pattern, since it would clash with the basic political myth on which the American system of government rests. We can now see that it would have the additional consequence of making the bureaucracy much more powerful. The existing pattern
of functional fragmentation under the leadership of technically minded men tends, therefore, to keep the government bureaucracies powerless, and therefore more amenable to direction and control by political organization and non-governmental power centres.

This characteristic dispersal of power in the American system of government is responsible for the problems which have, consequently, received utmost attention in our literature on public administration. Such is the need for "coordination" and "decentralization". Many studies of "inter-governmental relations", and efforts to resolve problems of "area and function", of "line and staff", deal with aspects of the complex inter-relationships produced by a highly fragmented system of administration.

Our sense of the difficulties inherent in the structure of American public administration illustrates another proposition. Even though, as I think it does, the fragmentation of administration serves an important function in helping to maintain non-bureaucratic control over the bureaucracy, we cannot infer that it was organized that way on purpose. Opposition to functionally useful practices often reveals ignorance of the practices' usefulness.

Certainly many historical accidents and tendencies would have to be mentioned in any explanation of how our administrative system came into existence. To assume, that because something serves a particular purpose it was established for that reason is the teleological fallacy. The fact that oil burns has made possible the modern development of the automobile and airplane engine, but we cannot reason backward from this fact to assume that God gave oil the capacity to burn in order that man might enjoy rapid transportation.

I mention the teleological fallacy here because of the danger of falling into this trap in connection with all my earlier arguments. Even if the market has contributed to American administration and our administrative practices have strengthened the market, as I have argued, we cannot deduce from this that administration was deliberately modelled after the market, or the market instituted because of its administrative consequences. The psycho-analysts have shown how little we know of the
motives which guide our actions. To state reciprocal relationships or dependencies is merely to observe a phenomenon but not to impute motives for the establishment of the phenomenon.

*Power and the Administrative Model*

Finally, these considerations should help us to understand the theory or doctrine of public administration as developed in the United States. First of all, the complexity of the problems posed in the previous paragraph have been a challenge to the practical imagination. Administrative specialists have been required to work as consultants and on the staff agencies of executive offices to assist, through planning, budgeting, personnel work, etc. in solving these difficult administrative problems. The writings on public administration have correspondingly had a strong practical orientation toward their solution.

Although much time has, admittedly, been devoted to the description and analysis of existing administrative practices and situations, these analyses have, first of all, tended to take for granted, and therefore not to examine closely, the environmental factors about which I have been talking. Secondly, they are preoccupied with prescription, with "principles" of good practice which could be offered to administrators as practical maxims and rules that would help them solve their problems.

These principles have been based on a model or "ideal-type" of the administrative bureau in which it is assumed that fairly clear-cut policy decisions have been made by a political leadership. The task of administration is then to devise the most efficient means for the implementation of these policies, all means for this purpose being considered scarce and neutral. The chief administrative problem is therefore to make rational choice among these means to accomplish goals which are ranked in order of priority.

You will probably recognize the structural similarity between this model and the neo-classical economic model in which, under market conditions, it is also assumed that rational choices are made in situations of scarce means. The market and the bureau, are, then, alternative vehicles for the solution of problems of
rational choice. Such models are no doubt of considerable utility for the solution of practical problems in situations which approximate the conditions set by the models. Probably the market model is more often approximated in practice than the administrative bureau model. However, I think we may safely say that the administrative bureau is more nearly approximated in American practice than in many other countries, especially outside the Western world.

Where administrative reality differs widely from the bureau model it may prove quite misleading to use it naively. It is like using rules for measuring the circumference of a circle to measure a triangle. If progress is to be made in solving administrative problems in countries where the bureau model is inappropriate, the first step is, I should think, to make an impartial examination of the facts to find out what kind of a situation does prevail. On the basis of this kind of knowledge, one might then be able to set up relevant criteria for determining desirable changes, assuming we have some idea of the direction in which it is desired to move.

I cannot pretend to do this for you in any profound sense. However, since I have spent the last two years in Thailand and the Philippines, I will give you, in the remaining lectures, my impressions of the administrative situations there, and their relation to the Thai and Philippine ecology.
CHAPTER II

THAILAND: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRADITIONAL ECOLOGY

Not long ago the representative of an American export firm called on his agent in a Southeast Asian city. The agent, whose business was rather slow, had been living in the city for over twenty-five years. He complained defensively to his young visitor that one must not expect too much in the "unchanging Orient". "After all", he said, "these people have been doing things the same way for thousands of years. You cannot expect them to change their habits overnight."

The sales representative then asked how he transported goods from dockside to warehouse to shop. The answer was that they were carried by lorry. "And how", the young man persisted, "did you transport them when you first came to this country?" "Oh," the answer came, "formerly we had to use coolies to carry them on shoulder poles. There's been a lot of change since those days!"

From carrying poles to lorries! Rapid change in the changeless East! How are we to reconcile these apparently irreconcilable impressions? It is difficult to make sense out of such inconsistencies if we plug suddenly into the contemporary scene without any knowledge of the historic background. The key fact about Thai administration, as about Philippine, and I imagine also about Indian administration, is that it is not static, but is in a process of transformation.

Whenever we confront change we tend to be baffled. It is like trying to take a picture of a racer with a slow film—all you get is a blur. To make sense out of the scene we must look back to the place where the racer came from, and try to plot the distance he has run.

If we apply this method to Thailand's administrative system, we will have to ask what it was like before the changes brought on by modern times. Only a hundred years ago Siamese administration under the absolute monarchy was fundamentally dif-
ferent from modern Thai administration. The differences between the traditional and modern systems will reveal how change has come about. Moreover, knowledge of the ancient system will help us to distinguish old from new elements as they are mixed together in contemporary Thailand.

I want to emphasize that this is not an attempt to describe the classical Siamese society and government. Historians and anthropologists have already performed this task better than I can.¹ In this brief lecture I wish merely to offer a possible interpretation, especially to relate Siamese administration to its ecology. I am also disregarding the substantial changes in the structure of government which took place between the earlier Sukhothai period, and during the later Ayuthaya and Bangkok periods. My aim is to identify some general characteristics which, with changes in detail, were true throughout.

I shall employ the same categories I used in discussing American administration. I dare to do this because the headings I used were not the names of institutions, but referred rather to functions which seem to be universally necessary in every society. For example, everywhere people have to satisfy their material wants by producing and distributing goods and services. In other words, they must have some kind of substantive economic system, whether or not they use a market of the type which exists in America.

Similarly, they could not get along without some kind of social organization, whether or not they have associations; they must be able to communicate with each other and they require symbols with which to communicate; they need to make choices or decisions of some kind, and hence require a power structure of political system, whether or not they have formal government and bureaucracies. Let us ask, then, how the Siamese satisfied these functions a century ago.

¹ For a start, consult Walter F. Vella's *Siam under Rama III; 1824–1851*, Association for Asian Studies, 1957.

It is clear that the Siamese did not rely on a market system. True, there was foreign trade, but this was carried out under close royal supervision, largely in order to bring to the court imported luxury goods, which were highly prized. It is doubtful if even this trade could be understood as market oriented. It was not governed by a price mechanism but responded directly to the decisions of the monarch.

As to the popular economy, it based on subsistence agriculture, each farmer with his slaves producing most of what he needed for consumption in his own household. But there was also a system of exchange involving the movement of goods and services, and changes in their relation to persons, i.e. "locational" and "appropriational" movements. The main pattern of such exchanges can be described as "redistributive".  

The chief centre of the redistributive movement was the king, to whom everyone from the highest noble down to the humblest free man was obliged to render service. The income derived from these services was available to the king for redistribution, especially to the nobles or officials in his court, to the royal household, and to the Buddhist order. Each official, in turn, was a "patron" to whom were attached many "clients" each of whom rendered service, and in exchange received customary benefits from his patron. The ordinary free farmer likewise had "slaves" attached to his household who served him and in exchange were provided for. The monks of the Buddhist order—including virtually every free man for at least a short period—received "alms" and contributions were made for the construction of monasteries and temples, which, in turn, may be considered as centres for the redistribution of "spiritual" benefits.

There was, then, a considerable movement of goods and exchange of services, but this whole system did not rely on price-

---

making markets although money and restricted local markets may have existed. Thus the economic institution which, as we have seen, is basic both to the economy and administrative practice in America was lacking in the traditional Siamese economy. But this is not to say that there was not a well structured economic system, nor that it was not adequate for the needs of the Siamese society. The structure, however, was not a market structure, but something else which, tentatively at least, we may call a “redistributive” structure.

Can we relate this economic system to Siamese public administration as we did the market to American administration? The answer is that we can, and the identification is even easier to make because the administrative system was identical with the redistributive system, although viewed from a different perspective, whereas in America the market is clearly a different structure from the administrative structure, although the two have striking formal similarities.

Siamese administration consisted of the procedures used by the king and officials in ruling and presiding over their society. In doing this they received tributes or offerings in goods and labour services from their clients, and in turn made redistributions and governed the affairs of those below them. The redistributive structure, in other words, was a unitary system which cannot be divided neatly into discrete “economic” and “administrative” structures. It had, certainly, economic and administrative aspects, but this is like saying a coin has two sides—yet the coin remains a unit and the sides cannot be separated from each other. Hence whatever characterized the redistributive economic system also characterized the redistributive administrative system. Every act was totally a while. The actors could not have thought, “Now I am performing an economic act, now an administrative”. They must have thought, “Now I am acting”, and only the visitor from a different kind of society could interpret this act as a synthesis of two kinds of action.

**Social Structure: Particularism**

What shall we say about the social structure? There must have
been groups of some kind, certainly they were not associations. There was no "aggregation" of specific interests, nor were there voluntary membership organizations, nor contracts to establish such relationships. However, the family was pervasive throughout the society, and what shall we call the relationship between the king and nobles, between patron and clients, between freeman and slaves; how shall we speak of the Buddhist order with its monks-filled monasteries and its hierarchy of abbots and higher ecclesiastical officials? A complex set of groups but scarcely associations! What were their important characteristics?

Whereas the associations in America are functionally specific, these Siamese groups were functionally diffuse. A peasant family, for example, was not only a social and biological unit, but also a working centre, a focus of religious activity, an apprenticeship "school" for the next generation, and a basic political unit in the Siamese power structure. On a higher level the patron with his clients, was equally diffuse in the functions carried out. Let us call such a group, composed of a patron and his clients, a "patronate".

A patron might be assigned, by the king, some important official duties, to head one of the boards of agencies of the court. He might be called on to supervise trade with China, to register clients, or to look after the royal treasury. In performing these duties his clients would assist him and do the routine or menial tasks. In other words the assignment would be made to the patronate. Later, the patronate might be assigned to a different task, in which case the patron and all his clients would transfer together to the new work. A patron's home would be his office, so it might be more accurate to think of the work being transferred to him.

Some functional specialization is visible here, but it can be considered a marginal development of a diffuse kind of life pattern. In the same way, an American association, while fundamentally specific in its goals, might also exhibit some diffuseness—for example, a trade union, chiefly concerned with collective bargaining and working conditions, sets up a school and organizes a dramatic club for members to participate in. It would be misleading to think of the patronate as a function-
ally specific group, just as an association cannot be considered a functionally diffuse one.

Perhaps the Buddhist order came as close to specificity as any Siamese group, but its activities too were highly diffuse. The monastery was a part of each rural community, indeed, its core. Here every young man spent some time as a monk, perhaps also a period of novitiate as a boy. Here the community met for ceremonies and activities which could scarcely be called "recreational", or "social", or "educational", or "religious", because all of these elements or aspects entered into the activity. Here every stage in the life cycle was celebrated. The abbot could not be considered a purely religious "pastor" or "priest", because his functions were many-faceted, as leader, adviser, companion, recluse, doctor—how shall we characterize a role which was not just a combination of such apparently incompatible elements but an undifferentiated totality?

The Siamese administrative system was not a discrete structure interacting with these social groups, as American administrators interact with associations. Rather, the king and his court formed the apex of a social structure which may be likened to a cone. From the king to the humblest slave stretched a continuous fabric of interlacing particularistic groups. The king's role was as diffuse and many-faceted as that of his officials, family heads, monasteries.

Some writers on the modern Siamese family speak of its "loose structure". By this they mean that family obligations are not weighty. Family names formerly were not employed, and the use of formal and honorific titles apparently made it difficult to identify family connections, at least for outsiders.

It seems to me that this view, while valid in part, oversimplifies the reality. Do we have to assume homogeneity of the family structures in a society? A striking feature of the old Siamese culture was the vastly extended family system of the king himself. A large number of wives, brought together in the royal family, established affinity between the king and many other families, especially hereditary princes in outlying states or principalities. High princes of the royal family in turn had their own large establishments. Thus the royal family, including
its affinal relatives, must have been of fantastic size.

Instead of trying to fit a single model to every Siamese family, would it not be more accurate to use a sliding scale, according to which the size and influence of family varied directly with status: the higher the status, the larger and more influential the family; the lower, the less important, until one reached the small peasant household and the even more fragmented slave family? The system provided a basis for political order, since it made the king’s family the strongest, and linked other strong families to him by ties of kinship. Thus the family was not only the building block of society, but the administrative apex.

The nobles, whether hereditary or raised by royal appointment, with their patronates—a kind of “social family”—performed administrative tasks as a family would its household chores or tasks. Just as the administrative and economic systems were aspects of a redistributive pattern so the administrative and group structure were, identically, familistic. The role of king as super patron and super family head set the model for a descending order of patronates and families, just as it furnished the political and administrative keystone of the system.

What kind of “interests” could be brought into such an administrative system? They must all have been highly particularistic. A family does not aggregate specific functional interests. It cannot press for the adoption of a policy universally applicable to everyone. Instead, it seeks to promote the particular interests of its family members—an elevation in status, appointment as an official, enlargement of the number of clients, or a favourable judgment in a dispute. The administrative response is not to promulgate policies or promote general interests, but rather to make continuing series of judgments or choices, favouring this one, punishing that one, striving always to maintain order by preventing the rise to power of anyone seeking to displace the monarch. And each official, patron, family head, as one moves down the social scale, seeks, in his turn, to maintain or improve his status, to contain his rivals, to make suitable alliances, etc. The administrative order, in short, rested on a particularistic group structure, which it also helped to sustain.
What about the class structure? The Siamese system seems to have been neither a caste-like closed system, nor open enough to encourage easy mobility. Rather, I should consider it an intermediate type, something we might call a “sticky” class system. Descendants of the king and of noble families were degraded one rank each generation until they returned to commoner status. The king could also raise his favourites to noble status.

The system was too tight to permit the formation of a mandarinate recruited by examination, like the Chinese civil service, but it was not so closed as to produce a feudal aristocracy or ruling caste. Hence the king was able to maintain his supremacy, to achieve stronger royal unification than under feudalism, but not so firm a control system as in traditional bureaucratic societies. The administrative system, then, was loosely bureaucratic, or highly “prebendary”, in Max Weber’s terminology. By prebendary I mean that officials, while obtaining royal grants, depended largely on the services of their clients. Yet they were not hereditary, fief-holding nobles, either. The administrative order was clearly intermediate between feudal and bureaucratic.

With regard to the degree of separation between criteria of upper-class status, there was virtually none. At most, the top hierarchy of the Buddhist order were eminent in rectitude, but the king and prebendary officials constituted an elect, enjoying simultaneously the most favoured positions in power, wealth, and prestige. Correspondingly, separation of administrative functions, so far as it evolved, was limited in scope, ephemeral and changing. Nor did administration provide any security or protection for the emergence of autonomous spheres of wealth, learning, or prestige in the class structure.

Communications Network: Unmobilized

The language of Siam is Thai and, in this respect, Thailand is more fortunate than many of its neighbours who have polyglot populations. No doubt linguistic unity played an important part in helping the Siamese maintain their independence during the period of European imperial expansion. But even in
Thailand, there are some important linguistic minorities.

Perhaps most important in its consequences is the widespread use of Chinese by an immigrant community which plays a dominant role in the modern Thai economy and, even a century ago, provided the chief merchants for the conduct of the royal trade with China. According to an arbitrary fiction the Chinese, being immigrants and aliens, can conveniently be ignored in studies of Thai society. Unfortunately, this is merely a fiction because the Chinese happen to constitute a highly differentiated community which has a profound impact on politics and administration as well as on the economy.

In the south there is a second, quite large and increasingly differentiated Muslim, and Malay-speaking community. Other small agricultural minorities are to be found in border areas, especially Cambodian and Vietnamese. Most interesting, perhaps, are a great number of tribal peoples especially in the hills and mountains, who are divided into many language groups.

Thailand, then, shares the growing poly-communal differentiation of its neighbours, but the phenomenon is less pronounced than elsewhere. A century ago, one might scarcely have been aware of differentiation, since the population was predominantly un-mobilized. People who have not been brought into a large-scale communications net, especially through the use of the media of mass communication, can be called an “underlying” or “un-mobilized” population. The traditional outlook on life prevails among the un-mobilized. The horizon is set by the kith and kin with whom one has daily, face-to-face contact. Outside this circle one knows, perhaps all too well, about the patron and compulsory labour service but, however onerous the duty may be, it is no doubt considered also a welcome change of routine and a chance to glimpse the exciting and but dimly imagined world of the awesome and the great, the majesty of the almighty king which blends indistinguishably into the world of gods and unseen, but powerful spirits.

In traditional Siam, messages could not be broadcast to a large audience, not only because the technology was lacking, but because the very forms of address did not permit it. The court
language was filled with Sanskrit-derived words and deferential forms, while the ordinary people spoke a plain tongue similar to that of the Chinese. A man of high station, speaking to one below him, would use different words than if he were speaking to an equal, and again more noble and complex expressions if speaking to a superior. Even men and women must use different forms of speech, reflecting their proper stations in life, as they do to this day.

If the population was un-mobilized, the question of assimilation did not arise, for assimilation becomes an important factor only to the degree that mobilization has taken place. The ideas, symbols, policies, interests of the court were only of real concern to those in direct contact with the court. Not that a certain homogeneity of basic myths did not prevail, for the common outlook everywhere accepted the wholeness of action, its sacral basis, the hierarchic structuring of society, and the meaninglessness of mere natural events in this world except as they corresponded to ancestral or supernatural gestures, events, or attitudes which, somehow, brought order and meaning out of meaningless chaos. But the specific content of myth and symbol could vary as one moved from community to community, and the pressure that modern man feels for conformity and consensus was not present.

The existence of an un-mobilized population had a dual impact on administration—it limited the extent to which public interests could be aggregated and articulated, it inhibited any attempt to impose responsibility or responsiveness upon government. But at the same time, it also hampered any governmental efforts to control the population, to set up norms or policies and police their implementation.

True enough, the very inability of a population to impose responsibility on government meant that rulers were free to be arbitrary. Consequently a monarch could, if he wished, indulge his arbitrary whims, whether he desired to live licentiously or become a mystic, to hoard up treasure or spend it wildly, to whip and execute others, or heap honours upon them. And the same lack of restraint, license for arbitrary acts, prevailed to a progressively lower degree as one moved down the social pyramid
from king to commoner. Without mobilization, in other words, there can scarcely emerge machinery to impose upon rulers the rule of law.

Whereas mobilization of a population draws the people and government into a tightly woven network of inter-action, the un-mobilized condition leaves the fabric very loose, with maximum opportunity for privatized, personal and even arbitrary behaviour. Under those conditions we cannot draw fine lines between fact and fancy, between the legal and illegal, between formal and informal, between real and unreal, public and private, rights and duties. All such distinctions arise in a world under growing pressure, where people live more closely together, must adjust to larger circles, and gear their personal activities into more interdependent economic, social, and political machines.

But surely, you may ask, if Siam had such a loosely structured system, why did it not fragment into a thousand autonomous communities? What kind of cement held it together? The answer has already been suggested, but to give it specifically, we must examine the nature of authority and the traditional symbol system.

The Symbol System: Sacral

Writers about Siam never fail to mention its White Elephant which played such an important part in court ceremonies and, even today, is the subject of an elaborate and ancient ritual. To the outsider and the materialistic modern mind, the elephant cult may appear a quaint and fantastic remnant of unintelligible custom, but to the archaic Siamese it was no mere ceremony or tradition. The Elephant, indeed, was the vehicle for reincarnated deity, as was the King himself.

Through the King, the Elephant, Palace and Temple the sacral world, which alone had true meaning, made its theophany, its divine manifestation. In the royal rituals the world was renewed, order restored out of chaos, life assured, the fertility of fields and birth of progeny made possible. The test of a monarch was not his personal life for—like all merely temporal events—
this was irrelevant. The test was rather the events of nature, whether harmony prevailed and life flourished, or whether chaos, death and suffering ruled the earth. Such events manifested supernatural forces which the world of nature merely imitated. It is no doubt as hard for the modern man with his this-worldly historicism and materialism to comprehend this perspective as it would have been for a traditional mind to understand our way of looking at the world.\(^3\)

I shall not attempt here to describe or even to discuss in any detail the complex ramifications of the system of thought which informed the ancient institution of divine kingship. The original practices have long since been intertwined with later doctrines and customs. In Siam, the introduction of Buddhism heavily coloured and re-shaped the original system. Indeed, some writers attribute the Siamese system of government, and the perspectives of its people, to Buddhist doctrine. No doubt the Siamese kings became devout Buddhists, supported the Buddhist order and even conceived of their own roles in strictly Buddhistic fashion.

In the same way Christian kings in the West who received their coronations at the hands of Archbishops and Popes considered themselves devout Christians, and claimed a divine mandate for their royal authority. Nevertheless, we can scarcely claim that Christian teachings established the kingship, since we know the institution antedated Christianity, nor can we even find a very good Biblical basis for the establishment of monarchy. Indeed, American Christians seem to think that republi-

\(^3\) Heine-Geldern, Robert, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia" (Cornell, Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 18, 1956).

canism is as consistent with Christianity as kingship, and they often argue that it provides the best foundation for democracy.

The religion and institution of kingship, then, is older than Buddhism or Christianity. It has its own archaic basis which may be encrusted by the traditions, practices, and symbols of any religion, but cannot be attributed to it. The Siamese court as a matter of fact, owes as much to Brahmanic ritual as to Buddhistic, and to this day a group of hereditary court Brahmans preside at major royal ceremonies, especially coronations and cremations.

The myth and formula of the Siamese monarchy was provided by the Thammasat, from the Pali Dhammasattha. The King "abides steadfast", upholding the ten virtues of almsgiving, morality, liberality, rectitude, gentleness, self-restriction, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance and non-obstruction. His duties include the four lines of conduct, sassa,medha or knowledge of food organization; purisamedha or knowledge of men; sammapāsā or winning the people's heart, and vācāpeyya or gentle words. Prince Dhani, however, considers these ethical interpretations as later Buddhistic accretions, and attributes the origin of these terms to ancient sacrifices prescribed for monarchs in the Satapatha Brāhmana. The first was the asvamedha or horse-sacrifice; the second the purushamedha or human-sacrifice; the third, the vājapeya ritual, and the fourth, an unidentified ritual equivalent to the Sanskrit samyāprāsa.4

It is clear that the duties of the king are to "abide steadfast", to perform sacred rituals, but not to govern in an active, administrative sense. As Prince Dhani writes, "The function of the king was not to legislate but to protect the people and preserve the sacred law". According to the Buddhist Canon, the king, through righteousness, might attain the dignity of a chakravartin or universal sovereign. After the Khmer Hindu influence became strong, he adopted the trident of Siva, the discus of Vishnu, and included in his title the Dibyadebavatār or Incarnation of the Celestial Gods.

Once we comprehend this traditional, sacral orientation, ques-

4 Prince Dhani, op. cit., p. 166.
tions of government and administration fall into a new perspective. For a court to exhibit the most lavish luxury would not be regarded as an oppressive mis-use of funds, as we might consider such conspicuous display by a democratic President. The more luxurious the court, the more it imitates the divine, and hence the more likely it will be to bring life and prosperity to the earth. The king cannot, after all, be disciplined as we would a mere human, and a representative. After all, is the king not himself a god, a reincarnation? To serve the king and to increase the glory and magnificence of the court was a joy and a life-giving act. Hence no one could begrudge the service or envy the ruler.

Authority, moreover, was not derived from the people, but from sacred sources. To speak in tones of command, as from above, and to demand obsequious attitudes and humble obedience was to reinforce the sacral basis of authority. For a king to act in any other way would have been to cast doubts on his actual possession by the god. Officials who acted in the god’s name, or who derived authority themselves from a sacral mandate, similarly had to demonstrate their higher powers in manner and deed.

From the perspective of the common people, submission to the court was not, as in our views, a matter of political oppression if the ruler were not sufficiently responsive to the demands and interests of the ruled, but was rather a way of assuring life, prosperity, fertility. Not to submit was to endanger life, to risk chaos and disorder, famine and sterility.

I do not want to suggest that this ideal vision of the traditional monarchy was fully realized in practice. No doubt clients resented their obligatory service, and ugly intrigues against the king took place in the court. After all, the Siamese were human too, and just as we fail to live up to our ideal image of democratic equalitarianism in America, so the Siamese could not fully realize in practice the patterns set by a sacred archetype. But we must try to understand the ideal image, first because it was approximated in actual practice, and second, because it provided the symbols and vocabulary in terms of which everyone viewed and understood his society, government and universe.
We must see also that this way of viewing the world made no provision for dividing life into separate categories—for economics, religion, politics, administration, etc. Everything as a whole, and the king and court nobles, although administrators, were no more specifically administrators than they were politicians or merchants or priests. We can analytically split up these—and other aspects—of their total roles, but in their minds they were acting parts which could not be partitioned. That a patron should differentiate between the "public" and the "private" aspects of his behaviour could not have been imagined, nor could a king have distinguished in his mind between the functions of a court ceremonial as a religious, or a political, or a personal event.

Obviously in such a society, there could be no separate doctrine or study of "public administration", any more than there could be separate teachings on economics or religion. Religious ideas were embodied in myths and teachings which also related to politics, administration, and economics but not *per se*—more realistically, they simply related to life. The Siamese could have a Dharma, but no POSDCORB.

*Power Structure: Arbitrary but not Effective*

Foreign observers have characterized the Siamese monarchy as one of the most absolute in world history. They note the symbols of total obeisance imposed in the king's presence, his arbitrary power of life and death, punishment and promotion, his sacral pretensions and the magnificence of the court and harem.

It seems to me that these impressions were superficial. They mistook the surface for an underlying reality. Our look at the myth of divine kingship shows us why the king had to be treated like a god, why the court had to be magnificent. Our study of the unmobilized communications net shows why a framework for imposing a rule of law upon the king was lacking. If a god chose to be arbitrary, who could resist his will?

But the same factors also restricted, or reflected the limitations on, the king's effective power. Were he to give up the cere-
monies and the attentions to his royal family, devoting himself to national problems and policies, he must thereby undermine the image of himself as divine, for he would then be acting the part of a man rather than a god, and he would also be impinging on the prerogatives and traditional way of life of his court and people. But even if he were to devote himself in this way to administrative tasks, he would lack the machinery, the communications net, for transmitting policy to the country and carrying it out in day-to-day affairs. Nor would he have sufficiently accurate sources of information to construct a reliable picture of events and problems throughout the realm as a basis for making decisions.

The strength of royal control over the country was tested by the threat of European imperialism. One by one, border provinces or districts were nibbled off by expanding British and French power. It became clear that effective control by Bangkok over these areas was negligible. During the last half of the nineteenth century the great reforming monarch, Chulalongkorn, transformed the administration. One of his brothers, Prince Damrong, was put in charge of a new Ministry of Interior, and charged with the creation of an effective bureaucracy, using commissioners to bring princes and bosses under central control. In Damrong’s autobiography you will find an account of the chaotic conditions he discovered in the provinces as he began an unprecedented series of tours throughout the country. Local magnates—ranging from high patrons to parochial strong men—ran affairs much as they pleased. All deferred in awe to the sacred power of the king, but one reason for their willingness to recognize the court was its very willingness to leave local questions and rulers alone, provided traditional dues and services to the crown were forthcoming.

This interpretation helps us understand the arbitrary character of royal power, and the apparently whimsical official behaviour. If the court lacked effective power to control the countryside, the people were also unable to control the officials and the king. There could be no “rule of law” imposing restraints upon administrators or sovereign, nor could private “rights”, such as
“property” and “contract”, be protected against molestation.

Power and Decision-Making

The impression of vast power exercised by the absolute monarch is based, I think, upon confusion in the use of the word “power”. The concept of political power in Western usage is related to the “decision-making” process. It is assumed that, in any society, some decisions have to be made which affect everyone, or at least large sectors, of the population. Such decisions may be made by one person, by a small group, or with the effective participation of a large part of the population. The smaller the degree of participation, the more “autocratic” the system; the larger the scale of participation, the more “democratic”.

We can study decisions from two perspectives: first what goes into the making of a decision and second, what results from decisions that have been made. Let us call the first perspective the “input” system, and the second, the “output”. Of course, these both refer to aspects of a single entity, just as water flowing through a pipe is one process, but it may be seen from two viewpoints as what goes in and what comes out. Similarly, our impressions of a political system vary with the perspective we use.

From the input perspective, we define “power” as the degree of participation of an actor who shares in the making of decisions. If all the decisions are made by the king, and he is not influenced by anyone else, then he monopolizes power and the system is autocratic. In a democracy, although government must legitimize, promulgate, and supervise the enforcement of a decision, thousands of individuals may participate in shaping it. From this input perspective, there can be no doubt that the Thai court, and especially the king, was very “powerful”.

Taking the output perspective, however, we define “power” by the results of the decision-making process. To what extent are decisions in fact made, i.e. policies adopted which can be and are enforced. In old chronicles and descriptions of court life we often read of a King sitting on his throne and issuing commands.
A scribe quickly writes down the order and then intones: "So it is ordered, so it is done!" But is it, in fact, "done"?

To inform the king that it is not "done", would be to incur his wrath and hence risk dishonour and even death. As a result kings often lived in a make-believe land where they imagined their orders were carried out, as the wishes of an omnipotent god might instantly be translated into fact, perhaps with the hurling of a thunderbolt to punish the disobedient. But without a continuous and reliable flow of incoming information, they could not adapt their decisions to the "capability" of administration nor to the realities of the interests involved, the technical aspects of the situation, etc.

We reach the conclusion, then, that although many royal commands may be issued, such "decisions" often do not reach very far. Of course an order to honour one man, degrade or punish another, to hold a feast or distribute treasure, could be more easily implemented because the king could personally see the results. But if a traditional monarch wished to launch a social reform, build a railroad, initiate an agricultural extension programme, or start a textile industry, he would have found such decisions beyond his capacity to implement, not only technologically but also in terms of the administrative machinery needed. In terms of "output", then, the power of the royal court was extremely limited. In order to understand the paradox of royal "power" and weakness we must go more deeply into some theoretical distinctions.

*Formal and Substantive Structures*

At the end of my first lecture, I spoke of the similarity between the models of the administrative bureau and the market as structures for the making of rational decisions, for choosing between alternative uses of scarce means to accomplish predetermined goals. I have already referred to Polanyi's concept of "redistributive" systems as an alternative economic structure to the "market". He calls the model of rational action developed by the economists, involving the market and scarcity concepts, "formal economics". "Substantive economics" refers to all so-
cial structures for satisfying man's material moans, including the redistributive, the "reciprocative", and other possible patterns.

Similarly we can refer to the "bureau", in which rational decisions are taken to maximize output in terms of agreed objectives and scarce means, as a "formal" administrative model. The formality of the model arises from its correspondence to an administrative "formula" which not only prescribes legitimate "forms" of administrative action, but also distinguishes administration from other forms of action.

Substantive administration, by contrast, includes any output of a bureaucracy, whether determined by rational choices or not, and whether or not formally distinguished from non-administrative action. The formal "bureau", then, is one type of substantive administration.

I shall use a similar distinction between the "formal" and the "substantive" in analysing power structures. By "substantive" politics I refer to any system whereby power is allocated in or for a society. Among the various ways in which power can be allocated is one which we will call the "formal model".

**Formal Political Model**

It is generally taken for granted that there exists a political process in which policies are chosen on behalf of a society and then implemented or enforced in that society. It is further assumed that these policies are made in accordance with a "political formula" which specifies who shall participate, and what procedures shall be followed. Policies are considered "authoritative" to the extent that the formula has been observed. This process of choosing and implementing policies is called "decision-making". The formula also defines the parts or aspects of the decision-making process which are considered specifically "political".

On the basis of such a model, it is possible to ask how decisions are made, and what influence different actors have in the process—the "input" perspective. It is also possible to examine how decisions are carried out—the "output" perspective. The
input-output concept as applied to the formal political model obviously resembles the supply-demand concept as used in formal economics.

The formal political model is the unexpressed presupposition of most of our studies of politics and public administration. However, the literature sometimes recognizes the possibility of decisions being made without formal authority. We can refer to such activities as the exercise of "control", or "naked power", not "power" in the formal sense. A gangster, for example, who compels a crowd of people to surrender their money to him, is able to control their behaviour, but he acts without authority and hence without formal power. To say that one "has power to act" is precisely to imply that he has authority, as well as the capacity to control others.

Another possibility is recognized, where authority is claimed but cannot be implemented. The Japanese Emperor in Tokugawa times, for example, had authority but no power, or at best mere "formalistic power". Any act is "formal" when it conforms to a formula, but "formalistic" when it lacks effective implementation. Power is "formal" to the extent that control is exercised in conformity with a formula, "formalistic" when it cannot control.

In terms of these definitions, we see that the "formal political model" presupposes the existence of a political formula, and a condition in which effective control coincides with formal authority.

The formal model also assumes the possibility of distinguishing political power from other forms of influence. You will remember that in my discussion of the American class system I spoke of "weal" as including all valued characteristics, such as power, wealth, prestige, learning, righteousness, skill, etc. We may say that in so far as anyone enjoys weal, or is likely to enjoy it, he possesses "influence". If I have money, for example, I can buy a pair of shoes. With his gun a robber might also induce the shop-keeper to part with a pair of shoes. If he is a religious man, the store owner might give shoes to a monk in the expectation of earning "merit". Perhaps family loyalty would induce him to present a pair of shoes to his uncle. All of
these are examples of forms of influence but not of power.

It is apparent that power is a form of influence, but it may or may not be clearly separated from other forms of influence. An "elect", possessing all forms of weal, would exercise power and many other kinds of influence as well. "Rulers", in contrast, could exercise power but not the other forms of influence, at least not to a great extent. A man with power but without wealth clearly can make political decisions, but not buy expensive things.

Let us call the power of rulers, lacking other forms of influence, "distinct power"; the power of elects, which includes other forms of influence, is "indistinct power". When power is distinct, other forms of influence are also separated, and may be called "distinct influence".

A "formal political structure", then, refers to any system of "formal" and "distinct" power.

Even under the assumptions of a formal power structure, those with distinct influence may affect the decisions made by the formal power holders. The provision of information, the use of wealth, the casting of votes, etc. can all influence the decisions of those vested with formal authority. Even civil servants in a formal bureau can exercise such influence without having formal power. In so far as such influence is exercised, it may be called "informal power", as distinguished from "formal power". Whenever the officials or politicians vested with authority by the political formula become mere puppets of the influential holders of informal power, the situation changes to one of formalistic and naked power: the formal becomes formalistic, the informal becomes naked. When this happens, however, we no longer have a "formal power structure", but a different kind of substantive political system, to which I shall return later.

Although the extent to which substantive politics in any society approximates the formal political model surely varies within wide limits, I dare say they have never been identical. The separation between distinct power and other kinds of influence is incomplete; and formal authority is divorced to a certain extent from effective control, even in the countries where
government comes nearest to the formal political model.

Nevertheless, substantive politics in America has approximated this model to such an extent that we fail to make a clear distinction between the ideal type and the reality. We have the same logical problem as in economics where the formal (market and scarcity) model is confused with the substantive economic system.

The result of this confusion between two different but nearly coinciding concepts is that our writers frequently examine the logical and normative implications of the formal model, and sometimes study the behavioural characteristics of substantive politics, without making clear which they are doing. The results are usually not fatal to our objectives in America because the two structures are sufficiently similar to each other so that generalizations about one apply roughly to the other also. But this confusion is a major obstacle to clear understanding of a political system like that of traditional Siam. We shall have to devise new models and terminology in order to make this distinction fully apparent.

The Archaic Political Model

In order to appreciate the nature of a substantive political system quite different from the formal structure, let us create an alternative model. It would have characteristics the opposite of the formal: namely "indistinct" and "non-formal" power.

By indistinct power I mean that power is not distinguished from other forms of influence. In other words, the elite (power holders) would be an elect (holders of all types of influence, wealth, prestige, righteousness, etc.) rather than a group of rulers (holders of distinct power only).

An elect would hold its position by virtue of a diffuse myth and formula not relating to power and the right to make decisions, but dealing with such general topics as the creation of the earth, forces of nature, gods and goddesses, the genealogy of rulers, etc. Power, righteousness, wealth, prestige, and knowledge, are all mingled inextricably in such a way of thinking. Instead of a "political formula" you might think of this as a
"general formula", since it explains and validates the rituals which are regarded as the basis of all life and order. If this way of thinking provides no political formula, then there can be no "formal power" as a distinct entity. Rather, power would appear only as an incidental by-product or aspect of something much broader in scope. Hence we can think of power in such a situation as "non-formal", or perhaps even better as "incidental", as an indistinct aspect of influence.

If there is no basis for formal power, then "effective power" can scarcely be distinguished from "formal", and the contrast between "naked" and "formalistic" power would not arise. Similarly it would be impossible to distinguish between "formal" and "informal" power. Let us call a power structure of this type "archaic". We can then say that we have distinguished, as polar opposite types of substantive political systems the "formal" and "archaic".

I do not say that traditional Siam was a pure example of the archaic type. Just as I said that the American system approximates, but is by no means identical with, the formal model; so the Siamese system approximated, without being equal to, the archaic model. Having said this, however, I must add that it is easier to understand traditional Siam if we think of it as similar to the archaic model, rather than as similar to the formal model.

Someone will now surely point out that even in ancient Siam some decisions must have been made, and hence we should be able to apply the decision-making, formal model. Even if true, this argument does not affect the utility of the models. To illustrate, let us think of two geometrical models, a plane surface, and a sphere. Look at the top of a table, and a tennis ball, as examples. Now think of the surface of the earth: is it more like a plane or a sphere? For centuries men thought of the earth as being "flat", and this proved adequate for their needs. But when Columbus wanted to find a new route to India by going West instead of East from Europe, he could only do so after thinking of the world as a sphere. In the modern "air age", we often say the world is "really" round, but for some purposes we still treat it as though it were flat. A map of
New Delhi, or even of India, for example, probably uses a projection on a flat surface.

In political terms, American government no doubt has some "archaic" features, and the Siamese absolute monarchy probably had some "formal" political characteristics. But we will perceive the overall significant features of each system more clearly if we think of substantive politics in America as similar to the formal pattern, in Siam as like the archaic.

**Decisional and Ordering Functions**

In talking about the formal political structure, I mentioned the decision-making process, and spoke of it as having "input" and "output" aspects. In the archaic model, we have also seen that the conscious establishment of policies is negligible, and correspondingly it is almost meaningless to speak of "input" and "output". Let us examine these concepts a bit more closely and see what is meant by input-output and how it relates to decision-making.

Let us think of decision-making as a "function", i.e. as a result of some pattern of activity which is a "structure". Then the formal political structure has the function of making basic decisions. Similarly the formal administrative bureau has the function of implementing these basic decisions, a process which involves, of course, the making of secondary or instrumental decisions. To the extent that such decisions may involve basic value choices, they are political in character. To the extent that they are value-neutral, i.e. tests of "rationality" and "efficiency" can be applied, they are purely administrative. In the formal model the making of political decisions becomes the duty of politicians, administrative decisions, of administrators.

Now, obviously concrete or actual bureaucrats make both political and administrative decisions. Only in the formal model, in the abstract, does the official make only administrative decisions. It may not even be socially desirable to have a bureaucracy that is purely administrative in function. But the model enables us to describe an existing government according to the degree of its similarity to the ideal type.
In the archaic model, by contrast, policies are not consciously chosen and implemented. Hence there can be no distinct political and administrative structures. This is not to say that the archaic elect have no function, but their functions cannot be well understood in terms of making and enforcing decisions. Let us instead, say that the main function of an archaic system is to create "order".

Perhaps an analogy from electricity will clarify the subject. Consider first an electric motor which is run by feeding a current into it. The electricity provides the input, the mechanical energy of a rotating wheel is the output. This is like the decisional function of a formal political structure.

The ordering function of an archaic political structure is like the effect on a mass of iron filings resting on a piece of glass when you place a magnet under the glass. Immediately all the filings rearrange themselves into a neat pattern, oriented toward the positive and negative poles of the magnet. Order is created, but the system is static—no input and output flow can be discerned.

The electric motor analogy is useful in suggesting another characteristic of the decisional model. You will notice that the motor does not run unless the electric current makes a complete circuit—wires must be provided to conduct the current back to its source. A break in the circuit, such as we make with a "switch", halts the flow, and stops the motor from running. In the same way the decisional process in government requires the establishment of circuits for the exercise of formal and informal power between the rulers and the ruled.

If rulers try to control the people's behaviour without in any way responding to the demands, interests, and communications of the people, they cannot be successful. It is like trying to run a motor with only one wire for the electric current to flow to the machine, but no return wire to close the circuit.

Effective control over behaviour—the power output in substantive politics—varies with the degree of "politicization" of the population. By politicization I refer to the extent to which people act in the light of the political (or power) situation, and the effect of their actions on that situation. As a population is
mobilized, as its economy becomes more interdependent so that everyone becomes concerned about how it works, and as rules and regulations begin to affect them more intimately, they become involved in governmental decisions. Consequently they begin to take part in making as well as in carrying out such decisions. The more politicized the population, the less the resistance in the circuit, and hence the greater the power output in the system.

In America, as well as in other industrialized countries, a high degree of politicization has taken place, and so the population is mobilized for intensive participation in decision-making and executing processes. Indeed, the classification of phases or aspects of the decisional process has become quite complicated. We are all familiar with the classical categories of "legislative", "executive", and "judicial" processes which provide the basis for the establishment of three major branches of government in the United States. All presuppose extensive popular participation.

A more elaborate classification has been proposed by Harold Lasswell. He suggests that decision-making involves the processes of "intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal, and termination".\textsuperscript{5} It is unnecessary to examine these categories here, but I mention them to show that the decisional process can become very elaborate, as different aspects or stages are distinguished from each other, and separate structures or institutions can be established to perform each one. To the extent that this happens in the United States or elsewhere, substantive political and administrative practice approaches the formal political and administrative models.

More should be added also about the "ordering" function. The word brings to mind two connotations which are applicable to archaic politics. First, it refers to the maintenance of "order"—as suggested in the analogy of the magnet and iron filings. I refer to social order, as between human groups, and also to universal order, as between man and his environment, both natural and supernatural. In this sense the function of

\textsuperscript{5} The Decision Process; Seven Categories of Functional Analysis (College Park Md., Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, 1956).
government is to turn chaos into order. Obviously this ideal implies sacred as well as secular functions. The king as judge is more typical than the king as “law-giver”, because in judging the ruler re-establishes or creates order where it is threatened by chaos. But the primary means for establishing order lies in the performance of sacred rites, and the recitation of sacred myth. The king imitates archetypal acts of gods and ancestors, but he cannot innovate or re-shape society of nature.

In a second, and inferior sense, the word “order” suggests the giving of orders, and I believe this is the typical form of action in traditional substantive politics. Orders are given, not just because rulers can be arbitrary, but because the source of authority is sacral, and hence commands, to be legitimate, must appear as theophanies, as divine injunctions. For a policy to be laid down as a collective decision would imply that men, rather than gods, were the source. How could such a decision have legitimate authority? Only the divine word could be obligatory, and only the vehicle for divine manifestation could promulgate such a word. Hence the form of ordering is inherent in the model, but the content of orders is traditional, not innovational or creative.

To apply this model to administration, I would say that the acts of officials, so far as they were administrative in character, could be called “arbitrary” and “non-effective”. I prefer arbitrary to “autocratic” since autocracy implies a decisional model, namely, the autocrat makes policy decisions which are implemented. In the archaic model we have an elect which is as much symbolic figurehead as governing body. Its non-ritual behaviour is little restricted by laws and public opinion, and hence “arbitrary”. In the ritual, however, traditions must be rigidly followed.

On the other hand, acts of the elect also have minimal direct impact on the population, and hence are non-effective. I do not use the word “ineffective”, because that implies failure to carry out what one sets out to do. Modern administration is effective or ineffective to the extent that its programmes and policies (its decisions) are fully implemented. But where programme and policies are not launched, one cannot say that administration is
“ineffective” since the non-existent cannot be effected either. We need, therefore, a third category, the “non-effective”, to characterize administration in the “ordering” model.

_Ancient Siamese Politics: Archaic and Ordering_

These categories now give us a basis, I think, for clarifying the essential differences between the traditional Siamese and the modern American systems of politics and administration. They help us to get away from our preoccupation with the distinction between “democratic” and “autocratic” government as the fundamental criteria for classifying systems.

I do not wish to imply that this distinction is not of great importance, but it arises only in the context of societies which approximate the formal and decisional models. Once the existence of a governmental system with a mobilized, industrialized population is assumed, then the question arises, “Who will participate in making decisions, and by what means?” The questions about power become primarily concerned with relative participation in the decisional processes. The wider the range of participation, the more “democratic” the system; the smaller the range, the more “autocratic”.

These distinctions do not apply to the ancient Siamese system. We must, rather, start with the more basic classification of systems as “formal” or “archaic”, as “decisional” or “ordering”. The democratic-autocratic dichotomy does not apply to an archaic system. It may be arbitrary but not autocratic, since the rulers are not subject to popular control, but neither can they impose and implement far-reaching policies. The archaic system is non-effective, but not democratic, since it cannot regiment the lives of the people, but neither can the people control government.

Just as a redistributive economy cannot be regarded as either monopolistic or competitive, concepts which apply only under market conditions, so an archaic political system cannot be democratic or autocratic. The Siamese traditional system was more archaic than formal, more ordering than decisional. Hence the king, while arbitrary, was not autocratic, as I have defined
the term. The rule was non-effective, but not democratic.

These usages will sound strange to you because we are used to thinking of an absolute monarchy as “autocratic” and “un-democratic”. I have gone through this involved explanation of concepts precisely to be able to show why these terms are unsuitable and create false images in our minds.

However, this is not to say that, by 1932 when the Thai revolution established a constitutional monarchy, these concepts were still inapplicable. Indeed, the whole process of modernization which reached its height under King Chulalongkorn brought about a gradual transformation of Siamese society and government from the archaic toward the formal system; from ordering toward decisional functions. Consequently the government became progressively more “autocratic” and “un-democratic”, with the result that signs of revolutionary tension and pressure began to appear. I shall turn, therefore, to an analysis of the character of these changes and their effect on modern Thai administration.

Modern Thai Administration

We can summarize what has happened in terms of each of the variables that I have discussed.

In economics, the growth of public administration, with its increasing complexity, difficulty and cost has taken place more rapidly than the productivity of the economy, with the result that a tremendous budgetary squeeze has occurred. This accounts for low salaries, lack of needed equipment and facilities, and many concomitant administrative difficulties.

Or, thinking substantively, the traditional redistributive system has been displaced but not replaced by the market system—in other words, new market structures have been introduced but old redistributive structures still remain. Correspondingly, we find in public administration a mixture of new kinds of market systems mingled with older types of status and redistributive systems.

In the organizational sphere, associations have been introduced into Thailand, and play a growingly important role in
government, but the older type of particularistic family, religious, and local groupings still play a very important part in public administration. We might think of changes in the class structure as involving a gradual loosening of status barriers, movement from a “sticky” to a “less sticky” or a semi-open system.

But this implies more homogeneity than is probably true. Perhaps a better way to think of the change is as a “kaleidoscopic” process, in which shifting and overlapping patterns appear—in some sectors fairly rapid mobility may occur, in others traditional barriers to movement remain; or alternatively, existing strata are not related to each other in intelligible fashion, considerable variety exists in the way people would evaluate the relative class position of others. When we take into account the relationship between the different communities—Thai and alien, especially the Chinese—those discontinuities become more striking.

These signs of structural transformation in class relationships are reflected in similar upheavals in bureaucratic stratification. The military coup, for example, provides opportunities for military officers to make sudden jumps in social position, so that men who would normally have to spend years attaining top rank by seniority find themselves catapulted into posts of great power, carrying opportunities for prestige and enrichment.

The communications network has been marked by considerable mobilization and some, but less extensive, assimilation. The widespread use of the Thai language, and the extensive practice of a single religion have both been positive factors to support assimilation. Because Thailand has not mobilized so rapidly as most other Southeast Asian countries, and because of linguistic and religious homogeneity, it has probably assimilated more fully than other countries in the region. Nevertheless, signs of differentiation are apparent. They are most obvious in the relations between the Chinese and Thai communities, and to a lesser degree in relations with the Malay-Muslim population. Mobilization has, so far, affected the tribal societies to such a small degree that little differentiation is yet apparent in those areas.
Another pattern of differentiation arose between the symbols of absolute monarchy and those of modern constitutionalism and democracy. The old royal elite was unable to maintain assimilation as it simultaneously promoted mobilization by establishing higher education and sending young men abroad for advanced study. It was precisely from this foreign educated group that the challenge to royal power came in the 1932 revolution.

It is also apparent that the degree of differentiation in Thailand was not so extreme as in countries like Egypt and Iraq where new elite elements completely eliminated the old. In Thailand, differentiation came in a moderate form, and the grip of the royal elite was sufficiently loose so that the revolutionary outburst took an extremely mild form. The result was compromise and the relatively easy establishment of "constitutional monarchy", members of the old royal elite continued to hold positions of influence, if not of power.

The pattern of administration is, accordingly, one in which communication between bureaucracy and public is far more intensive than under the old regime, but still limited as compared with most modern countries. At the same time, the appearance of differentiated communities—especially the Chinese—has introduced characteristic communications barriers and difficulties, although in a less extreme form than in many other countries.

The shifting *symbol* system has similarly produced administrative consequences. The old sacral and royal basis of authority (the archaic model) has been undermined and a new parliamentary structure (the formal model) based on the myth of popular sovereignty has been introduced. The new system, however, is not widely understood or accepted, and lacks a strong foundation in the class and organization structure. Consequently it operates to only a limited degree, remaining largely an ornamental façade.

In the absence of consensus on either the traditional (archaic) or the parliamentary (formal) basis of authority, effective control gravitates toward those who are best able to wield the instruments of naked power, notably the military men. Whoever is able to seize power, however, must try to legitimize his position in order to obtain the benefits of authority, and hence
tends to rely on both the old and the new myths and formulae—seeking by both a royal proclamation and a parliamentary mandate to institutionalize his rule.

But recognizing the weakness of both bases of authority, leaders rely also on a third source of authority which we may call the "charismatic", i.e. the appeal of personality and the creation of a personal following.

A similar ambiguity in the norms followed in public administration naturally follows. To a considerable extent old patterns of status relationship, new contract-based and work-oriented situations, and purely personal charismatic situations are mixed together in a complex assortment that cannot easily be untangled. This situation can be called "poly-normative", which is to say that a variety of old and new value systems are intermingled without coherence. To a considerable extent individuals lack adequate norms for the guidance of personal behaviour because of the conflict and incompatibility of norms, and hence fall back on a kind of "normless" behaviour, in which personal advantage opportunism prevails, rather than any sense of guiding ethical principles and social goals.

Finally, in regard to the political framework, formal bureaucratic power as an "input" has increased at the same time substantive political "output" has also grown. This reflects, again, displacement but not replacement of ordering by decisional structures. With increasing mobilization, and the spread of associations established in large part as a result of governmental rather than private initiatives, the control structure of the rulers has considerably expanded in weight. Although a contractual legal system has been installed, it has been applied particularly to foreign property and trade as a means of eliminating extraterritoriality. But its internal application, especially as a control over arbitrary bureaucratic action, has been less thorough-going.

The result is a considerable expansion of bureaucratic power in the formal, input sense, accompanied by some, but relatively less increase of power in the substantive, output sense. This kind of change encourages bureaucrats to spend a good deal of their time attempting to promote their personal or expediency
interests at the expense of programme goals, or principled interests, which, often enough, are incompatible with formal policies. Intra-bureaucratic struggles arise to a marked degree, and the details of administrative action can be understood only in the light of how they affect the relative power position of the actors, rather than in terms of their relationship to programme goals and public or clientele interests.  

**Heterogeneity, Formalism and Overlapping**

In concluding this lecture, I should like to speak about three general characteristics which seem to me to result from a mixture of traditional Siamese practices and the new elements introduced as a response to the threat of Western imperialism. These characteristics are “heterogeneity”, “formalism”, and “overlapping”.

By **heterogeneity** I refer simply to the simultaneous presence, side by side, of quite different kinds of systems, practices and viewpoints. The existence of heterogeneity naturally makes it difficult to describe a situation, because whenever you try to generalize about it, especially from a few examples, someone will say “No, I can think of cases which are quite different.” Secondly, heterogeneity creates specific administrative problems, especially because of the contradictory and often incompatible interests and needs of the population.

By **formalism** I wish to distinguish the extent to which a discrepancy exists between the prescriptive and the descriptive,

---

6 The foregoing observations apply to the contemporary Thai administrative situation, a set of categories or “models” which I have presented elsewhere as tools for the analysis of “transitional societies”. For further details on these models, see, “Prismatic Society and Financial Administration”, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, June 1960, “The Bazaar—Canteen Model”, *Philippine Sociological Review*, Vol. 6 (1958) nos. 3 and 4, pp. 6-59; and “Social Sciences and Public Administration”, *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, April 1959. My original framework for this analysis is described in “Agraria and Industria”, in William Siffin (ed.), *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Indiana University Press, 1957).
between formal and effective power, between the impression given by constitution, laws and regulations, organization charts and statistics, and actual practices and facts of government and society. The greater the discrepancy between the formal and effective, the more formalistic is a system.

Related to formalism, perhaps as manifestation or result, is the phenomenon of *overlapping*. By this term I mean the extent to which what is described as “administrative” behaviour is actually determined by non-administrative criteria, i.e. by political, economic, social, religious or other factors. Similarly what purports to be “economic” turns out to be much influenced by non-economic considerations; political structures are to a considerable extent non-political; etc.

My next undertaking will be to illustrate and elaborate on these concepts, especially to show how they help us to understand administrative realities. However, since the phenomena in question can often be seen more clearly in the Philippines than in Thailand, I shall delay the discussion until the next lecture.

However, I shall offer you Thai as well as Philippine examples of these characteristics. The striking fact is that, although the background of Thailand and the Philippines is so different in many respects, these same phenomena can be found in both places.

The most obvious difference is that Thailand has never been a colony, whereas the Philippines has been under European rule longer than other Asian countries, and most of its population has accepted Christianity, whereas the Thai people retain their devotion to Buddhism. Siam had a well-developed central government under an absolute monarchy in pre-modern times, whereas the Philippines had no unified government, being an island archipelago inhabited by many different tribal peoples, although they shared important cultural similarities.

So far as differences in Western influence affect developmental patterns, Spanish and American models had the greatest impact in the Philippines, whereas French and British influences played a more important part in Thailand.

Despite these differences, I hope to show that in regard to the three characteristics—formalism, heterogeneity, overlapping—the
similarities between these countries are striking. These similarities, however, must be evaluated against the background of a developmental frame of reference. Although both traditional and modern characteristics are mixed together in these two countries, the traditional elements are stronger in Thailand, the modern are more conspicuous in the Philippines. Indeed, when I went, after a year in Thailand, to the Philippines my first impression was that I had left Asia for America. This was not only because of the superficial symbols of Americanization—just as here in India one sees many evidences of the former British rule—but rather because the general standard of streets, shops, consumer goods, clothing, government offices, etc. seems to represent considerably more industrialization, standardization, specialization, or, if you prefer, “modernization”.

A Scale of Comparison

I have a peculiar terminology of my own that I like to use to refer to this developmental background. You may also find it convenient, although it is quite possible to talk about the subject without using these terms. The underlying concept is what we call “functional-structural analysis”. We call a basic pattern of activity which is repeated over and over again in a society a “structure”. Thus the way parliament passes laws, how officers are chosen for the administrative services, the system for making estimates, the organization of a corporation—these are all examples of structures. The formal and archaic political models are also structures.

The results of any such pattern of activity are called its “functions”. The large categories of analysis I used in my first lecture are based on the opinion that each of them represents a function which must be performed in any society. For example, the concept of “substantive economics” rests on the idea that in every society some way must be found to satisfy man’s material wants. It may be done through a “formal economic” or “market” structure, or by a “redistributive” structure. Similarly every society must have some way for allocating power, for distributing influence. This may be done through the structure I
have called the "decisional model", through the "ordering model", or through combinations thereof.

To take a physical analogy, the provision of light is a function which may be performed by an electric globe, a kerosene lamp, a candle, a camp fire, the direct radiation of the sun or the indirect illumination of the moon. Each of these different structures can have the function of giving light, as well as a variety of other functions. Thus the camp fire can also furnish heat and cook food, the candle may serve as a religious symbol.

We can imagine a purely hypothetical society in which a single structure would perform all the functions necessary for the survival of a society. Let us call it a "fused model", just as we call white light fused. In extreme contrast, let us imagine a situation in which every function has a corresponding structure that is specialized for its performance. We will call this situation a "refracted" model, just as we say that light is refracted into all the separate colours of a rainbow or spectrum.

Now we need not think that any real society in this world is fully refracted or fused, but I think it fair to say that traditional Siamese society was quite fused, and American society is rather refracted. We have seen how the kingship and family served for religious, educational, political, economic, and administrative purposes in Siam, and we have also seen how a wide variety of specialized associations, administrative agencies, media of communications, market practices, schools, churches, trade unions, etc. each quite "specific" in the functions it performs, are typical of American society.

It would be a mistake to think of the fused and refracted models as a dichotomy, like two boxes, into which we could sort every concrete society. Rather, we should think of them as polar types on a scale, with an indefinitely large number of intermediate types between. To make it simple, however, let us first imagine a mid-point between these extremes, and let us call it the "prismatic model" because of the prism which refracts fused light.

It is apparent, I think, that in so far as a mixture of traditional and modern, industrial characteristics exist side by side in countries like Thailand and the Philippines, they are prismatic.
However, if we keep the idea of a scale in mind, we might be able to find on closer analysis that one is more refracted or more fused than the other.

**Figure I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fused</td>
<td>prismatic</td>
<td>refracted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Figure I the letter X has been placed at three points on a scale to suggest where pure or "ideal" types of the fused, prismatic and refracted models might be located. If we could average the characteristics of real societies, we might be able to place them on the same scale, and I would suggest that traditional Siam might be put where I have placed the letter S, modern Thailand near T. P would represent the Philippines and A, America. Of course, these are speculative guesses, and not the result of any exact measurement, but I believe that this method lends itself to quantification, and some day I hope to offer some indices by which we could measure the relative refraction or fusion of particular groups or systems.

You may also note similarities between this scheme and others which have been widely used. For example, the German scholar, Toennies, used the terms "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesselschaft" for something rather similar, and sociologists often speak of "differentiated" and "un-differentiated" systems. I prefer the terminology presented here because the definitions are more specific, and the use of three words gives us more flexibility than the use of one, or even two, words. Moreover, I prefer to use the word "differentiated" for mobilized but not assimilated communities, a phenomenon which is typical for the prismatic rather than the refracted model. Other possible uses of the word, "differentiated" create further ambiguities which interfere with its use as a clear synonym for "refracted".

**Some Qualifications**

Two possible sources of confusion need to be cleared up. First, this scale is not normative or predictive but purely descriptive.
I do not wish to imply that one of these models is inherently better than any other. The extreme fused and refracted positions are probably not possible, and would doubtless also be undesirable. There are advantages and disadvantages of the different kinds of positions on the scale, depending on your opinions or value judgments. Traditional agricultural societies certainly had advantages which were highly desirable. Our judgments of the pros and cons of social arrangements, however, are rather useless unless they can be related to alternatives which are actually possible. However much the peace and security of a traditional society might beckon us, the fact is that we can scarcely re-construct it in the modern world. A thermometer, in the same way, does not tell us what temperature is best, but it gives us a way of measuring and comparing temperatures. We also know that some temperatures are preferable to others, but we have to determine desirability from other considerations than those marked on the thermometer. Moreover, temperatures which are good for a polar bear or a penguin are not good for elephants or parrots.

The scale is also not predictive in that it cannot tell you whether a society will change its pattern of organization. In one country a great transformation may take place over a short period of time, whereas in another no change may occur for a long period. I would guess that changes can occur in either direction, and the pace and direction of change would have to be determined in any particular case by the forces at work in that case, whether generated from within or outside.

It must also be emphasized that this scale does not measure all the important variables in comparing societies. For example, I have mentioned the distinction between “democratic” and “autocratic” forms of government. These forms occur in the “formal political model”, which I can now identify with a refracted system as its characteristic political form. However, the scale measuring degree of power concentration or dispersal cuts across every point on the scale of refraction.

For example, we can have a relatively fused kind of society in which power is centralized, and one in which it is localized. The former is illustrated by a bureaucratic empire, the latter
by a feudal society. I would place the traditional Siamese monarchy midway between these extremes. As we move toward the mid-point on the scale of refraction, we would be able to classify prismatic societies on a scale of consolidation and fragmentation of power.

Although it is important to be able to show the similarity with respect to power distribution of a concentrated autocracy and a centralized empire, it is also necessary to know that one is refracted, the other fused. They are alike in one variable, quite different in another. In the same way, a democracy with dispersed power is like a feudal society with localized power, but they differ greatly in degree of refraction. The scale of refraction, then, does not imply that all societies pass through the same stages, or toward the same ultimate goals. One refracted or prismatic society may be quite different from other refracted or prismatic societies in terms of any number of variables. Rather than trying to fix developmental patterns into rigid moulds, this framework of analysis provides maximum flexibility. In the same way the thermometer is a simple scale, but it helps us to get away from simple dichotomies of "hot" and "cold" countries, and enables us to measure the specific climate of any place, distinguishing it from and comparing it with the climate of any other place. Similarly, also, temperature is related to, but different from, humidity, which can also be used to measure climatic conditions.

Among the variables which ought to be correlated with the scale of refraction are degrees of heterogeneity and formalism. My opinion is that both the fused and refracted models are relatively homogeneous and realistic, so that as one moves from either end of the scale of refraction toward the prismatic mid-point, one observes a relative increase in the amount of heterogeneity and formalism.

I apologize for this excursion into theory, but I think these concepts and hypotheses will help us to understand more clearly the characteristics of modern Thai and Philippine societies and administrations which I will discuss in the third lecture.
CHAPTER III

ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND

This morning I saw a newspaper item that illustrates quite well a characteristic administrative problem in many countries where processes of rapid social transformation are taking place. The headline read: “SHOPKEEPERS RESENT N.D.M.C. ACTION.” According to the report, shopkeepers in the Municipal Market in New Delhi suspended their business to protest against what they described as “autocratic action” on the part of the enforcement staff of the New Delhi Municipal Committee. The president of the Shopkeepers’ Union said the action was unprovoked and without any legal justification. The Committee’s staff had removed goods lying in the corridors and verandahs of the market.

Without knowing the details of the case, I would assume that the shopkeepers had violated regulations against encroachment on the public right of way, by displaying merchandise on corridors and verandahs, but that they had been doing this for so long a time without police interference that they considered it a right. The episode reminds me of an experience I had last year in the Philippines when I visited Naga City. Naga is some distance south of Manila, one of the important secondary cities of the country.

It happened that when I arrived there had just been a disastrous fire which had wiped out the Municipal Market. Everyone was talking about it. It was disastrous, first of all, because it had destroyed the major source of revenue for City government. The market was owned by the City, and the shopkeepers not only paid various licence taxes, and fees, but the rents also went to the public treasury.

The fire was also a great blow to the City’s developmental policies. In most of Southeast Asia, trade is largely monopolized by aliens, especially Chinese merchants. One of the manifes-
tations of Filipino nationalism has been a drive to develop native entrepreneurship, and reduce the role of the Chinese. The slogan "Filipino First", has become popular as an expression of the policy to extend opportunities for loans, licences, permits, quotas, etc. to Filipinos in preference to aliens whenever possible. On this basis the market had been sponsored by the City, and opened to native merchants only, in the expectation that thereby the monopolistic position of the Chinese shopkeepers in the older adjacent sections of town would be broken. As a result, the fire had virtually wiped out the assests of the indigenous business community, leaving only the alien establishments. Thereby the disaster struck a body blow at the community’s developmental programme.

Thirdly, of course, the fire was a catastrophe in simple human terms, for many people had lost their hard earned savings and been impoverished, and the City people were deprived of an important source of consumer goods.

Naturally, the first question that came to my mind was whether the City had an adequate Fire Department, and why the fire had not been localized in the section of the market where it started. The market covered an extensive area, and several streets ran across it in both directions, cutting it into blocks. I discovered that the City, indeed, had some good fire fighting equipment, but the trucks were unable to enter the area because the streets were encumbered by the shopkeepers with stalls and merchandise displayed on the right of way.

I expressed surprise to learn this, and asked, "Why don’t you have safety regulations to prevent shopkeepers from cluttering up the side-walks with merchandise and vendors’ carts, thereby obstructing the access of fire engines?"

The answer was, "We have such regulations, but have not been able to enforce them!"

Here you have a situation that reveals in microcosm many of the characteristics of the "prismatic" model. First, the discrepancy between the unenforced rules and the actual practice is an example of formalism. If we probe more deeply into the causes of non-enforcement, we shall also find instances of "over-
lapping”, and “heterogeneity”. I shall take the incident as a clue to lead us through various aspects of the prismatic situation.

Formalism

First, I should define formalism in relation to the scale of refraction which I explained in my last lecture. We can find examples of poorly enforced laws in every country, so you may say that formalism is not a distinguishing characteristic of any particular kind of situation. I think that this is correct. Only in the extreme, hypothetical models of a “fused” and “refracted” society might you find complete realism, i.e. no discrepancy between the formal and the effective.

Let us call all possible stages between these extremes, “transitional”. Then both traditional Siam and modern America are transitional; they approach, but do not reach, the extreme poles on the scale.

However, such a concept of “transitional” is so broad as to be almost useless. That is why I postulate a situation at the mid-point on this scale which I call “prismatic”. The following figure illustrates the concept:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
T^1 & \text{transitional} & T^2 \\
X_1 & X_2 & X_3 \\
fused & \text{prismatic} & \text{refracted}
\end{array}
\]

Scale of Refraction

In this scale the three X’s represent the positions of the three models or ideal types. The word “transitional”, however, stands for all the real possibilities that arise as one moves from \( T^1 \) to \( T^2 \).

Formalism no doubt characterizes every transitional society, but the degree of formalism increases to a maximum as one moves toward the prismatic mid-point, from either end of the scale. The non-enforcement of regulations in the Naga City
market, for example, must have been considerable, and hence
the degree of formalism was high.

In the episode reported earlier in the New Delhi Municipal
Market an attempt was being made to enforce regulations by
confiscating goods displayed in violation of regulations. You
can probably guess better than I can what will happen next,
as a result of protests by the Shopkeepers’ Union. If the Munici-
pal Committee succeeds in its enforcement drive, the degree of
formalism will be reduced; if it fails, formalism remains. To
the extent that enforcement succeeds, access to fire fighting
vehicles will improve, and fire hazards be reduced, to say noth-
ing of other benefits for the general health, safety and con-
venience of the public. Of course, formalism might be reduced
also by repealing the regulations, thus moving toward a more
fused position.

We can see, then, that changes in the degree of formalism in
law enforcement can have important social consequences. They
may also deeply affect, or reflect, the quality of administrative
action. If, for example, a law is generally violated, opportuni-
ties arise for the corruption of administration. An inspector,
knowing that a rule is being broken by a merchant, is put in
the position of being able to make trouble for him unless he
receives some consideration. The shopkeeper knows that if he
obeys the regulation, he will be put at a disadvantage in com-
petition with his rivals. Hence he has a keen incentive to resist
enforcement and, if necessary, to offer the inspector something
in the hopes of being left alone. The officer, for his part, may
be badly underpaid. He knows that there is little realistic pros-
ppect for securing effective enforcement of the regulation, and
so eases his conscience when he looks the other way.

I have not discovered how to provide an exact measure of the
degree of formalism in a society as a whole, but it is possible
to calculate some indices for specific activities. If a compulsory
education law, for example, requires that all children between
6 and 12 must attend school, but a survey reveals that only half
of the children in this age group are attending, then we could
use an index of 50 per cent as a measure of the degree of formal-
ism.
Even this kind of figure would be hard to establish, however, since some children might attend school part of the time, many would conceal the true facts, and we might not have a large enough staff to collect the figures. I merely offer the example to illustrate a possibility. Obviously for many items it would be impossible to establish a precise measure of formalism. However, I think it is feasible to start out with some rough impressions, especially of the extreme cases.

Constitutional Formalism

Let me offer an example of a somewhat different kind of formalism, taken from the political sphere. In Thailand, since the revolution of 1932, there have been several constitutions. Each one establishes some formal structures for parliamentary government, with a limited monarchy and a cabinet system. Provision is also made for popular elections.

It happened that I was in Thailand during the national elections in December 1957. I was in Nan Province, in the far north, at the time, and witnessed the polling as well as other aspects of the election procedures. So far as I could see, every rule for a well-conducted election was strictly enforced. The voting was very orderly. The rival candidates were able to post inspectors to assure fair play. The people came out quietly and cast their ballots in an orderly way.

One point which rather impressed me was the creation of polling stations for the occasion as an exact replica of the chart shown in the book of instructions distributed by the Ministry of Interior. In fact, I discovered virtually every polling place was set up exactly as shown in the picture. If there was no building available of the right size and shape, one was constructed outdoors on the grounds of the school or monastery, using bamboo and other simple materials.

Far from formalism, this seemed to be the height of realism. Everything was made to conform as closely as possible to the rules and regulations. Yet if you examine the proceedings more closely you begin to find an element of make-believe at a different level. The fact is that the politicians elected to the Na-
tional Assembly were not able to exercise much influence over the policies adopted by the Government. Half of the members of the Assembly were appointed, and were mostly officials, especially from the military services. Among the elected Assemblymen the Government could always expect to find some co-operative supporters, and so it had never had real difficulty in getting the Assembly to endorse its recommendations.

Indeed, during the elections I witnessed, there was no Government party. A military coup had been staged in the Fall of 1957. The party which had supported the previous government was discredited and broken up, several new party groupings had appeared, and many candidates ran only on their personal reputations in their districts.

It was not until after the elections had been completed that the Prime Minister and other top Government leaders announced the formation of a new party, and invited most of the elected Assemblymen to join. The advantages of joining must have outweighed those of remaining aloof, for the new party quickly succeeded in gaining the adherence of a majority which, together with the appointed members, made it clear that the Government could not run into trouble with its parliament.

This example teaches us something about the nature of formalism. The elections were not plebiscites, as we have seen them in totalitarian, industrialized societies. There the vote is taken quite seriously, and the Government, through propaganda or coercion, can assure an overwhelming majority to ratify its own candidates.

In Thailand I did not see evidence of pressure from the Government, and there were obviously many candidates and a free choice. The copying of the polling station plan was a more significant indicator, because it revealed a certain preoccupation with the external formalities, rather than the essence of voting as a way of making crucial decisions.

In America, for example, you would be surprised to see the great diversity in the way each polling station is set up. There are certain basic elements of the electoral process which must be present in order to assure freedom of choice, honest counting of the ballots, and effective participation of as many qualified
voters as possible. If these fundamentals are satisfied, it makes little difference how the physical facilities are arranged.

Perhaps the officials who administered the elections thought that if every procedure were rigidly adhered to, the parliamentary process might become more effective—at least they would not individually be subjected to criticism. But the essence of formalism lay in the inability of parliament to control the government, and hence the relative indifference of the population, and even the ruling group, to the actual conduct of the elections.

I must add that during the following year some members of the parliament began to show signs of restlessness, and exerted themselves to impose their wishes on the Government. After a series of episodes, the Government simply abolished the National Assembly and appointed a “Constituent Assembly” which was instructed to draft a new Constitution. There have been so many constitutions in Thailand since 1932 that it is hard to keep track of them. In any event, it is scarcely worth the trouble because the written document remains, in large part, merely a formalistic statement of intention.

There is not enough real power in society, in local self-government, associations, universities, the business community, etc. to impose effective controls upon the bureaucracy. Although formal “political” roles have been created in the Cabinet which represent quite substantial power, the chief base of this political power is not the representative process, but control over branches of the machinery of government, especially the military branches.

The Crisis of Authority

If this is so, you might well ask, “Why bother with constitutions and parliamentary institutions?” The answer, I think, is that no system of rule can be stabilized unless it is legitimized, unless it conforms to a formula under which those who exercise control also possess authority. The prismatic condition arises often in our own times because of the impact of the Western industrial powers which has largely compelled almost all the
traditional societies of the world to transform themselves.

In many cases, as you well know, the transformation was carried out directly by the foreign rulers, but Thailand offers an interesting laboratory for examination because the Siamese were able to safeguard their political independence by carrying out the transformation under the direction of their own leaders. For this process, the old basis of government, the fused or "archaic" power structure, was totally inadequate, and had to be replaced by a new one. The new system required the creation of many functionally specialized and technically equipped administrative organs, a process which incidentally transformed the power structure. The growing bureaucracy became more and more influential, and the higher bureaucrats found that their decision could have far-reaching consequences.

It is difficult for any bureaucratic group to maintain control of government without benefit of a formula to confer legitimacy upon their decisions. It is not just that the people might resist the illegitimate rule of a bureaucratic elite, but other branches of the bureaucracy will surely resent control imposed by one of their own number. It is only in the name of some higher source of sovereignty that authority can become recognized.

Yet the very monarchical leadership which created an expanding bureaucratic machinery in Thailand also necessarily undermined the archaic, ordering basis of royal rule. Hence the time came when a new basis of legitimacy became necessary. The only readily available formula was that of the Western world, which attributed the ultimate source of sovereignty to the people rather than to a divine monarchy. The revolution of 1932, then, not only destroyed the absolute monarchy, but borrowed a parliamentary constitutional formula from the West.

The new formula, however, did not grow out of Siamese experience, nor represent a realistic balance of power in Thai society, and hence it could not be anything but formalistic. Since it lacked roots, it could easily be tossed out and a new document adopted whenever those in power found it inconvenient.

I should add that the reason for having a parliamentary constitution was not only the desire to legitimate the rule internally,
but to create a basis for authority that would have foreign recognition. Indeed, a primary reason of the whole transformation of any traditional society in modern times has been to prevent foreign conquest or aggression, rather than to satisfy profound internal movements demanding change. No doubt the preservation of autonomy depended, in the first instance, upon the establishment of effective control at home, a condition met by the creation of a modern type bureaucracy.

But a second condition of autonomy was the establishment of a regime which could be recognized as authoritative by foreign powers. Thereby an important pretext for intervention would be removed, and it would become easier to deal with other countries through established diplomatic and organizational procedures.

These reasons, I think, are sufficiently compelling to explain the adoption, and even the frequent revision, of parliamentary constitutional documents in a society where the new formula does not represent the realities of internal power.

Further evidence of the formalism of the constitutional facade is provided by the retention of monarchism. The absolute monarchy was destroyed as an effective power centre, but a constitutional monarchy was retained as an alternative, or supplementary, device or legitimating the rule. Every prime minister, after seizing power, has obtained a royal proclamation confirming his appointment, *ex post facto*. But it is clear that, although the King and Queen of Thailand are highly respected and much loved by most Siamese, they lack effective power. The royal proclamation, in other words, is as much a formalistic gesture as the enactment of legislation by parliament.

The two primary foundations for legitimacy in Thailand, the monarchy resting on divine sovereignty, and a parliament based on popular sovereignty, are both equally formalistic. Effective control falls to a group of bureaucrats—chiefly military officers—who are able to seize power.

*Formalism in the Philippines*

The Philippine political situation is different in degree from
the Thai, but reveals also a good deal of formalism. The Philippine Congress is much more powerful than the Thai Assembly. Elections are real battles, and members of the opposition often win seats, as well as candidates of the Government party. The President himself, following the American plan, is also elected. Congress not only makes real decisions in passing laws, but also sets up many committees which investigate and harass the bureaucracy. This separation of political from bureaucratic power reflects not only a formal structure established by constitutional mandate, but the substantial development of autonomous power centres in Philippine society.

An important evidence of this difference can be found in the behaviour of the military officers. I hazard the general proposition that, wherever non-bureaucratic power is strong enough to bring the bureaucracy under control, the military leader cannot seize control of the government by coup d'état. It is true that there has been talk several times in recent Philippine history of a possible military revolt, but I do not believe that it went far beyond the talking stage. There has not been a military revolt, to say nothing of a successful coup.

Despite these evidences of greater realism in the Philippine constitutional structure as compared with the Thai, the degree of formalism is considerable. For example, although the major task of legislators is supposed to be the enactment of laws, a study of Congressional behaviour reveals that much of their time is spent trying to find posts in the public service for their constituents, political supporters, relatives and friends. This situation prevails despite a constitutional provision extending civil service recruitment procedures to most positions. In other words, legislators are pre-occupied with appointments. The Bureau of Civil Service is unsuccessful in its efforts to administer examinations and civil service recruitment to the extent that the legislators intervene successfully.

Moreover, the legislative weaknesses of Congress compel bureaucrats to take a more active role in policy formation. The less adequately Congress and the President can set the goals and policies to be implemented by public administration, the more bureaucrats must seek to influence goals.
I assume that even in the formal political model public officials, being directly concerned with policy implementation, must have some ideas about what ought to be done and what is feasible. They seek to influence the political policy-makers by offering information, policy alternatives, and recommendations. In this way they exercise "informal power".

Basically, however, they rely on someone else to make the final decisions, to exercise formal power. Hence they can also concentrate on arguing the intrinsic merits of the case. The more accurately they understand a situation, and the more convincingly they present the facts and the probable consequences of the possible alternatives, the more influence they are likely to have.

In the case where the formal political structure is unable to exercise effectively its policy-making prerogatives, bureaucrats find that their recommendations lack effect, unless backed up by more than arguments and statistics. Only if they are able to invoke some more potent form of influence are their proposals likely to be followed. In other words, bureaucrats begin to find themselves involved in an intra-bureaucratic political struggle, in which each agency or high official forms alliances, joins cliques, and begins to seek control over small empires.

When this happens, the character of administration is profoundly affected. Appointments and promotions, for example, are made with a view to strengthening empires rather than to finding the best qualified person for a given post. If my success as an administrator depends on my ability to command support in key places, I shall certainly seek the appointment of dependable allies, even though less well qualified, in place of better equipped men of uncertain loyalty.

The more intra-bureaucratic politics takes precedence over the intrinsic merits of a case, considered in a rational, means-ends context, the less the purely administrative criteria—efficiency and rationality—can prevail. In any event, if goals and policies are not clear, it is impossible to decide what means are more rational and efficient.

Indeed, a counterpart to the politicization of administration appears, namely the "ritualization" of procedures. Whatever
formalities, rules and regulations, and established bureaucratic habits, have developed in the past tend to rigidify as practices of intrinsic value. Indeed, the word “bureaucratic” is often used in this specific sense, not for all characteristics of a bureaucracy, but for the particular trait of insistence on complex and unnecessary “red tape”, proceduralism. The reason, obviously, is that if one has no clear sense of the goals and policies to be accomplished, one lacks any criteria by which to judge what is essential and what can be dispensed with. The only course of action which is safe, especially for minor officials, is to carry out established procedures and regulations with undeviating attention to detail.

In using the word “ritualization” we must distinguish the concept of “ritualistic” from “ritual”. In the fused or archaic model, rituals formed the heart of governmental action. Their purpose was to establish order, to assure life and, however unscientific the procedures, they rested on a solid foundation of deep conviction and purpose.

As the underlying sacrificial beliefs which give vitality to ritual die out, however, many ritual practices persist. They became “ritualistic”. Thus any persistence of forms which have lost their inner or vital meaning for those who practise them can be called ritualization. If the practices resemble the national procedures of a formal administrative model, without being actually “rational”, we may call them “rationalistic”. It is apparent that both ritualistic and rationalistic behaviour in administration reflects formalism.

Administrative Aspects of Formalism

Both the phenomena of keen intra-bureaucratic politics, and the ritualization of procedures are to be found in Philippine administration. They can equally be found in Thailand. It is apparent, I think, that they cannot be eliminated by procedural and technical reforms, or even by great reorganizations of the administrative structure of government. If my analysis is correct, these problems can be traced back to the underlying power structure, namely one in which formal power is insufficient to
impose effective control over the bureaucracy.

Once we have grasped the basic principle of formalism, in relation to bureaucratic power, a number of paradoxes become intelligible. I have spoken, for example, of the contest over appointments between the Bureau of Civil Service and the members of Congress. This contest reinforces the power position of the top bureaucrats who make the ultimate decisions on appointments. The fact that they are able to choose means that they acquire, in fact, considerable latitude to play the rules of personnel administration and the politicians against each other.

If they prefer a man coming up through the examination procedure, they can take him and tell Congressmen they have no choice. But if they prefer a patronage candidate, they can manipulate the rules so as to take him. Often, indeed the higher officials have their own protégés whom they sponsor. They advise him how to satisfy the technical requirements, and send him to seek political endorsement from a friendly Congressman or the Office of the President. Then if one politician complains to an official about his failure to “take care” of a protégé, the official can reply that he is sorry, but he had to give the position to the candidate of another politician.

In Thailand there is also a Civil Service Commission with responsibility for supervising a personnel system, with complex rules for taking examinations as a prerequisite to office. The weakness of the parliamentarians, however, means that in practice the higher officials largely run the personnel system to suit themselves. They are able to manipulate the Civil Service rules in a straightforward way through a series of sub-committees, one for each department, nominally responsible to the Commission, but in fact controlled by the departmental officials. Of course, all the decisions of the sub-committees are duly recorded in the Commission so as to give the impression that the Commission does implement the civil service rules.

Another paradox which often strikes the observer is the rigidity of conformity to regulations which officials often insist upon in contrast with their apparent ability to disregard the rules if they wish. This becomes understandable if we assume
that bureaucrats exercise in fact a good deal of power, i.e. they can make their own decisions and are not subject to effective political control. They can, then, insist on an extremely legalistic and technical interpretation of regulations if it is to their advantage to do so, otherwise they can have them waived. Where political power is effective, the official is offered strong incentives to accomplish the objectives for which a law or rule was adopted. He finds it difficult either to insist on technicalities in the law which interfere with the accomplishment of its purpose, or to disregard the provisions of law.

The reason would be that effective control reflects the autonomous power of interest groups, the organized clientele, associations and public opinion. Such interests, having first secured the enactment of legislation, will not be content to see it unenforced, or its aims defeated by ritualistic conformity. Consequently the civil servant works in a “glass house”, so to speak, continuously aware of the impact of his behaviour, not only on those immediately affected, but on the larger interests responsible for the law and concerned about its implementation.

The prevalence of formalism encourages corruption or what the Filipinos euphemistically call “anomalies”. The ability of an official to insist on the letter of the law and regulations gives him a weapon in dealing with a private citizen which he can often use for his personal advantage. In so far as the official can also waive the rigour of the law, he can make it easy for the individual who is willing to offer a quid pro quo.

The Attainment Orientation

Another type of formalism can be observed in connection with the recruitment process. In the formal model of a refracted society, where policies are sharply defined, criteria can be established for recruitment based on the ability of each candidate to achieve the goals set. We can say that recruitment is “achievement oriented”.

In the archaic model of a fused society, we have seen that “ordering”, rather than policy implementation, is the basic administrative function. To maintain order, the social strati-
fication system must be maintained, traditions carried out, the ways of the ancestor imitated, etc. To accomplish this it is necessary that each position be filled according to tradition. Often the basis is hereditary, sons taking over the positions held by their fathers. We can call a system of recruitment which relies upon a person's parentage, race, religion, or other criteria of identity rather than capacity, "ascriptive".

The contrast between ascription and achievement as bases of recruitment has often been noted, and the impression is given that these are the only alternatives, that one can pass directly from one to the other orientation. I think there is a third possibility which is typically prismatic. Let us assume that ascriptive criteria have been abandoned, and examinations established, supposedly instituting an achievement oriented system. However, if the policies to be implemented are not clearly defined, it is difficult to prescribe examinations which actually test and determine relative aptitude. The examinations become formalistic to the extent that they measure indeterminate qualities.

When this happens it does not necessarily result in abandonment of the examinations. Indeed, merely to pass a set of examinations and obtain a specified certificate may become a new basis for appointment. That the certificate holder may be unqualified for a particular post becomes irrelevant if the duties of the post are themselves only vaguely defined. One passes to a system where the degree or certificate becomes more important than the knowledge or skill which one has, supposedly, acquired while studying to pass the examination. I call such a system "attainment" oriented. It falls between ascription and achievement as a criterion.

Whereas achievement tests seek to measure a man's capacity for future performance, attainment tests measure what he has accomplished in the past. In the Philippines the attainment orientation has led to a great expansion of higher education, of colleges and universities run for private profit. They are often called "diploma mills". The standard is not set very high, but the graduates obtain degrees which, they hope, will substantially improve their social and economic position. There
is great interest among civil servants also in taking “in-service training” courses. No doubt those who take them derive real benefit from these courses, but I was impressed by the eagerness of the trainees to obtain a certificate for their work.

Those who pass civil service examinations obtain an “eligibility”. This entitles them to hold positions at a certain level, or rank, often without much regard to whether the test given showed real capacity to perform the work to be done. Moreover, the eligibility can last a long time, so that one may be appointed even though he has forgotten what he knew in order to pass the test long before. Some people collect “eligibilities”, and like to boast about how many they have.

A similar situation prevails in Thailand, but you are not quite so conscious of it because there are not nearly so many graduates without posts. However, you find the same attainment orientation, the same vagueness about the relevance of training for the work to be done. I recall the problem we had trying to work about with the Thai participants in our contract programme a series of courses and a research plan that would be relevant to their future careers. We tried at first to get information about the work that each one would be expected to do after he returned home. We discovered that they lacked plans, but even when they had some idea what their positions would be, they did not see much relationship between that and their studies. Most of them took a rather broad, general programme of administrative studies, and were delighted to receive a degree afterwards. But when they went home, we discovered that they were often assigned to work quite unrelated to their studies, but that virtually all of them made good progress by virtue of the degrees which they now held. Attainment criteria, although they look like achievement criteria, can also be considered a disguised form of ascriptive criteria.

In saying this I do not want to imply any criticism of the individuals concerned. Where administrative goals cannot be clearly defined in the light of politically determined policies, how can the situation be different? Moreover, we need to examine more seriously the relevance of what is actually taught to
university students for the kind of positions they will find themselves in.

**Academic Formalism**

In the countries which have come under Western influence during the last century, there has appeared a class of people whom we may call the "intelligentsia". The word is taken from Russian history where a group of aristocratic intellectuals who obtained an education in Western Europe, in France and Germany especially, became the leaders of a kind of renaissance that combined disillusionment and often despair with remarkable creativity.

Similarly we have seen in other countries a new kind of educated man whose learning grows out of the experience of Western civilization. Some went abroad to study at European and American Universities. The Siamese promoters of the 1932 revolution came to know each other as students in Paris. The great leaders of the Philippine revolution against Spain had been students in Madrid. A later generation of Filipino intelligentsia received their higher education in America.

Local schools were also established by foreign missionaries, educational advisers, and royal tutors. With the best will in the world, foreign teachers could not transform the intellectual world they knew into terms fully relevant and adapted to the world of their students. The first American schools in the Philippines necessarily taught American, not Philippine history. The student of botany learned more about oak and elm trees than about banana and coconut.

Today, of course, all this has been changed. Filipino boys are learning to glorify Lapu Lapu, the tribal king who threw back the Spanish invader, rather than about the "discovery" of the Philippines by Magellan. No doubt a certain amount of myth-making accompanies such historical reconstruction, but who is free of wishful thinking as he views his own people's past?

The main point I wish to make is that the learning of the intelligentsia is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it helps him to cope with the modern world, whether this means the
making of revolutions, or the creation of enlarged bureaucracies, building of railroads and starting airlines, operating exchange control and managing central banks.

On the other hand, it also fastens on a country's leaders a kind of magic spectacles which transform what is seen into the image of Western countries. It was not only the foreign visitor who looked for familiar things in the new lands to which he came: to see market institutions, rent and prices and property, in societies where redistributive economies had prevailed for centuries; to see political decision-making processes in archaic systems based on ordering processes. The new intelligentsia also began to view society in Western economic and political terms.

Indeed, the foreign observer could sometimes see more than the native, because recognition of differences did not threaten his self-image and his social status. To the intelligentsia, however, a full confrontation of reality was most painful, partly because the necessary models and tools of analysis were not available, and partly because such recognition threatened his status and identity.

The intellectual, of course, often had a choice between his own history and the new values and technology. Some opted for history and sought to restore or revitalize it—they became the traditionalists or "reactionaries". Others chose the foreign world, and became the modernizers, reformers, and "radicals". There were also syncretists who strove to choose the best of both worlds and find, somehow, a pattern that could contain them both. But always the horizon was limited by the stereotypes of the traditional and the imported.

Neither Western social science nor the soul-searchings of the intelligentsia led to the creation of a new kind of theory and discipline which would permit recognition and analysis of what was happening as a thing in itself, as a totality, as something comprehensible and meaningful. Nor do I think the creation of such a new mode of analysis is an easy thing to accomplish. There are too many vested interests to be overcome, too many intellectual ruts to be escaped, and creative discovery is, at best, a rare and fragile flowering.
Moreover, the very pattern of politics and administration which grew up discouraged such an evolution. The life of scholarship and research was not highly valued for its own sake. As we have seen, intellectual eminence must be its own reward and objective knowledge must first become an autonomous goal. Funds to support research were limited and, given the attainment orientation, a university degree means access to bureaucratic and political power and prestige.

Indeed, the more original and critical of established views a scholar might be, the more difficult it would become to pass the prescribed examinations and win the coveted degree. Teachers who might seek to lead young minds to question and observe reality in new terms could easily lose their following if their pupils, as a result, failed the examinations.

Here, I think, is one of the root causes of formalism—reliance on models and concepts drawn from a more refracted social order. These models presuppose the existence of formal economic, administrative and political structures, and thus make it difficult to see and understand a social order in which such structures play a marginal role.

Even the anthropologists, whose studies of primitive societies have helped us to understand a fused social order, to see a culture as a whole, each part functionally related to every other part, have failed to provide models for understanding prismatic conditions. When the anthropologists have turned to the great civilizations of Asia, they have largely confined their attention to the villages. Here they recognized a relatively familiar world, for the life of the villager remains set in a social matrix not so different from that of a fused tribal society.

If formalism arose, in the first place, because of the introduction of alien patterns of government and administration in social orders to which these patterns were not attuned, it has been perpetuated, in the second place, by the highly schooled incapacity of the intelligentsia to see the world in terms other than those of the relatively refracted Western industrial society, or their own traditions. Since the members of the bureaucracy are drawn from the intelligentsia, they reinforce formalism in every branch of the government service.
Whether the official is working in a department of health, agriculture, public works, commerce and industry, or communications, he tends to see the public as responding to the needs and socio-economic-political patterns of a refracted society. If interest rates in the village are oppressively high, then we must pass legislation to curb them, and establish agricultural banks and credit cooperatives. If farmers cling to rice cultivation where the production of sugar cane or cotton would be more profitable, then let us send extension agents to explain the benefits of a crop change, or at least let us demonstrate improved varieties of rice seed and the use of chemical fertilizers. If alien merchants monopolize the retail trade, let us adopt legislation excluding them or imposing heavy taxes, thereby safeguarding entrepreneurial opportunities for citizens.

In each of these instances—and in many others which, I have no doubt, you will think of—the proposed solutions cannot work, and the reason lies in differences between the situation in Thailand or the Philippines, and the situation in the United States or England. These reasons are not hard to understand, but they require a different frame of reference from that used in a Western, market-oriented and decision-making society. But so long as they are not understood, “solutions” of the type mentioned merely intensify formalism.

Attempts to suppress high interest merely make lending more risky, and hence further heighten the rates. Those who borrow at such rates, usually for unproductive purposes, would never get a low interest loan at a farmer’s bank, even if the bank had enough money to make the loan requested.

Official discrimination against the Chinese merchant may intensify the corruption of public administration, without providing incentives for the growth of vigorous native entrepreneurship. The proposed actions, instead of remedying the difficulties complained of, tend to intensify formalism by increasing the gap between the official and the actual, between the prescribed and the practised. To understand better the reasons for these dilemmas, I would like to turn next to an examination of the phenomenon of “heterogeneity”.
In my first lecture I compared the scale of refraction with a thermometer. Both can be used to measure differences and similarities between situations. Such comparisons can be of two types, the "central tendency" and the "range of variation".

There are several ways of defining a "central tendency", such as arithmetic mean, mode and median. Whatever method we use, we get a single figure or point on the scale. Thus the average temperature in New Delhi might be given at X°F, and this can be compared with an average temperature of Y°F at New York or Manila. We have assumed that it might be possible to discover an index number that would measure the average degree of refraction of different countries, such as America, Thailand and the Philippines.

There is another measure which is less frequently used, but is sometimes even more significant, namely the "range of variation". If we take the highest and the lowest temperatures recorded in New Delhi during a year, the distance between these extreme points is the range of variation. Every other temperature reading during the year must have fallen between these extremes.

When the range of variation is very small, we can say that the temperature is even, or "homogeneous" throughout the year. When it varies between wide extremes, we can say it fluctuates, or is quite "heterogeneous". Obviously the degree of heterogeneity of a single variable when used to measure a situation gives quite different results from those obtained by measuring the central tendency only.

Let me illustrate by using temperature again, as applied to the major climatic zones on the earth. Around the North Pole the temperature is not only uniformly cold, but stays cold throughout the year. Similarly around the Equator it is not only hot, but stays hot throughout the year. Hence, although the Torrid and Tropical zones are polar opposites on the "hot-cold" scale, they are both relatively homogeneous in temperature.

Intermediate between these extremes lies an area which is
usually called the Temperate Zone. If, by this, we refer only to average temperature, the name is not inaccurate. But if we think of seasonal variations, we realize that the weather fluctuates between extreme cold and heat as one moves through the annual cycle from Winter to Summer. Thus, although average temperature lies between the Torrid and Tropical, the heterogeneity of Temperate Zone weather places it at the opposite extreme from its homogeneous climatic neighbours.

The name, Temperate Zone, accordingly conveys a false impression of mildness. Of course, we have mild weather too, during the Spring and Autumn, but perhaps the area would be better named the “Temperamental Zone”.

I think the same kind of changes can be observed on the scale of refraction. Thus the fused and refracted models are relatively homogeneous, but the prismatic model is marked by great heterogeneity. Just as in the Temperate Winter one finds the extreme colds of the Torrid Zone, so in the prismatic cities one finds many refracted characteristics; and just as in the Temperate Summer one finds the extreme heat of the Tropics, so in the prismatic Winterland one finds many fused characteristics.

When I think of the air-conditioned office buildings of Manila, and study the way in which business and administration is conducted in them, I am reminded of Madison Avenue, New York. But when I travel to the mountains of Luzon to visit a tribal settlement, I think of the accounts given by archaeologists and anthropologists of how our primitive ancestors must have lived.

Of course, the mountain tribe and the city office building are extreme types, and in between there are many villages, towns, government offices and back street “hang-outs” having distinctive characteristics quite different from both the extremes.

This image should help us to understand better the limitations of our conventional social science models. Disciplines such as Political Science, Economics, Sociology, and Public Administration are quite at home in dealing with the political, economic, social and administrative phenomena they would find in the big cities of a prismatic society, whether Manila, Bangkok, Alexandria, Nairobi or Bombay. Similarly the Anthropologist feels
that the village in an agricultural civilization is not so different from the tribal society he knows best. But the approach from neither extreme gives us a picture of the society as a whole, and both extremes omit the crucial central characteristics of prismatic life.

To extend the climatic analogy once more, let us suppose there could exist a being, perhaps a Snowman from the North Pole, who could experience cold, but whose sensory organs could not respond to temperatures above 32°F. If he visited the Temperate Zone, he would be comfortable during the winter, but otherwise he might be quite uncomfortable, although baffled to explain his discomfort. Similarly a denizen of the Equator, sensitized only to temperatures over 70°F, would understand the Temperate Summer, but be unable to cope with the rest of the year. Neither the northern nor the southern visitor could appreciate the Fall and Spring temperatures which fall between their ranges of sensitivity.

To correct our perspective, therefore, in analyzing a prismatic society, we need to make two kinds of adjustment. First, we must see the parts as related to the whole. Neither the urban nor the rural world exist in full autonomy, and so each can be fully understood only as it affects and is affected by the other.

Every Western visitor to Bangkok or Manila is soon told that these cities are not the "true" Thailand or Philippines, as the case may be. To form a "true" impression, one is told he must visit and live in the countryside. In part, this means that the city is enough like Western cities so that one does not really see anything very different from what he is used to. But there is a deeper implication, namely that the urban Thai or Filipino is, somehow, not a "true" example of his own people, that in coming to the city he has somehow alienated himself from his society.

One can mean by this the rather obvious point that urbanization is accompanied by far-reaching social and psychological changes. But the changed Thai or Filipino remains as much a Thai or Filipino as he was before. He is, of course, no longer as traditional in his outlook, but he does not thereby lose his
national identity. In the same way a Westerner who learns about the rest of the world by residence abroad does not thereby cease to be an American, Englishman, Frenchman, etc., although we may hope that he would thereby lose some of his provincialism.

As I see Philippine society, it includes the rice farmer in the village and the taxi-driver in the city; the tribal chief, barrio (village) lieutenant, and bureau chief; the thatched hut and skyscraper; the water buffalo and jet plane. Confusing as these juxtapositions may be, they are not chaotic. Heterogeneity differs from chaos in that there is a pattern in the range of variation, and there is a history and law about the relationships of such contrasting phenomena to each other. Any attempt to understand or deal with a society as a whole which is based upon analysis of only one of its parts—important as that part may be—is surely bound to fail.

The second adjustment needed is to discover a concept and create hypotheses about the relationships among those aspects or parts of the society which lie on its middle range, between its fused and refracted extremes. These are the elements which are most typically prismatic. They escape analysis because neither the tools of the anthropologist nor the economist, political scientist and administrative analyst come squarely to grips with them.

Naturally if heterogeneity applies to a society as a whole, it applies also to the public administration. We have already seen how different and incompatible formulae for legitimating government have been used in Thailand. The whole range from archaic to formal political structures may be found together, with numerous paradoxes and conflicts as a result.

_Bazaar-Canteen: Heterogeneity in Economics_

In the economic sphere many characteristic phenomena appear. I have called the typical prismatic economic structure, the “bazaar-canteen model”\(^1\). Among its salient characteristics

\(^1\) For an extended analysis see “The Bazaar-Canteen Model”, in *Philippine Sociological Review*, July-Oct. 1958, Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 6-59.
are "price indeterminacy", "agglomeration of values", "intrusive access to the elite", and "pariah entrepreneurship". I lack time to explain and elaborate on these concepts in a single lecture, but I mention them simply to illustrate the proposition that we can develop models which direct our attention to prismatic economic characteristics which are not typical for either the fused or refracted models. I will speak here about the general consequences of a bazaar-canteen economy, especially to show its relation to administration.

The concept of "development" usually refers to process of economic transformation, leading from a traditional, subsistence-based system to a highly marketized and industrialized system. It is apparent that developmental processes include different variables which may change simultaneously, or perhaps at different rates of speed. I shall mention only two elements: marketization and capital formation. It is usually assumed that with specialization and exchange, plus the new incentives provided by the market system, output per capita rises, surpluses appear and are invested in capital plant and equipment, leading to a further rise in productivity.

Is it possible for marketization to take place without any corresponding increase in capital formation, and hence no rise in productivity? I believe this is precisely the characteristic of the bazaar-canteen model. Marketization occurs for a variety of reasons, including the appearance of manufactured goods which are cheaper or more attractive than their home made equivalents. At the same time a demand arises for raw materials, cash crops, etc. which can be produced and sold in exchange for the new manufactures. To promote the marketization of the rural society, petty entrepreneurs are encouraged or assisted to set up small shops in the villages, and protected, if need be, against local reprisals. For the village store, from the first, is a disruptive social force. The old reciprocative and redistributive systems clash with the market principle. The demand for credit, and later for repayment of loans, with interest, brings the peasant into conflict with the shopkeeper.

Why does marketization not lead to capital formation? First of all, the "surplus" accumulated, if any, is not large, and it is
scattered in small local markets. Loans are often, if not usually, obtained for non-productive purposes, to finance consumer expenditures, especially celebrations and ceremonies that form part of the traditional round of life.

But most important, perhaps, the entrepreneur does not form a politically influential class. Characteristically, commercial activity is accorded a low status position. The elite bases its power on land, religion, family, government position, but not entrepreneurship. The businessman is, therefore, squeezed between a resentful rural population, on the one side, and a hostile ruling class on the other.

The position is so uncomfortable, indeed, that it is usually a last choice occupation, and those who can obtain land and become farmers, or who have a chance to enter politics or the bureaucracy, take these preferred alternatives. Hence it is likely to be an alien group, or members of a deviant religion or sect, who being barred from the preferred social roles, are forced into trade as the only available means of survival. Max Weber coined the expression “pariah capitalism” to refer to such groups. The word “pariah” is not used for a specific low caste group, as in India, but in a more general sense for any “outsider” or “stranger” class. Again, all members of a specific “pariah” group need not be entrepreneurs—many may work as labourers, and in many lowly tasks. But within such a group entrepreneurs often do emerge, and come to play a dominant role in a prismatic society’s commercial life if, somehow, they can secure a minimum of protection for their business activities.

Such a role is played by the Chinese in both Thailand and the Philippines. Although they have ventured into industry, more perhaps in the Philippines than in Thailand, conditions do not favour it. First, because they lack power, the Chinese cannot influence legislation, and so find themselves subject to all sorts of discriminatory regulations, taxes, and limitations which, if fully enforced, would terminate their business activities. To prevent enforcement, therefore, they are compelled to seek the protection of influential men, contribute to charitable cause, support the treasury of the ruling party, etc. All of these measures are necessarily costly, so that much of the
“profit” or “surplus” which might otherwise have gone into capital formation is, instead, diverted into the coffers of the elite, and made available for their consumer expenditures, often on luxury items.

Moreover, the penalization of pariah entrepreneurship, and the general unpredictability of government policies makes it very risky to invest capital in permanent plant. Who can tell whether necessary maintenance parts, imported raw materials, etc. will still be available after the next change in personnel in a key government agency. Consequently, even that saving which does take place in pariah entrepreneurship tends to be reinvested in rapid-turnover, high-profit commercial ventures, or exported, if possible, to a safer market.

Such conditions lead to a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. The elite, by their conspicuous consumption, exaggerate their appearance of affluence. Meanwhile the poor become poorer. Cheaper and more effective public health measures lower the death rate while birth rates continue high, so that a population boom begins. Moreover, the mining of soils to produce cash crops leads to erosion, and wasteful lumbering and mining methods further deplete natural resources. Productivity may decline as decapitalization takes place more rapidly than capital formation.

A growing spread between the conditions of life for the elite and the masses is thus characteristic of a prismatic economy. A large gap between rich and poor is also typical of the most industrialized countries, but the great increase in productivity made possible by capital formation and industry tends at the same time to raise the living standards of the mass of the population. Differences in consumption standards also become less, and large middle economic strata soften the impact of great wealth differentials. Thus the acute consciousness of a broad gap between the economic conditions of rich and poor in an industrialized country is diminished.

Increasingly unequal distribution of wealth forms, then, part of the pattern of heterogeneity which is characteristically prismatic. It has important consequence for administration. If the pariah entrepreneur must purchase exemption from discrimina-
tory regulations, this corrupts administration, making it difficult to secure full enforcement of officially adopted policies. Moreover, it is hard to frame policies which are just and beneficial to both the rich and the poor. Naturally the elite seek to use their power to protect their special privileges, such as the collection of rents for landlords. Mutual hostility and resentment between rulers and the ruled increases, and revolutionary tension develops.

The Intelligentsia and Counter-elites

I have already spoken about the intelligentsia in connection with the introduction of foreign ideas and models. The growing bureaucracy requires the services of men trained in the new learning and technology. It is also apparent that government service—whether in politics or administration—provides the most available and desirable road to prestige, power, and wealth in a prismatic society. The old barriers to class mobility tend to break down, and so a whole new class of ambitious intellectuals appears, eager to gain admission to the elite. Unfortunately, many cannot satisfy their ambitions or even if they obtain posts, they may remain at lower levels than they had expected.

From among the dissatisfied intelligentsia, then, appear groups which form “counter-elites”. They seek to displace the elite. In Thailand, where the basis of power is relatively weak, they may succeed simply by joining a coup group to overthrow the government. In the Philippines, some provided the leadership for the Communist directed Hukbalahap guerilla uprising. This group can transform diffuse revolutionary tensions in a prismatic society into organized revolutionary movements and revolts.

We must view the rise of counter-elites as part of a much broader phenomenon, to which I have already referred, namely the “differentiation” of a population as it becomes mobilized but not assimilated. The increasing self-consciousness of the Thai and the Filipino in relation to the Chinese minority, accompanied by the growing nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese, are signs of this movement. Thus a third dimension of prismatic heterogeneity is its poly-communalism. This phenomenon
is clear enough in both Thailand and the Philippines, but it is
even more striking in neighbouring Southeast Asian countries,
especially Burma, Indonesia, Malaya and Vietnam. The fate
of the Indian community in Burma, and the revolt of the Karens
against the Burmese are well-known instances of poly-communal
tension in Burma.

I have already spoken also of the displacement of traditional
values by new ones, which I have called “poly-normativism”. It
is only necessary here to point out that this proliferation of
incompatible values is a fourth dimension of prismatic hetero-
geneity.

“Clects.” Prismatic Groups Par Excellence

In the organizational sphere we observe the continuing influence
of primary groups, such as the family, and the rise to importance
of secondary type associations. But I should add also an inter-
mediate category of characteristically prismatic groups, which
I call “clects”, a purely artificial word coined because I could
not find a dictionary word for the concept. By “clect” I refer
to any group which makes use of modern, associational methods
of organization, but retains diffuse and particularistic goals of a
traditional type.

It is almost impossible, for example, to form a single national
association for all those with a specific kind of functional interest
in a prismatic society. Instead, such a group might form in
each community. In Thailand, for example, there are separate
Chambers of Commerce for the Chinese, American, Japanese,
and Thai communities. Although such a group resembles an
association in form, it is more accurately called a “clect”, since
it places the national or communal interests of its members above
the general interest of business.

It may become quite diffuse in its goals. The Chinese Chamber
of Commerce in Thailand, for example, not only promotes com-
mercial interests, but it organizes schools, serves as a political
spokesman for the Chinese community, and engages in philan-
thropic and service functions for its members. In the Philip-
pines we find the apparent anachronism of Chinese Family
Name Associations. Such a group is not a clan, but neither is
it an “association” in the strict sense of the word since, although it uses associational techniques of organization, its purpose is highly particularistic.

Political and administrative agencies, also, can be better understood as clects than as either primary or secondary type groups. Members of the Philippine Congress, for example, devote much, if not most, of their time to efforts to find positions for their protegés, a particularistic activity, in addition to the time they can spend on legislation, on policies applicable to everyone, and hence universalistic.

A government bureau, while associational in form, being built around a policy and specific goals, tends to become a clect in practice. The agency head develops attitudes and practices toward employees under his supervision which are close to those of a father toward his children. As organization leaders are invited to become the godfather (compadre) of their colleagues, formal administrative relationships become converted into ritual familialistic ties.

The interaction between bureaucrats and citizens is also heterogeneous. To some extent policy questions are raised, and delegations from associations call on officials to discuss specific policies and their implementations. Family pressures are also exercised to secure appointments or favours for this or that relative.

But interaction with clects is perhaps most important. The National Chamber of Commerce not only seeks rules favourable to business, but demands that they be applied in a discriminatory way, for nationals and against aliens. An association identified with a religious sect seeks policies favourable to its members as against those of other sects. Such a policy is not narrowly particularistic, since it applies to a large aggregate, but neither is it universalistic. I like to call it “selectivistic”, since it discriminates between communities in applying otherwise universalistic norms.

Prismatic heterogeneity, in other words, embraces the geographic urban-rural range, growing class and communal differentiation, the rise of counter-elites and revolutionary movements, poly-normativism and selectivism in administration, and the
prevalence of cliques, accompanied also by both primary and secondary groups.

Overlapping

If you hold a deck of cards in your hands, there is no overlapping, since each card is completely superimposed upon the one below. Again, if you deal out ten cards from the pack so that each card lies by itself on the table there is no overlapping, since each card has its own separate position. However, if you arrange the ten cards in your hand, fan-shaped, as you would to play a game of bridge, each card overlaps the one below it and the one above—the cards are not superimposed, nor are they fully separated.

In this sense overlapping is characteristic only of the prismatic model. In a fused model, since all functions are performed by a single structure, we can think of the functions as being superimposed upon one another. One cannot distinguish, in the role of the archaic king, what is political and administrative from what may be religious, educational or economic. At the opposite extreme, we can imagine in a fully refracted society that economic structures would be governed exclusively by economic criteria, educational structures by educational criteria, religious by religious, political by political, administrative by administrative, etc.

I make these assumptions for the formal model although I know well enough that even in the most developed or industrialized countries such complete autonomy of structures is not a reality. However, in the formal economic model it is postulated that each participant as an "economic man", strives to maximize profits, to obtain the best price for his product, in a word to allow "rational" criteria to govern his activities in the market. Similarly, it is assumed that the bureaucrat, as an "administrative man", seeks to use the scarce means at his disposal in such a way as to maximize the accomplishment of the policies and goals set by the law and his agency's programme. In other words, "efficiency" would govern his activities in the bureau.

I must repeat that no one will claim that, in America, for example, actual economic and administrative behaviour is fully
autonomous, as prescribed in this model. Indeed, it is perhaps less autonomous now than in the heyday of laissez-faire liberalism. However, actual market and bureau operations in the United States are close enough to these models for them to be taken as practicable norms. Moreover, the norm provides a set of criteria for judging actual behaviour, and hence for attempting to modify practice to fit the prescription.

A good model for this attitude is given by the clock. Just as the model market maximizes rationality, so the model clock keeps accurate time. Clocks in practice tend to deviate from this model, sometimes going too fast or too slow, or stopping altogether. When this happens, we tinker with the clock mechanism, wind it up, set it, etc. in the hope that it can be made to run in accordance with the behaviour of the model clock.

When the actual practice is far from the norm, however, the use of the formal model of autonomous, functionally specialized structures become dangerous and confusing. It is dangerous because it suggests the need for rapid and basic social transformations which can be socially very disruptive, since any such change involves more or less traumatic transition costs. It is confusing because it misleads us into seeing things which are not there, and failing to see things which are there.

It is my opinion that a more accurate image of reality in countries like the Philippines and Thailand can be obtained if we start from a model which assumes overlapping structures, another basic feature of the prismatic model. In other words, a market system does exist as a formal structure, unlike the fused model where it does not exist at all, except analytically within the framework of a single all-purpose structure. However, prismatic market behaviour is governed by many non-economic as well as strictly economic, considerations. In the fused model religious, social, or familial motives of a traditional sort govern the movements and appropriation of goods. In the refracted model, economic motives alone govern the market. In the prismatic model, a combination of economic and non-economic motives act together. It is as incorrect to interpret the "bazaar-
canteen" solely in terms of non-economic forces, as it is incorrect to see it only in the light of economic pressures.

*Price Indeterminacy and Rank*

Let me illustrate by the concept of "price indeterminacy" which I have already mentioned. In the market, prices are determined by the relationship between supply and demand. In the bazaar-canteen, such forces affect price also—i.e. economic considerations are institutionalized. However, prices are also affected by other factors, such as the social and political relationships of buyers and sellers to each other. In the bazaar, for example, where no fixed price is set, each transaction is based on bargaining. But the result of such bargaining is determined not only by the intensity of the buyer's demand, and the scarcity of the supply, but by the play of personal relationships. A good friend or relative may be able to buy more cheaply than a stranger; a member of a favoured community will get a better rate than someone from an oppressed community; an influential politician may be privileged in comparison to a "nobody".

In the canteen these price discriminations are institutionalized to groups. The "subsidized canteen", for example, provides goods at a price lower than the average for members of a privileged group, those with political influence, for example, who are given access to the canteen. In a "tributary canteen", by contrast, the under-privileged are forced to pay higher prices because they cannot obtain access to other markets, they are captives of the canteen.

The concept of price indeterminacy can be extended to include not only goods and services, but all factors of production, such as labour, capital, land, time, money.²

Let me illustrate price indeterminacy as applied to the labour market. We have seen that, in America, the market concept is applied to administrative work as a form of labour. The slogan "equal pay for equal work" symbolizes the market approach

to setting salary scales in terms of a position classification scheme. In the traditional or archaic model, as I have also indicated, the maintenance of order presupposes the establishment and preservation of the relative social status of different families and groups in the society. Hence whatever income one receives is not interpreted as a direct payment for services rendered, so much as a natural perquisite appertaining to individuals in a particular social station.

In the prismatic bureaucracy both the market and the status ideas are combined. An attempt is made to establish the market basis, with a scale of salaries for the various positions. At the same time, it is considered that a person of a given rank ought to obtain a specified income and privileges in view of his rank, rather than of the work he performs. If a man of lower rank performs work of greater importance or difficulty than someone higher in the status ladder, this will not affect remuneration. However, the rank is determined in part by the capacity of the individual to perform work, and so those of lower rank may be promoted in recognition of superior work.

In the strictly formal market and bureau models, salary is directly adjusted to work performed. Accordingly the basis for classification would be “duties”. The criteria for compensation is achievement.

In contrast, a traditional system adjusts perquisites, honours, etc. to the “status” of each official. Here the criteria for compensation is ascription.

The intermediate, prismatic, model for position classification combines both duties and status, achievement and ascription. The key basis is “rank”, the criterion, “attainment”. Rank is an artificial status which is earned or attained by the individual. Thus it reflects in part the actual work capacity and contribution of the incumbent. It may also be determined by seniority, by prior education and, to a considerable extent, by family connections, social background, racial, religious, or ethnic considerations, etc.

In Thailand, where the traditional orientation is close, rank orientations are very conspicuous in the public service. Much energy is devoted in the bureaucracy to attaining and symboliz-
ing rank. In the Philippines, where the traditional background is weaker, rank consciousness is also strong, but relatively greater emphasis is placed on duties classification. With American technical assistance a Wage and Position Classification Office has been established and has already analyzed and re-classified many positions to bring pay scales into line with the difficulty and responsibility of the duties actually performed. However, progress has by no means been smooth, and clearly there is strong resistance from many who fear that they will lose income as a result of the programme.

Stress on rank makes it difficult to use rationality and efficiency as criteria for administrative action. When something needs to be done, only those of the suitable rank can be asked to do it. If an appointment is to be made, only one with the necessary backing can be appointed. Obviously the principle appropriate to a bazaar-canteen economy is not to pay only for the product purchased—although this is one criterion—but to pay also in accordance with the standing of the person from whom the product is purchased with his rank or backing. Rank orientation, in the words, brings price indeterminacy into the “market” for bureaucratic labour.

Administrative Efficiency and Development

You will no doubt think of other ways in which overlapping of non-economic with economic criteria affects the operation of the “bazaar-canteen”. I should say that it has profound effects for economic development and industrialization as well as for public administration. Price indeterminacy introduces a large element of risk and uncertainty, to say nothing of “non-economic costs”, into entrepreneurship. This, in turn, makes necessary a high rate of profit on all investments. The usurious money-lender, so much the victim of public hostility, is not just a mean fellow, but is a businessman who is compelled to exact high interest rates by the extreme risks of his position, and his high level of costs. The government bank which offers low interest loans does not reflect market conditions, since it is a subsidized canteen, open only to a few relatively privileged members of the community. Such a bank could not survive as a business ven-
ture without governmental subsidies and special privileges.

But if risks and the basic interest rate are high, from an economic viewpoint, then industrial capital formation is unlikely to occur since the returns on such investment are often moderate and can only be obtained over a long period of time. Moreover, industrial investments require large aggregates of capital which cannot be accumulated with ease under bazaar-canteen conditions.

The relationship between scale of operations and the phenomenon of price indeterminacy can be illustrated by comparing the operations of the Cottage Industries Emporium in New Delhi with the small retail shops in the adjacent bazaar. The Emporium is run on the lines of a formal market. Prices are determinate and clearly marked. No bargaining is permitted. Clerks record each transaction on sales slips which are sent to a cashier's office where the customer pays. He picks up his parcel at a third place on presentation of a receipt for payment. Under these circumstances, it is possible to have a large-scale organization and to make plans for the future. Clerks cannot cheat because they do not handle cash. The cashier is responsible for all the money collected, because at least two other records of the amount are available from the duplicates of the sales slips and the records of the parcel distribution desk. Inventory control completes the system of full accountability.

At the small shops in the bazaar, however, no prices are marked on the goods and clerks bargain with the buyer, collect the rupees, and hand over the purchase. It would be possible for a clerk to sell an item for 50 rupees, keep 10 and turn the rest over to the owner, saying that he had sold it for 40 rupees. To prevent such losses, the owner can only run a small shop so that he can personally watch everything that is going on. Or he may employ only close relatives and friends in whom he has full confidence, so that personal standing and loyalty become more important criteria for employment than capacity to do the work. Moreover, since the store keeper buys and sells at indeterminate prices, he cannot estimate very well just what his costs of operation and profit margin are. He may calculate his position simply by looking from time to time in his cash box
and at his inventory to see how things stand. Thus price indeterminacy hampers large-scale organization and impairs delegation of responsibility, a major factor in the extreme centralization of authority in all prismatic administration.

The slowness of productivity to increase has another consequence which also illustrates overlapping. I have already indicated that the threat of Western industry and imperialism, plus a growing demand for the products of the new technology, cause a sharp increase in government budgets. It would be futile to describe the change in detail. At random, I note that whereas there were less than 7,000 children in public schools in 1900 in the Philippines, there were 1,200,000 by 1935. During the same 35 years road mileage increased from 1,600 kilometres to 20,000. Municipal and provincial water-works increased from 1 to 285. Similar transformations occurred in every field. Obviously the cost of these improvements was tremendous, especially in relation to the low level of productivity of a poor economy.

One of the important sources of revenue to finance these improvement is the commercial profits of the business class. Hence taxes, licence fees, and duties of all sorts are imposed. Where exact records are kept, as in the Cottage Industries Emporium, it would be a simple matter to determine the total income from sales, and a fair tax could easily be collected—assuming this were a private rather than a governmental enterprise. This is the general situation in a marketized Western country.

But a bazaar merchant, with no definite records of expenditures and income, or only an inaccurate and perhaps illegible record, would certainly try to convince the tax collector that his net income was quite small. On the other side, the fiscal office and the politician would probably estimate his profits at a much larger rate than they really were. The more the collector tries to exact from the shopkeeper, the more the merchant conceals and minimizes his income. The bazaar-canteen setting, then, not only makes it difficult to collect taxes, but reinforces the secretiveness of bazaar psychology which perpetuates price indeterminacy.

Since tax revenues remain small in relation to the govern-
ment services for which there is a growing demand, and in relation also to the increasing pressure for public employment as an end in itself, the amount available for salaries per capita tends to decline. The result in a prismatic situation would be an extremely low rate of salaries, probably well below actual living costs. This in turn makes it necessary for bureaucrats to supplement their income from outside sources. Whether the supplement comes from second jobs, from the work of one’s wife and relatives, or whether an official capitalizes on his opportunities to exploit his position in exchange for gifts and considerations, the quality of administrative work certainly declines.

The official need not take bribes in an outright manner. Suppose he is dealing with a merchant who wants to avoid paying a tax or wishes to violate some regulation, such as a rule against the display of merchandise on the public right of way. The enforcing officer may also be a customer, and might be able to buy from the merchant at a very low price, the more so since no fixed price is marked on the goods. Let us assume that the storekeeper makes a loss on such a transaction, but considers the loss a small price to pay for the immunity from taxation or regulation thereby obtained. However, he must also recover his loss in some other way, and so attempts to charge an exhorbitantly high price to other customers, and especially to those who do not know enough to refuse, or bargain him down to a more reasonable price.

Again we see how price indeterminacy fits into the phenomenon of parish enterpreneurship, administrative corruption, low official salaries, diminished productivity. The episodes of the fire in the Naga City market and the events at the New Delhi Municipal Market fall into place as characteristic expressions of the bazaar model. The New Delhi market situation, however, represents a more refracted pattern than the Naga City one, because here we see an attempt by the Municipal Committee to enforce its regulations, whereas in Naga City it is apparent that similar regulations were not enforced. Once we recognize the typical prismatic pattern, we can look for it even in the most industrial countries, like the United States. There it is often referred to as market “imperfections” or “fric-
tions". When we have a model to establish a pattern and understandable relationship, however, we can give it a more precise name.

*The “Sala”: Prismatic Administration*

If we think of the administrative office as a focus for analysis, we can use the same concept of overlapping to distinguish the prismatic type from its refracted counterpart. In place of the “bureau”, where administrative rationality and efficiency serve as governing criteria, the prismatic office may be called the “sala”. In the sala administrative rationality is not ignored, any more than economic rationality is ignored in the bazaar-canteen. But in addition to strictly administrative criteria, the sala recognizes and reflects many non-administrative considerations.

We have already looked at some of these non-administrative factors, notably economic forces. Whenever we talk about the low salaries of prismatic officials, and their temptation to look for unofficial sources of income at the expense of their administrative duties, we are introducing a non-administrative factor. Whereas the use of salaries to compensate for official work properly performed may be considered an efficient use of scarce resources to maximize goal attainment, unofficial income which detracts from goal attainment constitutes an economic consideration which interferes with goal attainment by diverting officials from use of their labour to accomplish the organization’s presumed policies.

But other kinds of non-administrative criteria also detract from administrative rationality. For example, the persistence of primary organization, especially strong family ties, and the strength of elets, influence prismatic administration. In anthropological discussions of family structure, much attention is devoted to the structure of kinship systems. For example, a distinction between bi-lateral and uni-lineal systems is made, depending upon whether affinal relationships with the wife’s family are important or not. I do not discount the weight that such considerations may have different social systems, but I wish to focus attention on a different variable, namely the in-
tensity of family loyalty, and the accompanying obligations, together with the number of relatives to whom ties of obligation are recognized.

In this sense the Philippine and Thai families, while more loosely structured than the tightly-knit Chinese family, nevertheless involve the member in a large network of reciprocal obligations. This network is greatly expanded in the Philippines by ritual relationships established through the compadre system, whereby prominent individuals and friends are asked to serve as "godfathers" for one's children. The resulting obligations are highly particularistic. They impose the duty of assisting relatives whenever possible. These obligations are widely recognized as compelling, even though in conflict with other responsibilities, such as those imposed by public office. Consequently a man in office often feels as much duty to help relative obtain positions as he does to carry out official policies.

This contrast between official duties, in which appointments on merit basis are prescribed, and family loyalties which prescribe aid to relatives in finding positions, produces the familiar phenomenon of nepotism. In a traditional setting, say a tribal society, where all elite positions depend on family position, nepotism cannot exist. It is the incompatibility between an administrative and a conflicting family code which creates the problem of nepotism.

In America, family obligations exist also, but they are relatively weak, and the number of relatives to whom such obligations may be recognized is few, so that nepotism becomes a relatively unimportant phenomenon. However, it undoubtedly does exist, and is generally regarded as one of the "frictions" or "imperfections" in the formal bureau. I would prefer to describe it as a residual manifestation of sala characteristics in a system which has moved far toward the bureau pattern.

The family, of course, is not the only primary group which imposes particularistic obligations on the administrator. District of origin, and the "old school tie" also create powerful loyalties which often compromise administrative duty in the sala model. The question of province-mates is an extremely important subject in determining Philippine administration, and may well
be the same in Thailand, though I have less evidence on this point.

The development of social mobilization, differentiation and the appearance of cects also creates non-administrative considerations in the sala model. Pressure from cects is directed not so much toward the employment of particular individuals, as toward the restriction of public employment to members of a favoured group. In other words, prismatic pressures are more characteristically selectivistic than particularistic. Similarly great force is exerted to extend governmental benefits and services to favoured groups at the expense of the dis-favoured.

This takes a geographic form in the "pork barrel", a scheme whereby funds are allocated to be spent for public works in chosen localities. Congressmen are given considerable option in deciding who will be the beneficiaries, and how these funds are to be spent.

Socially, funds may be appropriated, or contracts made, regulations interpreted, etc. so as to favour members of the dominant community, as contrasted with various deviant communities, especially those whom I have called the "parish entrepreneurs".

Selectivistic recruitment and allocation of benefits, responding to pressure from cects, is a fundamental feature of the sala model, and clearly reveals the importance of non-administrative criteria.

Politics in the Sala

Of course, discrimination arises not only in the administration of policies, but in the actual terms of the policies themselves. This represents selectivism not only in the administrative but in the political process. Overlapping is as prevalent in the prismatic political arena,—which I call the "cock-pit"—as in its administrative setting. Thus, although the constitution and formal political structure may be universalistic in character, prismatic politics nevertheless excludes important sectors of the society from a political role. As a result the laws and official policies adopted often discriminate selectivistically against the excluded groups. This reveals the formalistic character of the
constitutional structure—to which I have already referred.

One of the striking characteristics of the Philippine political scene is the extent to which members of Congress are preoccupied with the problem of securing positions for their protégés. This reflects, of course, the intense pressure to which they are subjected by job applicants who throng their offices and give them no peace. As often as not these candidates are distant relatives, friends or province-mates who have done little or nothing to support the political campaign of the congressman. Nevertheless, he feels obliged to assist them, if possible.

One of the most powerful weapons the members of Congress have is the approval of the National budget, and the use of the “line-item” method in constructing the budget. This means that it is possible to identify the salary item for all important and even unimportant positions in the government. Members of Congress who are dissatisfied with the response of bureau and department chiefs to their requests for the “accommodation” of protégés can threaten to have an item removed from the budget, resulting in the loss of the incumbent’s position.

This specific system may not have an exact counterpart elsewhere, but it has functional equivalents in the sense that politicians can find some device by which to put pressure on officials to favour their friends and supporters. Thereby administrative factors enter the political “cock-pit”.

An attempt has been made to replace the line-item budget in the Philippines by a “performance” budgeting system, established with American technical assistance. Unfortunately, in my view, the reform was considered largely as a technical administrative matter without regard to the weight of the political implications of the line-item budget. Now both systems are in operation, for the Congressmen are unwilling to abandon the old one, although they are glad to obtain the new information performance budgeting gives them.

Preoccupation of congressmen with patronage problems lessens the time they can give to legislation and policy making. At the same time, the weakness of associations and the strength of clergymakes it difficult to obtain information and support for truly universalistic policies. For a variety of reasons, in-
cluding these, political policies are not clearly designed, nor are they well adjusted to the capabilities of the administrative system. The result is not only the considerable formalism to which I have already referred, but also the need for bureaucrats to interpret and adapt the laws to practical realities. In practice, administrators must spend a good deal of their time trying to make basic decisions about policy. Here, in my view, is one of the most crucial non-administrative factors in the sala model, namely the inherently political position of the bureaucrat.3

In Thailand where, as I have already mentioned, the parliament is relatively much weaker than the Congress in the Philippines, the political role of bureaucrats in policy making is, of course, even greater.

Intra-bureaucratic politics, of course, means that questions about how to obtain support and build alliances become as important to administrators as finding means to implement policies. Moreover, to the extent that policies are not clearly decided, whether by the nominal politicians or by the officials themselves, criteria can scarcely be found to determine the most efficient means to administer. We come back, then, to the proposition that bureaucrats will either enforce regulations ritualistically, or waive them entirely if this suits their interests. The very fact that officials have no clear conception of what they are supposed to accomplish reinforces their willingness to allow economic and family considerations to deflect them from the proper performance of their duties.

It is scarcely necessary, I believe, to give further illustrations of the effect of non-administrative factors on administrative behaviour in the sala model. I hope I have given enough examples to illustrate my proposition that the sala represents considerable overlapping, just as does the bazaar-canteen and the cock-pit. I shall also not take time to elaborate further a theory of the political cock-pit, or any other focus of action in the prismatic model.

It should also be clear that overlapping is closely related to

3 I have discussed this question at greater length in “Politics, Policies, and Personnel” (Manila, Institute of Public Administration, Occasional Paper no. 1, 1959).
the phenomena of formalism and heterogeneity. It is precisely the formalism of laws and regulations which permits administrators to allow non-administrative criteria to influence their actions to such an extent. It is the heterogeneity of the prismatic society which introduces numerous complexities and difficulties in formulating and implementing policy, and so contributes to both formalism and overlapping.

The Genetic Problem

An objection which may well be raised to the framework for analysis that I have presented is that Western societies, which were not always as refracted as they are today, may not have passed through prismatic stages marked by as high a degree of formalism, heterogeneity and overlapping as many contemporary non-Western countries are experiencing.

This objection has some validity, I think. It forces me to qualify my formulation to this extent—the degree of these prismatic characteristic may vary in different prismatic societies. In other words, I will argue that formalism prevails in every prismatic situation, but is greater in some prismatic situations than in others. Let us draw a series of hypothetical curves to mark the degree of formalism in relation to refraction for several societies, as in Figure 3.

![Figure III](image)

If curves 1, 2, and 3, represent possible paths of transformation for three different societies, then the positions $p^1$, $p^2$, and
p³ represent the most prismatic condition in each case, but the case of p³ is less formalistic than the case of p¹. Thus degree of formalism should not be thought of as an absolute characteristic, but as a condition relative to other stages of transformation in the same society.

Having made this qualification, I would add that even in Western societies, say during the late medieval and early modern period, as feudalism was being transformed in the direction of nation states and capitalism, a considerable degree of formalism and heterogeneity appeared. It would take too long to illustrate and justify this contention, but I should at least make a few general observations about it.

First of all, it is obvious that the transformation took place over a longer period of time. This made it possible for changes in effective behaviour and formal structure to be adjusted to each other in gradual stages. Instead of a "giant leap forward", small marginal changes in form could be followed or preceded by minor changes in behaviour. Common sense suggests that the transition costs of rapid revolutionary change are greater than those of more gradual evolutionary change.

A second distinction is perhaps even more significant, and related to the pace of transformation, namely the source of the impact or pressures stimulate change. I suppose the need for change always arises from some combination of internal and external pressures. However, the ratio between these two kinds of changes presumably varies considerably. Let us call the question of where the pressure for change comes from the "genetic problem". Then if the pressure is predominantly external, we can speak of "exo-genetic" change; if the pressure is predominantly internal, "endo-genetic" change. Perhaps if the internal and external pressures were equal in strength, we could speak of "equi-genetic" change.

In these terms the transformation of European society was largely endo-genetic, responding to forces which evolved within the matrix of Western feudalism. Here Western Europe must be viewed as a whole, as a single society rather than a congeries of different societies. We can see that the political institution of the Holy Roman Emperor was highly formalistic as contrasted
with the effective localization of power. Similarly the diversity between city states and backward feudal domains gives a characteristic expression of heterogeneity.

The salient characteristic of endo-genetic transformation, however, was that effective changes in behaviour usually preceded modifications in the formal institutions. In exo-genetic transformation, the reverse sequence takes place. It is precisely the impact of foreign models and the desire to "borrow", "adopt", or "catch up with" foreign institutions which impels reformers to introduce new forms before the effective behaviour has changed to match the innovations. No doubt the imposition of structural transformation is the way to force rapid substantive change, although the social costs, as I have said, may be high. It accounts both for the more rapid course of transformation, the higher danger of formalism and heterogeneity, and the severity of revolutionary tensions.

I am led, then, to the proposition that the more exo-genetic the process of refraction, the more formalistic and heterogeneous its prismatic phase; the more endo-genetic, the less formalistic and heterogeneous. Although formalism, heterogeneity and overlapping mark all prismatic societies, they mark "exo-prismatic" societies more strongly than "endo-prismatic" ones.

Conclusion

In closing these lectures, let me repeat again the statement that what I have offered you is a highly tentative formulation. I have not yet completed enough research to substantiate all the views I have presented. The very fact that the models of public administration and social science with which we are familiar were developed for refracted, and to a lesser degree, for the study of suchd societies, helps to explain the lack of models for the study of prismatic situations. It is only now that we are beginning to move in this distinction. I hope that, if I have not provided a satisfactory framework for the understanding of administration in prismatic societies, my work will at least stir up enough controversy and interest to lead others to urttrer investigations and greater success.
INDEX
INDEX

ACADEMIC FORMALISM, 114-17
Administration: architectural environment, 2; influence on, 6, 10; legitimacy in, 43; problems in, 3; process of transformation, 59; social environment of, 2; structure, characteristic of, 8; system of, 1-5
Administration and equality, 46-9
Administration and national community, 37-40
Administration and power, 51-2
Administrative and economic systems, inseparable, 52, 65
Administrative authority, 42-4
Administrative class, recruitment in, 45
Administrative efficiency and development, 132-6
Administrative model and power, 57-8
Administrative system, decentralization of, 48
Agraria and industria, 91n
America: declaration of independence and constitution, 41, 46; democracy in, 4
American administration, archaic features in, 82; impact of ecological forces on, 49
American agricultural college, 11
American Bar Association, 14
American Congress, decision in policy matters, 42
American Constitutional Structure, 4
American economic system, 5
American market system, *irt* productivity, 12
American Medical Association, 14, 16, 19
American personnel administration, bureaucracy in, 6
American personnel, wages, 6
American Political Science Association, 14-15
American President, decision in policy matters, 42
American Society, aspects of, 4, 6
American Society for Public Administration, 14
American tax, method of payment, 9
Ancient Siamese Government and administration, 60n
Ancient Siamese politics, archaic and ordering, 86-7
Archaic political model, 80-82
Arensberg, 61n
Assimilation, *irt* Communication, 36-8
Association, administrative use of, 20-23; characteristics of, 15; role of, 14-16
Attainment orientation, 111-13
Authority and popular sovereignty, 44-5
Autocratic and democratic systems, differences of, 86-7
Ayuthaya period, *irt* Siamese administration, 60

BANGKOK PERIODS, *irt* Siamese administration, 60
Bazaar canteen, different types
INDEX

of, 130-32; economy, irt administration, 122-3; effects of, 132; model, 91n, 121n; operation of, 132
Blanchard, Weldell, 60n
British and French power, expansion of, 74
Buddhist doctrine, 70
Budget system, 9
Bureaucracy: characteristic of, 24-6, 32; control over, 104, 107; division of, 55; non-bureaucratic power, basis of, 52-4
Bureaucracy in a democracy, 50n
Bureaucratic weakness, basis of, 54-7
Business administration in American Universities, 17
Business corporation, formation of, 17

CAMBODIAN, LANGUAGE GROUP, 67
Career Service, 7
Chain of Command, a doctrine, 47, 48
China, trade with, 63-7
Chinese administration, comparison with, 125-7
Chinese Civil Service, irt Class structure, 66
Chinese family, name associations, 126
Chinese family, structure of, 137
Chinese method for recruitment, 45
Christianity, role in administration, 70-71
Chulalongkorn, King, 87
Civil Service Assembly, 14
Civil Service, foundation of, 46
Class structure 23-7; closed 23,
40; conflicts in, 40; open, 24, 30, 40
Class system, administrative impact on, 33-4
Class values, separation of, 27-31; terminology, 27n; struggle for, 29; upper class, groupings, 29
Clepts, prismatic groups, 126-8
Cockpit, political theory, 140
Columbus, 53, 81
Communications network, 34-7; sources of, 35
Communist Party, domination of, over administration, 50
Comparison, a scale, 93-5
Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast-Asia, 70n
Confucian idea for recruitment in administration, 45
Consensus and administrative authority, 42-4
Constitutional formalism, 102-04
Cottage industry emporium, 133, 134
Counter-élites, 125-6
Cultivation, new techniques in, 11

DAMRONG, PRINCE, 74
Decision making, formula of, 77
Decision process: seven categories of functional analysis, 84n
Decisional and ordering functions, 82-6
de Gaulle, General, 41
Democratic and autocratic system, difference of, 86-7
Deutsch, Karl, 36n
Dhami, Prince, 70n, 71n, 71
Diploma mills, irt technical personnel, 112
ECOLOGY, IMPORTANCE OF, 2
Ecology of government, 2n
Economic productivity, 4, 5
Economic structure, redistribution, 61-2
Economic system, strength of, 12
Economy as instituted process, 61n
Egypt, irt Thai administration, 89
Elite Society, 27-8
Employee, relations with employers, 5-8
Employing agency, 8
Equal pay for equal work, 130
Equality and administration, 46-9
European feudalism, irt non-bureaucratic power, 53
European imperialism, 74
Executive class, 32
Exchange system, 61

FAVOURITISM, CRITISM OF, 49
Financial administration, 8
"First come first serve", forceful doctrine, 49
Formal and substantive structures, 76-7
Formal economics, 76-7
Formal political model, 77-80
Formalism, 99-102; academic, 114-7; administrative aspects of, 108-11; causes of, 116; constitutional, 102-04; intensification of, 117
France: distribution of political power, 41; Fourth Republic, 41; Great Revolution, irt Symbol system, 41
French political parties irt, Symbol system, 41

Functional-structural analysis, 93

GAMA, VASCO DA, see Vasco da Gama
Gams, John, 2
Geldern, Robert Heine, see Heine-Geldern, Robert
Genetic change, 142-3; problem, 141-3
Gettysburg address, 42

HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 2
Heine-Geldern, Robert, 70n
Heterogeneity, 118-21, 141; central tendency, 118; characteristics, 121-2; formalism and overlapping, 91-3; irt, economics, 121-5; range of variation, 118; unequal distribution, 124
Hocart, A.M., 70n
Hopkins, Terence K., 61n
Human equality, 47
Hyneman, Charles S., 50n

INDIA, TRADE WITH, 53
Indian administration, process of transformation, 59
Indian Civil Service, recruitment in, 45
Industrial Society, structure, 13
Intelligentsia, class of people, 114
Intelligentsia and counter-éliges, 125-6
Iraq, irt Thai administration, 89

JACKSONIAN PERIOD, irt SOVEREIGNTY, 45
Japanese Emperor, 43, 78

KAPLAN, ABRAHAM, 27n, 41n
Kingship, 70n

LANGUAGE PROBLEM, irt COMMUNICATIONS, 35
Lapu, Lapu tribal leader, 114
Lasswell, Harold 27n, 41n; irt political decision making, 84
Laws, enforcement of, 100-02
Lincoln, Abraham, 42
Loyal opposition, irt political party, 39

MACSELAN, DISCOVERER OF PHILIPPINES, 114
Magna Charta, irt non-bureaucratic power, 54
Malay language, 67
Market master, irt obligations of contracts, 10
Marketization, irt bazaar canteen economy, 122; reasons for, 122
Marxian view irt, non-bureaucratic power, 52
Medieval Europe, 53
Mobilization irt Communications, 36-8

National Community and Administration, 37-40
Nationalism and social communications, 36n
Negro population, irt sub-community, 39
New Delhi Municipal Committee, 98; autocratic action, 98
Non-bureaucratic power, basis of, 52-4

OLD SIAMESE CONCEPTION OF
MONARCHY, 70n

PALI DHAMMASATTHA, 71
Pariah capitalism, 123
Particularism, social structure, 62-6
Patronate group, 63
Pearson, 61n
Personnel: best man for the job, 7; comparison with a commodity, 6-7; contracts in, 7; equal pay for equal work, 6, 10; security of, 7; tenure, 7; wages, 6
Personnel administration, 6; bureaucracy in, 6; freedom of choice, 6
Philippine administration, process of transformation, 59
Philippine family, structure of, 137
Philippine public administration, 10
Philippines: attainment orientation, 111-14; budgeting system, 139; bureau of civil service, 107; appointment of 110; congress, power of, 107; formalism, 106-09; military revolt, 107; political administration, characteristic of, 139; president, direct election of, 107; under European rule, 92
Plural security, 37-9
Polanyi, Karl, 61n, 76
Political framework, 49-51
Political party, two-party system, 39, 41
Politics in the Sala, 138-41
Politics, policies and personnel, 140n
INDEX

Poly-Communal society, 37-40, 125-6
Popular sovereignty, 44-5
Pork barrel, Scheme, irt allocation of funds, 138
POSDCORB, complex, 31, 73
Power: distinct, 77-9; formal, 77-9; indistinct, 77-9; informal, 77-9
Power and administration, 51-2, 57-8
Power and decision making, 75-6
Power and Society, 27n
Power Structure: arbitrary but not effective, 73-5
Price discrimination, 130
Price making market system, 5
Prince indeterminacy and rank, 130-32
Prismatic, administration, 136-8; group par excellence, 126-8; heterogeneity, 127; model, characteristics of, 99; society and financial administration, 91n, 130n
Productivity, different aspects of, 12-13
Public administration, aspects of, 9, 34; associational character of, 18; growth of, 11; implications of the theory of, 31-2; organization for, 4; principles of, 9-10; qualifications, 7; reflections on, 2n; system of, 12
Public administration in American Universities, 17
Public health service, 20, 21
Public opinion, irt communications, 36
Public relations, techniques in, 44
Rank and Price Indeterminacy, 130-32
Recruitment in enterprises, 25-6
Recruitment of personnel, criteria, 38
Redistribution, irt economic structure, 61-2
Redistributive movement, 61; structure, 62; system, 76
Reflections on public administration, 2n
Republican Party, irt Symbol system, 40
Revolutionary slogans of non-bureaucratic power, 53
Roman Emperor; 142
Rural free delivery, 11
Rule of law 74; irt class system, 33

Sacral, Symbol System, 69-73
Sala: prismatic administration, 136-8; characteristics of, 137; politics in, 138-41
Separation of powers, 51, 53-4, 56
Service first to those of highest rank, principle of, 49
Siam under Rama III 1824-1851, 60n
Siamese State ceremonies, 70n
Siffin, William, 91n
Social factors, 14-17
Social science and public administration, 91n
Social structure, contents of, 64; particularism, 62-6
Sociology and the substantive view of the economy, 61n
Sovereignty, 44-5
Soviet Union, irt productivity, 13; public administration, 50
Spoils system, irt sovereignty, 45
Substantive economics, 76-7
Sukhothai period, irt Siamese administration, 60
Superior men, irt sovereignty and equality, 46
Symbol system, 40-42

TAX, ASSESSMENT OF, 9; AVOIDANCE OF, 134-5
Taxation, principle of, 8; system of, 8
Thai: administrative system, 59; associations, place for, 87-8; family, structure of, 137; language, 67; revolution, 87
Thai administration: Buddhism, effects of, 70; different models of, 93-5; influence of other Govts. over, 92; modern, 87-91; process of transformation, 59; qualifications of 95-7; religion, role of, 70-73; scale of comparison, 93-5
Thailand: its people, its society, its culture, 60n; ancient politics, 86-7; civil service, manipulation of rules, 110; civil service commission, 110; class structure, 66; communications, hurdles in, 67; communications network, mobilization, 88; unmobilization, 66-9; constitutional assembly, appointment of, 104; crisis of authority, 104-06; king, domination of, 66; lack of effective power, 106; military camp in, 103; ministry of interior, 74; instructions for elections, 102; national assembly, abolition of, 104; Prime Minister, formation of party, 103; symbols for power, 89; symbol system: sacral, 69-73
Thammasat, 71
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 4, 14
Toennies, German Scholar, 95
Tokugawa period, 43, 78
Toward the comparative study of public administration, 91n
Trade and market in the early empires, 61n
Transport, methods of, 59

Vasco da Gama, 53
Vella, Walter F., 60n
Venice, 53
Vermont farmer, 11
Vietnamese, language group, 67

Wage and Position Classification Office, 132
Wales, Quaritch H.G., 60n, 70n
Weber, Max, 66, 123
Western society, characteristics of, 4

Yankee Ingenuity, 5