PLATO'S PHÆDO.
PLATO:

PHÆDO.

WITH

INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND APPENDICES.

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[Note.—The text used in this edition is, with some modifications, that of Teubner. The editors wish here to acknowledge their debt both to the interesting edition of Professor Geddes, and to the more critical edition of Mr. Archer-Hind. Much use has been made of the analysis, and of the wealth of illustrative matter in the former, and of the careful summaries of the argument interspersed through the latter work. Anyone who desires to know more of the Phædo should read Mr. Archer-Hind’s Introduction. For further knowledge of the subjects on which the Phædo touches we would recommend the Appendices of Professor Geddes. Constant reference has been made to Professor Joseph B. Mayor’s lucid ‘Sketch of Ancient Philosophy from Thales to Cicero.’ The two tables at the end of the Introduction form a conspectus of the best period of Greek Philosophy, and are intended to be used as a kind of guide to his book.

Our thanks are due to Mr. D. G. Ritchie, Fellow and Tutor of Jesus College, Oxford, for kindly reading through the proofs of the Introduction, and for several valuable suggestions.]
§ 1. Plato, the deus philosophorum, as Cicero calls him, was born at Athens, or possibly Ægina, in the year 428 B.C. His parentage was noble: his father’s family traced its line back to Codrus, whilst on his mother’s side, Plato claimed descent from Solon. It is said that his real name was Aristocles, and that it was either his fluency of speech or the breadth of his chest which won him the name of Plato. He was carefully educated, and was reputed a keen scholar. His life falls naturally into three divisions.

(1) Period of Discipleship, 428-399 B.C.—He was at first deeply impressed with the views of Heraclitus, and was drifting, it is said, into scepticism, when in his twentieth year he fell under the influence of Socrates, and, like his brothers Glaucon and Adimantus, sat at the feet of that teacher till the latter’s execution in 399 B.C. There is little doubt that this act completed the disgust with which the unsettled state of politics at Athens since 415 B.C. had already inspired Plato, and contributed to turn his thoughts to the excogitation of an ideal state which should be free from the faults of the constitutions which he saw around him.

(2) Period of Travel and Development, 399-387 B.C.—On the death of his master he lived for some time at Megara with Euclides, a disciple of Socrates, who dwelt almost exclusively on the logical side of the Socratic teaching. In the course of his wanderings thence he reached Cyrene, and there acquired a dislike to the theory which Aristippus, the head of the Cyrenaic School (§ 7), had wrung from the teaching of Socrates—that, as our feelings are the only thing we can be sure of, pleasure is the end of life. In Magna Græcia he found flourishing two pre-Socratic schools of thought, both of which influenced his mind very considerably. To the Pythagoreans is due not only much of
Plato's mysticism (note 74A), but also of his fondness for mathematics. To the Eleatics he was indebted for the conception of the reality, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀτόμου, underlying that ceaseless flux, τὸ γὰρ γινομένον, which was, in Heraclitus's view, the only form of existence. It was under these influences that Plato conjoined to the ethical ideas he had drawn from Socrates the beginnings of a system of logic, physics and metaphysics, which he gradually blended together into an harmonious whole.

(3) Period of Professorship at Athens, 387-347 B.C.—During most of this time he gave free public lectures, both in the garden of his own house at Colonus, and in the Academy, a gymnasium about a mile to the north-west of the city, whence his followers took the name of the Academic School, or the Academy. These were not exactly formal lectures, but rather conversations like those in which Socrates sought to "bring men's thoughts to the birth by means of question and answer" (cf. Phædo, 75 D). Probably his deeper teaching at home to his more intimate disciples, some twenty-eight in number, took more of the shape of that professorial discourse which his writings, at first pure dialogues, tended more and more to assume. Amongst this inner circle of his disciples were Speusippus, his nephew, who succeeded him as head of the Academy (§7), and Aristotle, whom Plato called "the Intellect of his School," and who, after his master's death, founded the School which was called the Peripatetic. Plato's residence at Athens was interrupted by two visits to Sicily, which he had seemingly already once visited during the second period of his life. On the first occasion, in 387 B.C., he is said to have been at first kindly received at Syracuse by its despot, Dionysius the Elder, but to have been afterwards sold into slavery, from which he was liberated by Anniceris of Cyrene. He, however, made a great impression on Dion, the brother-in-law of the despot, who, on the death of the Elder Dionysius, in 367 B.C., invited Plato over in the hope that he would train up the despot's son and successor, the Younger Dionysius, upon the model of the philosopher-king of the Republic. The experiment was not successful, as is fully explained in the ninth chapter of the History of Sicily.
in this series. Dionysius grew impatient of control, banished Dion, and made it advisable that Plato should withdraw before the expiry of the year. Some years later, 361 B.C., he was induced to return, but was glad to make a hasty escape. Having thus proved to his sorrow the impracticability of his ideal state, “save in the heavens,” he continued teaching at Athens till his death, 347 B.C.

§ 2. The Writings of Plato. There are extant, besides one book of Letters (almost certainly spurious), thirty-five dialogues ascribed to Plato. These have been classified in as many ways as the plays of Shakspere. They may be arranged according to the subject-matter—ethics, physics, and metaphysics; they may be divided into dialogues of search (ζητητικοί), and of exposition (υφηγητικοί); or they may be arranged, not exactly in chronological order, but in order of development. The second is the orthodox and time-honoured method: the last the most fruitful. The first must needs be arbitrary, as Plato himself did not either confine or express his thought in any such definite departments—that was left for Aristotle to do, and to do well. To Plato philosophy was one and indivisible: Aristotle, while accepting its unity, broke it up, for convenience of treatment, into the still recognised parts. Aristotle handled apart both Logic, and thereafter in succession those sciences for the study of which Logic provides principles and methods. His classification of these sciences may be shown thus:—

Philosophy.

Speculative Philosophy (whose aim is truth) (θεωρητική).

Practical Philosophy (whose aim is action) (πρακτική).

“Metaphysics” Mathematics. Physics (including Psychology).

Poetic Philosophy (whose end is artistic production) (ποιητική).

Poetics. Rhetoric (?)

Ethics.

Economics.

Politics.
Doubtless many of Plato's works might be assigned to one or other of these divisions; but the more important it would be very difficult to locate. The Republic, for instance, may be mainly political, but it treats, not merely touches, every single one of the foregoing sciences. So, too, with the Phædo, the Laws, etc.

(1) Accepting, then, the third method of classification, we find, corresponding to the first period of Plato's life, certain Socratic Dialogues, in which, with a view to learning what a given thing is, various opinions concerning it are compared, the accidentals are eliminated, and ultimately, in some cases, a general concept (εννοια) is arrived at. It is thus that the Laches deal with Courage, the Charmides with Temperance, the first book of the Republic with Justice, the Lysis with Friendship, the Euthyphro with Piety, the Protagoras with Virtue, etc. All these are Socratic, both in subject and in method, i.e., they deal with ethics, and they prove to the interlocutors, by means of question and answer (or "dialectic"), that they don't know what they are talking about, and what they should and can know.

(2) Influenced by the various thinkers whom he met in the second period of his life, Plato went a step further by regarding these general conceptions not merely as thoughts in the mind, but as ιδέαι, Ideas, having an existence of their own. The ideas are separable (χωρίστα) from things (φανόμενα), which are, in fact, what they are, because of the ideas. He never quite explains the how of it: at first the ideas are present or immanent in things, and things participate in the ideas (παρουσία, μέθεξις); later the ideas are the exemplars or archetypes which things imitate (παραδείγματα, μίμησις). Only ideas can be known: things can only be seen, heard, felt, etc. This is because things seem, ideas are. Heraclitus is, in fact, right, so far as he goes: the phenomenal world is in a state of ceaseless flux and change (πάντα μετα), and the senses whereby we perceive it are equally unstable. But over and above this, there is an ideal world apprehended, not by the senses, but by the soul, which must be eternal, even as the ideas it comprehends. This ideal world is not continually changing (γίνεται), but really exists (ἐστί). True, Parmenides was
wrong in thinking all that really exists to be one and the same \((\tau \odot \ ; \tau \varepsilon\)\), but he was right thus far at least: there are many realities, existences \((\omega \alpha i)\), for there are many \(i\delta \varepsilon \eta\); but they are all subordinate to the one supreme reality, the \(i\delta \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \; \alpha \gamma \alpha \theta \varepsilon \eta\) \((\S \ 4)\). Thus Ethics, closely interwoven with Politics, finds an abiding basis in Metaphysics \(\text{the knowledge of what really is}\), and is bound up closely with Dialectic \(\text{the instrument whereby its truths are discovered}\), and with Psychology \(\text{which deals with the nature and function of the human soul—the only home of those truths}\).

All this is elaborated in the second and in the early part of the third period of Plato's life in Dialogues of the middle stage of Plato's thought. Amongst these Dialogues—the precise order is fertile matter for speculation—come the Symposium, treating of the lofty philosophic \(\varepsilon \rho \omega \sigma\), which impels to the pursuit of true beauty and beauteous truth; the Meno, which elaborates the theory that knowledge \(\varepsilon \pi \sigma \tau \theta \mu \eta\), not mere \(\delta \varepsilon \xi\), seeming) is the reminiscence \(\alpha \varepsilon \alpha \mu \nu \nu \varepsilon \zeta\) of what the soul knew in a pre-existent state \((\Phi \alpha \varepsilon \delta \alpha\), Ch. XVIII.–XXI.)\; the Phædo, which asserts that the soul exists not only before birth, as is shown in the Phædrus, but after death—thus, in fact, it is eternal; the Gorgias, which treats of pleasure, both on its ethical and on its psychological side; and the Republic—"that unsurpassable monument of genius," which, purporting to discover what justice is, tells us, as it were by the way, how states rise, wax and wane, works out a magnificent theory of education, and almost exhausts the analogy of state and individual.

(3) Answering to the third period of Plato's life, but in strict chronology covering only his later years, are the Dialogues from which his Syracusan experiences have taken away that high hope of the betterment of things with which he started, and in which the mysticism of Pythagoras becomes more pronounced. Of these the chief are the Timæus, containing a physical theory of the universe in which the agency of the ideas is more exactly depicted than elsewhere, and the Laws, which retraces, in a somewhat more conservative spirit, the ground already covered in the Republic. [A complete list of the Dialogues, and some
valuable hints on Plato's philosophy generally, will be found in Mr. St. George Stock's edition of the *Meno.*]

§ 3. Scene and Date of the 'Phædo.'—(1) The *Phædo* is, with the *Apology*, the *Crito*, and the *Euthyphro*, marked out from the other works of Plato as giving an account of Socrates' last days. They are not, and are probably not meant to be, historically accurate: for instance, Socrates knew nothing of the theory of Ideas even in the comparatively rudimentary form in which he is made to speak of it in the *Phædo*. But they give the substance of some things which Socrates really said and did during his imprisonment down to his very death. Why was such a man executed? Some account of his life and fortunes will be found in the Index. Suffice it to say here, that he incurred hatred through his disagreeable, though healthy, habit of showing up other folks' ignorance, and suspicion through mistaken notions of his tenets and tendencies. He had been lampooned virulently enough in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes 423 B.C. In 399 B.C. he was formally accused of two crimes: first, of not worshipping the gods whom the city worshipped, but introducing new divinities of his own; and secondly, corrupting the youth. The occasion of the first charge was apparently Socrates' habit of alluding to his δαιμονίον, the voice within him which forbade him to do certain things: that of the second was the circumstance that in his flock there had been two notoriously black sheep—Alcibiades and Critias. Socrates did not, in the defence which is ascribed to him in the *Apology*, make any considerable attempt to conciliate his judges, and was, therefore, condemned to death. Owing to the ceremonial requirements—fully explained at the very opening of the *Phædo*—of the Delian Festival in honour of Apollo, which began on May 20, Socrates was, contrary to the usual custom, not put to death at once, but detained in prison during nearly the whole of a month. His friends endeavoured to persuade him to escape—an attempt which gives rise to the dialogue known by the name of *Crito*. The dialogue before us takes up the story on the morning fixed for Socrates' death, and it contains a list of the friends of Socrates who were then present with him. It tells how
Socrates, being called upon to defend his cheerfulness when about to lose his friends, is led first to assume the immortality of the soul, and then to justify that assumption; and finally relates how composedly and nobly Socrates drank the hemlock and passed away.

(2) The scene of the dialogue is thus the prison-house at Athens, sometime near midsummer, in the year 399 B.C. The account of what was done and said on that sad day is put into the mouth of Phædo, an Elean friend of Socrates, in answer to the inquiries of Echecrates, a native of Phlius, a city to the north-west of the Argolid. As regards the date when this story is supposed to be told—the dramatic date of the narrative, that is—two suppositions have been made, based on internal evidence. Professor Geddes thinks that Phædo, as an eye-witness, may well have been asked for the story, as he was passing through North Peloponnesus on his way home to Elis during the dispersion of the Socratic group immediately after the death of Socrates. Others object that the phrase τῶν τῶντε in Ch. LXVII., unless a slip of Plato's, involves the supposition that some years have elapsed since the death of the master, and find the clue to the date in the reference (57 A) to the breach of relations existing between Athens and Phlius, which might be due to the Corinthian War that began in 394 B.C.

(3) The actual date of composition is a problem to be solved by internal evidence alone, and so almost indeterminate. The approximate position of the Phædo in the list of dialogues has been already hinted at in § 2. It is generally regarded as following as the three principal dialogues dealing with the theory of knowledge—the Theaetetus, the Sophistes, and the Politicus, and as immediately preceding the Philebus, in which is defined the place and function of the idēa τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ or κατ’ τὸ ἀγαθόν in the ideal theory (cf. the importance attached to τὸ βέλτιστον in Ch. XLVII.). And both the Phædo and the Philebus come very near the position attained in the Republic—the “coping-stone” of the Platonic system.

§ 4. Topics of the ‘Phædo.’—It was stated in § 2 that Plato does not give a book or books to a particular science, but rather treats of any science which may bear on the
subject in hand in what seems a somewhat discursive manner. Thus though, as the sub-title περὶ ὠντὸς, ἥπινος implies, the dialogue strikes one as a treatise on psychology, not in its physiological, but in its ethical aspect, its professed object, and, as some think, its real purpose is something quite different. Scattered through the Phædo there are many topics which are capable, not of independent, but of separate treatment, e.g., the Ethics of Suicide, Ch. V., VI.; the Conditions of Knowledge, Ch. X., involving an implicit criticism of hedonistic theories, Ch. XIII.; a logical treatise on Predication in Ch. L.; a criticism of the Early Cosmologists, Ch. XLV., XLVI.; and an essay towards a scientific Physical Geography, Ch. LVIII.—LXI.; and so on. But these are not the main subjects of the Phædo. Neither are they digressions; still less are they excrescences—"Plato never wastes his words:" but they are purely subsidiary to the chief concern. What was this? The Phædo pretends to be Socrates’ defence of two positions he took up during the casual talk which opens the Dialogue: that, though (a) we are here on earth by the will and under the protection of good and wise gods, (b) the philosopher should busy himself in preparing for death, and should be glad when it comes. He is asked why, and in answering this demand he presupposes the immortality of the soul. This is too big a thing to take for granted, and proofs are required and given. The early ‘proofs’ are all very well, but are shown by Cebes, one of the interlocutors, not to go far enough. Socrates pulls himself together, and goes to the root of the matter by showing that the ideal theory, which is accepted by all present, presupposes the immortality of the soul. It is thus that Socrates justifies himself for looking forward to death as a good.

This defence, which is the ostensible object of the dialogue, gives it its artistic unity; but its real purposes are undoubtedly to establish the immortality of the soul, and to erect a true theory of causation on the débris of old materialistic systems. And it is probable that this metaphysical result, which seems to us quite incidental to the ethical dogma, was what a Plato of to-day would have put
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down in his Preface as his excuse for publishing the book. Let us briefly summarize Plato’s teaching on these two subjects, referring to the next section for a fuller presentation of the order in which they are introduced.

(I.) The Immortality of the Soul.—In the Phædo the arguments in favour of immortality are variously estimated at three, four, five or seven. We have followed Professor Geddes in making them consist of five (see § 5). The first four of these are not proofs, but simply presumptions in favour of immortality; only the fifth does Plato regard as a perfect demonstration of the theory. The first argument rests on the physical law of γένεσις ἐξ ἐναρτίων (the generation of opposite from opposite); but this may not always apply. The second proves the pre-existence of the soul, but does not say anything about its after-existence. The third seems unsatisfactory because, though it is true that, as like knows like, the soul must be akin to the ideas of which it alone has cognition, the soul may be sufficiently like the ideas to apprehend them without being eternal. The fourth merely confutes the theory that the soul is a harmony—a theory incompatible with its eternity. In fact all these arguments, as Cebes shows, do nothing more than make it highly probable that the soul is more lasting than the body: is this enough to help us to face death? The answer to this query is the elaborate metaphysical argument detailed in § 5, which rests on the principle that the ἰδεὰ are the sole ultimate causes of all existences: soul is soul because of the ἰδεὰ of life, and if it admitted the contrary ἰδεὰ of death it would become a dead vital principle, which is absurd. Given the hypothesis of the unique causative power of the ἰδεὰ, this argument is incontrovertible.

Plato was the first to base the immortality of the soul on reason, as opposed to tradition and the human instinct for self-preservation; and he is certainly the strongest advocate of the doctrine apart from Revelation. He apparently derived it from Pythagoras, rather than from Socrates, who, in the Apology, halts between two opinions—that death is either ὅτι, ἦν κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τίς καὶ μετοίκησις—who, in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, never takes up
the doctrine, and whose followers (§ 7), with the exception of Plato, never seem to adopt it. Nor does it take very deep root in later philosophers: it is always a debatable subject until Christianity arose and based it on the justice and moral purpose of an intelligent Creator. But there is a wide gap between the Platonic and the orthodox doctrine.

Why did Plato lay such stress on the theory, and how did he support it? Its meaning will become fairly clear in the light of the five positions as to the soul which in Plato depend each on the other in such a way that they all stand or fall together: the pre-existence of the soul, the theory of ἀνάμνησις, the continued existence of the soul, future rewards or punishments, Transmigration or Metempsychosis. There is a fixed amount of soul in the universe which never dies, and which, therefore, has never been born, for only that which has never had a beginning can never have an end: soul has a complete knowledge of real existence which is obscured in each portion of it when it is incarcerated in some material shape, but is partially recovered by means of Dialectic; and, whether the individual soul has a continued independent existence after its separation from the body—as seems to be implied in the Phædo—or is merged again into the universal soul from whence it sprang—which seems to be the teaching of the Timæus—in either case the future of the soul is regulated by its past, though the vices which it may have practised in one of its embodiments do not involve it in an eternity of vice and misery.

Yet other Platonic arguments in favour of immortality must be briefly summarized here. In the Symposium the theory rests on the conception of the philosophic ἕρως which is ever striving for higher forms of beauty: this contains the germ of the Christian argument from Aspiration, which is more closely approximated to in the Theæctetus, where the ἕρως appears as ὑποίουσι τῷ θεῷ. The Meno expounds the theory of ἀνάμνησις, and so contributes its share to the theory of immortality. The Phædrus contains the argument from ἀιτωκινησία, i.e., the soul, being selfmoved and the universal source of motion, must needs be immortal. In the Republic the principle is laid down that nothing is
destroyed save by its own proper evil, and from this it is deduced, that as the soul does not perish in consequence of its own evil, to wit sin, it is indestructible. Finally, in the Timæus the soul cannot die, because it is the abode of reason in all its beauty and simplicity.

(II.) The Ideal Theory was partly an outgrowth, partly a subversion, of previous Greek systems tabulated in § 6. The earliest thinkers had set themselves the problem of Ontology: What is Being? How can we explain the Universe? They took things as they were, and wanted to know why they were as they were. Then came some thinkers who looked a little deeper, and asked how we could know things: Empedocles by asserting that we can know things only in virtue of some resemblance between the knowing mind and the known thing; Parmenides by maintaining against Heraclitus, that it is only by reducing things to some sort of unity that we can know them, raised the problem of Epistemology: What is Knowing? On the top of these speculations came the Sophists, who, pointing to the diversity of method and result in their predecessors, declared that no such thing as knowledge exists: what seems to a man to be right is right, and what seems to a man to be true is true; or, as Protagoras puts it, πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρώπως. This is known as the Doctrine of Relativity.

Against this relativity of logical and ethical truth, Socrates raised his voice, and said there always lay beneath diversity of opinions some general conceptions accepted by all. Plato took over these general conceptions as his starting-point, and elevated them not only into independent existences, but into the only real existences (οὐσίαι). In the Phædo they are the causes, later they are the archetypes, of things as known to our senses (§ 2). In the Timæus they are stamped on matter (ἐκμακρεῖον, ἐξαριστοῦν), and so make things what they are. In the Republic, where perhaps the theory takes its most symmetrical form, they are all subordinated to the Idea of the Good, which has in the real world the threefold functions that the sun has in the phenomenal world: (a) just as the sun is the cause of light on one side, and of seeing on the other, so the Idea of the Good stands in a causal relation, both to truth and to
knowing; (b) just as the sun is the cause of vitality, so is
the Idea of the Good the cause of real existence; (c) just
as the sun rules the visible world of sense-perception, so the
Idea of the Good rules the intelligible world of reason.

This supremacy of the Idea of the Good, the foundation
alike of morality and of reality, which, like the rest of the
*idea*, has both a metaphysical, an ethical, and a logical
aspect, is only hinted at in the *Phædo*: the ideas make for
the Good, but are not yet clustered round it.

§ 5. **Analysis of the 'Phædo.'**—Ch. I.—IV.—In answer
to Echecrates, Phædo explains why Socrates was so long in
prison, and mentions who were present with him on the
day of Socrates' execution, and describes the opening of the
conversation with him.

Ch. V.—VII.—Socrates expresses the opinion that a
philosopher should be willing, even wishful, to die, but
quotes two stock reasons against suicide: (1) We are in
custody here, and ought not to try to escape; (2) we are
the slaves of the gods, and so ought not to deprive them of
our services. Simmias and Cebes raise the objection that
in that case Socrates ought not to wish to die.

Ch. VIII.—XI.—Socrates points out that by dying he
simply transfers his services to other gods, and that he
hopes for the best after death. He is told by the executioner
that so much talking may render death painful, but
persists in continuing the discussion. He lays it down
that the philosopher's life is nothing but a preparation for death:
and, accepting the definition of Death as the separation of the
soul from the body, shows: (1) That the philosopher is,
during life, hampered by the needs of the body, whilst his
mind is hindered by the bodily senses in its search for
Truth; and (2) that on present purity future happiness
depends.

Ch. XII.—XIV.—Since *none but the pure can attain the
pure*, Socrates shows that the true philosopher cannot but
wish his soul to shake itself free from the body; and that
only such an one can really be brave or temperate from
adequate motives. What others practise because it is 'the
best policy,' he practises because it is in accordance with
his Practical Wisdom (*φρόνησις*). In answer to Socrates'
expression of confidence, that he will soon know whether his views are right, Cebes asks for the reasons why he believes that the soul does not perish with the body. Five arguments for the immortality of the soul are given.

Ch. XV.—XVII.—(1) Cyclical.—In accordance with the principle that opposite is generated from opposite, it is probable that as there is a process or transition from Life to Death, so, too, there is a process from Death to Life: in fact, if there were not such a Cycle of change, the result of the former process working by itself would be universal death.

Ch. XVIII.—XXII.—(2) Platonic.—The pre-existence of the soul is deduced from the theory that learning is reminiscence, i.e., that our ideas (e.g., equality) are innate in the soul, obscured at birth, and afterwards gradually recalled.

Ch. XXIII., XXIV.—Socrates points out how this supplements the previous proof that the soul exists after death, and promises to try to remove the lingering dread of Simmias and Cebes, that possibly the soul may be dispersed abroad at death.

Ch. XXV.—XXIX.—(3) Metaphysical.—Only that which is composite is liable to dissolution; while what is not composite is constant and changeless. The ideal or invisible world is divine and indissoluble; the phenomenal or visible world is mortal and destructible. The soul comes under the former, the body under the latter, head. Besides, if the body can be long preserved by embalming, how much longer should we expect the soul to live?

Ch. XXX.—XXXIV.—If the soul associates too freely with the body it becomes like the body, gross and earthly, and after death still haunts the earth till it enters a lower animal. The soul which practises popular and social virtue enters a higher animal, or man: only that of the genuine philosopher joins the gods. The lesson of the doctrine of Metempsychosis to the philosopher follows.

Ch. XXXV.—XL.—Pause in the discussion: Socrates compares himself to the Dying Swan, which sings for joy at the approach of death, and invites those present to state their difficulties. Simmias' objection: is not the Soul a
harmony of the parts of the body, which perishes like other harmonies when the instrument producing it is dissolved? (Ch. XXXVI.) Cebes' objection: just as a weaver may wear out many of his garments, yet ultimately perish himself, so may not the Soul wear out many bodies, and yet itself also perish at last? (Ch. XXXVII.

Phædo breaks off to depict the dismay created in the prison by these objections; Echecrates sympathizes and asks for more; Phædo describes Socrates' calmness and patience, and continues the narrative. Socrates warns his hearers against unreasonable μησολογία, as against misanthropy, and points out his immense personal interest in being able to honestly believe what he has said with regard to the immortality of the soul.

Ch. XLI.—XLIII.—(4) Psychological.—The Soul is not a harmony: (1) because, if so, it could not have existed before the parts whereof it is a harmony, and in that case the doctrine of Reminiscence falls to the ground; (2) because, if so, vice, being a discord, could not exist in the soul, as we know it does; (3) because the soul rules the body. This is the answer to Simmias.

Ch. XLIV.—XLIX.—Digression, preparatory to solving Cebes' objection—which is carefully re-stated—on Socrates' early dabbling in Physicism in search of a true theory of causation. Unsatisfactory as he proved to be, Anaxagoras nevertheless, by his conception of a regulating mind, gave him his first notion of a teleological (see note, 97 C) theory of the universe: hence his attempts to arrive at definitions and general conceptions (ἐννομείναι), and later the Ideal theory. This means that the cause of beauty, of two, etc., is the idea of beauty, of duality, etc.: beyond this statement no true philosopher will go.

Ch. L.—LVI.—(5) Ideal. It being granted that ideas exist, and that things are what they are by participation in those ideas, Socrates shows that contrary ideas may coexist in the same thing, but can never combine: an idea cannot admit (a) its opposite, or (b) an idea which necessarily contains its opposite, e.g., the triad containing the idea of odd can never admit its opposite even; but at the approach of either (a) or (b) it either (i.) withdraws or (ii.) perishes
Applying this to the concrete, since a thing is what it is because of the immanence of an idea, which can never admit its opposite, therefore soul, which contains the principle of life in the body, can never combine with death, which is the opposite to life. It is, therefore, deathless; and so indeed indestructible, for on the approach of death alternative (ii.) not being open to it—since that word means death—it (i.) withdraws and lives on in Hades.

Cebes is at length convinced: Simmias, though satisfied with the proof, still feels misgivings, and is encouraged to search further into the truth of the hypothesis on which the proof rests.

Ch. LVII.—LXII.—Myth regarding the conformation of the earth, and of the underworld to which the soul goes on its withdrawal from the body. The earth is a sphere balanced in the midst of the heavens: we live in a foggy hollow in its surface, all unconscious of the brighter region of the upper earth where is no fog. There are many other such hollows, the chief of which is Tartarus, whereinto all the rivers of the earth flow, and whence they reissue: of these rivers the chief are Oceanus, Acheron, Pyrithlegethon and Cocytus. Thither the souls of the departed come for judgment: those which have lived fair lives are sent to Acheron till they are cleansed; those which have sinned past cure are hurled into Tartarus for ever; those whose guilt, bad as it is, is not past remedy, are sent to Tartarus till they are forgiven by those whom they have wronged; those which have lived holy lives ascend to the earth’s higher and true surface, and live in bliss and purity.

Ch. LXIII.—LXVII.—How Socrates applies the myth, and teaches that we must keep ourselves unspotted from the world; how he gives his last requests, and tells Crito not to talk of ‘burying Socrates,’ but of ‘burying Socrates’ body’; how he bathes and says good-bye to his friends; how he drinks the poison, and how he dies, saying:

‘Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius: pay it, and do not forget!’
§ 6.—Pre-Socratic Philosophy of Nature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. EARLY IONIC SCHOOL.</th>
<th>B. ITALIC SCHOOLS.</th>
<th>C. LATER IONIC SCHOOLS.</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dynamical Physicismand Transcendental Physicism.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mechanical Physicism.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mechanical Physicism.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaximander of Miletus, 610-547 B.C. (§6)</td>
<td>(a) ἀρκετοῦς.</td>
<td>Four elements acted upon by two processes, νεῖκος καὶ στοργὴ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaximenes of Miletus, fl. 520 B.C. (§6)</td>
<td>(b) Ten pairs of elements (σῶντονα) like odd and even, etc.</td>
<td>(a) τὰ πληρῶς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heraclitus of Ephesus, fl. 513 B.C.</td>
<td>(c) Soul divided into νοῦς, φρένες, θυμόν.</td>
<td>(b) ἔτοιμα, impelled by ἀναγκῆ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) ἐνέργεια, religious and political brotherhoods aiming at—</td>
<td>(c) Distinction between that which exists ἑτέρῳ (φύσι) and that which exists νόμῳ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Aristocracy.</td>
<td>(d) ὁμοίωματα acted upon by a divine principle, νοῦς.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 By Dynamical Physicism it is assumed that the original matter has in itself vital energy, in virtue of which it changes its nature and takes varying forms; by Mechanical Physicism, that matter, being itself immobile, is acted upon by external forces.

2 This was one of the main tenets of the Sophists (such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus), who, finding so many conflicting views, maintained the Relativity of Knowledge: What seems to a man to be right and true, is right and true. Against this Socrates protested.
§ 7.—Tree to illustrate the Socratic Schools.

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND MAN.

SOCRATES (470-399 B.C.).

(Ascetic.)

CyN. Antisthenes
Antisthenes (fl. 380).

Diogenes (fl. 360). 

Xenophon (440-355).

Eschines (fl. 360).

ACADEMY. 

PLATO (428-347).

ELIAC. Phædo (fl. 390).

MEGARIC. Euclides (fl. 399).

CYRENAIC. 

Aristippus (fl. 380).

Theodorus (fl. 320).

Euhemerus (fl. 316).

Hedonistic.)

INTRODUCTION.

PERIPATETIC.

ARISTOTLE (385-322).

Theophrastus (fl. 310).

Strato (fl. 290).

OLD ACADEMY.

Speusippus (fl. 350).

Xenocrates (fl. 340).

ERETRIAC.

Menedemus (fl. 310).

STOIC.

Zeno of Citium (fl. 280).

Cleanthes (fl. 260).

Chrysippus (fl. 240).

MIDDLE ACADEMY.

Arcesilaus (315-241).

NEW ACADEMY.

Carneades (214-129).

SCEPTIC.

Pyrrho (fl. 320).

Timon (fl. 270).

EPICUREAN.

Epicurus (341-270).

Note.—Some account of all those whose names appear in the first line of this table will be found in the Index.
THE CHARACTERS OF THE DIALOGUE.

ECHECRATES.
PHÆDO.
APOLLODORUS.
SOCRATES.
CEBES.
SIMMIAS.
CRITO.
THE ATTENDANT OF THE ELEVEN.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

η περὶ ψυχῆς, ηθικός.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΔΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.
ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΩΔΩΡΟΣ,
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΙΣ, ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ,
Ο ΤΟΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΥΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ.

I. EX. Αὐτὸς, ὁ Φαίδων, παρεγένοι Σωκράτει ἐκεῖνη τῇ 57
ἡμέρᾳ, ἢ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ
ήκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτὸς, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες.

EX. Τί οὖν δὴ ἔστιν ἄττα εἶπεν ὁ ἄνηρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου;
καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ὡδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἁκούσαμι. καὶ γὰρ οὐτὲ
τῶν πολιτῶν Φιλισσῶν οὐδεὶς πάντα τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν
'Αθηναίες, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίκεται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκεῖθεν, ὡστὶς ἂν
ἡμῖν σαφῆς τι ἀγγείλαι οὖσα τ' ἢν περὶ τούτων, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι Β
φάρμακον πιῶν ἀποθάνοι. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἰχεν φράξειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἀρα ἐπούθεσθε ὁν τρόπον 58
ἐγένετο;

EX. Ναι, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἡγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομεν
γε, ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῆς ύστερον φαίνεται ἀποθα-
νών. τί οὖν ἢν τοῦτο, ὁ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη: ἐτυχεν γάρ
τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρῶμα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου, ὁ εἰς
Δῆλον Ἄθηναιοί πέμποντοι.

PHÄED.
EX. Τούτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τούτ’ ἐστι τὸ πλοίον, ὡς φασίν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐν ὕποθεσιν ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δίς ἐπτά ἐκείνους ἀγών καὶ ἐσωθεὶ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὐξαντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεὶ, ἐκάστῳ ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον’ ἦν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐτί ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ’ ἔναντον τῷ θεῷ πέμπτουσιν. ἔπειδαν οὖν ἀρξώνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστίν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀποκτινώναι, πρὶν ἄν εἰς Δῆλον τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεύδο· τούτῳ δ’ ἐνίστε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν

C τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτοὺς. ἡρῴχ’ δ’ ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἔπειδαν οἱ ζηρεύς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναι τοῦ πλοίου· τούτῳ δ’ ἐτυχεῖ, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταύτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ θανάτου.

II. EX. Τι δὲ δὴ τα περὶ αὐτὸν τῶν θάνατον, ὡς Φαίδων; τι ἦν τα λεχθέντα καὶ πραξθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὐκ εἰών οἱ ἀρχόντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ’ ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα τῶν.

D ΦΑΙΔ. Οὔδαμως, ἀλλὰ παρήσαν τινες καὶ πολλοί γε.

EX. Ταύτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἠμῖν ἀπαγγείλα, εἰ μὴ τίς σου ἀγχολία τυγχάνει οὖσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὡμίν διηγήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνημόθα Σωκράτος καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκοφύντα ἔμοιγε αἰεὶ πάντων ἠδότων.

EX. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὡς Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκοουσμένους γε τοιούτους ἔτερους ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβεστάτα διεξελθέειν πάντα.

E ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσσω ἐπαθὼν παραγενόμενος.

οὕτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἐλεος εἰσῆλθε· εὐδαιμὸν γὰρ μοι ἀνήρ ἐφαίνετο, ὡς Ἐκέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἄδεως καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὡστε μοι ἐκείνον παρίστασθαι μηδ’ εἰσ’ Ἀιδοῦ ἱόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἱέναι, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἐκεῖστε ἀφικόμενον εὕττε τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. 59
dia δὴ ταύτα οὐδὲν πάνυ·μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῆξε, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δοξεῖν
eῖναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὖ ἡδονή ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν
ὄντων, ὥσπερ εἰσθειμένη· καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιούτοι τινες ἔσταν·
ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρήν· καὶ τις ἀήθες κραῖ-
σις ἀπὸ τις ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης,
ἐνθυμομένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἐμμέλε τελευτᾶν· καὶ πάντες οἱ
παρόντες σχεδὸν τι οὕτω διεκειμέθα, ὅτε μὲν γέλωντες, ἐνὶστε δὲ
dακρύνοντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, 'Απολλόδωρος· οὐθα
γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

Ε. Πῶς γὰρ οὕ; 

ΦΑΙΔ. 'Εκείνος τε τοῖνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἴχεν, καὶ αὐ-
tός ἔγγυε ἐτεταράγμη καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Ε. Ἕτυχοι δέ, ἃ Φαῖδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὕτος τε δὴ ὁ 'Απολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν
καὶ ὁ Κρετόβουλος καὶ ὁ παθὴρ αὐτοῦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἔτι Ἐμμο-
γένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Ἀδεχάμης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἢν δὲ καὶ
Κτήσιππος ὁ Παίανειδ καὶ Μενέέβους καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπι-
χωρίων· Πλάτων δὲ, οὐμαί, ἐσφένει.

Ε. Ξένοι δὲ τίνες παρῆσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Συμμάς τε γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαῖ-
dωνίδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

Ε. Τί δέ; 'Αριστιππος καὶ Κλέομβροτος παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δὴτα· ἐν Ἀἱγύπτῳ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἴναι.

Ε. Ἀλλος δὲ τίς παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδὸν τι οὖμαι τούτους παραγενόσθαι.

Ε. Τί οὖν δή; τίνες, φῆς, ἔσταν οἱ λόγοι;

Π. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἔγω σοι εἴς ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι δυνη-
σαθαι. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰσθειμεῖν φοιτάν
καὶ ἑγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἐωθέν
εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν
τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένουμεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἐως ἀνοιχθεῖ τὸ
dεσμωτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἀνεφύγετο γὰρ οὐ πρόπ.
PLATO, PHÆDO.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεῖ, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Ἐστῆρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ δημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωιαίτερον συνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐπειδὴ ἐξῆλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου Ἐ ἐστῆρας, ἐπυθόμεθα, ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφίγμενον ἦν, παρηγελλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἥκειν ὡς πρωιαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ἢκομεν, καὶ ἦμιν ἔξελθων ὁ θυρωρός, ὥστε εἰσέβη ὑπακούειν, εἰπεν περιπέμενεν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παρεῖναι, ἦς ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ. 'λύσουσι γὰρ, ἔφη, 'οἱ ἐνδεκα Ὑσκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν, ὅπως ἂν τῇ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ.' οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἑπισκὼν ἦκεν καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἡμᾶς εἰσίναι. εἰσίνοιτε οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Ὑσκράτῃ ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ἐστῆρα πη— γιγνώσκεις γάρ — ἔχουσαν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ἐστῆρα πῆ, ἀνεφήμησε τε καὶ τουαύτ' ἄττα εἰπεν, οἷα δὴ εἰσώθαις αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὅς Ὑσκράτης, ὦστατον δὴ σε προσεροῦσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τοῦτοι. καὶ ὢ Ὑσκράτης βλέπας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα. ὅς Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οὐκαδε. καὶ ἐκείνη μὲν ἄπηγόν τινες τῶν Β τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσαν τε καὶ κυπτομένην. ὁ δὲ Ὑσκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψε τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτρυψε τῇ χειρὶ, καὶ τρίβων ἀμα. 'ὡς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὅς ἄνδρες, ἐοικε τι εἶναι τοῦτο, ὡς καλουσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποί ἦδο. ὅς θαυμασώσεις πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἰναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἀμα μὲν αὐτὸ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγιγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δὲ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἔτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδον τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, Σ ὥσπερ ἐκ μᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένω δὖ ὑπνε. καὶ μοι δοκεὶ, ἔφη, 'εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Λύσποτος, μῦθον ἄν συνθείναι, ὡς ο θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνήψεν εἰς ταύτων αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταύτα ὅ ἂν τὸ ἔτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὅστερον καὶ τὸ ἔτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι έοικεν. ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἢν ἐν τῷ σκέλει πρότερον τὸ ἀλγεινὸν, ἢκείν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἥδυ. IV. 'Ο οὖν Κέβης ύπολαβὼν. 'νὴ τὸν Δία, ὃ Σώκρατες,

ἐφη, ἐὰν γὰρ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας μεν. περὶ γὰρ τοῦ τῶν ποιημάτων διὸν πεποίηκας ἑντεύναι τοὺς τοῦ Αισώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλων προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς μὲ ἡδὴ ἡροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐήνος πράγμαν, ὅ τι ποτὲ διανοηθεῖσα, ἑπειδὴ δεύρῳ ἡλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτὰ, πρότερον οὐδὲν πῶς ποιῆσας. εἰ οὖν τὶ σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν μὲ αὐθεὶς ἐρωτῇ — εἴ οίδα γάρ, ὅτι ἐρήσεται — εἰπέ, τί χρὴ λέγειν. ’’Λέγε τοῖνν, ἐφη, ἀυτῷ, ὁ Κέβης, τάληθη, ὃτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνοι εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα—ἡδὴ γάρ, ὡς οὐ βάδιον εἰθ—ἂλλ᾽ ἐνυπνῖν τινῶν ἀποτειρώμενοι, τί λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιώμενος, εἰ πολλάκις ταῦτῃ τῇ μούσικῇ μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνυπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ᾿ ἐν ἄλλῃ ὑφει φαινόμενον, τα αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον· ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὅπερ ἐπραττόν, τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτὸ μοι παρακελεύσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς 61 θέουσι διακελεύμενοι, καὶ ἐμὸν οὐτῷ τὸ ἐνυπνιον, ὅπερ ἐπραττόν, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὕτως μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἔμοι δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος· νῦν δ᾿ ἐπειδὴ ἦ θεία ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ θεοῦ ἐορτὴ διεκώλυε με ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἐδοξε χρῆται, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάτι τὸ ἐνυπνιον ταύτην τῇ δημιωδῇ μουσικῇ ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν. ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπίναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσωσθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα καὶ πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὖτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα, οὐ ἦν ἡ παρούσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεοῦ, ἐνυόησας, ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, ἐπερ μέλλοι ποιητῆς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μῦθους, ἀλλ’ οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἢ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὐ προχείρως εἴχον καὶ ἡμιστάμην μῦθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τοῦτος ἐποίησα, οἷς πρῶτοι ἐνέτυχον.

V. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρώσθαι καὶ, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκεις ὡς τάχυστα. ἄπειμι δὲ, ὡς ἔοικε, τῇ—Ὁ μερον· κελεύουσιν γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι· καὶ ὁ Συμμάς· ‘οίδον παρακελεύει,’ ἐφη, τοῦτο, ὁ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνῳ; πολλὰ γὰρ ἦδη ἑντε-
τύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρὶ· σχεδόν οὖν, εξ δὲν ἕγει ἰσθημαι, οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν σοι έκὼν εἶναι πείσεται.’ τί δαί;’ ἢ δ’ ὅς, ’οὐ φιλόσοφος Ἔφηνος; ’ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Συμμάς. ’ἐδεξησείς τοῖνυν καὶ Ἐφηνος καὶ πᾶς, ὅτι ἄξιος τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἰσως βιάσται αὐτῶν’ οὐ γὰρ φασί θεμιτὸν εἶναι. καὶ ἀμα λέγων ταύτα καθήκε τὰ σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης ἐπὶ

D τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεξόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. ἤρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης· ’πῶς τούτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ μή θεμιτὸν εἶναι έαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ’ ἄν τῷ ἀποθνησκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπέσταθι; ’τί δε, ὁ Κέβης;’ οὐκ ἀκήκοατε σῦ τε καὶ Συμμάς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάφων συγγεγονότες; ’οὐδὲν γε σαφές, ὁ Σώκρατες. ’ἄλλα μὴν καὶ ἕγω ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἀ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοώς, φθόνος οὖδείς

E λέγεις. καὶ γὰρ ἰσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπείν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τής ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεί, ποιαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἴομεθα εἴναι. τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοὶ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

VI. ’Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτῶν ἐαυτὸν ἀποκτενύναι, ὁ Σώκρατες; ’ηδη γὰρ ἐγώγε, ὅτερ νῦν δὴ σῦ ἢρον, καὶ Φιλολάφῳ ἢκουσα, ὅτε παρ’ ἦμιν διηγᾶτο, ἦδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφές δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν

62 οὐδενὸς πόστοτε οὔδεν ἀκήκοον. ’ἄλλα προσθυμεῖσθαι χρή,’ ἐφη· ’τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσας. ἢ ὅσοι μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται, εἴ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τάλλα, ἐστὶν ὅτε καὶ οἴς βέλτιον τεθνάαι ἢ έξήνοις δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάαι, θαυμαστόν ἢ ὅσοι σοι φαύνεται, εἴ τοῦτο τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιν αὐτούς ἐαυτός εὐ ποιεῖν, άλλά ἄλλος δεὶ περιμένειν εὐρεγέτην.’ καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἦρεμα ἐπιγελάσας· ’Ἰττω Ζεύς,’ ἐφη τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ

B εἰπών. ’καὶ γὰρ ἂν δοξείει, ’ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐτῶ γ’ εἶναι ἄλογον οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅσοι γ’ εἶχε τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν λόγοι, ὡς ἐν τινὶ φρονών ἐσμεν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ οὐ δεὶ δὴ ἐαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λῦειν οὐδ’ ἀποδι-
δράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὔ ῥάδιος διδεῖν· οὔ μέντοι ἄλλα τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Κέβης, εὗ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοῦς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τοῖς κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἦ σοὶ οὖ δοκεῖ οὖτως; ἐμοίγε, φησίν ὁ Κέβης ἡ ὁκοῦν; ἦ δὴ ὅς, καὶ σῦ ἀν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἰ τι αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ ἀποκτιννύοι, μὴ σημάναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἀν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰ τινὰ ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῦ ἄν; ἰᾶν γ', ἐφῆ. ἰῶσ τοῖνυν ταῦτη οὐκ ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι δεῖν, πρὸν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεῶς ἐπιτέμψῃ, ὡσπερ καὶ τήν νῦν ἡμῶν παρόυσαν.'

VII. Ἡ ἄλλ' εἰκὸς,' ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, 'τοῦτο γε φαίνεται. ὃ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τούς φιλοσοφοὺς ῥαδίως ἂν ἐβέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, ἐοικὲν τοῦτο, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπως, εἴπερ δὴ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομεν εὐλόγους ἔχει, τὸ θεὸν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπίοντας, ἐν ἔπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἴπερ ἀριστοὶ ἐσόν τῶν ὄντων ἐπίσταται, θεοῦ, οὔκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γὰρ ποι ὁ αὐτὸς γε αὐτοῦ οἴεται ἀμείον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος. ἅλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἀνθρώπος τάχ' ἀν οἰνθείη ταύτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὔκ ἀν ὁ λογίζοιτο, ὅτι οὐ δεὶ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν, ἅλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι. οὐ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ ποῦ ἄν ἂλ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίων. καὶ τοῦτον οὕτως, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοιούταν εἶναι εἰκός ἢ δὴ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγεστο τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δ' ἄφρονας χαίρειν. ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἤσθηναί τε μοι ἕδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς. ἦ δὲν 63 τοῦ' ἔφη, ἢ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾶ καὶ οὔ πάνω εὐθεῶς ἔθελεν πείθεσθαι, ὅτι ἄν τις εἰπῇ. καὶ οἱ Σωμμίας. ἅλλ' μὴν,' ἔφη, ὁδ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἀνδρεῖς σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμεῖνοι αὐτῶν φεύγοιοι καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοιτο αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὔτω ῥαδίως Χ. V.—VII., pp. 61—63.
pleres kai hemas apoleitpon kai arxontas agathous, ws autos
B omologeis, theous. 'dikaiar, efhi, legete. oymi gar hemaslegein,
Oti xrh me prods taauta apologhsthai wsteper en dikasthriw.
Pany men ovin, efhi o Symmias.

VIII. 'Fere de', de ois, pieiradoi pithanoteron prods hemas
apologhsthai he prods touz dikastas. gen gar, efhi, o Sym-
mia te kai Kebh, ei men mou fymen hezen prwton men parate
allous sofous te kai agathous, epente kai par' anbropous

teleuhtikotas ameinous ton ethade, ndikouan an oik aganaktwn
C tou thanaot' vun de eiste, oti par' andra te elpliz afizesthai
agathous kai touto men oik an pany diousychriaimn. oti men-
toi parata theous destopotas pany agathous hezen, eiste oti,
eipex ti allo toin toioorton, diousychriaimen an kai touto.
Oiste dia
tauta oix omoiws aganaktw, all' evelpinis emi einai ti tois
teleuhtikosi kai, wosper ge kai palaile legetai, polu ameinon
tois agathous he tois kakoi.' 'ti ovin, efhi o Symmias, o Sym-
krates; autous exow ton dianoian teutn en pov echeis apienai, h
D kan hemin metadoiis; koindn gar de emoiye dokei kai hemin eina
agathon toyto, kai ama sou apologia estin, evan apter legeis
hemas pepith.' 'allla pieirastos, efhi. 'prwton de Kritowa

tonde skexfomothe, ti estin o boulesthai moi dokei palaile eipein.'
'ti, o Symkrates, efhi o Kriton, 'allo ge he palaile mou legei o mel-
loin sou dowsen to farmakon, oti xrh sou fraxein ws elachista

diaclegethai; phoio gar thermaivosai malalw dialeugomeneus,
E dein de oivden toioorton prospherein ton farmakos' eide
men, eviste
anagkazesthai kai dis kal tris pinen tois to toioorton poiountas.'
ka o Symkratis. 'eia, efhi, 'xairein auton. allla monon to evntou
paraskeuvzetos ws kai dis dowsen, evan de deym, kai tris.' 'allla

scedden men ti idh, efhi o Kriton. 'allla mou palaile pragmati
parexe.' 'eia auton, efhi. 'alll' hemin de tois dikastais boyl-
lomai idth ton logon apodounai, ws moi fainetai eikotow anh
64 tou onti en filosofofia diatrpas ton bion tharrein mellos
apothanisthai kai evelpise einai ekei megista oisesthai agath,
IX. Κινδυνεύοντας γάρ ὅσι τυχάνουσιν ὤρθως ἀπτόμενοι

φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἀλλούς, ὦτι ὠδὲν ἄλλο ἄυτοι ἐπιτη-

dεύσωσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνᾶναι. εἰ ὄν ἄντο ἄληθές, ἀπο-

τον δήπον ἢ ἐκ προσυμείσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο

ἡ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ ἢ ἄυτον ἀγανακτεῖν, δὶ πάλαι προευθυμοῦντό

tε καὶ ἐπετήδευον." καὶ Ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας: 'νη τὸν Δία,' ἐφι,

'ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νῦν γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσας. Β

ὁμια γάρ ἢ τοὺς πολλόνς αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εἰ

πάνυ εἰρήνεια εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας καὶ ξυμφάναι ἢ τοὺς

μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὦτι τῷ ὅντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντας

θανατῶσι καὶ σφᾶς γε ὡς λεληθάσιν, ἢτι ἄξιοι εἰσὶν τὸντο πασ-

χεῖν.' 'καὶ ἀληθὴ γ' ἢ ἱέγοιεν, Ὁ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς

μὴ λεληθέναι. λέλθησιν γὰρ αὐτοὺς, ἢ τε θανατώσι καὶ ἢ ἄξιοι

εἰσὶν θανάτον καὶ οὗ θανάτου οἱ ὦς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι.

ἐπειμεν γάρ,' ἐφι, 'πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκεῖνοι: Ζ

ἡγούμεθα τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; 'πάνυ γε,' ἐφι ὑπολαβὼν Ὁ

Σιμμίας. ᾧ ὁμὴ ἅλλο τῇ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος

ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνᾶναι, χαιρός μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς

ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγεῖν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χαιρός δὲ

tῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὐτὴν

eῖναι; ᾧ ὁμὴ ἅλλο τῇ θάνατος τῇ τῷτο; 'οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο,'

ἐφι. 'σκέψατε δή, ὡς ἀγαθὲ, ἐὰν ἀρα καὶ σοι ἐνδοκῇ ἀπερ ἐμοὶ.

ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον ὁμια ἡμᾶς εἰςεσθαί περὶ δὲν σκοπούμεν. Δ

φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφον ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐπιστούδακέναι περὶ τῶς

ἡδονᾶς καλουμέναις τὰς τοιάσθε, οἴον σϊτών τε καὶ ποτῶν;

'ἡμιστα, ὥ Σώκρατες,' ἐφι Ὁ Σιμμίας. 'τὶ δὲ; τὰς τῶν ἀφρο-

δισών;' 'οὔδαμως,' 'τὶ δὲ; τὰς άλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θερα-

πείας δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἤγειοθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἴον ἰματῶν

dιαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀλλους καλλω-

πισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμῶν δοκεῖ σοι ὡς ἀτιμάζειν,

καὶ' ὅσιον μὴ πολλῆ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; 'ἀτιμάζειν ἐμοιγε Ε
PLATO, PHÆDO.

dokei,' ἐφη, 'ο γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος.' 'οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι,' ἐφη, 'ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτῶι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν
tετράφθαι; ' ἐμοιγε.' 'ἀρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις

65 δὴλὸς ἔστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὁ τι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ
tῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφέροντως τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀνθρώπων;'
'φαίνεται.' 'καὶ δοκεῖ γε ἄητο, ὃ Συμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώ-
ποις, ὃ μιθὲν ἥδυ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶι, οὐκ ἄξιον
εἶναι ζήν, ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων
τῶν ἡδονῶν, αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν.' 'πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὴ
λέγεις.'

Χ. 'Τί δὲ ἰη περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονίσεως κτῆσιν; τότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, ἐὰν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ἔριθει Β
κοινωνίαν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἶνον τὸ τοιοῦτο λέγω. ἀρα ἐχει
ἀλήθειαν τινα ὅψεις τε καὶ ἀκόη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἡ τά γε τοιαῦτα
καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῶν ἀδὲ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβεῖς
οὐδὲν οὔτε ὅρωμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθη-
σεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσὶν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολὴ αὗτ' γε ἄλλαί• πᾶσαι
γάρ ποι τούτων φαυλότεραι εἰσίν: ἡ σοι οὖ δοκοῦσιν; 'πάνυ
μὲν οὖν,' ἐφη. 'τότε οὖν,' ἢ δ' ὡς, ἢ 'ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας
ἀπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρή τι σκοπεῖν,

Γ. δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.' 'ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
'ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, εἰπέρ ποι τὸ ἀλλοθω, κατάδηλον
αὐτὴ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων; ' ναλ.' 'λογίζεται δὲ γε ποι
τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκόη
μήτε ὅψεις μήτε ἀλγηδῶν μηδὲ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὃ τι μάλιστα αὐτὴ
cαθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεται ἐδώσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται
μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομένη ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὄντος.' 'ἐστι
ταύτα: 'οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχῆς μάλιστα

D ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἡγεῖτε δὲ αὐτὴν καθ'
αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ' φαίνεται.' 'τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὃ Συμμία;
φαμὲν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὔδεν; ' φαμὲν μὲντοι νὴ Διά.'
'καὶ καλὸν γε τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν;' 'τὸς δ' οὖ;' 'ἡδ' οὖν πώποτε
τι τῶν τοιούτων τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἶδες; 'οὐδαμῶς,' ἡ δ' ὃς.

'αλλ' ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήτησι τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφῆσιν αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἶνον μεγέθους πέρι, υγείας, ἱσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας, δ' τυγχάνει ἐκαστὸν 

ην'; ἥρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθεστάτων θεωρεῖται, ἥ δὲ ἔχει· ὅσ ἄν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβεστάτα παρασκευάσθηται αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὖ σκοπεῖ, οὕτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἢο τοῦ γνώναι ἐκαστὸν; 'πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 'ἀρ' οὖν ἐκείνος ἂν τούτο ποιήσει καθαρώτατα, ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ οὐ ἐφ' ἐκαστὸν, μῆτε τὴν ὅψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μῆτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἰσθήσατο ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινεῖ ἐκαστὸν ἐπιχειροὶ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεῖς δ' τι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμών τε καὶ ὠτῶν καὶ ὃς ἔτοι εἰπεῖν ἔμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὃς τραπτόντος καὶ οὐκ ἔντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησαι, ὅταν κοινώς; ἅρ' οὖν οὕτος ἐστιν, ὅ Σωμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὃ τευχόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; 'ὑπερφυσὶς, ἐφη ὅ Σωμίας, ὃς ἄληθή λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.'

XI. 'Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, 'ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρέβιον θαυμασθαί δόξαν τοιαύτες τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὡστε καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλους τοιαύτα ἀττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὃσπερ ἀτραπός τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, ὅτι, ἐξὸς ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ἡ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχῇ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτὲ κτησώμεθα ικανῶς ὃν ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαιμὲν δὲ τούτῳ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφὴν· ἔτι δὲ, ἂν τινὸς καὶ νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζοντων ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρωτῶν δ' καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦμοι καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπιστεύσων ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὡστε τὸ ληγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι.
D τα δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτάσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπεῖα. καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀγχολιὰν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταύτα. τὸ δ’ ἐσχατὸν πάντων, ὅτι, ἐὰν τις ἥμιν καὶ σχολῇ γένηται ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπαράπεμψα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ἄρετεσιν ἀδ πανταχοῦ παραπάντων θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἔκπληττε, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι ἃ ἀυτοῦ καθοράν τάληθες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅτι ἥμιν δέδεικται, ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομεν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ
Ε ψυχῇ θεατέον αὑτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὅσ ἐοικεν, ἥμιν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασται εἶναι, φρονήσως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὅσ δ’ λόγος σημαίνει, ἡδιν δ’ οὐ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἴδοι τε μετά τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γυνῶν, δυνῶν θάτερον, ἡ οὐδαμοῦ ἐστὶν κτῆσαι τὸ εἴδειν ἡ τελευτήσωσιν.
67 τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρίς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ’ οὐ. καὶ ἐν ὅδ’ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὅσ ἐοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσώμεθα τοῦ εἴδειν, εἰ δ’ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνώμεν, ὅ τι μὴ πάσα ανάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπτυξόμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἔος ἃν δ’ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὅ τ’ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσώμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι’ ἧμῶν αὐτῶν πάν τ’ εἰλικρινεῖς· τοῦτο
Β δ’ ἐστὶν ἴσως τ’ ἀληθείς. μὴ καθαρὸ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτόν ἦ. τοιαῦτα οἴματι, ὁ Συμμία, ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλοραθεῖς· ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; ‘παντὸς γε μᾶλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες.’
XII. ‘Οὐκοῦν; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ‘εἰ ταύτα ἀληθῆ, δ’ ἐταίρε, πολλή ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένη δ’ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανὸς, εἰπέρ που ἄλλοθι, κτῆσασθαι τούτῳ, οὗ ἔνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἥμιν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὡστε ἥ γε ἀποδημία ἢ νῦν
C μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῃ ἀνδρί, ὃς ἦγείται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὦστερ κεκα-θαρμένην.’ ‘πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας. ‘καθαροῖς δὲ εἶναι
αρα οὗ τοῦτο ἔμμηβαινε, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν διὶ μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν καὶ έθύσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δύνατον καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑπετεία μόνην καθ' αὐτήν, ἐκλυνομένην ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; 'πάνυ μὲν οὖν,' ἐφη. 'οὐκοῦν τοῦτο γε θάνατος οὐνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; 'παυτάπασι γε,' ἤ δ' ὡς. 'λύσεις δὲ γε αὐτήν, ὡς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐστὶν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἤ οὐ;' 'φαίνεται.' 'οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν αρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοιοῦν ἀν εἰὴ ἀνδρα παρασκεναζόνθ' ἐαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὦ τὶ ἐγγυνατῶ οὐντά τοῦ τεθναίναι οὕτως εἶν, καὶ εἰ ἐκεῖθ' ἥκοντος αὐτῷ τοῦτον ἀγανακτεῖν; οὐ γελοιοῦν;' 'πῶς δ' οὐ;' 'τῷ ὅντι ἁρῷ,' ἐφη, 'ὅ δ' Συμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκει, μελετοῦσι, καὶ τὸ τεθναίναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶν πέρι οὐ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληται μὲν πανταχὺ τῷ σώματι, αὐτήν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τοῦτον δὲ γεγυνομένου εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῦσι, οὐ πολλὴ ἀν ἁλογία εἰ, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι εἰκεῖσε ἑοιὲν, οἱ ἄφικομένοι ἐπίτεις ἐστὶν οὐ διὰ βίου ἱρὸν τυχεῖν. ἱρὸν δὲ φρονησεως. ὦ τε διεβέθη, 68 βληντο, τοῦτον ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἤ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ νεῶν ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες θῆλησαν εἰς Ἀιδοῦ ἐλθείν, ὡδ' ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὅφεσθαι τε ἐκεὶ δὲν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι φρονήσεως δὲ ἀρα τις τῷ ὅντι ἑρὼν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τῆν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἄξιος λόγου ἤ ἐν Ἀιδοῦ, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθνήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενοι εἰςιν αὐτός; οἷοτε γε χρῆ, ἐὰν τῷ ὅντι γε ἦ, δ' ἐταίρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταύτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἄλλ' ἤ ἐκεί. ει δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἀρτί ἐλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἀν ἁλογία εἰ, εἰ φοβοῦτο τὸν τάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; τολὴ μὲντοι νη Δία,' ἤ δ' ὡς.
XIII. Οὐκοῦν ἴκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἐφη, τούτο ἀνδρός, δόν ἂν ἰδὴς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὃτι οὐκ ἡρ' ἦν

C φιλόσοφος ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ που οὗτος
tυγχάνει δόν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἥτις τὰ ἔτερα
tούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα. 'πάνυ, ἐφη, ἔξει ὄντως, ὃς λέγεις.
'ἀρ' οὖν, ἐφη, δ' Συμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς
ὄυτῳ διακειμένους μάλιστα προσῆκε; 'τάντως δήτου, ἐφη.
'οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἢν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζονται σωφρο-
σύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μη ἔπτομησθαι, ἄλλ' ὀλγόρως
ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἅρ' οὐ τούτους μόνους προσῆκε τοῖς μάλιστα.

D τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροδυῖν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ᾠσίων;
'ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. 'εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἢ δ' ὦς, ἐννοήσαι τὴν γε τῶν
ἀλλῶν ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος.
'πῶς δή, δ' Σωκράτες; 'οἴσθα, ἢ δ' ὦς, ὃτι τὸν θάνατον
ηγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; 'καὶ μάλ',
ἐφη. 'οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειὼντο κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ
ἀνδρείοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν; ἐστὶ ταῦτα. τῷ
dedieinai ἄρα καὶ δεί τους ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι.
καίτω ἀλογόν γε δεί τινα καὶ δειλία ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι. 'πάνυ

Ε μὲν οὖν. 'τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ τοῦτον τοῦτο πεπό-
νθασιν ἀκολασία τυλί σωφρονεῖς εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἄδοναν
einai, ἀλλ' ὦμοι αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὦμοιον τὸ πάθος τὸ
περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐθῇ σωφροσύνην. φοβοῦμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων
ἥδονῶν στερεθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦμεντες ἐκεῖνων, ἄλλων ἀπεχονται
ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατουμένους. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν τὸ ὑπὸ

69 τῶν ἥδονῶν ἀρχεσθαί. ἀλλ' ὦμοι συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένους
ὑφ' ἥδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἥδονῶν. τοῦτο δ' ὦμοιον ἔστιν ὃ
νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπῳ τυλὶ δ' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοῖς σεσω-
φρονίσθαι. 'εὔοικε γάρ. 'δ' μακάριε Συμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ
αὐτὴ ἢ ἡ ὄρθη πρὸς ἁρετὴν ἀλλαγῆ, ἥδονᾶς πρὸς ἥδονᾶς καὶ
λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ
μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὅπερ νομίζεται, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐκείνο μόνον τὸ
νόμοσμα ὅρθὸν, ἀντὶ οὐ δεὶ ἄπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι,
φρόνησις, καὶ τοῦτον μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ὄνομενα τε καὶ Β πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὁντὶ ἂν αὐτῆς καὶ δικαιο-
σόνη τε καὶ ἐπίληφθην ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγνω-
μόνων καὶ ἀπογνωμόνων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
πάνων τῶν τοιούτων· χωρίζομεν δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττό-
μενα ἀντὶ ἄλληλων μή σκιαγραφία τις ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴ καὶ
τῷ ὁντι ἀνδραποδόδηθε τι καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ’ ἀληθῆς ἔχω, τοῦ
δ’ ἀληθῆς τῷ ὁντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ
σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις

C μὴ καθαρμὸς τις ἤ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν
οὐτοι καταστῆσαντες οὐ φαύλου εἰναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὁντι πάλαι
ἀνυπτεθαί, ὅτι, ὅσ αν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἀίδου ἀφίκη-
tαι, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος
ἐκείστε αφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσίν γὰρ δὴ, ὡς φασιν
οἱ νηπὶ τὰς τελετὰς, ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ, βάκχοι δὲ τε
παῦροι· οὕτοι δ’ εἰσίν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ
D πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. δὲν δὴ καὶ ἔγω κατὰ γέ τὸ δυνατὸν
οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπτον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προυθμηθήν
γενέσθαι· εἰ δ’ ὀρθὸς προυθμηθὴν καὶ τὶ ἠνύπαμεν, ἐκείστε
ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἀν θεὸς ἐθέλη, ὀλίγου ύστερον, ὡς
ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἔγω, ἔφη, ὡΣμίμα τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολο-
γοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὡμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας
οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ’ ἀγανακτῷ, ἡγούμενος κακεὶ οὐδὲν ἤττον
ἕν ἐνθάδε δεσπότας τε ἀγαθῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ έταῖροις· τοῖς
dὲ πολλοῖς ἀποστιάν παρέχει· εἰ τι οὖν ὡμᾶν πιθανῶτερὸς εἰμὶ
ev τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εἰ ἃν ἔχων

ΧΙ. Εἶποντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπολαβῶν ὁ
Κέβης ἔφη· ὡΣωκράτες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐμοιγε δοκεὶ καλῶς
λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλῆς ἀριστίαν παρέχει τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἐτί ἂν,
ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολλύσει, ἢ ἂν δὲ
ἀνθρώπω ἀποθνῄσκῃ· εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένῃ τοῦ σώματος καὶ
ἐκβαινοῦσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται
PLATO, PHÆDO.

diasteméni kai oúden éti óndamóv ἰ'. ἐπει, εἴπερ εἴη πον αὐτή καθ' αὐτήν συνηθρουσμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν

Β δὲν σὺ νῦν δὴ δήλαθε, πολλὰ ἂν ἐλπὶς εἴη καὶ καλῆ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐστὶν αὐτόν ς ἄν λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἵσως οὐκ ὅλης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πάστως, ὡς ἐστὶ τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. ' ἀληθῆ,' ἔφη, 'λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὃ Κέβης. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιώμεν; ἣ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἶτε εἰκός οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; 'ἐγώγη οὖν,' ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, 'ἡδέως ἂν ἂκοῦσαιμ, ἣντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. 'οὐκον γ' ἂν οἴμαι,' ἢ

C δ' ὁ τύ Σωκράτης, 'ἐπεί τινα νῦν ἂκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμῳδιοποιός εἴη, ὡς ἄδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

XV. Σκεψόμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδε τῇ, εἴτ' ἢ ἂν 'Αιδον εἰσὶν αἰ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος, οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθέδε ἄφικομενα ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεύτερο ἄφικονται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὐτός ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ἔωτας, ἀλλὸ τι ἡ εἶν ἂν αἱ ψυχαί ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν πον πάλιν ἐγένοντο μὴ οὕτως, καὶ τοῦτο ἰκανόν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὅτι φανερὸν γένοιτο, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ἔωται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλον ἂν τοῦ δεός λόγου. 'πάνυ μὲν οὖν,' ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. 'μὴ τοῖνοι κατ' ἄνθρωπων,' ἢ δ' ὁς, 'σκοτεί μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥῶν μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ξύφων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ἐννόηθηδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων εἰδόμενε, ἢρ' οὕτωσι γίγνεσθαι πάντα, οὗ ἄλοθεν ἡ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοι τυγχάνει ὅν τοιούτων τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον πον καὶ δίκαιον ἅδικον, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτω ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψόμεθα, ἢρ' ἄναγκαιον, ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι ἡ ἐκ τοῦ αὕτη ἐναντίον. οἷον ὅταν μεῖζον τι γέγονται, ἀνάγκη ποι ἦς ἐλάτ- τονος οὖντος πρότερον ἐπείτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι; ' ναι.' ὁὐκοῦν
καν ἐλαττον γέγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος οὔτος πρότερον, ὅστερον ἑλαττον γενήσεται; ' ἔστιν οὕτω, ἐφη. ' καὶ μήν ἐξ ἴσχυρο-
τέρου τὸ ἀθανεύστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θάττον; ' πάνυ γε. ' τί δέ; ἂν τι χείρον γέγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείωνος, καὶ ἂν 
δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; ' πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ' ἰκανὼς οὖν,' ἐφη,' ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γέγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων 
τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; ' πάνυ γε. ' τί δ' αὖ; ' ἐστι τι καὶ 
τοιοῦδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οὖν μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων 
δυῶν ὁντων δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἕτερου ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρων, ἀπὸ B 
δ' αὖ τοῦ ἐτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρων μείζονοι μὲν πράγματος 
καὶ ἐλάττονοι μεταξὺ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως, καὶ καλούμεν οὔτω 
τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; ' ναὶ,' ἐφη. ' οὐκοῦν καὶ 
διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, 
καὶ πάντα οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐναχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργω γοῦν παντοχοῦ οὕτου ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαι 
τε αὐτὸ ἐξ ἄλληλων γένεσιν τε εἶναι ἐξ ἐκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα,' 
' πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἡ δ' οὖ.

XVI. 'Τί οὖν;' ἐφη. ' τῷ ζῆν ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίων, ὡς- C 
περ τῷ ἐγρηγορεῖν τὸ καθεύδειν; ' πάνυ μὲν οὖν,' ἐφη. 
τί; ' τὸ τεθνάναι,' ἐφη. ' οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἄλληλων τε γέγνεται 
ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστίν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτῶν μεταξὺ 
δύο δυῶν οὖτων; ' πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ' τὴν μὲν τοῖνυν ἐτέρων 
συνήγαγεν διὰ νῦν ἡ ἔλεγον ἐγώ σοι,' ἐφη, ἐρῶ; ὁ Σωκράτης, 
καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις. σὺ δὲ μοι τὴν ἐτέραν. λέγω δὲ 
τὸ μὲν καθεύδει, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορεῖν, καὶ Εκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ 
ἐγρηγορεῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ Εκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορεῖν τὸ καθεύδειν, D 
καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν 
δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἰκανῶς σοι,' ἐφη, ' ἡ οὖ; ' πάνυ μὲν οὖν.' 
ἀλλ' ἐκὴ δὴ μοι καὶ σοῦ,' ἐφη, ' οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ 
ἐναντίων μὲν φὴς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;' ' ἔγωγε. ' γίγνε-
σθαι δὲ ἐξ ἄλληλων; ' ναὶ.' ' ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τὸ τὸ 
γενόμενον; ' τὸ τεθνηκός,' ἐφη. ' τί δέ; ἡ δ' οὖς, ' ἐκ τοῦ 
τεθνε-
ώτος; ' ἀναγκαῖον,' ἐφη, ' ὀμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν.' ' ἐκ τῶν 
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τεθνεώτων ἀρα, δι Κέβης, τὰ ξόντα τε καὶ οἱ ξόντες γίγνονται;
Ε ἡ 'φαίνεται,' ἐφη. 'εἰςὶν ἀρα,' ἐφη, 'αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἀιδών, ἑοίκεν.' 'οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσεόν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἢ γ' ἔτερα σαφῆς οὕτα συγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνησκεῖν σαφές δήποτε, ἢ οὐ; 'πάνυ μὲν οὖν,' ἐφη. 'πῶς οὖν,' ἢ δ' ὡς, 'ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτη χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοθόν τῇ ἀποθνησκέει ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; 'πάντως ποι,' ἐφη. 'τίνα ταύτην;' 'τὸ ἀναβίωσκεσθαι.' 'οὐκοῦν,' ἢ δ' ὡς, 'εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβίωσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς
72 ζόντας αὐτή, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι;' 'πάνυ γε.' ἑμολογείται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοῖσ ξόντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων γεγονέναι οὗθεν ἦττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ξόντων· τούτου δὲ οὖντος ἰκανῶν ποι ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχᾶς εἶναι ποι, ὧθεν ἢ τάλιν γίγνεσθαι.' 'δοκεῖ μοι,' ἐφη, 'ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὑμολογημένων ἀναγκαίον οὖτος ἔχειν.'

XVII. 'Ἰδὲ τοῖνον οὖτως,' ἐφη, 'ὁ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὑμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοι δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἂν ἀνταποδώσομεν ταῦτα τοῖς τεθνεῶτας οὐκ ἦττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ξόντων· τούτου δὲ οὖντος ἰκανῶν ποι ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχᾶς εἶναι ποι, ὧθεν ἢ τάλιν γίγνεσθαι.' 'δοκεῖ μοι,' ἐφη, 'ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὑμολογημένων ἀναγκαίον οὖτος ἔχειν.'
τὰ τεθνεώτα καὶ μὴ τάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἃρ' οὖ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ἔξω; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ἔξωντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ἔξωντα θύνσκοι, τὶς μηχανῇ μὴ οὖ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; 'οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἃ ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς παυτάπασιν ἀλήθη λέγειν.' ἔστων γὰρ, ἔφη, ἃ Κέβης, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὐτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὕτα ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατῶμεν οἰμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστε τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶντων τοὺς ἔξωντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τᾶς τῶν τεθνεῶντων ψυχὰς εἶναι καὶ ταῖς μέν γε ἀγαθοῖς ἁμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ Ε. κακαίς κάκιον.'

ΧVIII. 'Καὶ μήν,' ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβῶν, 'καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἔστων, ὄν οὐ εἰσώθας θαμά λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἢ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυχάναι οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τούτον ἀνάγκη ποὺ ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἐν νῦν ἀναμνηστόκομεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἢν ποὺ ἡμῖν ἢ ψυχῆ πρὶν ἐν τῷ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῃ εἶδεν γενόται. 73 ὥστε καὶ ταῦτα ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴ τι ἐσοικεν εἶναι. 'ἀλλὰ, ὁ Κέβης,' ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας ὑπολαβῶν, 'ποια τούτων αἴ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι.' 'ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ,' ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, 'καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτῶμεν οἱ ἀνθρωπο- ποι, ἐὰν τὰς καλῶς ἐρωτᾶ, αὐτὸι λέγουσι πάντα ὑ' ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοὺς ἐπιστήμην ἔνοισα καὶ ὅρθος λόγος, οὐκ ἀν οἰοί τί ἦσαν τοῦτο πουήσεν. ἔπειτα ἐὰν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγγον ἤ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ, ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. 'εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε,' ἔφη, 'πείθει, ὁ Συμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, 'σκέψας, ἀν τῇ δέ τῇ σοι σκοπομενον συνδόξην. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ ὅτι, πῶς ἡ καλομενὴ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἐστὶν;' ἀπιστῶ μὲν σοι ἐγνωγε, ἢ δ' ὃς ὁ Συμμίας, 'οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τούτο,' ἔφη, 'δέομαι μαθεῖν περὶ οὐδὲν λόγος, ἀναμνησθήναι. καὶ σχεδὸν γε εξ δὲν Κέβης ἑπεχειρήσῃ λέγειν ἢ δι' ἀμνησθήναι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μὲν ἢττυν ἀκόουμι νῦν, τῷ ὑπὸ ἑπεχείρη- σας λέγειν. 'τῷ δ' ἐγνωγε, ἢ δ' ὃς. ὁ ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ ὃς 3—2
δήποτε, εἰ τίς τι ἀναμνησθῶσαι, δεῖν αὐτὸν τούτο πρότερον ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. 'πάνυ γ', ἐφη. 'ἀρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε ὀμολογούμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπω τιοῦτω, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τινα τρόπον τόνδε· εάν τίς τι ἐτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκείνον γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὗ μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλη, ἄρα οὐχὶ τούτο δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὗ τήν ἐννοιαν ἐλαβεν; 'πῶς λέγεις; 'οὗν τὰ τοιᾶδε· ἄλλη ποι ἐπιστήμη αὐθρόπου καὶ λύρας.' 'πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 'οὐκοῦν οὖσθα, ὅτι οἱ ἑρωταί, ὅταν ἰδὼσιν λύραν ἢ ἰμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οὐς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἰσέθη χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τούτῳ· ἐγνωσάν τε τήν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλαβον τὸ εἴδος τοῦ παιδός, οὗ ἢν ἢ λύρα; τούτῳ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις; ὅσπερ καὶ Σιμμᾶν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα ποι πυρία τοιαύτ᾽ ἂν εἴη; 'μυρία μέντοι νῇ Δία, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμᾶς.

Ε ἦν οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὡς, 'τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα μέντοι, ὅταν τις τοῦτον τάθη περὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἡδὴ ἐπελέλειητο; 'πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. 'τί δε;' ἦ δ᾽ ὡς· 'ἐστιν ἤππον γεγραμμένον ἵδοντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπον ἀναμνησθήναι, καὶ Σιμμᾶν ἵδοντα γε- γραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθήναι; 'πάνυ γε;' 'οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμᾶν ἵδοντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμᾶν ἀναμνησθήναι;

74 ἦστι μέντοι, ἐφη.

XIX. 'Ἀρ' οὖν οὗ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὀμοιῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων; 'συμβαίνει;' 'ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὀμοίων ἀναμμηνήσκεται τίς τι, ἀρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν, εἰτε τι ἐλλεῖπε τούτῳ κατὰ τήν ὀμοιότητα εἰτε μὴ ἐκείνον οὗ ἀναμμη- νήσθη;' 'ἀνάγκη,' ἐφη. 'σκόπει δὴ,' ἦ δ᾽ ὡς, 'εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν ποῦ τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὗ ἐξουλον λέγω ἐξολο οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὗδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα Β ἐτερον τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον· φωμέν τι εἶναι ἦ μηδὲν; 'φῶμεν μέντοι νῇ Δί;' ἐφη ὁ Σιμμᾶς, 'θαυμαστῶς γε;' 'ἡ καὶ ἐπι-
στάμθη αὐτὸ δ' ἔστιν; 'πάνυ γε,' ἤ δ' ὦς. 'πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἔξ ἔν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἄλα ἑλθοῦσιν ἡ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες ἦσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐννοοῦμεν, ἐτέρον ὁν τούτῳ; ἦ οὐχ ἐτέρον σου φαίνεται; σκόπητι δὲ καὶ τῆς. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μέν ἦσοι καὶ ἄλα ἐνιστε ταῦτα ὅντα τῷ μέν ἦσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὖ; 'πάνυ μὲν οὖν.' 'τί δε; αὐτὰ τά ἦσα ἐστίν ὅτε ἄνυσα σου ἐφάνη, ἡ ἢ ἰσότης ἀνυσότης;' οὔδεπω ποτέ γε, ὁ Σώκρατες. 'οὐ ταῦτόν ἁρα ἔστιν,' ἤ δ' ὦς, 'ταῦτα τε τά ἦσα καὶ αὐτὸ τῷ ὦνον.' 'οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὁ Σώκρατες.' 'ἀλλὰ μήν ἐκ τούτων γ',' ἐφη, 'τῶν ἦσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ὄσον, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννοοκάκας τε καὶ εἰληφᾶς;' 'ἀληθεστατα,' ἐφη, 'λέγεις. 'οὔκοιν ἡ ὁμοίων ὄντων τούτως ἡ ἀνομοίως; 'πάνυ γε.' 'διαφέρει δὲ γε,' ἤ δ' ὦς, 'οὔδεν ἐως ἀν ἄλλο ὦν ἀπὸ ταῦτης τῆς ὄψεως ἀλλο ἐννοήσης, εἰτε ὁμοίου εἰτε ἀνομοίου, ἀναγκαῖον,' ἐφη, 'αὐτὸ ἀνάμμην γεγονέναι.' 'πάνυ μὲν οὖν.' 'τί δε;' ἤ δ' ὦς; ἤ πάσχομεν τι τοιούτων περὶ τά ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἦσοι; ἄρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἦσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ δ' ἔστιν ἦσον, ἡ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὦν τῷ ὦν, ἡ οὐδεν; 'καὶ πολύ γε;' ἐφη, 'ἐνδεῖ; 'οὔκοιν ὁμολογοῦμεν, όταν τίς τι ὦν ἐννοήση, ὅτι βουλεῖται μὲν τούτῳ, ὅ νῦν ἔγω ὅρω, εἶναι οὖν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὗ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὦν οὖν ἦσιν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν παυλότερον, ἀναγκαίον ποὺ τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο δ' φησιν αὐτὸ προειδότα μὲν, ἐνδεικτέρους δὲ ἐχεῖν; 'ἀνάγκη.' 'τί οὖν; τοιοῦτον πεπόθημεν καὶ ἡμείς, ἦ οὖ, περὶ τε τά ἦσα καὶ αὐτὸ τῷ ὦν; 'παντάπασι γε;' ἀναγκαίον ἁρα ἡμᾶς προ- ειδέναι το ὦν πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τά ἦσα ἐννοοῦσαι, ότι ὁρεῖται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οὖν τῷ ὦν, ἐχεῖ δὲ ἐνδεικτέρως. 'ἔστι ταῦτα.' 'ἀλλὰ μήν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μή ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννοοκέναι μηδὲ δυνατόν εἶναι ἐννοήσαι, ἀλλ' ἢ ἔκ τοῦ Ἰδείν ἡ ἦλιος ἡ ἦλιος τῶν ἀιόθησεων ταῦτά τέ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω.' 'ταῦτάν γὰρ ἔστιν,
Ω Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὁ βούλεται δηλώσαι ὁ λόγος. ' ἀλλὰ μὲν ὃ ἐκ γε τῶν ἀἰσθήσεων δεὶ ἐννοῆσαι, ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς διὰ τὴν ἓρμηνείαν τοῦ ὃ ἐστὶν ὦσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἐστιν ὣς πῶς λέγομεν; 'οὔτως. 'πρὸ τοῦ ἀρα ἀφαίρεσθαι ἡμᾶς ὅραν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τᾶλλα ἀἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει ποιν εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὦσον, ὅτι ἐστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀἰσθήσεων ὅσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίγειν, ὅτι προ- θυμεῖται μὲν πάντα ταιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι οὗν ἐκεῖνο, ἐστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. 'ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὁ Σώκρατες. 'οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἐωρῶμεν τε καὶ ἣκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς αἰσθήσεις εἰχομεν; 'πάνυ γε, ' ἐδει δὲ γε, φομέν, πρὸ τοῦτων τὴν τοῦ ὦσον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; 'ναί. 'πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς οὖκεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῶν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. ' οὖκεν.

XX. 'Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἡπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ὦσον καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕμμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ὦσον νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν μᾶλλον τι ἦ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὅσιον καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων, οἷς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τούτῳ, ὅ ἐστι, καὶ εὖ ταῖς ἑρωτήσεως ἐρωτῶντες καὶ εὖ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεως ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὡστε ἀναγκαίοι τίνυς τοῦτον πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. 'ἐστι ταῦτα. 'καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελημμεθα, εἰδότας ἀεί γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ᾽ ἐστιν, λαβόντα τὸν ἐπιστήμην ἑχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι. ἦ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, δΣιμμία, ἐπι- στήμης ἀποβολήν; 'πάντως δηποῦ, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες. 'εἰ δὲ γε, οὖμαι, λαβόντες πρὸν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὠστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεις χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἃς ποτε καὶ πρῶν εἰχομεν, ἀρ' οὖχ ὁ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἄν εἴη; τότε δὲ πον ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὅρθως ἂν λέγομεν;
Χ. ΧΙΧ.—ΧΧΙ., pp. 75, 76. 23

τὰν γε. 'δυνατὸν γὰρ ὅτι τούτῳ γε ἐέφαγη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἡ 76 ἱδόντα ἡ ἀκούσαντα ἡ τινα ἀλλην αἰσθήσειν λαβόντα ἐτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι, ὃ ἐπελέλυστο, ὃ τοῦτο ἐπιλησίαζεν ἀνώμοιον ὧν ἡ ὃ ὁμοιον. ὃτε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν τὰ ἐτερα, ἢτοι ἐπιστάμενοι γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίον πάντες, ἡ ὑστερον, οὐς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὔδεν ἀλλ' ἡ ἀναμμυνήσκονται οὕτω, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀναμμυνησίς ἂν εἴῃ. 'καὶ μάλα ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ Σώκρατες.'

XXI. 'Πότερον οὖν αἴρει, ὃ Σιμμία, ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἡ ἀναμμυνήσκεσθαι ύστερον δὲν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην Β εἰληφότες ἦμεν; 'οὐκ ἔχω, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι. 'τι δὲ τόδε; ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῦ σου δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ δὲν ἐπισταται ἔχοι αὖ δοῦναι λόγον ἡ οὖ; 'πολλὴ ἀνάγκη,' ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες. 'ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων δὲν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; 'βουλούμην μέντ' ἂν,' ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας. 'ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλλον φοβοῦμαι, μή αὕριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ἡ ἀνθρώπων οὐδές ἄξιως οἷς τε τούτῳ ποιήσαι. 'οὐκ ἀρὰ δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπιστασθαι C γε,' ἐφη, ὃ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; 'οὔδαμός, 'ἀναμμυνήσκονται ἄρα ὅ ποτε ἔμαθον; 'ἀνάγκη,' 'πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἂφ' οὐ γε ἀνθρώποι γεγόναμεν. 'οὐ δῆτα,' 'πρότερον ἄρα,' 'ναλ.' 'ὅσαν ἄρα, ὃ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἴη αὖ ἐν ἀνθρώπων εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἴχον.' 'εἴ μὴ ἄρα γεγονόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ταῦτάς τὸ ἐπιστήματι οὕτως γὰρ λείπεται ἐτὶ ὁ χρόνος. 'εἰεν, ὃ ἐταίρε· ἀπόλλυμεν D δὲ αὐτὸς ἐν πούρῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐχοντες γε αὐτὰς γεγονότεθα, ως ἄρτο ωμολογήσαμεν ἡ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν ἰπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἡ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινα εἰπεῖν χρόνον; 'οὐδαμός, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαβον ἐμαυτῶν οὔτων εἰπών.'

XXII. 'Ἀρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἐφη, 'ἡμῖν, ὃ Σιμμία; ἢ μὲν ἐστίν ὃ θυροῦμεν ἄει, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τάσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀνα-
Ε φέρομεν, ὑπάρχονσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖν, καὶ ταύτα ἐκείνη ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὖτως ὡσπερ καὶ ταύτα ἐστὶν, οὖτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶ ταύτα, ἀλλὰς ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένοις εἰ; ἃρ' οὖτως ἔχει, καὶ ἂν ἀνάγκη ταύτα τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταύτα, οὐδὲ τάδε; ‘ὑπερφυῶς, ὁ Ἔσωκρατες,’ ἔφη ὁ Συμμῖας, ‘δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ 77 λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἢν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἐγώνε ὦτι δεν ἤδη τοῦτο· τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα εἶναι ὡς οὖν τε μάλιστα, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τάλλα πάντα, ὥστε νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἰκανῶς ἀποδείκται.’ ‘τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητί;’ ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· ‘δει γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθεν.’ ‘ἰκανῶς,’ ἔφη ὁ Συμμῖας, ‘ὡς ἐγὼνε οὖμαι· καὶ τοις καρτερώτατοι ἀνθρώπων ἦστιν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις· ἀλλ᾽ οὖμαι οὐκ ἐνδείξαι τούτῳ πεπείσθαί αὐτὸν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή.

XXIII. Εἰ μέντοι, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, ἔτι ἐσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ; ἔφη, ὁ Ἔσωκρατες, ἀποδείξεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐτι ἐνέστηκεν, ὅ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθεθηκοντο τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδαστώτα ἡ ψυχή καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τούτῳ τέλος. τὸ γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτήν καὶ ἐξωρίσασθαι ἀμόθεν ποθὲν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώ- πεον σώμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττητα τοῦτο, τότε καὶ αὐτῆν τελευτάν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι;’ ‘εὖ

C λέγεις,’ ἔφη, ὁ Συμμῖας, ὁ Κέβης. ‘φαίνεται γὰρ ὡςπερ ἡμῶν ἀποδείξεται οὐ δεί, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδείξει, ὅτι, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, νῦν ἄττον ἐσται ἡ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐχειν.’ ἀποδείκται μὲν,’ ἔφη, ὁ Συμμῖας τοι καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, ‘καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι τούτῳ τε τῶν λόγων ἐις ταύτῳ καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτῳ ὁμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ἐξων ἐκ
τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ιούσης τε καὶ γιγνομένη μηδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἄναγκη αὐτήν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνη, εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε δεῖ αὕτης αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγεται καὶ νῦν.

ΧΧΙV. Ὄμως δὲ μοι δοκεῖσι σὺ τε καὶ Συμμίας ἡδέως ἢν καὶ τούτων διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδείναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ώς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σῶματος διαφυσῆ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τὸν τις μὴ ἐν νυμέρα, ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τούτι πνεύματι ἀποθητήκων.' καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας· 'ὡς δεδομένων,' ἐφη, ἢ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ώς ἡμῶν δεδοτῶν, ἀλλ' ἵσως ἐν τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαύτα φοβεῖται· τοῦτον οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδείναι τὸν θάνατον ὠστερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.' ἀλλὰ χρῆ, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπύδειν αὐτῆς ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἐως ἅν ἔξεπισθητε.' πόθεν οὖν, ἐφη, ἢ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν ἐποδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σὺ,' ἐφη, 'ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις;' 'πολλὴ μὲν ἡ 'Ελλάς;' ἐφη, ἢ Κέβης, ἐν ἑ ἐνεισὶ που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑαρβάρων γένη, οὐς πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ἢτούντας τοιοῦτον ἐπιφέρον, μῆτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μῆτε πόνων, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς τι ἄν εὐκαίριοτερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτῶς μετ' ἀλλήλων' ἵσως γὰρ ἄν οὐδὲ ῥαδίως εὑροίτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν.' ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή,' ἐφη, 'ὑπάρξει.' ὁ Κέβης. ὁθὲν δὲ ἀπελπισμένως, ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἰ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἔστιν.' ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε' B πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλεις;' 'καλῶς,' ἐφη, 'λέγεις.'

ΧΧV. Ὅμως τοιόνδε τί, ἡ δ' ὁ Σωκράτης, 'δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐρέσθαι ἐαυτοὺς, τὰ ποίω τινὶ ἁρὰ προσήκει τούτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ύπὲρ τοῦ ποιῶν τινὸς δεδεῖναι μὴ πάθῳ αὐτὸ, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὖ· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον ἡ ψυχή ἔστιν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδεῖναι ύπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς;' 'ἀληθῆ,' ἐφη, 'λέγεις.'
ΠΛΑΤΟ, ΦΗΔΗ."" C 'ἀρ' οὖν τὸ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτων ὄντι φύσει προ-
σήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαφερήναι ταύτη ἦπερ συνετέθη· εἰ
dὲ τι τυγχάνει ὃν ἄξυνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν
tαύτα, εἰπέρ τῷ ἄλλῳ; ’δοκεῖ μοι,’ ἔφη, ’οὕτως ἔχειν,’ ὁ
Κέβης. ’οὐκοῦν ἀπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει,
tαύτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἄξυνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοι’ ἄλλοις
καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα, ταύτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ σύνθετα; ’ἔμοιγε
δοκεῖ οὕτως.’ ’ωμεν δή,’ ἔφη, ’ἐπὶ ταύτα, ἔφ’ ἀπερ ἐν τῷ
D ἐμπρόσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἢ οὐσία ἃς λόγον δίδωμεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ
ἐρωτήτες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ
tαυτὰ ἢ ἄλλοι” ἄλλοις; αὐτὸ τὸ ὴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ
ἐκαστὸν, ὁ ἐστιν, τὸ ὄν, μὴ τοτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἤντινον ἐν-
dέχεται; ἢ αἰ ἀυτῶν ἐκαστὸν, ὁ ἐστι, μονοεἰδές ὁν αὐτὸ
καθ’ αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδα-
μῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; ’ὡσαύτως,’ ἔφη, ’ἀνάγκη,’
ὁ Κέβης, ’κατὰ ταύτα ἔχειν, ὦ Σῶκρατες.’ ’τὶ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν
Ε καλῶν, οἶνον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἔπων ἢ ἔματιν ἢ ἄλλων ὡσινονοῦν
τοιούτων ἢ ὴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνως ὡμωνύμων;
ἀρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ὃ πᾶν τοιναντίον ἐκείνους οὔτε αὐτὰ
αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλληλος οὐδέποτε, ὡς ἐτος εἴπειν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ
ταύτα;’ ’οὕτως,’ ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. ’οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει.’
79 ’οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν καὶ ἄφαις καὶ ὶδοις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀι-
θήσεσιν αὖθενοι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταύτα ἐχόντων οὐκ ἐστιν ὅτι
ποτ’ ἂν ἄλλω ἐπιλάβοι ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐσ-
tων ἀειδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὄρατά; ’πανταπασίν,’ ἔφη,
’ἄληθῆ λέγεις.’
XXVI. ’Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει,’ ἔφη, ’δύο εἰδή τῶν ὄντων, τὸ
μὲν ὄρατὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδὲς; ’θῶμεν,’ ἔφη. ’καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀειδὲς
ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὄρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα;’ ’καὶ
tοῦτο,’ ἔφη, ’θῶμεν.’ ’φέρε δή,’ ἢ δ’ ὅσ, ’ἀλλο τι ἦμῶν
B αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή;’ ’οὐδὲν ἄλλο,’ ἔφη.
’ποτέρφ οὖν ὁμοίότερον τῷ εἰδεὶ φαίμεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ἐξυγγενε-
στερον τὸ σῶμα;’ ’παντὶ,’ ἔφη, ’τούτῳ γε δῆλον, ὦτι τῷ
ΧΙ. ΧΧV.—ΧΧVIII., pp. 78—80.

δρατῷ. 'τὶ δὲ ἦν ψυχῇ; ὅρατον ἤ ἄειδες,' 'οὐχ ὅπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἔφη. 'ἅλλα ἡμεῖς γε τὸ ὀρᾶτα καὶ τὰ μή τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν· ἡ ἅλλη τυλικῇ οὐεί; 'τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.' 'τὶ οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὅρατον ἡ ἄορατον εἶναι;' 'οὐχ ὁρᾶτον. 'ἀειδεὶς ἄρα;' 'ναί.' ὁμοίουτον ἄρα ψυχή σώματός ἐστιν τῷ ἄειδε, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὀρᾷτῳ. 'πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σωκράτης.'

ΧΧVII. Ὅνοκοιν καὶ τὸδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἦν ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρήται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἀλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τούτῳ γάρ ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι—τότε μὲν ἐλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτῇ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἑλλυγηθὲς ὡσπερ μεθύουσα, ἀτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένης; 'πάνυ γε.' 'ὅταν δὲ γε αὐτῇ καθα' αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, ἐκεῖσε οὐχεταὶ εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ ἄει ὅν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὁσαύτως ἔχων, καὶ ός συγγενής οὔσα αὐτοῦ ἄει μετ' ἐκεῖνον τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτῇ καθα' αὐτήν γένηται καὶ ἐξῆ ἀυτῇ, καὶ πέπανται τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἄει κατὰ ταύτα ὁσαύτως ἔχει, ἀτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένης καὶ τοιὸ τοῦ αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; 'παντάπασιν,' ἔφη, 'καλῶς καὶ ἄληθῆ λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης.' 'ποτέρῳ οὖν αὐτοὶ δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχῆ ὁμοίουτον εἶναι καὶ ἑγγενέστερον; 'πᾶς ᾧ μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, 'συγχωρήσαται, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὃς ἐλω καὶ παντὶ ὁμοίουτον ἐστὶ ψυχή τῷ ἄει ὁσαύτως ἔχοντι μάλλον ἡ τῷ μῆ; 'τὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα,' τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

ΧΧVIII. 'Ὁρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅσι ψυχῆ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἠ φύσις προστάττεται, τῷ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταύτα αὐτὸτέρον σοι δοκεῖ ὁμοίων τῷ θεῖῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἡ οὖ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ μὲν θείων οὖν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἠγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τῷ δὲ θνητῶν ἄρχεσθαι τε καὶ δουλεύειν; 'ἐξοινε.' 'ποτέρῳ
οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐοικεν;· ἔδηλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἂ μὲν ψυχὴν
tῇ θείᾳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ.· σκόπει δὴ, ἐφή, ὥς Κέβης,
el ἐκ τῶν τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν ἐξυμβαινει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ
Β καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεί καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ
ωσαύτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντι ἐαυτῷ ὀμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχῆν, τῷ
de ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεί καὶ ἀνοητῷ καὶ διαλυτῷ
καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντι ἐαυτῷ ὀμοιότατον αὖ εἶναι
σῶμα. ἔχομεν τι παρὰ ταύτα ἅλλα λέγειν, ὁ φίλε Κέβης, ἣ
οὖν οὕτως ἔχει;· οὐκ ἔχομεν.

XXIX.· Τί οὖν;· τούτων οὕτως ἔχοντων ἄρ’ οὐχὶ σῶματι
μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσῆκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν
C αδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἣ ἐγγύς τι τούτων;· πῶς γὰρ οὖ;· ἐννοεῖς
οὖν;· ἐφή,· ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνη ὁ ἀνθρωπός, τὸ μὲν ὅρατον
αὐτῷ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῶ κείμενον, ὁ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν,
ὡς προσῆκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαιπνεύσθαι, οὖκ εὐθὺς
tούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἅλλ’ ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμενεῖ χρόνων,
ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν
tοιαύτῃ ἥρα, καὶ πάνυ μάλα. συμπεσον γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ
tαριχευθέν, ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχεύθεντες, ὀλίγον ὤλον
D μὲνε ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνων.· ἔναι δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἄν
σαπῆ, ὅστα τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ὦμος ὡς ἐτος
eἴπειν ἀθάνατα ἐστίν· ἢ οὖ;· ναὶ.’· ἢ δὲ ψυχῇ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδὲς,
tὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον οἴχομεν γενναίον καὶ καθαρὸν
καὶ ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἀἰδοῦ ὡς ἄληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἁγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον
θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς ἔθελῃ, αὐτικά καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἱτέον, αὐτῇ δὲ
δὴ ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτῳ πεφυκών ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώ-
ματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὡς ψαφίν οἱ πολλοὶ
Ε ἀνθρωποὶ;· πολλοὶ γε δεῖ, ὁ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Συμμία, ἅλλα
τολλῷ μᾶλλον ὃς ἔχει· εὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν
tοῦ σώματος ἐξυφερέλκουσα, ἀτέ οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ
βίῳ ἐκόσμα εἶναι, ἅλλα φεύγουσα αὐτῷ καὶ συνηθρουμενὴ αὐτῇ
eῖς αὐτῆς, ἂτε μελετῶσα ἂεί τούτο—τούτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἅλλο ἐστὶν
81 ἡ ὀρθώς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὀντὶ τεθνάναι μελετῶσα θρόδιως· ἥ
οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου; 'παντάπασι γε,' οὐκοῦν οὐτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὄμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀείδες ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θείόν τε καὶ θάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἱ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἁνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπεῖων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὥστε δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυμένων, ὅσον ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεών διάγοισα; οὐτω φῶμεν, δὲ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

XXX. 'Οὔτω γὰρ Δία,' ἐφή ὁ Κέβης. 'ἐὰν δὲ γε, οἴμαι, Β μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἂτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ ἐξωθεύσα καὶ τούτῳ θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ γεγορτευμένη ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἱδονῶν, ὡστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἄληθες ἄλλα ἢ τὸ σωματείδες, οὐ τις ἁν ἀψαυτῷ καὶ ἵδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγου καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσατο, τὸ δὲ τοὺς ὁμοσπονδοὺς καὶ ἀείδες, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἰρέτων, τοῦτο δὲ εἰσίσμενή μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὔτω δὴ ἔχουσαι οὐκ ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν εἰλικρινὴ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; 'οὐδ’ ὁπωσοῦν, ἐφή. ἄλλα καὶ διειλημμένην γε, οἴμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματειδοῦς, ὁ αὐτὴ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συννοσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ εὐενείαν καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε ἐξυμφυτον; 'πάνυ γε.’ ἐμπριθὲς δὲ γε, ὃ φίλε, τοῦτο ὠφεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεωδές καὶ ὀρατόν. ὁ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτῃ ψυχῇ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἥκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπου, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀείδους καὶ Ἄιδου, ὥστε λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματα τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένην, περὶ ἄ δὴ καὶ ὅφθη ἀττα ψυχῶν σκιωδῆς φαντάσματα, οὐ παρέχονται αἱ τοιαύτης ψυχῆς εἰδώλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὀρατοῦ μετέχουσαν, διὸ καὶ ὀρίστην.' εἰκὸς γε, ὁ Σώκρατες. 'εἰκὸς μέντοι, δὲ Κέβης καὶ οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἁγαθῶν ταύτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανάσθαι δίκην τίνουσα τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὐσίας· καὶ μέχρι γε τοῦτο πλανῶνται, ἐως ἃν τῇ τοῦ ἐννεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματειδοῦς ἐπιθυμία ἐνδεδοσθην εἰς σῶμα.
XXXI. Ἐνδούνται δέ, ὦσπερ εἰκὸς, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἡθη ὅποι ἀττ' ἀν καὶ μεμελετηκύναι τοῖχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. 'τὰ ποιὰ δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὥσπερ Ἀδαμάτες;' ὁδὸν τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὑβρεῖς καὶ φιλοσοφίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβη-μένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένει καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρῶν εἰκὸς ἐνδούσθαι. ἦ ὦνκ οἰεί; 'πάνι μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. 'τοὺς δὲ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγῶς προτετεμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἱκτίνων γένει· ἦ τοῖς ἀλλοις φαίμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἱέναι; ' ἀμέλεις,' ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, 'εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα.' ὦνκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὦσ, 'δὴ δὴ καὶ τάλλα, ἦ ἀν ἔκαστα ἰος, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης; 'δὴλον δὴ,' ἐφη· 'πῶς δ' οὖ;' 'SOEVER αὐτῶν εὐθαμονέστατοι,' ἐφη, 'καὶ τοιότων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν B ἀρετὴν ἐπιτηθευκότες, ἦν δὴ καλουσί σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δι-καλοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονοῦσαν ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; 'πῇ δὴ οὗτοι εὐθαμονέστατοι; 'ὅτι τοιότως εἰκὸς ἔστιν εἰς τοιούτων πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικὸν τε καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἦ ποῦ μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, ἦ καὶ εἰς ταύτῶν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀνδρας μετρίους.' 'εἰκὸς.'

XXXII. 'Εἰς δέ γε τεὸν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφῆσαι καὶ C παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντει οὐ θέμες ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἦ τῷ φιλομαθεί. ἀλλὰ τοιτῶν ἐνεκα, δ' ἔσταιρε Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὁρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐκθυ-μίων ἀπασῶν καὶ κρατηροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόσαν αὐταῖς ἐαυ-τοῦς, οὐ τι οἰκοφορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβοῦμενοι, ὅσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὐτίμιαν τε καὶ ἄδοξίαν μοχ-θηρίας δεδομένη, ὅσπερ οἱ φιλαρχοὶ τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἐπείτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν. 'οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέπου, ἐφη, δ' Ἀδαμάτες;' δ D Κέβης. 'οὐ μέντοι μᾶ Δία, ἦ δ' ὦσ. 'τοιοῦτοι τοιτῶν μὲν ἀπασιν, ὁ Κέβης, ἐκεῖνοι, οὐδ' τι μέλει τῆς ἐαυτῶν ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι πρᾶπτοντες ἵναι, χαίρειν εἰσώντες οὐ κατὰ ταύτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὖν εἰσώσιν ὅπη ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ Ἡγοῦ-
XXXIII. 'Πῶς, ὁ Σῶκρατες; ' ἐγὼ ἔρω, ἐφη. 'γιγνώ-  
σκούσι γάρ; ἢ δ' ὦς, 'ὅι φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν  
ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδαμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ  
προσκεκλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὀσπερ διὰ εἰργιοῦ διὰ τοῦ  
τουποῦ ὑποκείμεναι τὰ ὀντα ἄλλα μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτής, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ  
ἀμάθῃ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἰργιοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα  
ὅτι δ' ἐπιθυμίας ἔστιν, ὅσ ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος ἔμιλη-  
tωρ εἴη τοῦ δεδέσθαι,— ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκοντι οἱ φιλομα-  
θεῖς, ὅτι οὔτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν  
ψυχὴν ἡ ἔρεμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη, ὅτι  
ἀπάτης μὲν μεστή ἡ διὰ τῶν ἀμμάτων σκέψεως, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ  
tῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθοντα ἐδ' ἐκ τούτων μὲν  
ἀναχώρειν, ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν  
ἐμιλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδὲν  
ἄλλῳ ἄλλ' ἡ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὅ τι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν αὐτὸ  
kαθ' αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων· ὅτι δ' ἂν δ' ἄλλων σκοπῆ· ἐν ἄλλοις ὅν  
ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖται ἄλλης· εἰναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθήτων  
tε καὶ ὀρατῶν, ὅ δ' ἂν ὅρᾳ νοητῶν τε καὶ αἰείδες. ταύτη ὅμως  
τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰκεῖν ὃν ἑισπροκεῖται ἡ τοῦ ὅς ἄληθῶς φιλοσόφου  
ψυχή οὕτως ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ  
φόβων, καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη, ὅτι, ἔπειδὰν τις σφόδρα  
ἐπιθυμῆ ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ λυπηθῇ ἢ ἐπιθυμῆσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακῶν  
ἐπαθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν διὸ ἂν τις οὐκ ἔσχε, οὐκ ἡ νοσῆσαι ἢ τι ἀναλώ-  
sας δια τὸς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ἡ πάντων μέγιστων τοῖς κακῶν καὶ  
ἐσχάτων ἄτοι, τούτῳ πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτῷ. 'τί τούτῳ,  
ὁ Σῶκρατες; ἐφη ὁ Κέβης. ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγ-  
kάζεται ἀμα τῇ ἡθὸν ἡ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσ-  
θαι, περί δ' ἂν μάλιστα τούτῳ πάσχῃ, τούτῳ ἑναργεστατοῖν τε  
eίναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐκ οὕτως έχον· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ  
ὄρατα· ἢ οὔ; 'πάνυ γε,' οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα
καταδείκται ψυχή ύπο σώματος; 'πῶς δή;' ὧτι ἐκάστη ἠδονή καὶ λύπη ὡσπερ ἤλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῦ ἀυτῆν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερνά καὶ ποιεὶ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἄληθῆ εἶναι, ἀπέρ ἀν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φη. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτῶς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται, οὕτω, ὁμότροπος τὲ καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οὐα μηδέποτε εἰς Ὅδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἂν τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξίηναι, ὡστε ταχὺ πάλιν τίτπειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὡσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι,

Ε καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀμοιραίς εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνοπτικώς. ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη, 'λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης,

XXXIV. 'Τούτων τοῖνυν ἐνεκά, ὁ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλοσόφους κόσμου εἴσοι καὶ ἄνδρείοι, οὐχ ἃν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνεκά
84 φασίν: ἢ σὺ οἴει; 'οὐ δήτα ἐγογε.' ὦ γάρ, ἄλλ' οὕτω λογίσαι ἢν ψυχή ἄνδρος φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἃν οἰηθεὶς τῆν μὲν φιλοσοφιαίν χρήμαι ἐαυτήν λύειν, λυνόμεν δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτήν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἐαυτήν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκατα-
δεῖν καὶ ἀνήρτυνον ἐργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης τινα ἐναντίως ἵστον μεταχειριζομένην, ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἂν ἐν τούτῳ οὕσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ

B θείον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ξῆν τε οἴεται οὕτω δεῦν, ἐώς ἃν ἦλ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ἐγγυγενεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ ποιοῦσαν ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάξθαι τῶν ἄνθρω-
πίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῦν μὴ φοβηθῇ, ταύτα γ' ἐπιτηςθεύσασα, ὁ Σιμμάτε τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅποιος μὴ διασπασθείσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τῶν σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυγοσθεύσα καὶ διαπομένη οὐχὶ ταῖς οὐδέν ἔτι οὐδαμοίν ἕνν.'

XXXV. Συγῆ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰσόστο τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολλῶν χρόνων, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἤν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἦμῶν οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμάθα σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελεγέςθην· καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἱδὼν αὐτῶ ἦρετο· τι; ἐφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα
μόνον μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεώς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ ὅτι ἐτι ἐχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάσας, εἴ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἰκανὸς διεξεῖναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἀλλὸ σκοπεῖσθορν, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δὲ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκνήσητε καὶ αὐτὸι εἶπείν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἰ τῇ ύμιν φαίνεται βέλτιον ἀν λεχθῆ, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀκούσαν τῇ τυχῇ καὶ διελθεῖν, εἰ τῇ τῷ αἰτίᾳ οἶσθε μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσεσθαι. καὶ οἱ Συμμιᾶς ἐφη· καὶ μὴν, ὦ Ὀσκρατε, τάληθη σοι ἑρω. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορών τὸν ἐτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκούσαι, ὡκνεῖν δὲ ὁχλον παρέχειν, μὴ σοι ἀἰδῆς ἓ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν· καὶ ὅσ ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τι ὑρέμα καὶ φησίν. βαβαί, ὦ Συμμία· ἦ που χαλεπῶς ἀν τοὺς ἀλλός ἀνθρώπους πείσαμι, ὡς οὐ συμφορῶν ἡγοῦμαι Ε τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μὴν ύμᾶς, δύναμαι πείθειν, ἄλλα φοβείσθη, μὴ δυσκολότερον τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἦ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ· καὶ, ὅσ ἑοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαιλότεροι ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, οἱ, ἐπειδαν αὐτῶνται ὅτι δε αὐτοῖς ἀποθανεῖν, ἂδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ μάλιστα 85 ἂδοντι, γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρά τὸν θεόν ἀπεινά, οὔπερ εἰσὶ θεράποντες· οἱ δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δεός τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδοντα, καὶ φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξηδείν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὀρανον ἂδει, ὅταν πευκῇ ἢ ἰμαοὶ ἢ τινα ἀλλήν λύπην λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἢ τε ἁρδῶν καὶ χελεδών καὶ ὁ ἐποψ, ἢ δὴ φασί διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ἂδειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ταύτα μοι φαίνεται λυποῦμενα ἂδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἄτε, οἴμαι, τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος Β οντες μαντικοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ προεδότες τὰ ἐν Ἀδιόν ἀγαθα ἄδοντι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν· διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ εἰμπροοθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγούμαι ὁμόδουλος γε εἰναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἔρος τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χειρὸν ἐκεῖνων τῇ μαντικῆ ἐχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τούτου γε ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρή καὶ ἔρωταν ὁ τι ἀν βούλησθε, ἔας 'Ἀθηναίων ἔσων ἀνδρες ἐνδεκα· καὶ καλῶς,' ἐφη, 'λέγεις,' ὦ Συμμίας· 'καὶ ἐγώγε σοι ἑρω, ὦ ἀπορῶ, ΡΗΜΕΙΔ.
καὶ αὐ Dion, ἃ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὡς Ἑφραῖος, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὠσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἶδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίω ἡ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἡ παγχάλεπον τι, τὸ μὲντο αὐτὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μή οὔχι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίαστασθαι, πρὸν ἀν πανταχῆ σποτῶν ἀπείητη τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός. δεῖ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γῇ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν, ὅτι ἢ εὑρεῖν ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οἰκών λαβόντα

D καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὁχούμενον ὠσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλέυσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερον ὁχήματος ἡ λόγον θείου τινὸς διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐγγυὴ οὐκ ἐπαυσχυνθῆσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπιειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδὲ ἐμαυτὸν αἰτίασομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ, ὅτι νῦν οὐκ ἔπον δὲ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὡς Ἑφραῖος, ἐπιειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἰκανῶς εἰρήσθαι.

Ε XXXXVI. Καὶ ὁ Ἑφραῖος. ' ἂσως γὰρ,' ἐφη, ' ὡς ἐταίρη, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται. ἀλλα λέγε, ὅτι δὴ οὐχ ἰκανῶς.' 'ταύτη ἐμοιγε,' ἢ δ' ὅσ, ' ἢ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἀν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τούτον λόγον ἐποίη, ὡς μὲν ἀρμονία ἀδρατός τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλον τι καὶ θείον ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἱρμοσ-

86 μένῃ λύρᾳ, αὕτη δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματα τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ξύνθετα καὶ γεωδὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ ξυγγενῆ. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἡ κατάξη τις τὴν λύραν ἡ διατέμη καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδὰς, εἰ τις διωσχυρίζωτο τῷ αὐτῷ λύρῳ ὡσπερ σὺ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἐτι εἶναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι. οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανή ἢ ἐκ τῆς μὲν λύρας ἢ εἶναι διερρωγοῦν τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὖσας, τὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι

B τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὀμοφύς τε καὶ ξυγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην. ἀλλὰ φαίνῃ ἀνάγκη ἐτι που εἶναι αὕτην τὴν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπησθῆσθαι, πρίν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν — καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὡς Ἑφραῖος, οἷμαι ἐγγυὴ καὶ αὐτὸν σε τούτῳ ἐνεπιμήκθαι, ὅτι
τοιούτον τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ Ἐγηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κράσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλ- ὡς καὶ μετρίως κραϑῆ πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὕσα ἀρμονία τις, δήλου ὦτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἁμέτρως ἡ ἐπισταθῆ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὖθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολολέναι, καὶ οποῖοι οὖν θεωτάτην, ὡσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρμονίαι αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τούς δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστοτε πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν, ἐως ἢ ἡ κατακαυθῇ ἡ κατα- στατῇ—ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τούτων τῶν λόγων τῷ φήσομεν, ἐὰν τις αξιοί κρᾶσιν οὖν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ βαθαίρῳ πρὸτην ἀπολλυσθήναι.

XXXVII. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰσθαί, καὶ μειδιάσας· 'ὅδεια μὲντοι,' ἔφη, 'λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ οὖν τις ἡμῶν εὐπρότερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεὶ μὲντοι μοι χρὴναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἐτι πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκούσαι, τί ἂδ ὦ Ε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἕνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσόμεθα, τι ἐρόμεν, ἐπειτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἡ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν τι δοκῶσι προσάδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μῆ, οὕτως ἢ ἐπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἀγε,' ἡ δ' ὦς, 'ὁ Κέβης, λέγε, τί θῆν σὲ ἄδ θράττον ἀπιστίαν παρέχει; 'λέγω δή,' ἡ δ' ὦς ὁ Κέβης. 'ἐμοί γὰρ φαίνεται ἐτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καὶ ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταυτὸν ἐγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν 87 εἰς τόδε τὸ εἴδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μή οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέως καὶ, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθὲς ἐστὶν εἰπείν, πάνυ ἰκανῶς ἀποδεδείχθαι· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἐτι που ἔσται, οὐ μοι δοκεὶ τῦ δε. ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἵσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονώτερον ψυχή σώματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῷ Σιμμίῳ ἀντιλήψει· δοκεὶ γὰρ μοι πᾶοι τούτων πάνω πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν, ἄν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἐτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὤρξς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ γε ἀσθενεστέρον ἐτι

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B ὃν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σου ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐτι σφῶσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τὸδε ἐπισκέψαι, εἰ τι λέγω· εἰκόνος γὰρ τινος, ὃς έοικεν, κἀγὼ ὅσπερ Συμμίας δέομαι. ἤμοι γὰρ δοκεῖ δομοῖς λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἃν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου υφάντων πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγει τούτῳ τὸν λόγον, ὃτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ἀλλὰ ἐστὶν που ᾧσως, τεκμηρίων δὲ παρέχοιτο θομάτων, ὃ ἡμπείχετο αὐτός υφηνάμενος, ὃτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, καὶ εἰ τις ἀποστοίη

C αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτήθη, πότερον πολυχρονιώτερόν ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἰματίαν ἐν χρεία τε ὅτι καὶ φορομένου, ἀποκρυμμένου δὲ τινος, ὃτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἴοιο ἄποδεδείχθαι, ὃτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὃ γε ἀνθρωπος σώς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν. τὸ δ', οἶμαι, ὃ Συμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σύ, ἃ λέγω. πάς γὰρ ἃν ὑπολάβοι, ὃτι εὐθὺς λέγει ὃ τοῦτο λέγων· ὃ ἄρα υφάντης οὕτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τουαίτα ἰμάτια καὶ υφνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὑστερος

D ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν οὕτως, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίων, οἶμαι, πρότερος, καὶ οὔδὲν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἑνεκα ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἰματίων φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ, οἶμαι, εἰκόνα δέξιτ' ἂν ψυχῇ πρὸς σώμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι' ἂν μοι φαύνουτο λέγειν, ὃς ἡ μὲν ψυχῇ πολυχρονίων ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σώμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἕκαστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἀλλως τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἑτη βιψῆ· εἰ γὰρ ἰέοι τὸ σώμα καὶ ἀπολύουσο τε ἐτὶ ξόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχῆ αἰὲ τὸ

E κατατριβόμενον ἀνυψαῖν, ἀναγκαῖον μὲν' ἂν εἴη', ὅπτε αὐτολύουτο ἡ ψυχῆ, τὸ τελευταίων υφαιμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνον προτέραν ἀπόλλυσαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότε ἦδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σώμα καὶ ταχόν σαφὲν διοίκουσι. ὃςτε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὐπώ ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν, ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ἀποθάνωμεν, ἐτι που ἡμῶν ἢ

88 ψυχῆ ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλέον ἐτι τῷ λέγοντι, ἢ ᾧ σὺ λέγεις, συγχωρήσειεν, δοῦς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ καὶ γενέσθαι
Ημᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνομεν, ἐνών ἐτί εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι, καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι ἄθις· οὔτω γὰρ αὐτῷ φύσει ἴσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν· δόσει δὲ ταύτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ ποινεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενήσεσι καὶ τελευτῶσαν γε ἐν τινὶ τῶν βασάνων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι· τούτων δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ ποιμάτος, ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὀλέθρων, μηδένα Β φαΐνει εἰδέναι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὑπὸν αὐτοθάνασθαι ἡμῶν· εἰ δὲ τούτο οὕτως ἔχειν, οὗτιν προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοίγως θαρρεῖν, ὡς μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδείξας, ὅτι ἔστιν ψυχῇ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατον τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρων· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδεῖται ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ ποιμάτος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόληται·

XXXVIII. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰσόντων αὐτῶν ἀγών διετέθημεν, ὡς ὑστερον ἑλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς ὑπὸ οὗ τοῦ ἐμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμῶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξας καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν ὑμῖν μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὔδενος ἄξιος εἶμεν κριταί ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἀπίστω ἢ.

Ε.Χ. Νὴ τοῦς θεοὺς, ὥς Φαιδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν μὲ νῦν ἀκουσάντας σου τοιοῦτον τι λέγειν πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται· τίνι οὖν ἐτί πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὡς, ὁν ὁ Σωκράτης ἐλεγε λόγου, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέτωκεν. θαυμαστὸς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὕτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἂν τοῦ άρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὡσπερ ὑπέμνησεν μὲ θητεῖς, ὧτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προνεδόκοτο. καὶ πάνω δὲομαι πάλιν ὡσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀλλον τινὸς λόγου, ὡς με πείσει, ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συν- αποθνήσκει ἡ ψυχή. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Δίος, τῇ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κάκεινος, ὡσπερ ἡμᾶς φῆς, Ε ἐνδηλὸς τι ἐγένετο ἀχθὸμενος ἡ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρῶς ἐβοήθησε τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἰκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἡ ἐνδεώς; πάντα ἡμῖν διέλθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.
ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σω-
κράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ
89 μὲν οὖν ἔχειν, ὃ τι λέγοι ἔκεινος, ὡσοι οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλὰ
ἔγωγε μᾶλιστα ἐθαυμάσα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἤδεως
καὶ εὑμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμέμνως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο,
ἐπείτα ἥμων ὡς ἔξεως ἤσθετο, ὃ πεπόνθειμεν ὅπο τῶν λόγων,
ἐπείτα ὡς εὖ ἥμας ἱάσατο καὶ ὦσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἦττημένους
ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προοτρέψειν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαι τε καὶ συν-
κοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

EX. Πῶς δή; ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἔρω. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιῇ αὐτοῦ καθῆμενος
Β παρά τὴν κλάνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὃ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ υψη-
λοτέρου ἢ ἐγὼ. καταφύγος οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπτέςας
τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας· εἰώθει γὰρ, ὅποτε τοῦχοι, παίζειν μου
εἰς τὰς τρίχας—ἀὑριόν δή, ἐφη, ἢ ἱσως, ὁ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς
κόμας ἀποκορεῖ. ἢ ἐοικεῖ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἢ Σώκρατες. ἢ οὐκ, ἂν
γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ. ἢ ἀλλὰ τί;, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. τήμερον, ἐφη,
κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμᾶς καὶ σὺ ταῦτας, ἐάντερ γε ἥμιν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ
C καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἐγωγ' ἂν, εἰ σὺ
ἐγὼ καὶ με διαφεύγων ὁ λόγος, ἐνορκὼν ἂν τοιχαίμην ὥσπερ
Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσεις, πρὶν ἂν νικήσῃς ἀναμαχόμενος
tὸν Συμμῖον τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. ἢ ἀλλ', ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, 'πρὸς
dύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οὖς τε εἶναι. ἢ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμὲ,
ἐφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἐως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν. τ' παρακαλῶ
toίνυν,' ἐφην, οὐκ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆς;
' οὐδὲν διώσει, ἐφη.

XXXIX. ἢ Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμεν τι πάθος μὴ
πάθωμεν. ἢ τὸ ποιόν; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ. μὴ γενώμεθα, ἢ δ' ὅσ,
D μυσόλογοι, ὥσπερ ὁι μυσάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν,
ἐφη, ὡς ὁ δ' τὶς μεῖξον τοῦτον κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μυσέως.
γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μυσόλογία τε καὶ μυσάνθρωπα.
το γὰρ μυσάνθρωπα ἐνδυέται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πυτεῖσθαι
ἀνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασι τε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ψυχή
καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν, ἔπειτα ὅλον ὦστερον εὑρεῖν τούτον πονηρὸν τε καὶ ἄπιστον καὶ αὕθις έτερον· καὶ ὅταν τούτο πολλάκις πάθη τις καὶ ύπὸ τούτων μάλιστα, οἷς ἀν ἤγγισατο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἐταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μυσεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἤγειται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ή οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὑπὸ τοῦτο γεγονόμενον; 'πάνυ γε,' ἤν δ' ἐγώ. 'οὐκοῦν,' ἢ δ' ὅς, 'αἰσχρὸν, καὶ δὴλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τάνθρωπεια τὸ τοιοῦτον χρήσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἔχρητο, ὦστερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἄν ἤγγισατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὅλιγους εἶναι ἐκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. 'πώς λέγεις; ἐφην ἐγώ. 'ὡσπερ,' ἢ δ' ὅς, 'περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων: οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἡ σφόδρα μέγαν ἡ σφόδρα σμικρῶν ἔξευρεν ἀνθρωπὸν ἡ κύνα ἡ ἄλλο οὕτων; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἡ βραδὺν ἡ αἰσχρὸν ἡ καλὸν ἡ λευκὸν ἡ μέλανα; ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι, ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιοῦτων τὰ μὲν ἁκρά τῶν ἑσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὅλιγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πόλλα; 'πάνυ γε,' ἤν δ' ἐγώ. 'οὐκοῦν οἰεὶ,' ἐφη, 'εἰ πονηρίας ἄγων προτεθεί, πάνυ ἂν ὅλιγους καὶ ἑνταῦθα τοὺς πρῶτους φανῆσαι;' 'εἰκός γε,' ἤν δ' ἐγώ. 'εἰκός γάρ,' ἐφη. 'ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὁμοίω οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεστόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, ἡ, ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἄλλῃ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κάπετα ὅλιγον ύστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὢν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὢν, καὶ αὕθις έτερος καὶ έτερος· καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἴσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφῶτατοι γεγονέαν τε καὶ κατανενοκεῖαν μόνοι, ὅτι οὐτὲ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιου οὐτὲ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ οὐντα ἄτεχνοι ύστερ ἐν Εὐρύπτω ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. 'πάνυ μὲν οὖν,' ἐφην ἐγώ, 'ἄλλῃ λέγεις.' 'οὐκοῦν, ἢ Φαίδων,' ἐφη, 'οἰκτρὸν ἄν έι τὸ πάθος, εἰ οὕτως δὴ τινὸς ἄλλῃσθος καὶ βέβαιον λόγον καὶ δυνατὸν κατανοῆσαι, ἐπείτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιοῦτοις D
λόγωσ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοτε μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτε δὲ μὴ, μὴ ἐαυτόν τις αἰτιώτο μηδὲ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτὰν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἁσμενὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀδ' ἐαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαετο καὶ ἦδη τὸν λυπὸν βίον μιωὸν τε καὶ λοιοδρῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοὶ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστημῆς στηριξθεῖν. ' ἥ τὸν Δία,' ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅικτρῶν δῆτα.'

XL. 'Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν,' ἐφη, 'τούτο εὐλαβηθὼμεν καὶ Ἐ μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν φυχήν, ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδύνεύει οὖθεν ὑγίες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὕτω ὑγίως ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέων καὶ προθυμητέων ὑγίως ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἐπεὶτα βίου παντὸς ἔγκεια, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα τοῦ θανάτου· ὡς κινδύνευον ἐγογο ἐν τῷ παρόντι περί αὐτοῦ τοῦτον οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνω ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονείκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶν, ὅτι μὲν ἔχει περὶ δὲν ἄν ὁ λόγος ἦ, οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ, ἃ αὐτοὶ ἐθεντο, ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνου διόυσεν· οὐ γὰρ ὡς τοῖς παροῦσιν, ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω, δόξη ἀληθῇ εἶναι προθυμηθήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἰ δέρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτὸ ἐμοὶ ὅτι Β μάλιστα δόξῃ οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὃ φίλε ἔταιρε—θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς—εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὅντα τὰ λέγω, καλὼς δή ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἔστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τούτον ἐν τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ὑπτον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀδηδὴς ἔσομαι ὅμως· ἥ δὲ ἁγνοίᾳ μοι αὐτῇ οὐ ξυνιδιατελεῖ, κακὸν γὰρ ἄν ἦν, ἀλλ' ὅλον ὡστερον ἀπολείται. παρεσκευασμένοι δή, ἐφη, 'ὁ Σιμώνη τε κα Κέβης, ὁ πρώτος ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὅμως μέντοι, ἄν ἐμοὶ Ο πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίζαντες Σωκράτους, τής δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μὲν τι ύμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθῆς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτινίτετε, εὐλαβοῦμεν ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἄμα ἐμαντον τε καὶ ύμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπτὼν οἰχύσομαι.
ΧΗ. ΧΧΧΙΧ.—ΧΛΓ., pp. 90—92. 41

XLI. 'Αλλ' ιτέον, 'έφη. 'πρῶτον με ὑπομνήσατε, η ἐλέγετε, εὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Συμμίας μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ἐγίθμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὄμως καὶ θείοτερον καὶ κάλλιον ὅτι τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύται ἐν ἄρμονίᾳ εἰδει D οὖσα. Κέβης δὲ μοι ἐδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιστέρων γε εἰναι ψυχήν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸδε ἄδηλον παντὶ, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρήσασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλυτοῦσα νῦν αὑτὴ ἀπολλύται, καὶ ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὀλέθρος, ἔπει σώμα γε ἁεὶ ἀπολλύ-μενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἀρὰ ἀλλ' ἡ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὁ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἢ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐπικοπείσθαι;' συννομολογεῖτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἀμφιω. 'πότερον οὖν,' ἐφη, 'πάντας τοὺς ἐμπροσθεὶς E λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τους δ' οὐ; 'τοὺς μὲν,' ἐφάτην, 'τοὺς δ' οὖ; 'τῇ οὖν,' ἢ δ' οὖς, 'περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ὃ ἐφαμέν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἐχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἀλλοθείρ πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι; 'ἐγὼ μὲν,' ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, 92 'καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὃς ἐπείσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὃς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ.' 'καὶ μῦρ,' ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας, 'καὶ αὐτοῦ οὕτως ἐχόω, καὶ πάντα ἀνθαμάζομι, εἰ μοι περὶ γε τοῦτον ἄλλα τοτὲ δόξειν.' καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. 'ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σου,' ἐφη, 'ἀ δὲν θηβαίε, ἀλλὰ δοξάσας, ἐάντερ μείνῃ ἢδε ἢ οὕσις, τὸ ἄρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πράγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἄρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκείσθαι. οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξει γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς πρότερον ἥν ἄρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν B ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, εξ δὲν ἐδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξεις; 'ὀδόν-μῶς,' ἐφη, 'ἀ Σώκρατες.' 'αἰσθάναι οὖν,' ἢ δ' οὖς, 'ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἴδος γε καὶ σώμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γάρ ἢ ἄρμονία γε σοι τοιοῦτον ἐστίν ὃ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι ἐτι ἄναρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευ- ταῖον δὲ πάντων ἐυνίσταται ἡ ἄρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται.
οὐτὸς οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ἔνυφσεται; 'οὐδαμῶς,' ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας. 'καὶ μὴν,' ἢ δ' οὐς, 'πρέπει γε εἰπέρ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἔνυφσῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας.' 'πρέπει γάρ,' ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας. 'οὖν, τοίνυν,' ἔφη, 'σοι οὐ ἔνυφσός ἄλλα ὅρα, πότερον αἱρεῖ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμμησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν;' 'πολὺ μάλλον,' ἔφη, 'ἐκείνον, ὃ Σώκρατες. οὖν μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἂνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ 

D εὐπρεπεῖας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώπως. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τάς ἀποδείξεις ποιομένους λόγοις ἔνυφσῳ σέδων ἀλαζόσων, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εἰ μάλα ἔξατασόσω, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασίν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμμῆσις καὶ μαθήσεως λόγους διὰ ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδείξασθαι εἰρήται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που λύτως ἤμων εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφίκεσθαι, ὡσπερ αὐτὴ ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα

Ε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ἡ ἔστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἰκανῶς τε καὶ ὅρθως ἀποδεδηγμαί. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἐοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μὴτε ἐμαυτοῦ μὴτε ἄλλου ἀποδείχθηα λέγοντος, ὡς ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἄρμονία.

XLII. 'Τί δὲ, ἥ δ' ὡς, ἃ ὁ Συμμία, τῇδε; δοκεῖ σοι

93 ἄρμονία ἡ ἄλλῃ τινὶ συνθέσει προσῆκειν ἄλλους πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἄν ἐκείνα ἔχυ, ἢ δὲν ἄν συγκέπτας; 'οὐδαμῶς.' ἀνθρώπως. 'οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγώμαι, οὐδὲ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ ὅ ἄν ἐκείνα ἢ ποιή ἢ πάσχω,' συνέφη. ὅποι ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαι γε προσῆκει ἄρμονίαν τούτων, ἢ δὲν ἄν συντεθῇ, ἄλλα ἐπεσθαι.' συνεδόκει. 'πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἄρμονία κινηθῆναι ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν.' 'πολλοὶ μέντοι,' ἔφη. 'τί δὲ; οὐχ οὖτως ἄρμονία πέφυκεν εἰναι ἐκάστη ἄρμονία, ὡς ἄν ἄρμοσθῇ;' 'οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. 'ἡ οὐχὶ,' ἢ δ' ὡς,

B 'ἀν μὲν μᾶλλον ἄρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἰπέρ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἂν ἄρμονία εἰη καὶ πλεῖον, εἰ δ' ἦττον τε καὶ ἐπ' ἐλαττων, ἦττον τε καὶ ἐλάττων;' 'πάνυ γε.' 'ἡ οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑμερότατον μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ ἐπ' ἐλαττων καί
δυττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆν; ' οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν,' ἐφη, 'φέρε δὴ,' ἐφη, 'πρὸς Διός: λέγεται ψυχή ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρέτην καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἢ δὲ ἄνοιαν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακῆ; καὶ ταύτα ἄληθῶς λέγεται; ' ἄληθῶς μέντοι; ' τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχῆν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταύτα οὖντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὴν τε ἄρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακάν; πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὐτή τινα ἀλλήν καὶ ἄναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθήν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὔσῃ ἀλλήν ἀρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄναρμοστον αὐτῆν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλλήν;

' οὐκ ἔχω ἔγνως,' ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ' εἰπεῖν; δῆλον δ' ὅτι τοῦ αὐτ' ἀττ' ἀν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος; ' ἀλλὰ προομολογηταί, ἐφη, 'μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἦττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆν ψυχῆς εἶναι; τούτο δ' ἐστι τὸ ὄμολογημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἐπὶ πλέον μηδ' ἦττον μηδ' ἐπὶ ἐλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας εἶναι. ἢ γάρ; 'πάνυ γε,' ' τὴν δὲ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον ἁρμονίαν οὔσαιν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡρμοσθαί; ἢ στιν οὔτωσ; ' ἢ στιν;', ' ἢ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡρμοσμένη ἢ στιν ὅτι πλέον ἡ ἐλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἵσον; 'τὸ ἵσον. 'οὐκοὖν ψυχῆς ἔπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον ἀλλή ἀλλής αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχῆς ἢστιν, οὔτε δ' μᾶλλον οὔτε δ' ἦττον ἡρμοσταί; 'οὔτως. 'τοῦτο δὲ γε πεπουθυῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἄναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχοι ἀν; 'οὐ γὰρ οὖν; 'τοῦτο δ' αὖ πεπουθυῖα ἢ πεπουθυῖα ἢ ἢ τὶ πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρέτης μετέχοι ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἰτερ ἢ μὲν κακία ἄναρμοστία, ἢ ἢ ἀρέτη ἁρμονία εἰ; 'οὔτε πλεον. 'μᾶλλον δὲ γε του, ὁ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχῆ μεθέξει, εἰτερ ἁρμονία ἢστιν: ἁρμονία γὰρ δῆπον παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα ἁρμονία ἄναρμοστίας οὐποτ' ἢ μετάσχοι; 'οὐ μέντοι; 'οὔτε γε δῆπον ψυχῆ, οὖσα παντελῶς ψυχῆ, κακίας; 'τῶς γὰρ ἐκ γε τῶν προειρημένων; 'ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ἡγοίοις ἀγαθαὶ ἐσονται, εἰτερ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφυκαν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχαὶ είναι; 'ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, 'ὁ Σώκρατες. 'ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅσ, 'οὔτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ
Β πάσχειν ἄν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὄρθῃ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἢ, τὸ ψυχῆν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι; 'οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν; ἔφη.

XLIII. 'Τι δέ; ᾖ δ' ὃς· 'τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσοθ' ὅτι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχῆν ἄλλωσ τε καὶ φρόνιμον;' οὐκ ἔγωγε.' 'πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοὺς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιομένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τούνδε, οἶδον καὶ ματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τούναντίῳ ἔλκειν, τὸ μῆ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μῆ ἔσθελεν, καὶ ἄλλα μνήμα πον

C ὅρωμεν ἐναντιομένην τὴν ψυχῆν τοὺς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ὃς· 'τίνα μὲν οὖν,' οὐκοῦν αὐτὸ ὑμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρώσθεν μήποτ' ἂν αὐτὴν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὐθαν, ἐναντία ἓδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνωτο καὶ χαλῶτο καὶ πάλλοτο καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιον πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα, ξὲ δὲν τυγχάνει οὐθαν, ἀλλὰ ἔπεσθαι εἰκέναι καὶ οὔποτ' ἂν ἢμεμονεύειν; 'ὑμολογήσαμεν,' ἔφη· 'πῶς γὰρ οὖ;' 'τί οὖν; νῦν οὖ πάν τούναντιν ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζόμενη, ἢμεμονεύουσα τε ἐκείνων πάντων, ξὲ δὲν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, D καὶ ἐναντιομένην ὅλγον πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ διστόλουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀληθῶν, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πρόστερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἑπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἀλλὰ οὗθα ἄλλω πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οὖν ποῦ καὶ Ὁμήρος ἐν Ὁδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὐ λέγει τὸν Ὁδυσσέα;

στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ.

Ε τέταθε δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο τοῦτ' ἐτλής.

ἀρ' οἶει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔς οἷς καὶ οἷς ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῖς σωμάτοις παθῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷς οἷς άγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ διστάζειν, καὶ οὕς οὕς αὕτής πολὺ θειότερον τυῶς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἀρμονίαν; 'νὴ Δία, δ' Ἐφίκρατε, έμουγε δοκεί,' οὔκ ἀρα, ἢ ἀριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμὴ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχήν ἀρμονίαν τῶν φάναι εἶναι; οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἑοικεν,

95 Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὑμολογούμεν οὔτε αὐτοί ἡμῖν αὐτοίς, ἔχειν οὕτως ἔφη.
XLIV. 'Ειλεν δή, ἣ δ' ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης, 'τα μὲν Ἀρμονίας ἦμιν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἱλειά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἐφη, ὡς Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; 'σύ μοι δοκεῖς,' ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, ἑξευρήσεις· τούτων γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἀρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίων γὰρ λέγοντος, ὅτι ἦπόρει, πάντα ἐθαύμαζον, εἴ τι ἐξεῖ τις χρῆσασθαι τῷ λογῷ αὐτοῦ· πάντα μὲν οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἐφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σου λόγου. ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἦν θαυμάσαμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. ὃς ἀν 'γαθέ, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, 'μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῶν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα λέγεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὀμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα, εἶ ἀρα τὸ λέγεις. ἦστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὅν χρείας· ἀξιώσει ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὕτων, εἰ φιλοσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, χαρρόν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανόντων ἐκεῖ εἰ πράξει διαφέροντος ἢ εἰ ἐν ἀλλῳ βίῳ βιών ἐπελεύσατο, μὴ ἀνόητον τε καὶ ἦλιθον θάρρος θαρρήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν, ὅτι ἰσχυρὸν τι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή καὶ θεοεἰδὲς καὶ ἢν ἐτὶ πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φύς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τὲ ἐστὶν ψυχή καὶ ἢν ποὺ πρῶτον ἀμήχανον ὀσον χρόνον καὶ ἦδει τε καὶ ἐπραττεν πολλὰ ἀττα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἢν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχῇ ἢν αὐτὴ ὀλέθρου, ὡςπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαπωρωμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ἤπατι καὶ τελευτώσα γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρειν δὲ δὴ φύς οὐδέν, εἰτε ἀπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἐρχεται εἰτε πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι ὡς ἀθάνατον ἐστι. τοιαύτ' ἀττα ἐστίν, οἴμαι, ὁ Κέβης, ὁ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπτύδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμῶς, εἴ τε τι βουλεῖ, προσθῆ ἢ ἀφέλης. καὶ ὁ Κέβης· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι,' ἐφη, 'οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθείναι δεόμας· ἐστί δὲ ταῦτα, ἡ λέγω.
XLV. 'Ο οὖν Σωκράτης συνχυν δρόμον ἐπισχῶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκεφάμενος· 'οὐ φαίλον πράγμα; ἔφη, ὅ ὁ Κέβης, ἐτέες· ὁλος γὰρ δει περί γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἔγω οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃς, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἐπείτα ἀν τί σοι χρύσιμον φαίνεται ὃν ἀν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ ὃν λέγεις χρύσει· ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαι γε.' ἀκοῦει τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἔγω γάρ, ἔφη, ὅ ὁ Κέβης, νέος ἃν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησά ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἤν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἰστορίας. ὑπερήφανος γὰρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἐκάστον· καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι· καὶ Ἡ πολλάκις ἐμαυτῷ ἁνω κατω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τουάδε, ἃρ' ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὡς τίνας ἐλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα συντρέφεται· καὶ πότερον τὸ αἰμα ἐστὶν ὃ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν, ὣς ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἐστὶν ὃ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὄραν καὶ ὁφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ ὁδὸς λαβοῦσθ᾽ τὸ ἱρεμεῖν κατὰ ταύτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς Σ σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἐδοξά πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυής εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμηρίων δὲ σοι ἐρώτησόν μοι· ἔγω γὰρ ὃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἴππιστάμην, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὡστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ὅ πρὸ τοῦ ὃμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τοῦ πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τὶ ἀνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τοῦτο γὰρ ὃμην πρὸ τοῦ παντί δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἐπειδὰν

D γὰρ ἐκ τῶν συντίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξί σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὅστεοις ὅστα, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεία ἐκάστος προσγενησάται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὁλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολλὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἀνθρωπόν μέγαν· οὕτως τότε ὃμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρῶς· ἐμοῦγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. 'σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι.
Χ. XLV., XLVI., pp. 95—97. 47

φυμην γάρ ἵκανως μοι δοκεῖν, ὅποτε τις φαίνοιτο ἀνθρώπος παραστάς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἕπος ὑπον. καὶ ἐτη γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μου ἑδόκει Ε τῶν ὁκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτῶς προσέθειν, καὶ τὸ διπηχῦ τοῦ πηχυαίου μείζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.'

'νῦν δὲ δή, ἐφῆ ο Κέβης, 'τι σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν;' 'πόρρω

που,' ἐφῆ, 'νῆ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οὐσθαί περὶ τούτων τοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὃς γε οὖκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτῷ οὐδὲ ὡς, ἐπειδὰν εἴν τις προσθῇ ἐν, ἢ τὸ ἐν, ὃ προσετὴθη, δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν καὶ ὃ προσετήθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τῷ ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο. 'θαναμάξω γάρ, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἄλληλων ἦν, ἐν ἀρα ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν ἄλληλους, αὐτή ἁρα αἰτία αὐτῶς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἥ ἕξωνος τοῦ πλησίον ἄλληλων τεθῆναι. οὐδὲ γε ὡς, εάν τις ἐν διασχίζῃ, δύναμαι ἐτι πειθεσθαι, ὃς αὐτῇ αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἥ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἕναντία γάρ γίγνεται ἡ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι. τότε μὲν γάρ ὅτι συνήγετο Β πλησίον ἄλληλων καὶ προσετῆθετο ἐτέρον ἐτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἐτέρον ἀφ', ἐτέρου. οὐδὲ γε, δι' ὅτι ἐν γίγνεται, ὃς ἐπίσταμαι, ἐτὶ πείθω ἐμαυτουν, οὔτ' ἀλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ, δι' ὅτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀπόλλυται ἡ ἐστί, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἄλλα τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτῶς εἰκῇ φύρῳ, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσέμαι.

XLVI. Ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἐφη, Ἀναξιαγόρου ἀναγινώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος, ὡς ἄρα νοὺς C ἠστιν ὁ διακοσμοὺν τε καὶ πάντων αἰτίους, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἰσθήν τε καὶ ἐδοξεί μοι τρόπον τινά εὔ ἐχειν τὸ τὸν νοὺν εἶναι πάντων αἰτίων, καὶ ἡγηγάμην, εἰ τοὔθ οὔτως ἐχει, τὸν γε νοὺν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἐκαστὸν τιθέναι ταύτην, ὅτι ἄν βελτιστώτα ἐχῄ' εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου, ὅτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀπόλλυται ἡ ἐστί, τούτῳ δὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅτι βελτιστώτον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἡ εἶναι ἡ ἄλλο ὅτιον πάσχειν ἡ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὖδὲν ἄλλο D
σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων, ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χείρον εἴδεναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενοι ἄσμενοι εὐρικέναι φύμη διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξιάγοραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν, πότερον ἡ γῇ ἔπειτα ἡ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδή δὲ φράσειν, ἐπεκδηγήσεθαί τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἄνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἀμείνον καὶ ῥητὸν ἀμείνον ἢν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίνει εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδηγήσεσθαι, ὡς ἀμείνον ἢν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσομενος αἰτίας ἀλλο εἴδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἥλιου ὀὕτω παρ-98 εσκευάσθην, ὡςαυτῶς πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρών, τάξιν τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, τῷ ποτε ταῦτ’ ἀμείνον ἐστὶν ἐκαστὸν καὶ πολεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἢ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν φύμην, φάσκοντα γε ἢπὶ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμήσθαι, ἀλλὰ τινὰ αὐτοίς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὸ ὀὕτω ἔχειν ἐστίν, ὃς τοι ἔχει· ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον φύμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδηγήσεθαι ἀγαθον· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην τολλοῦ τὸς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνω στοιχῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἶος τ’ ἢ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἢν ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χείρον.

XLVII. Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστής ἐλπίδος, δὲ ἑταίρε, ψυχόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προῖν καὶ ἀναγγελύσκων ὅρῳ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν ἐν ὑψόσεις οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπανιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὑδάτα αἰτιωμενον καὶ ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀτόπα. καὶ μοι ἐδοξεῖν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι, ὃς περ ἂν εἰ τις λέγων, ὃτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὡς πρᾶττει νῦν πράττει, κἀπείτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστον δὲν πράττων, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν, ὃτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὃτι σύγκειται μοῦ τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ
νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὦστὰ ἔστιν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυάς ἐχει χωρὶς ἀπὸ ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνέσεσθαι, περι-
αμπέχοντα τὰ ὦστὰ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος, οὐνυνεχει ἀυτὰ· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὦστέων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐξημβολαὶς χαλώντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι που ποιεὶ οἶον τ’ ἐίναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμ-
φθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὐ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ύμῖν ἐτέρας 
τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἄκοας καὶ ἄλλα 
μυρία τοιαύτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας Ἐ 
λέγειν, ὦτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴδοξε βέλτιον ἐναι ἐμὸν κατα-
ψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταύτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὐθιδεδοκαὶ ἐνθάδε 
καθήσατα, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην, ἴνα 
ἀν κελεύσωσιν· ἐπεὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγώμαι, πάλαι ἄν ταύτα 
τὰ νεῦρά τε καὶ τὰ ὦστὰ ἦ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ βωιωτοὺς ἤν, ὑπὸ 
δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ἡμην καὶ 
κάλλιον εἰναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ 
πόλει δίκην, ἦντων' ἄν τάτη. ἀλλ’ αἰτία μὲν τὰ τοιαύτα 
καλεῖν λίαν ἀτοπον· εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι, ὡτι ἂνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαύτα 
ἕχειν καὶ ὦστὰ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἶδος τ’ ἦν 
ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταύτα 
ποιῶ ἀ ποιῶ καὶ ταύτα νῦ πράττω, ἄλλ’ οὖ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου 
αιρέσει, πολλή καὶ μακρὰ μαθημαία ἂν εἰη τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ 
μὴ διελέονται οἶον τ’ εἰναι, ὡτι ἄλλο μὲν τ’ ἐστι τὸ αἰτίων τῷ 
ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο, ἀνευ οὐ δ’ ὑ αἰτίων οὐκ ἂν ποτ’ εἰη αἰτίων· ὃ 
δὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφώντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὑσπερ ἐν σκότει, 
ἀλλοτριών ὀνόματι προσχρήμονει, ὡς αἰτίων αὐτὸ προσαγόρευειν. 
διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις δίνην περιτθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὡφάρου 
μὲνειν δὴ ποιεὶ τὴν γῆν, ὡ δ’ ὑσπερ καρδότως πλατεία βάθρον 
tὸν ἀέρα ὑπερεῖδε· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὑ ᵛον τὸ βέλτιστο αὐτά 
τεθήναι δύναμιν οὐτω νῦν κείσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ξητοῦσιν οὔτε 
tινὰ οἴονται δαμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἐχειν, ἀλλὰ ἥγουνται τοῦτον 
Ἀτλαντα ἂν ποτὲ ἱσχυρότερον καὶ ἀδαναστότερον καὶ μᾶλλον 
ἀπαντά συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἄγαθον καὶ δεὸν 
PHÆD.
PLATO, PHÆDO.

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Πλάτων καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οὐονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχει, μαθητής ὅτου οὖν ἦσαν ἄγενοῦριν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστηρήθη καὶ οὐτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλον

D μαθεῖν οἶδαι τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ἁμήν ἡ πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοι, ’ἔφη, ’ἐπίδειξιν ποιῆσωμαι, ὥς Κέβης; ’ὑπερφυὸς μὲν οὖν,’ ἔφη, ’ὡς βούλομαι.’

XLVIII. Ἐποδέξα οἱ τοίνυν μοι, ’ὥς ὁ δὲ οὐ, ’μετὰ ταύτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι, μη τάθοιμι ἀπέρ οἱ τῶν ἥλιων ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι· διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἐνιοὶ τὰ ὄμματα, ἢν μὴ ἐν ὑδατὶ η τινὶ

Ε τοιοῦτω σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτον τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοθήνην, καὶ ἔδεισα, μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείν μέλειν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπισχεμῶν ἀπέπεμψα αὐτῶν. ἐποδέξα δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τῶν λόγων καταφύγοντα ἐν ἐκείνωσι σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν

100 ἀλήθειαν. ἦςως μὲν οὖν οὗ ἐκάκωξ τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐ γὰρ πάνω συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενο τὸν ὄντα ἐν εἰκώφα μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· ἀλλὰ οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ἀρμήσα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον, ἢν ἄν κρίνω ἐρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἢ μὲν ἃν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀλήθη ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων, ἢ δ' ἃν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀλήθη. βούλομαι δὲ σοι σαφεῖστερον εἰπεῖν ἢ λέγω· οἴμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν ὑπερφυὸς μὲν οὖν,' ὃν μᾶ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὦ Κέβης, ’οὐ σφόδρα.

B XLI. Ἀλλ’, ἢ δὲ ὅς, ὀδέ λέγω, οὐδὲν καίνον, ἀλλὰ ἀπερ ἄει καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληνυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέτανμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ ἐδός ἡ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἴμι πάλιν ἐπὶ έκείνα τὰ πολυθρόλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τί καλὸν αὐτὸ καθα' αὐτὸ καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τὰλλα πάντα· ἐς θρέος καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταύτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τῆς αἰτιῶν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν, ὡς ἀθάνατον ἢ

C ψυχή. ἀλλὰ μὴ γὰρ, ἔφη ὦ Κέβης, ’οὐ διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἁν

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φθάνοις περαινών, ‘σκόπει δή,’ ἐφη, ‘tà ἐξῆς ἐκείνους, εάν σοι ἐξυνδοκή ὁσπερ ἔμοι. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἲ τί ἔστιν ἀλλο καλὸν πλήν αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν, οὐδὲ δι’ ἐν ἀλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὔτως λέγω. τῇ τοιῷδε αἵτία συγχωρεῖσ; ‘ συγχωρώ, ἐφη. ‘οὐ τοίνυν,’ ἢ δ’ ὅσ, ‘ἐτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἀλλὰς αἰτίας τὰς σοφάς ταύτας γιγνώσκειν· ἀλλ’ ἐάν τίς μοι λέγῃ, δι’ ὅτι καλὸν ἐστίν ὅτιον, ἡ χρώμα εὐανθῆς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἀλλὸ ὄτιον τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἕω, ταράττομαι γάρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσι, τούτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ὅσως ἐνίθως ἕχω παρ’, ἐματυ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἢ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅτι δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσ- γενομένῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἐτι τοῦτο διοσχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. τούτῳ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλεῖστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐματυ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἀλλῷ, καὶ τούτων ἑχόμενος ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὅτιον ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλὰ· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; ’ δοκεῖ, ’ καὶ μεγέθει ἀρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; ’ ναὶ. ’ οὐδὲ τού ἅρ ἂν ἀποδέχοιο, εἴ τές τινα φαίη ἐτέρου ἐτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν, ὅτι οὐ μέν οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μείζων πᾶν ἔτερον ἐτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μείζων ἔστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μείζων, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἐλαττὸν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἐλαττὸν οὐκ ἑμετρητή, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλαττὸν, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβοῦμενος, οἶμαι, μὴ τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζωνα τινα φύς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζων μείζων εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ἐλαττῶ, ἑπεὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρῷ οὕση τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι μέγαν τινα ἂν εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῦντα;’ καὶ ὁ Ἐρεντης γελάσας· ἐγώγε, ἐφη. ’ οὐκοῦν, ’ ἢ δ’ ὅσ, ’τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῦ πλεῖώ εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῦσιν ἂν

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λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος; καὶ τὸ δίπτηχι τοῦ πηχυνών ήμίσει μείζον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ ποι φόβοις. ἑν τίδε; ἐν ἐνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἡ δια-

C σχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῦν αὐ νέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶς, ὅτι οὐκ οὐθα ἄλλως πὼς ἐκαστὸν γυγνόμενον ἡ μετασχοῦν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου, οὐ δὲν μετασχῆ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἀλλὰν τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἄλλ’ ἡ τῆς δυνάδος μετασχησθεῖν, καὶ δεῖν τούτον μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἐσεθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλη ἐν ἐσεθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψεῖς ἐφῆς ἂν χαίρειν, παρεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις.

D σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σεαυτοῦ σκιάν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενοι ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιται; εἰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοντο, χαίρειν ἐφῆς ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιτα, ἐως ἂν τὰ ἄπ’ ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαι, εἰ σοι ἄλληλοι συμφωνεῖ ἡ διαφωνεῖ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δεοὶ σε διδόναι λόγον, ὥσαυτώς ἂν διδοῖς, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενοι, ἢτις τῶν ἀνωθέν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο,

Ε ἕως ἐπὶ τὶ ἴκανυν ἐλαθοῖς, ἀμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροι ὅπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενοι καὶ τῶν ἐκείνης ὀρμημένων, εἰπέρ βούλοιτι τοὺν ὄντων εὐρεῖν; ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἄδεις οὐδέ εἰς περὶ τούτου λόγου οὐδὲ φροντὶς· ἴκανον γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκώνες ὡμοὶ δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἡ ἀρίσκειν· σὺ δ’, εἰπέρ εἶ τῶν φιλοσόφων, οἴμαι, ἂν ὃς ἔγερ λέγω ποιοῖς. ἔφη, ‘ἀληθέστατα,’ ἐφη, ‘λέγεις,’ ὅ τε Συμμίας ἄμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

EX. Νὴ Δία, ὁ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντε εἰπεῖν ἐκείνους ταύτα. 

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὐν, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες, καὶ πάσι τοῖς παροδίσκερ ἐδοξεῖν.

EX. Καὶ γὰρ ἦμιν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούονοιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἢν τὰ μετὰ ταύτα λεχθέντα;
L. ΦΑΙΔ. Ὅς μὲν ἐγὼ οὖμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτὸς ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὁμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τὰ ἄλλα Β μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ὅρθῳ, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὑρώτα: 'εἰ δὴ, ἢ δ' ὡς, 'ταῦτα, οὔτως λέγεις, ἄρ' οὖν, ὅταν Συμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μελζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάστω, λέγεις τὸν εἶναι ἐν τῇ Συμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; ' ἔγωγε, ' ἄλλα γὰρ, ἢ δ' ὡς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Συμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὖν, ὣς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται, οὔτω καὶ τὸ ἄλληθές ἔχειν. οὐ γὰρ ποιν πεφυκέναι Συμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Συμμίαν εἶναι. ἄλλα τῷ μεγέθει, δ' τυγχάνει ἔχων' οὐδ' αὐτῷ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ο Σωκράτης ἦστιν, ἄλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει τὸ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖνον μέγεθος; ' ἄληθή; ' οὔδε γε αὐτῷ ὅτι Φαίδωνος ὑπερ- ἔχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι λέγεσθαι τῷ Φαίδων ο Φαίδων ἦστιν, ἄλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ο Φαίδων πρὸς τῇ Συμμίᾳ σμικρότητα; ' ἄλλη ταὐτα; ' οὔτως ἄρα ο Συμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὅν ἀμφότεροι, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει τε ὑπερέχειν τῇ σμικρό- τητα ὑπερέχον, τῷ δὲ τῷ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχον ὑπερέχον; καὶ ἀμα μειδιάσας· ἔοικα, ἔφη, ' καὶ ἄνγγαρ ἐρείν, ἄλλ' οὖν ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγων. συνεφή. ' λέγω δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνεκα, βουλόμενος δύοι τοι ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἔμοι γὰρ φαίνεται οὕ τοι μονὸν αὐτῷ τῷ μέγεθος οὐδέστω' ἔδελεν ἄμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἄλλα καὶ τῷ ἣ μὲν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσ- δέχεσθαι τῷ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἔδελεν ὑπέρεχεσθαι. ἄλλα δοῦν τὸ ἔτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ προσῆ τῷ ἐναντίον, Ε τῷ σμικρὸν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκεῖνον ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομένων δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἔδελεν εἶναι ἔτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἄν. ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὄν, ὅπερ εἰμί, οὔτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἶμι· ἔκεινο δὲ οὐ τετάληκεν μέγα οὖν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὃς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ τῷ σμικρῷ τό ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἔδελει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὔτε τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὄν, ὅπερ ἄν, ἀμα τούναντιον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἄλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθή- 103 ματι.' 'παντάπασιν,' ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, 'οὔτω φαίνεται μοι.'
ΠΛΑΤΟ, ΦΗΕΔΟ.

LI. Καὶ τις ἐπί τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὁστὶς δ' ἦν, οὐ ἱεραφώς μέμνημαι—· 'πρὸς θεών, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦμιν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυν λεγομένων ὁμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μείζον γέγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἐλάττον, καὶ ἀτεχνώς αὐτῇ εἶναι ἢ γένεσις τοὺς ἐναντίους, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι τούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο.' καὶ ο Ἁγκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ Ἄνδρικως, ἐφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μὲντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγενο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίον πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γέγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἦμιν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῷ φύσει. τότε μὲν γὰρ, ὁ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχοῦντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπωνομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῷ ἔκεινοιν ἐπωνύμια, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν, διὸ ἐνότων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὁνομαζόμενα. αὐτὰ δ' ἔκεινα οὐκ C ἂν ποτε φαμεν ἐθελήσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δεξασθαι.' καὶ ἄμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν· 'ἀρα μή ποι, ὁ Κέβης,' ἐφη, 'καὶ σὲ τοῖς ἐπάραξεν διὸ οὐκ εἶπεν;· 'οὔδ' αὖ,' ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, 'οὔτως ἔχω· καὶ τοι οὐ οὐ τὰ λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά μὲ ταραττεῖ.' 'ἐπωνομάζοντες ἡγοῦντο, ἤ δ' ὅς, ἂπλώς τούτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντιόν ἐαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι.· 'παντάπασιν,' ἐφη. LII. 'Ετι δ' μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψασαι, ἐφη, 'εἰ ἄρα συνυπολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλείς καὶ ψυχρόν;' 'ἔγωγε.' 'ἀρ' ὀπερ D χίόνα καὶ πῦρ; · 'μᾶ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε.' 'ἀλλ' ἐσερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν καὶ ἐστρέψον τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν;' 'ναι.' 'ἀλλὰ τὸδε γ', οἶμαι, δοκεῖ σοι, οὔδεποτε χίόνα οὔσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὠσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἐτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χίόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ύπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι.' 'πάνυ γε.' καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ύπεξιέναι ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξαμένου τὴν ψυχρότητα ἐτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ Ε ψυχρόν.· 'ἀληθῆς,' ἐφη, 'λέγεις.' 'ἐστὶν ἄρα,' ἢ δ' ὅς, 'περὶ ἔνα τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστε μή μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιούσθαι τοῦ
αὐτοῦ ὄνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ ἥρανον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλὸ τί, ὅ ἐστι 
μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεὶ, ὀτάν τερ ἡ. ἐτὶ 
δὲ ἐν τούτῳ ὅσε ἔσται σαφέστερον ὁ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ 
ἀεὶ ποὺ δὲ τούτου τοῦ ὄνόματος τυγχάνειν, οπέρ νῦν λέγομεν ἢ 
οὐ; 'πάνυ γε,' 'ἀρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων, τούτῳ γὰρ ἐρωτῶ, ἡ 
καὶ ἀλλὸ τί, ὅ ἐστι μὲν οὐχ ὁπέρ τὸ περὶ τοῦ, ὁμως δὲ δει αὐτὸ 104 
μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὄνόματος καὶ τούτῳ καλεῖν ἀεὶ διὰ τὸ οὕτω 
πεφυκέναι ὡστε τοῦ περὶ τοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ 
αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶνον καὶ ἡ τριάς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει 
δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὄνόματι αἱ 
προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περὶ τοῦ, ὄντως οὐχ οὔπερ τῆς 
τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὁμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ 
πεμπτᾶ καὶ ἡ ήμισυ τοῦ ἀρίθμου ἀπας, ὡστε οὐκ ὃν ὁπέρ τὸ 
περὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἑκαστος αὐτῶν ἑστι περιττός· καὶ ὃ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ 
Β 
τέταρα καὶ ἄπας ὁ ἐτέρος αὖ στίχος τοῦ ἀρίθμου οὐκ ὃν ὁπέρ 
tὸ ἄρτιον ὁμος ἑκαστος αὐτῶν ἀρτιώς ἑστιν ἀεὶ· συνχωρεῖς 
ἡ οὐ; 'πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἐφη. ὁ τοῖνυ,' ἐφη, 'βούλομαι 
dhcploai, ἀθρει. ἐστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ 
ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὃντ' ἄλληλοι 
ἐναντία ἔχει αἱ τάναντια, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐοικε (δεχομένους ἐκείνην 
τὴν ἴδεαν, ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐσί ἐναντία ἡ;) ἀλλ' ἐπιούσῃς 
αὐτῆς ἦτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἡ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ 
C 
τρία καὶ ἀπολείπομεν πρότερον καὶ ἂλλο ὅτιον πείσεσθαι, πρὶν 
ὑπομείναι ἐτὶ τρία ὅντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι;' 'πάνυ μὲν οὖν,' ἐφη 
ὁ Κέβης. 'οὐδὲ μὴν,' ἡ δ' ὅσ, 'ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δώς τριάδι. 
'οὐ γὰρ οὖν.' οὐκ ἀρα μόνον τὰ εἶδο τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει 
ἐπιόντα ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἄπτα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει 
ἐπιόντα.' 'ἀληθεύσατα,' ἐφη, 'λέγεις.'

LIII. 'Βούλει οὖν, ἡ δ' ὅσ, 'ἐὰν οἴοι τ' ὄμεν, ὄρισόμεθα, 
ὀποῖα ταῦτα ἐστιν;' 'πάνυ γε.' 'ἀρ' οὖν,' ἐφη, 'ὁ Κέβης, D 
tόδε εἰς ἂν, ἢ ὃ τι ἂν κατάσχῃ, μή μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ 
ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἅχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ δὲ τινος;' 'πώς 
λέγεις;' 'δισπερ ἀρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἴσθα γὰρ δήπου, ὃτι ὃ ἂν ἡ
τών τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχετα, ἀνάγκη αὐτοίς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς. 'πάνυ γε.' ἔπει τὸ τοιούτον δή, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναντὶα ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἢ ἣν τούτῳ ἀπεργάζεται, οὐδέποτ' ἄν ἔλθωι.' οὐ γάρ.' 'εἰργάζετο δὲ γε ἦ περιττή;' 'ναί.' 'ἐναντὶα δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου;' 'ναί.' ἔπει τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἤζει.' οὐ δήτα.' 'ἀμοιρὰ δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία.' 'ἀμοιρὰ.' ἀμοιρῶς ἴππα ἡ τριάς.' 'ναί.' 'ὁ τόινυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποία οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, οἷον νῦν ἢ τριὰς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὕσα ἐναντία οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γάρ ἐναντίον ἄει αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἢ δυνᾶς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἀλλὰ πάμπολλα—ἀλλ’ ὅρα δή, εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὅ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ’ ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἐκι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέχασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμμηνήσκον· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἄκοινεν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέχεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον· τούτῳ μὲν οὐ καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ οὐκ ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ Β τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέχεται· οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τάλλα τὰ τοιαύτα, τὸ ἢμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὄλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὐ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα, εἰπέρ ἐπει τε καὶ συνδοκεὶ σοι οὕτως. 'πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ,' ἐφη, 'καὶ ἐπομαί.'

LIV. 'Πάλιν δὴ μοι,' ἐφη, 'ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μὴ μοι ὅ ἂν ἑρωτῶ ἀποκράνου, ἀλλὰ μμοὐμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὲ παρ’ ἢν τὸ πρῶτον ἐλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τήν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὄρων ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιο με, ὃ ἂν τί ἐν

C τῷ σώματι ἐγγέννηται, θερμὸν ἐσται, οὔ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρώ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ὃ τὸν θερμότητα, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ὃ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη, ὃ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγέννηται, νοσήσει, οὐκ ἔρω, ὃτι ὃ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἂν πυρετὸς· οὐδ’ ὃ ἂν ἄριστῳ τί ἐγγέννηται, περιττός ἐσται, οὐκ ἔρω, ὃ ἂν περιττότητα, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ’ ὅρα, εἰ ἡδὶ ἰκανὸς οὐσθ’ ὥς τοι βούλομαι. ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἰκανῶς, ἐφη.
'ἀποκρίνου δή,' ἦ δ' ὦς, 'ὄ ὄν τ' ἐγγένηται σώματι, ξῶν ἔσται;' 'ὅ ὄν ψυχή,' ἔφη. 'οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;' 'πῶς γὰρ D οὐχι;' ἦ δ' ὦς. 'ἡ ψυχή ἄρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτῇ κατάσχῃ, ἂεὶ ἢκεὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνου φέρουσα ξωῆν;' 'ἤκει μέντοι,' ἔφη. 'πότερον δ' ἐστι τι ξωῆν ἐναντίον ὃν οὐδέν;' 'ἔστιν,' ἔφη. 'τί;' 'θάνατος.' 'οὐκοῦν ψυχή τὸ ἐναντίον ὃ ἄυτῃ ἐπιφέρει ἂεὶ οὐ μὴ ποτὲ δέξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑμολόγηται;' 'καὶ μάλα σφόδρα,' ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

LV. 'Τι οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἄρτιον ἱδέαν τι νῦν δὴ ὄνομάξομεν; ἁνάρτιον,' ἔφη. 'τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται;' 'ἀμονοσον,' ἔφη. 'τὸ E δὲ ἄδικον.' 'εἰεν' δ' ὃ ὁ θάνατον μὴ δέχηται, τι καλοῦμεν;' 'ἀθάνατον,' ἔφη. 'οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχή οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;' 'οὐ;' 'ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχή.' 'ἀθάνατον,' 'εἰεν,' ἔφη. 'τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδείξατο φώμεν' ὃ τῶς δοκεῖ;' 'καὶ μάλα γε ἰκανῶς,' δ' Ἔσωκρατες.' 'τι οὖν;' ἦ δ' ὦς, 'ὁ Κέβης; εἰ τ' ἃναρτίῳ ἀναγκαίον ἦν ἀνωλέθρψ εἶναι, ἀλλο τι τα τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἦν ἢν;' 'πῶς γὰρ οὖ;' 'οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαίον ἦν ἀνωλέθρον εἶναι, ὅπτε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἑπαγάγω, ὑπεξέει ᾗν ἡ χιών οὕσα σώς καὶ άτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετο γε, οὐ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἀν τὴν θερμότητα.' 'ἀληθή,' ἔφη. 'λέγεις.' 'ὡσαυτός, οἶμαι, κἂν εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνωλέθρον ἦν, ὅπτε τ' ὁ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπήει, οὕπτον' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὖ' ἀπώλυτο, ἄλλα σῶν ἂν ἀπετέθην ζῷετο.' 'ἀνάγκη,' ἔφη. 'οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅδε,' ἔφη, 'ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἄθανάτου εἰπεῖν;' εἰ B μὲν τὸ ἄθανατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῆ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτῇ ὃ, ἀπόλλυσθαι. θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἂν τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὖ' ἔσται τεθηκυῖα, ὡσπερ τα τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἐφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὕδε γ' αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὕδε δὴ τ' ὁ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὕδε γε ἦ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότητι. ἄλλα τι κυλύει, φαίνει ἂν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γέγυναθαι ἐπίοντος τοῦ ἄρτιον, ὡσπερ ψυχρόν, ἄρτιον, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄντ' ἐκείνου C ἄρτιον γεγονέναι; τῷ ταύτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἐχομεν δια-
μάχεσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρον ἠστιν· ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὁμολογητὸ ήμῖν, ἔδοξας ἃν διεμαχόμεθα, ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία (ὑἱχετει ἀπιόντα) καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἃν διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὔ; 'πάνι μὲν οὖν.' 'οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἰναι,

D ψυχῇ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἰναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἢν δέοι λόγον.' 'ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δεί,' ἐφῄ, 'τούτον γε ἐνεκά· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορᾶν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον άδιον ὑν φθορᾶν δέξεται.'

LVI. 'Ὁ δὲ γε θεὸς, οἶμαι,' ἐφῄ ὁ Σωκράτης, 'καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἴδος καὶ εἰ τὶ ἄλλο ἀθάνατον ἠστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἀν ὁμολογηθεική μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι.' 'παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νη Δί,' ἐφῄ, 'ἀνθρώπων τὲ γε καὶ ἐτὶ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγὼμε, παρὰ Ε θεῶν.' 'ὅποτε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ἠστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχῇ ἢ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἃν εἴῃ;' 'πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ.' 'ἐπίοντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν τὸ μὲν θητῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σὼν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται ἀπιόν, ὅπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ.' 'φαίνεται.' 'παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα,' ἐφῄ, 'ὅ ἑδής, ψυχῇ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐσονταί ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαί ἂν Ἡ Λίδου.' 'οὐκουν ἔγωγε, ὁ Σώκρατες,' ἐφῄ, 'ἐξὼ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὖδε πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἄλλ' εἰ δὴ τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὗ ἔχει μὴ καταστησάται· ὡς οὐκ οἴδα εἰς οὕτων ταῖς ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοντα ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τε εἰπέν ἢ ἀκούσαί.' 'ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὡς ὁ Σιμμίας, ὅσον αὐτὸς ἔχω ὅτη ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὧτι μὲντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ δὲν οἱ λόγοι

107 Β ἐσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστεῖν ἄτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων.' 'οὐ μόνον γ,' ἐφῄ, 'ὁ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταὐτά τε εὗ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ἤμῖν εἰσιν, ὁμως ἐπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὸς ἴκανός διέλητε, ὃς
OH. LV.—LVII, pp. 106—108.

LVII. Ἅλλα τόδε γ', ἔφη, 'ὡς ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθήναι, οὕτως ἢ ἑπειδὴ ἄθανατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται υἱῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἁρμονίου τοῦτον μονον, ἐν δὲ καλοῦμεν τῇ ἔγη, ἄλλῃ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δῆ καὶ δοξεῖν ἅν δεῖν, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἄμελησει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἢν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἔρμαιν ἂν ἢν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἂμ; ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἄθανατος φαίνεται ōυδα, οὐδεμία ἢν εἴῃ αὐτῆς ἀλλή ἀποφυγή κακῶν ōυδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἀιδοῦ ἡ ψυχή ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὑφελείν ἡ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτῶς ἐν ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείστηκε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἀρα τελευτῆσαι ἐκαστον ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὥσπερ ἄνων ἑιλῆχιε, οὕτως ἁγεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον, οἱ δὲ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασμένους εἰς Ἀιδοῦ πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκεῖνον, ὃ δὴ προστετάκτα τοὺς ἐνθεόντε ἐκείστηκε πορεύεσθαι τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ δὲν δὲν τυχεῖν καὶ μειναντας ὡς ἀρη χρόνον ἀλλος δεύρο πάλιν ἡγεμών κομίζει εἰς τολλαίρ χρόνον καὶ μακραί περιόδους. ἐστὶ δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τῆλεφος λέγει ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπληθν ἥν ὁμοίω ὕψην εἰς Ἀιδοῦ φήρειν, ἡ δ' οὔτε ἀπληθν οὕτε μία φαίνεται μοι εἰναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν ἡγεμών ἐδει οὐ γὰρ τοῦ τις ἀν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσ, μίας ὡδοῦ οὐσῆς. νῦν δὲ έοικε σχίσεις τε καὶ περιόδους πολλαίς ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄσων τας καὶ νομίων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω. ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχή ἐπεται τε καὶ ὁμοῖον ἀναγοντα τὰ παρόντα. ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμητικος τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅτερ ἐν τῷ ἑμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτομημένη καὶ περὶ τῶν ὀρατῶν τόπον, πολλα ἀντιτείνοσα καὶ πολλα παθοῦσα, βίᾳ καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἶχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικο—
μένην δὲ ὃθισπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιηκυών τοιούτοιν, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμιμένην ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα τοιαύτα εἰργασμένην, αἱ τοιῶν ἄδελφά τε καὶ ἄδελφον ψυχῶν ἔργα τυχόναι ὁντα, ταύτην μὲν ἀπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε ἐξελθόντων οὔτε ἡγεμών ἐθέλει γιγνεσθαι, αὕτη δὲ πλανάται ἐν

U τάσις ἐχομένη ἀπορία, ἐώς ἀν δὴ τίνες χρόνοι γένωνται, δὲν ἐξελθόντων ὡς ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρέπονταν οἴκησιν: ἢ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξέλθοντα, καὶ ἐξελθόντων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχόντα, ἡμικνηθέν τὸν αὐτὴν ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰςδὲ πολλοὶ καὶ ἕλμαστοι τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὕτη οὔτε οἷα οὔτε οὐθέ δοξάσται ὡπ' ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰσβότον λέγειν, ὥς ἑγὼ ὑπὸ τίνος πεπεσμαί.

D LVIII. Καὶ ὁ Συμμίας: „τῶς ταῦτα,‟ ἐφη, „λέγεις, ὥς Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοῦ γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἢ σε πείθει· ἢδεις οὖν ἢν ἄν ἀκούσαμι,‟ „ἂλλα μέντοι, ὁ Συμμία, οὐχ ἢ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἢ γ' ἐστὶν· ὡς μέντοι ἄληθῆ, χαλεπῶτερον μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἄμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἑώς οὖν ὅν ἢν ὑπὸ τε εἶπα, ἀμα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἦπτυστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ἡ ἐμός, ὁ Συμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ. τὴν μέντοι

Ε ἴδεαν τῆς γῆς, οἰάν πεπεσμαί εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὔδέν με κωλύει λέγειν, „ἄλλα‟, ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας, „καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ‟ „πεπεσμαί τοίνυν,‟ ἢ δ' ὅσ, „ἐγώ, ὡς πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ ἐστὶν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ νευρήματι περίφρασις οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῆ δεῖν μήτε

109 ἀἐρος πρὸς τὸ μή πεσεῖν μὴτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμίας τοιαύτης, ἄλλα ἰκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ νευρήματι αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντη καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν· ἵσορροπον γὰρ πράγμα ὁμοίων τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθεῖν οὖν ἐξει μᾶλλον οὔθ ἢττον οὐδαμῶς κλειθήσει, ὁμοίως δ' ἐχὼν ἀκλίνες μενεὶ. πρῶτον μὲν, ἢ δ' ὅσ, „τούτο πεπεσμαί,‟ „καὶ ὃθόδως γε,‟ ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας. „ἔτι τοίνυν,‟ ἐφη, „πάμμεγα τι εἶναι αὐτὸ, καὶ ἡμῶς

Β οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους περὶ τὴν
καὶ ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς θαλασσῖς ἄφθινης, ἐκείνης ὁπώς δὲ ἢ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ὅπως ἦτο ἡ αἰσθησια πάντως οἰκονύμησις, καὶ ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς θαλασσῖς ἄφθινης.
Β πλέον φανείη διαφέρειν. εἰ γάρ δεί καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν, ἀξίων ἀκούσαι, δὴ Συμμία, ὥσα τυγχάνει τά ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. ' ἀλλὰ μήν, ἐφή οὐκ Συμμίας, 'δ' Σόκρατες, ἥμεις γε τούτῳ τοῦ μῦثου ἴδεως ἀν ἀκούσαμεν."

"LIX. 'Δέγεται τοίνυν,' ἐφη, 'δ' ἐταίρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτή ἰδεῖν, εἰ τις ἀνωθὲν θεῷτο, ὀσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυντοι σφαίραι, ποικίλη, χρωμασιν διειλημμένη, δὲν καὶ τά C ἑνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὀσπερ δείγματα, οἷς ἡ οἱ γραφεῖσ καταχρώνται. ἕκει δὲ πᾶσαν τήν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἐκ τούτων τῆν μὲν γάρ ἀλουργὴ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τό κάλλος, τήν δὲ χρυσοειδὴ, τήν δὲ ὤσθε λευκή γύψου ἡ χύνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνως καὶ καλλιάνων ἡ ὄσα ἥμεις ἑωράκαμεν. καὶ γάρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοίλα αὐτῆς, ὑδάτος τε καὶ ἄερος ἐκπλεο ὄντα, χρώματος τι εἴδος D παρέχεσθαι στήλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλία, ὡςτε ἐν τι αὐτῆς εἴδος συνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταῦτῃ οὐσῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τά φύσεμα φύσεθαι, δεύδρα τε καὶ ἄνηθ καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς καὶ αὐτὶ τὸ ὅμο ὡςαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τήν τε λειώτητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω. δὲν καὶ τά ἑνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδια τε καὶ ἰάσπιδος καὶ Ε συμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα· ἕκει δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ τοιούτων εἶναι καὶ ἔτὶ τούτων καλλίω. τό δ' αἰτίον τούτον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεθησαμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὦσπερ οἱ ἑνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεύρο ξυνεργηκότων, ἀ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄφοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αὐχεῖ τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τήν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμήσθαι τούτους τε ἀπασί καὶ ἐτὶ χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ 111 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὖ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῇ γάρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὅντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὡστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. ζεύς δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαί
vikouintas, tois de peri tivn aeran, woste peri meis peri tin thanat-
tan, tois de en nheous as peripreian tivn aeran prds tiv sepeir-
ousa. kai eni lorgan, oster hmin to wodor te kai h thanattta esti
prds tin hmeten chelan, touto keei tivn aeran, o de hmin aph, B
ekanwos tivn aithera. tas de wpras aughtis krasin echein toiauthin,
oste kekionous anousous einai kai xronon te zhein polu plevw twn
envade, kai zheia kai akoj kai frounthesi kai pasi tois toionous
hmin ofestanai tiv aughti apostastai, upter aph te idatos
ofestiken kai aithher aeros prds katharotita. kai de kai thewn
alos te te ierwa aughtois einai, en ois tiv ointi oikhtas theous
einai, kai phma te te kai manties kai aisthisses twn thewn kai
toiauthas sivnoniais gynesthai aughtois prds aughtous kai tivn
glew kai selhyn kai astera drasthai up aughton oia tyn-
chane ontan, kai tin allhn evdamoniain toin akoloutho
einai.

LX. 'Kai dleun men de tivn ghn ouw pefukena kai ta peri
tivn ghn' toitous de en aughtei einai katata ta egkoula aughtis kiklyw
peri dlen polloos, tois meu bavnterous kai anapetamewn
malloin en AX hmeis oikoumen, tois de bavnterous ontas tiv
xasma aughtous elattov echein tou par hmin topos, esti de ois
kai bavnterous tov batei tiv envade einai kai plautnterous:
toustous de pantas upo ghn eis allhlos sivneterosbai te
pallachyi kai katata stenoptera kai euruptera, kai diezodous echein,
xei polu men wodor reis ez allhlos eis allhlos wostper eis kra-
tiras, kai aevwnos potamou amhaxana megethi upo tivn ghn kai
thermou oidatov kai psykrow, polu de puro kai pyros megaloos
potamous, polloos de yrgos thelou kai katharotero kai
boorborodoterou, wostper en Sikelia ois pro tivn mukakos thelou
reontes potamoi kai aughtos o yuaxe. den de kai ekastous touis
toustous plhrousthai, ws an ekastois tych ekastote h periprop
ghnomene. tota de pantan kinein anw kai katw wostper aiwaran
tiva enousan en tiv ghn esti de ara aughti h aiwra dia phsion
tiainde tiva. en tiv tous xhsmatos tin ghn allws te megistou

CH. LVIII.—LX., pp. 110, 111.
Τυγχάνει δὲ καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δ' ὄλης τῆς γῆς, τούτο ὁπερ' Ὀμήρος εἶπεν, λέγων αὐτό

τὴλε μάλ' ἢ χιλιβάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἐστὶ βέρεθρον'.

οὶ καὶ ἀλλοθι καὶ ἐκείνος καὶ ἀλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τούτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσιν τε πάντες οἱ ποιητοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν· γίγνονται δὲ ἐκαστοὶ τοιοῦτοι, δι' οίας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέσων, ἢ δὲ αἰτία

Β ἔστιν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ἱεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὕγρον τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἄγρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταύτων ποιεῖ· ἤνεπται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἔπι νάνα, καὶ ὡσπέρ τῶν ἀναπεσόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεύει τε καὶ ἀναπνεύει ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεὶ ἄναυρωφυμένον τῷ ὕγρῳ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινοῦς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσίν καὶ ἔξιόν. ὅταν τε

C οὐν ὀρμήσαν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἱεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροὶ αὐτὰ ὦσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὑτ' ἐκείθεν μὲν ἀπολύτη, δεύορ δὲ ὀρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροὶ αὕθες, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα μεθὶ διὰ τῶν ὄχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἐκαστα ἀφικνούμενα, εἰς οὕς ἐκάστους ὁδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐν

D τεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλεῖοι, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττως καὶ βραχυτέρως, πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἐπηντλεύτῳ, τὰ δὲ ὀλέγων· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροής. καὶ ἔνια μὲν καταντικρυ ἢ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέστεν, ἐνία δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἢ ἐστὶ δὲ ὁ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἀπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὠσπέρ οἱ ὁφεῖς, εἰς τὸ δυνατόν κάτω καθένα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν

Ε δὲ ἐστιν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθίεναι, πέρα δ' οὐ' ἀναντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς ἱεῦμας τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.
LXI. 'Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ρεύματα ἐστὶ· τυγχάνει δ’ ἁρα ὅντα ἐν τούτωι τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ’ ἀττα ρεύματα, διὸ τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξουσιώτερον περὶ κύκλῳ ὁ καλοῦμενος Ὀκεανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ρέων 'Αχέρων, ὃς δ’ ἐρήμων το τόπων ὑπὲρ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, οὐ αἳ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαί, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκτείνονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις. τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπιπτεῖ εἰς τὸν μέγαν πυρὸς πολλῷ καὶ ὁμοίουν, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζων τῆς παρ’ ἡμῖν θαλάσσης, ἕφυσαν άδατοι καὶ πηλοὶ· ἐνετείθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιπτόμενος δὲ τῇ γῇ ἀλλοσε τῇ Ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ’ ἐσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιαδὸς λίμνης, οὐ συμμιγνύμενος τῷ ὑδατι· περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου· οὗτος δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπονομάζουσι Πυρφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύκακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσώσων ὅτι ἄν τόξωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δὲ αὖ καταντικρὺ δ’ τέταρτος ἐκπιπτεῖ εἰς τὸν πρῶτον δεινὸν τε καὶ ἀγριον, ὃς λέγεται, χρώμα δ’ ἔχοντα ὅλον οἶδον ὃς κυνάς, ὃν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην, ἢν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγια· ὃ δ’ ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβῶν ἐν τῷ άδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιπτόμενοι χωρεῖ ἐναντίῳ τῷ Πυρφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνη ἣν ἐναντίας· καὶ οὖδὲ τὸ τούτου άδωρ οὐδεὶς μιγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυρφλεγέθοντι· ὥνομαι δὲ τούτῳ ἐστὶν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

LXII. 'Τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἳ ὁ δαίμων ἐκαστὸν κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεικάσαντο οἳ τε καλῶς καὶ δόγμας βιωσάντες καὶ οἳ μή. καὶ οἳ μὲν ἄν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ΡΗΑΕΔ.
66 PLATO, PHÆDO.

... ηδικήσαν, ηδικήσαν, 

... τήν λήμνην, καὶ εκεῖ οἶκουσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκαι ἀπολύονται, εἰ...
CH. LXII.—LXIV., pp. 113—115.

ωστε ἀρετής καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.

LXIII. Ὅ τι μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα δισχυρώσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὃς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἑχοντὶ ἄνδρι· οτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν ἢ τοιαύτ' ἀττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατον γε ἢ ψυχή φαίνεται οὕσα, τούτῳ καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος· καὶ χρῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσπερ ἐπάθειν ἐαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγραψε καὶ πάλαι μηκένω τὸν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἑνεκα θαρρεῖν χρῆ περὶ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῆ ἀνδρα, οὕτως ἐν τῷ βίῳ τᾶς μὲν ἄλλας ἠδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἰσελεκαίρειν, ὃς ἀλλοτρίων τε ὄντας, καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὸς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασε τε καὶ κοσμῆσαι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαίουσιν καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἔλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περιμένει τὴν εἰς "Αἰδοὺ πορείαν, ὅς πορευσόμενος ὄταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῇ. ὡμεῖς μὲν οὖν," ἐφη, ὣς Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαύθης ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἐκαστοὶ πορεύσασθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἡδῆ καλεῖ, φαίνει ἀν ἄνηρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδὸν τί μοι ὦρα τραπέζασθαι πρὸς τὸ λυτρὸν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λοιμάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν νεκρὸν λοιμεῖν.

LXIV. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων· ἐξεν, ἐφη, ὣς Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτωι ή ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ή περὶ τῶν πάλιν ή περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅτι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν; ἂπερ ἂει λέγω, ἐφη, ὣς Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καῖνότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὡμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἀττ' ἂν ποιήτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὑμολογήσῃτε· ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε καὶ μὴ θέλητε ὡσπερ κατ' ἰχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρῶν ἕνν, οὐδὲ ἔαν πολλὰ ὑμολογήσῃτε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε· ταῦτα μὲν τοῖνυν προβυμηθησόμεθα· ἐφη, ὡς ὄτως ποιεῖν· πάσης ἐν σε 6'—2.
τίνα τρόπον; ' ὅπως ἂν, ἥφη, 'Βούλιησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητε με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς.' γελάσας δὲ ἀμα ῥυσχῆ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλήψας εἶπεν· ' οὔ πείθω, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς, Κρίτωνα, ὦς ἐγὼ εἴμι οὗτος Σωκράτης, δι νυν διαλεγόμενος καὶ διαστάτων ἐκαστὸν τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἴεται με ἐκείνων εἰναι, ὅν οὕτει διλύγον

D ύστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἔρωτᾶ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτη. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν πῦ τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχήσομαι ἀπὶν εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινας εὐδαίμονίας, ταῦτα μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἀλλὰς λέγεν, παραμυθούμενοι ἀμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἀμα δ' ἐμαντὸν. ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα,' ἥφη, 'τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἢν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυάτο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, Ἐ ἀλλ' οἰχήσεσθαι ἀπίοντα, ἕνα Κρίτων ράον φέρη, καὶ μὴ ὅρων μον τὸ σῶμα ἢ καιόμενον ἢ κατορνττόμενον ἁγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύπτει. εὐ γὰρ ὦθει,' ἢ δ' ὡς, 'δ' ἀριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγεν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλ' καὶ κακῶν τι ἐμποεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλ' ὀθρεῖν τε χρῆ καὶ φάναι τοῦτο σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν

116 οὕτως, ὅπως ἄν σοι φίλον ἃ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῇ νόμμου εἰναι.'

LXV. Ταὐτ' εἰπὼν ἐκείνοις μὲν ἀνώστατο εἰς οἰκημα τι δος λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευνε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένοι καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὐτὶ τῇς ξυμφόρας διεξιόντες, ὡσ ἡμῖν γεγονοῦσα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶν ἡγούμενοι ὡσπερ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάζεως ὄρφανοι τὸν ἐπειτα βίον. ἐπειδῆ δὲ ἐλούστατο

Β καὶ ἤνεχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱες σμικρὸι ἦσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ οἰκείαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο, ἐκεῖναις ἑναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεκθεῖσα τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἀττα ἐβούλετο, τὸς μὲν γυναίκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπίεναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἢν ἡδη ἐγγὺς ἥλιον δυσμῶν χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἐνδον. ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ
οὐ πολλὰ μετὰ ταῦτα διελέξθη, καὶ ἤκεν ὁ τῶν ἐνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ ὅτας παρ’ αὐτὸν· ‘ὡς Ὁσκρατεῖ, ἐφη, ‘οὐ καταγνώσομαι σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνόσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνονυ καὶ καταρωνται, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκάζοντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἔγω καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναίοτατον καὶ προσότατον καὶ ἀριστόταν ἀνδρά ὅντα τῶν πῶς τοῦ δεύρο ἀφικορέων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὐ οἶδ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔμοι χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνοι. νῦν, οὕθεν γὰρ ἡ ἥλθον ἀγγέλλων, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ὅμοι τῷ φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαία.’ καὶ ἀμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆλ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν· ‘καὶ σὺ,’ ἐφη, ‘χαίρε, καὶ ἥμεις ταῦτα ποιήσομεν.’ καὶ ἀμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ‘ὡς ἀστεῖος,’ ἐφη, ‘ὁ ἀνθρωπός· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῆκε καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίστε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λύστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίος με ἀποκαρύστηκα, ἀλλ’ ἄγε δή, ὁ Κρῖτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἀνθρωπός.’ καὶ ὁ Κρῖτων· ἀλλ’ οἰμαί,’ ἐφη, ἐγώγε, ὁ Σωκρατεῖ, ἔτι ἡλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρέσι καὶ οὐπο δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἀμα ἔγω οἰδα καὶ ἄλλος πάνυ ὑπε πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντας τε καὶ πιόντας εὐ μάλα, καὶ ἐγγεγενμένος γ’ ἐνίος ὅν ἄν τούχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγον· ἐτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· ‘εἰκότως γε,’ ἐφη, ὁ Κρῖτων, ἐκεῖνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὕς ὑπε λέγεις, οὖντα γὰρ κερδάιεις ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἐγὼ γε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποίησω· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδάιεις ὀλίγον ὡστερον πιὸν ἄλλο εἰς ἡ γέλωτα ὁφλήσειν παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ, γλυκόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδένος ἐτι ἐνότος. ἀλλ’ ἵθι, ἐφη, ‘πιθοῦ καὶ μή ἄλλως ποιεῖ.’

LXVI. Καὶ ὁ Κρῖτων ἀκούσας ἐνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἐστώτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίβας ἦκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα διδόναι τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικε χέρουν τετριμμένοι· ἱδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν· ‘εἰεν,’ ἐφη, ὁ Βέλτιστος, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρῆ ποιεῖν; ‘οὐδὲν
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ΠΛΑΤΟ, ΦΗΔΕΩ.

«Άλλο, εφη, ὅτι πιόντα περιέναι, ἐώς ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς
Β σκέλεσι γένηται, ἐπείτα κατακεύσθαι· καὶ οὕτως αὐτῷ ποιήσει.»
καὶ ἀμα ὧρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει· καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ
μᾶλα ἑλεως, ὃς Ἐχέκρατε, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὔδε διαφθείρας οὔτε
τοῦ χρόματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλὰ, ὡσπερ εἰῶθει, ταυ-
ρηθὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον· 'τί λέγεις, εφη, 'περὶ
tοῦδε τοῦ πῶματος πρὸς τὸ ἁπασπείσαι τιν.; έξεστιν ἥ
οὐ;' 'τοσοῦτον;' εφη, 'ὅς Σωκράτες, τρίβομεν, ὅσον οἰόμεθα
μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. 'μανθάνω,' ἧ δ' ὅς· 'ἄλλῳ εὐχεσθαι γέ
C ποῦ τοῖς θεοῖς έξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐσθένδε
ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχὴ γενέσθαι· ὃ δ' ἦ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο
ταύτη.· καὶ ἄμ. εἰπὼν ταύτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερός
καὶ εὐκόλως εξέστιν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς
οἷό τε ἢσαν κατέχειν τὸ μή δακρύειν, ὡς δὲ εἰδομεν πίνοντα τε
καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἄλλη ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτῷ ἀστακτὲ
ἐχάρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὡστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλειων ἐμαυτόν· οὐ
D γὰρ δ' ἐκείνον γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἷον ἄνδρος ἐταῖρου
ἐστερημένοις εἶπη. ὃ δ' Κρήτων ἐτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ
οῖς τ' ἢν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη. Ἄπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ
ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὔδὲν ἐπαινετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε
ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὔδένα ὅτι συν αὐτὲ-
κλασε τῶν παρόντων πλὴν γε αὐτῷ Σωκράτους. ἐκείνος δὲ,
'οία,' ἐφη, 'ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἦκιστα τοὐτὸ
ἐνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἦνα µή τοιαῦτα πλημμελοεύι· καὶ
E γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρή τελευτάν. ἀλλ' ἠσυχίαν τε
ἀγέτε καὶ καρπηρετέ.· καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἱσχύνθημεν τε καὶ
ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύων. ὃ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι
ἐφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίθη υπτίους· οὔτω γὰρ ἐκέλευν ὁ ἀν-
θρώπος· καὶ ἁμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δὸς τὸ φάρμακον,
dιαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κάπετα
σφόδρα πίεσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἱρέτο, εἰ αὐθάναυτο· ὃ δ' οὖκ
118 ἐφη· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐθεὶς τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανεῖν οὕτως ἦμῖν
ἐπέδεικνυτο, ὃτι ψύχοιτα τε καὶ πηγνύτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἦπτετο καὶ
εἶπεν, οὗτος ἔπειτα πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχύσεται. ἦν οὐν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἴν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἅτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενοι· ἔνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ—εἶπεν, δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξετο· ὁ Κρίτων, ἐφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσοιτε. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἐφη, ἂνταῖ, ὁ Κρίτων· ἁλλὰ ὅρα, εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρωμένον αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἦτο ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλὰ ὄλγον χρόνον διαλιπότον ἐκνήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὁ σὰ τὰ ὀμματα ἐστηθεν· ἱδών δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνελαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμόν.

LXVII. Ὅδε ἡ τελευτή, ὁ Ἐχέκρατε, τοῦ ἔταξεν ημᾶς ἐγένετο, ἄνδρος, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε δὲν ἐπειρᾶθημεν ἄριστον καὶ ἄλλος φρονιμωτάτον καὶ δικαιοτάτον.
NOTES.

Note.—G. refers to Goodwin's School Greek Grammar (Macmillan, 3s. 6d.). The sectional numbering is the same in G.G., i.e., Goodwin's larger Greek Grammar (6s., same publisher), in which the advanced student will find fuller explanations and more copious illustrations. A table of the more difficult verb-forms will be found in an Appendix.

M.A.P. refers to Professor Joseph Mayor's Sketch of Ancient Philosophy from Thales to Cicero, whose earlier pages give a readable general survey of Greek thought down to the time of Plato, and thus supplement what is said thereof in the Introduction with particular reference to its bearing on the Phaedo. For Plato himself, see the Introduction: the most useful part of Professor Mayor's account of him is contained in pp. 75-83 of his Sketch. Further information, both as regards earlier thinkers and as regards the characters in the Dialogue, will be found in the Index of Proper Names at the end of the volume. For the benefit of those interested in other branches of the subject-matter, a few references have also been made to such standard text-books as Mill's Logic and Sully's Outlines of Psychology.

I. 57A. āvτος: "in person." Can you tell us as an eye-witness, or only from hearsay?

τὸ φάρμακον: i.e., hemlock (κάνειον), by drinking which criminals were put to death at Athens. For the manner of taking it, see Chap. LXVI.; for the circumstance under which Socrates was condemned to drink it, see Index s.v. and Introduction, § 3.

τὰ...ἐπτα: for the change from singular to plural, which is by no means rare in Greek, cf. Soph. Antigone, 707-10, where στίς is taken up by οὗτοι.

ἡδέως ἂν ἄκοψαμι: "I would gladly hear." For the optative with ἂν, see G. § 226, 2. It is simply a conditional sentence, with the protasis suppressed, sometimes called potential.

τὸν πολιτῶν Φιλιστῶν: this position of the adjective is quite usual with national names.

ἐπιχωριάζει...Ἀθηναῖε: "is staying at Athens." The termination -αί expresses motion to, and its use here with a verb of rest is known as the Pregnant Construction. . . . It has been thought that the cause of this absence of intercourse was the Corinthian War, b.c. 394-387; see Introduction, § 3 (2).

χρόνον συχνοῦ: "for a long time." A genitive expressing time within which; one of the varieties of the partitive genitive, G. § 179.

PHAEDE.
§ 57B. ἀποθάνοι: the regular optative in Oratio Obliqua after a past ense; see G. § 242 (b).

φράζειν: "to tell"; distinguish from φράζεσθαι, "to think of," "to ponder."

§ 58A. τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης: a full account of which is given in the Apologia; see too Index, s.v. Socrates.

Note that the subject of the relative clause is put as the object of principal clause. This is one of the commonest types of Attraction in Greek; cp. also G. § 154.

καὶ ἑθανάμαζομέν γε: "yes, and we were astonished." καὶ supplements, γε corrects; cf. 58D below, καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

πολλὸν ὑπέρτερον: dative of manner, expressing limit; cf. G. § 188, 2. The interval was, as we learn from Xenophon, thirty days.

φάινεται ἀποθανόν expresses an actual fact, whereas the infinitive would have expressed a hypothesis. The first means "he obviously died" (or, as we should put it, impersonally, "it is obvious that he died"); the second, "he seemingly died"; cp. G. § 279, 1, Note 1.

πρύμνα: short for πρωμῆ ναῦς, the hindmost part of a ship, the "stern" or "poop" (Latin puppis), in contrast to πρῶπα, the "prow" (Latin prora).

ἐστεμμένη: note the participle with ἐτυχεῖν, where we use infinitive; cp. G. § 279, 4. Such wreaths conferred the protection of the gods; in this case they would be of laurel, in honour of Apollo.

Δῆλον: the central island round which the Cyclades cluster. Partly because of its position, partly because of its sacred character, it was chosen as the headquarters of the Confederacy against the Persians, formed in b.c. 475.

τοῦς δὲ ἔπτα: "the seven youths and seven maidens of the story." The story was that, to avenge the death of his son Androgeos in slaying the bull of Marathon for Aegaeus, King Minos of Crete laid siege to Athens and compelled the city to accept his terms. These were that a human tribute should be sent every nine years to be devoured by a pet monster of Minos, called the Minotaur. On the third occasion Theseus, son to Aegaeus, volunteered to go: with the help of Ariadne, Minos' daughter, he slew the monster, and thus freed his city from the tribute. The ship in which he made the voyage was patched up and sent to Delos annually to commemorate the deliverance.

§ 58B. εἰ σωθείειν . . . ἀπάξειν would be in direct speech ἔαυ σωθῶμεν . . . ἀπάξιομεν, but the subjunctive is changed to the optative after an historical tense and the ἔαυ disappears; see G. § 243.
θεωρίαν: “mission,” the sending of official representatives (θεωροι) to be present at (to witness) a religious ceremony.

καθαρεύειν: “to be kept pure.” Verbs in -αω, -εω, -ευω, -ωσιω signify to be or to have what the thing signifies. Apollo abhorred the sight of death, and on his island of Delos no one was allowed to die: Thucydides (iii. 104) tells how, in 426 B.C., the bodies of all who had been buried there were exhumed and carried across to Rhenea. The old Ionic Festival was renewed at the same time.

πριν ἄν... ἀφίκηται: πριν and temporal particles, with ἄν and aor. subj. (= Lat. fut. perf. with præsquam, &c.) may often be translated into English “have.”

N.B.—πριν seldom takes an infinitive after a negative notion; see G. § 274.

ἀπολαβόντες: “detaining”; in this sense of being “caught” by the winds, it is more usual in the passive. αὐτούς: “the crews.”

II. 58C. ἐπιτηδείων: fit to associate with, and so, “friends,” “relations.”

οἱ ἀρχοντες = οἱ ἐνδεκα: the Athenian Bureau of Police and Prisons, answering to the Tres viri capitales at Rome. They consisted of ten, one from each tribe, and a γραμματεύς.

ζημιος... φιλων: a genitive of ablation, “bereft of friends.”

G. § 174.

58D. ἀσχολία: the usual word for having no time on one’s hands; “being engaged,” or “busy.”

ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε: “well, I am at leisure and,” the γε throwing more emphasis on σχολάζω.

αὐτὸν λέγοντα... ἀκούοντα: agree with the subject of μεμνησθαι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν: “well, for that matter.” μὴν is a strong asseverative particle: “I can assure you, you have more of the selfsame disposition to listen to you.”

πειράω: both πειράω and πειράματι are used for “I endeavour,” but the latter is more common, as here, in Attic prose.

διεξελθεῖν expresses a bare narration, whilst διηγήσασθαι suggests something like an explanation. Translate respectively, “narrate” and “describe.”

58E. με ἔλεος εἰσῆλθε: notice the accusative and contr. οὐδέν μοι ἐλεεινὼν εἰσῆλθε in 59A. ἀνήρ = ὁ ἀνήρ.

τρόπον... λόγων: causal genitives, to which the ὡς clause is in apposition.

παρίστασθαι: “it seems,” “it appears”; impersonal. The idea is that of an image coming across one’s mind.
59A. ὃς εἰκὸς . . . παρόντι πένθει: "as would seem likely when I was present at such an affliction." παρόντι may go either with εἰκὸς, μου being understood; or it may be taken with πένθει, "in a present sorrow."

τοιούτων τινες: "of some such nature," τινες giving an indefinite idea.

ἀπεχνώς: "simply," "absolutely," "downright" (Latin plane), a favorite word of Plato's. Its derivation suggests a comparison to our phrase, "without any humbug." Distinguish it from ἀπεχνής, "unskilfully." The former is from ἀπεχνώς, the latter from ἀπεχνός.

διεκείμεθα: "were so disposed." ὲτε μὲν . . . ἐνίοτε δέ: "sometimes . . . at other times."

'Απολλόδωρος: see Index. His facility of tears is again mentioned in Chap. xlvi.

59B. τον: "I imagine," "I suppose."

Πῶς γὰρ σὺ; "Of course I do"; lit., "yes, for how could I not (do so)?"

Κριτόβουλος: for this and all the succeeding names of persons see Index.

ἡσθένει: "was ill." Plato desired to explain his absence, as he evidently means to reproach Aristippus below for not attending.

59C. Ξένοι: those who were not Athenians (ἐπιχώριοι).

Μεγαρόδεν: the termination implying motion from; G. § 61. The most important names in this passage are Antisthenes, Aristippus, Euclid, and Plato. For these, see Index and M.A.P. pp. 35–83.

III. 59D. πλησίον . . . τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου: both were near the Agora, which itself lay just to the N.W. of the Acropolis.

καλ ἡ δίκη: καλ in the middle of a sentence often emphasises the word that follows and is often equal to our "actually."

ἐως ἀνοιξθεῖ: frequentative optative, as also two lines lower; G. § 233, and G.G. § 239, 2.

διατρίβοντες: "chatting"; the ordinary Athenian manner of wearing away, or spending, time (Acts xvii. 21).

ἀνεφγέτω: another form is ἤνοιγέτω, but ἀνεφγνυτο is more usual than either.

πρῶ, or πρώ, = "early in the morning." Distinguish from πρῶν, (1) lately; (2) the day before yesterday.

τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν: "we used to spend the most of the day."

καλ δὴ καὶ introduces something which is really too natural to need mentioning; "and, of course."
59E. ἐσπέρας: genitive of time (partitive); see G. § 179.

ἀφιμένον εἴη: optative in indirect narration; G. § 242 (b).

ὑπακούειν: “answer the door.” Other subsidiary meanings, flowing from the primary sense of listening to, are (1) to hear (of a judge), (2) to obey or submit, and (3) to succeed (answer to one’s expectations).

περιμένειν: “to wait”; the other reading ἐπιμένειν would mean “to stay on” (ἐπὶ).

ἐσο ἄν ... κελεύη: ἐσο ἄν here = “until,” = Latin future perfect; in 85A it = “as long as.” In the former sense it is rarely, in the latter never, used without ἄν, when it takes the subjunctive; the particle serves to emphasise the uncertainty of the future implied in ἐσο. G. § 239, 2. πρὶν ἄν would be more usual here after μή πρότερον.

παραγγέλουσιν ὅπως ἄν ... τελευτήσῃ: the object of παραγγέλλων may be either (1) Socrates, or (2) the attendant. In the former case translate, “announce to him that he is to die to-day”; in (2), “give directions as to his execution.” The second gives a better sense to ὅπως ἄν; see G. § 216, 244.

ἐπισχῶν: “waiting.”

60A. κατέλαμβάνονε: “found,” “came across.” Σωκράτη: Geddes notes that Xenophon uses the other form of the accus. in -ην.

Σανθίπτην: see Index.

τὸ παιδίον: S.’s youngest son was named Menexenus; Lamprocles was the name of his other son.

ἀνευμήσῃ: “cried out”; an euphemism.

οἷα δῆ: the δῆ here, as in ὄστατον δῆ below, implies that the person addressed knows all about it. In the first case it is equivalent to the modern “don’t you know”; in the second to “And so, Socrates,” &c.

τυνε τὸν τοῦ Κ.: some of Crito’s attendants, he being a rich man; see Index.

60B. κοπτομένην: “beating her breast.”

ἡδον ... λυπηρόν: Plato’s theories about pleasure turned mainly on this conception of it as a state of transition (γένεσις) from one state to another. It was unstable, unreal, phenomenal, and thus could not give one a standard of life. Introduction, § 2.

ὁς θαυμασίως ... λυπηρόν: “in what a marvellous relation does it stand to that which seems to be its opposite—pain.”

tο ἁμα goes with both infinitives ἔθελεν and ἄναγκάζεσθαι. The dat. infin. gives the cause or reason, and is best translated into English by “since” or “because” with a finite clause. The μὲν is balanced by εάν δὲ τίς.

ἔθελεν παραγγέλλεσθαι: in such phrases ἔθελεν simply gives a general rule, while βούλεσθαι expresses almost deliberate tendency or aim.
σχεδόν τι: “all but,” modifying ἀναγκάζεσθαι.

εκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημένον: “sprung united from one head”; twin yet twain, as Geddes happily says.

60C. Αἰσωπός: see Index. μέθον ἄν συνθεῖναι: “would have composed”: this would have been in direct speech μέθον ἄν συνέθηκε. For ἄν with the infinitive and participle, see G. § 211.

διαλλάξασ πολεμώντα: “to reconcile them when at variance.”

αὐτός: the dative of reference, almost equals the genitive here.

φ ἄν: ἄν is used with indefinite and relative pronouns and subjunctive in general suppositions after a present tense; see G. § 233.

IV. ὑπολαβών: “taking him up,” “interrupting.” νὴ τὸν Δία: note that νὴ is generally used in strong affirmatives only, μᾶ in both assertions and denials. L. and S. say that the former was much used by women, and that the name of the god was often suppressed with the latter. μᾶ τὸν, like our “by —!”

60D. ἄν πεποίηκας: this attraction of the relative into the case of its antecedent (Attic Attraction) is very common in Greek, especially when the relative would ordinarily be in the accusative, as here; see G. §§ 153, 154. The two other forms of attraction in which the relative is concerned are less frequent: (1) inverse attraction, e.g.—

τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον ἄν πάλαι
ζητεῖς ἀπειλῶν, οὕτως ἔστω ἔνθαδε (Soph., Oed. Tyr.);

and (2) the attraction of the relative to the principal clause, e.g., ἢν οὐκ οἴδα εἰ μένει (Dem., De Corona).

ἐνεῖνας: the word used for “putting into verse,” or “setting to music.” The former seems more likely here. The word is also used of putting thought into words.

προοίμιον: “prelude” to a hymn or epic, usually, as here, in honour of Apollo.

Εὔηνος: see Index.

ὁ τί ποτε διανοηθάς ... ἐποίησας: “with what intention you composed them.”

εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει ... ἀποκρίνασθαι: “if you care for me to be able to give an answer to E.”; lit., “have (wherewith) to answer.” μέλει is used either (1) impersonally, as here, taking its object in the genitive; or (2) personally, with its object in the nominative. Cf. σοι χρῆ τάδε μέλειν (II. v. 490). In both cases it takes the dative of the person affected.

ἀντίτεχνος: “rival.”

60E. ἐνυπνίων ... λέγει: “trying to discover the meaning of certain dreams”; lit., “making test of certain dreams, what they mean.”
áfosphoúmenos: "make expiation" for a crime, or "fulfil obligations," and so avoid the crime of neglecting them. ὁσίωτις is defined in the Euthyphro as ἐπιστήμη αὐτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θείας.

εἰ πολλάκις: "if perchance"; so too μὴ πολλάκις, esp. after εἰ ἢ ἢ ἢν. "It expresses a rough generalisation from many particulars." (Geddes.)

ἀλλοτ' ἐν ἀλλή ὅψει φαινόμενον: "appearing at different times in different shapes,"

μουσική: a word of far wider meaning than our "music," as it applies to all art over which the Muses presided. Trans., "Adopt and cultivate the pursuits of the Muses."

ὑπελάμβανον: "assumed." αὐτό: i.e., the dream.

61A. παρακελεύεσθαι ... ἐπικελεύειν ... διακελευόμενοι: the first of these expresses incitement to begin an action; the second (a rarer word) encouragement in it when it is begun; the δια in the third compound suggests mutual cheering, or perhaps cheering throughout the course. For this last force of δια cf. διαπολεμέω: to bring a war to an end.

καὶ ἐμὸι σύνω: notice that here, as constantly in the dialogue, the first part of the sentence is repeated after the slight interruption of the simile ὡστερ ... διακελευόμενοι.

η δίκη: "the trial." η τοῦ θεοῦ ἔρτη: see Chap. r. and notes.

ταύτην τὴν δημόδη μουσικήν: "music in the popular sense," i.e., either (1) music in our sense of to-day, or (2) arts and letters as distinguished from φιλοσοφία.

ἀσφαλέστερον γάρ εἶναι: infinitive depending on χρῆναι supra.

"ἀπείναι: "depart hence," or, "this life."

61B. δέοι ... μέλλοι: optatives in indirect speech; G. § 242, 2.

μόθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους: "fiction and not fact." The two words are distinguished here, though λόγος is used of Ἀσωπ’s tales in 60D. Plutarch defines μόθος as λόγος ψευδῆς ἐσικῶς ἀληθινῷ; it is like our fable containing a moral.

οὐκ ἢ μυθολογικός: "that I had no taste for fable writing." Notice (1) the transition from indirect to direct speech (δέοι ... ἢ); (2) the form of the verb, usually ἢν. The necessity is given as a reflection, the statement as a fact.

V. ἔρρωσθαι: "be of good cheer." ὡς τάχιστα: i.e., as explained just below, with the limitation that the death must not be by one’s own hand.

61C. οἶνον παρακελεύει; "what is this advice that you give Euenus?"

πολλά: adverbial accusative = πολλάκις = "often."
ékōv eînai: "willingly." The phrase is only used in negative or quasi-negative sentences, and so means "not if I can help it." Similar apparently superfluous uses of the infinitive in adverbial phrases are: ἵνα νῦν eînai, at present; κατὰ τοῦτο eînai, in this respect. Cp. too G. § 268.

οὐδ᾽ ὁποστιότιν: "not at all."

οὗ φιλόσοφος Εὐήνος: this question strikes the keynote of the dialogue. If E. is a philosopher he is willing to die. Why? Because, as a philosopher, he must know "there is another and a better world."

toûτου τοῦ πράγματος: "this walk of life," i.e., a philosopher's; cf. ὑπερ ἔπραττον, 60E; μελέτημα, 67D.

οὗ βιάστει αὐτόν: "do himself violence." Plato in the Laws says that suicide is cowardly save at the command of the State, or to escape overwhelming trouble or disgrace. Aristotle regarded it as an act of disloyalty to the State; whilst the later Stoics and Epicureans rather approved the practice, which accordingly became more and more common at Rome in the later Republic and early Empire, down to about the time of S. Augustine. An interesting summary of ancient views on suicide will be found in Geddes' Phaedo (Note F) and Montaigne (Essais i. 3).

οὗ φασί = Latin negant. θεμυτόν (Latin fas) brings in the divine sanction against suicide: νομιμόν would express the rule of law and custom (Latin ius).

61D. Φιλολάφ: a Pythagorean; see Index. οὐδὲν σαφές: perhaps a hint at the obscurity of the Pythagorean teaching, which was always given δι' αἰνιγματῶν.

ϕθόνος οἴδεις λέγειν: "I do not grudge saying," or "no one could object to my saying."

61E. ἐκεῖς: euphemistic for εἰς "Αἰδού; so ἐκεῖ in the next line. Similarly ἐνθάδε is used for this life (cf. Antig. 75). Love of euphemism common in Latin too; cf. calamitas for "banishment," Dyrrhachium for Epidamnns, Beneventum for Maleventum.

dιασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν: "meditate and converse," simply, though the latter word gives a kind of a hint at the myth with which the argument on a future life is rounded off (Chaps. LVIII-LXII.).

μέχρι ἧλιου δυσμόν: the legal time for executions; cf. 116E.

VI. παρ' ἡμῖν: i.e., at Thebes; cf. D, above.

62A. προθυμεῖσθαι: "be of good heart," like our try, try, try again.

tάχα γὰρ ἀν καὶ ἀκούσας: "perhaps you may hear (something definite)." This optative with ἀν expresses a little more uncertainty than the future; cf. G. § 226, 2.
ei τούτο μόνον ... ζήν: note (1) εἰ = "that" after word expressing surprise; (2) μόνον τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων, an emphatic illogical phrase like the common inclusive use of the superlative, e.g., ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων (Thuc. i. 1); (3) οὐδέποτε, instead of the more correct μηδέποτε after εἰ. This last difficulty induced Schmelzer to take εἰ with ἔστιν ότε, and to treat τούτο μόνον ... τάλλα as an independent clause. Many other alterations have been suggested.

With the present text τούτο = τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀποκτινώναι (the unlawfulness of suicide); with τυχχάνει must be understood θεμιτὸν ὅν αὐτὸν ἀποκτινώναι; τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ = "the individual"; and the words after τάλλα = "so that it is only sometimes and for some persons better to die than to live." Others take τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ as "mankind," or regard τούτω as "the preferability of death to life," or make ἔστιν ότε ... ἣ ζήν the subject of τυχχάνει, ὅν being understood with βέλτιον. The sense is that in no circumstances and for no man can the lawfulness of suicide be admitted.

Ὑπό: Boeotian for ἵστω (from ὦδα). Trans., "May Zeus be the witness," sc., to my astonishment. φωνὴ: "patois." The Theban origin of Simmias and Cebes is again dwelt on in Chap. xlv. 95A, B.

62B. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἵσως ... λόγον: "not but what it has some reason." After οὐ μέντοι we understand a proposition the contrary of that which follows the ἀλλά; the sentence in fact = "οὐ μέντοι οὔδένα λόγον ἔχει ἀλλ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον."

ἐν ἀπορρήτοις: the reference may be either to the esoteric doctrines of the Pythagoreans, i.e., doctrines not divulged to the outside world; or to the Orphic traditions or Eleusinian mysteries.

ἐν τοις φρονῷ: "inward," or "on guard." Probably the former, as the Pythagoreans always spoke of the body as the soul’s prison. The metaphor is quite in keeping with their lofty conception of the soul. Equally appropriate are the Stoic’s idea of life as "a post allotted by the gods," and the Epicurean’s comparison of life to a theatre which we naturally quit if tired of the performance (De Finibus, i., Chap. 15). In some texts ἐσμὲν is accented: translate "live."

ἀποδιδράσκειν: "scamper away"; often of runaway slaves.

τῷ θεῶ εἶναι: θεός is predicative.

ἐν τοῖς κτημάτων: κτήματα is used of living possessions (e.g., cattle, slaves); χρήματα, possessions in kind, esp. money.

62C. καὶ σὺ ἂν: the ἂν goes with χαλεπαίνοις and is repeated with that verb.

πᾶνο γε: "why certainly," the γε expressing fictitious uncertainty.

πρὶν ... ἐπιπέμψη: temporal particles with the subjunctive usually take ἂν, but there are numerous exceptions, esp. in poetry and in
semi-poetical passages, as here. See notes on 59E and 73A, and G. § 239, 2. Note too the ἄν and aor. subj. = Lat. future perfect.

VII. 62D. ἐσκευεν τοῦτο ἄτοπῳ: “this is like a paradox.” This verb means: (1) “to be like,” (2) “to seem” and “likely,” (3) “it seems” (impersonal), (4) “to beseem.” εὐλόγως ἔχει: “is reason-able.”

tο γάρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν . . . θεὸς is the subject of οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. θεὸς is in apposition to the clause ὠπερ . . . ἐπιστάται. N.B. the various constructions of ἀγανακτεῖν: (1) with participle, as here; (2) with the dative, accusative, or genitive of the thing; (3) διὰ τι, περὶ τινι, πρὸς τι, ἐπὶ τινι.

αὐτός, though singular, takes up τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους in the previous sentence; cf. 57A, τί . . . ἄρτα.

ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος: “when he has become free” (sc. by death from bondage to the gods).

φευκτέον εἰναι: the verb in -τέος used impersonally = δεῖ with the infinitive; for such verbal adjectives see G. § 281, 1, 2.

62E. ὅτι μάλιστα: “above all things.”

tούναντίον . . . ἢ δ: “the opposite to what.” νῦν δὴ: see 62B.

63A. πραγματεία: “ingenuity,” or “insistence.” Socrates laughs gently at Cebes being so intent on the argument.

αἱ τοι: a mock heroic phrase, calling attention to Cebes’ well-known foible; “he’s at it again.” For this trait in Cebes’ character cf. 77A.

καὶ αὐτῷ: connect with μοι. Join τι . . . λέγειν: “to talk sense.”

ός ἀληθῶς: idiomatic phrase (= “truly”) referring to σοφοὶ.

εἰς σε τέινειν: “level his argument at you.” Simmias means that Socrates’ position is a case in point: he presses home Cebes’ general remark with a personal illustration. Socrates begins a personal defence (ἀπολογήσασθαι, three lines below) and so launches on what to us is the real subject of the dialogue—the Immortality of the Soul.

VIII. 63B. θεός ἄλλοις: i.e., the χθόνιοι θεοὶ, as distinguished from the οὐράνιοι.

οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν: “in being thus unmoved at death,” whereas μὴ ἀγανακτῶν would = “if I were not moved”; cf. G. § 283, 4.

63C. εὖ ἵστ’ ὅτι: this has become a stereotyped phrase for strong assertion, in which the ὅτι is really pleonastic.

τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄν πάνυ διαχυμαλίμνη: either because he is less certain about having the companionship of men than the protection of the gods, or because he is not sure of his own worthiness. He is quite confident on the matter in the Ἀπολογία.
ΔΤΩ... ἡξειν: resumed in καὶ τοῦτο at the end of the sentence. The construction is shattered by the parenthesis: ἡξειν is dependent on ἐπιτίω by a kind of attraction; for a similar infinitive after a particle like δή, viz. ἰσ, see 108Ε.

πάλαι λέγεται: notice the reliance on tradition. The subject is worked out in mythic shape in Chaps. ΙVΙΙΙ.-ΙΧΠ.

αὐτὸς ἤχεν: “keeping it all to yourself.” Cf. the use of αὐτός, 73Α.

ἐν νῦ ἤχει; “do you intend?” καὶ ἶμιν μεταδότης: “would you impart it to us,” sc., if you were asked; the optative with ἰν here expresses a polite request, like our “would you be so good as to.”

63D. τι... ἀλλο γε ἦ πάλαι: lit., “what else is it but what . . . ?” i.e., “nothing but what the man who is to administer the poison, etc.” The phrase is elliptical for τι ἀλλο ἐστὶν ἦ δῆ; πάλαι: with the present, like the Latin iamdudum. The servant was called ὃ δῆμοις or ὅ δημοῦς.

οὐθέν τοιοῦτον... προσφέρειν: “nothing of this kind ought to interfere with the poison”; lit., “be brought to bear on.” Note οὐθέν in a prohibition.

εἰ δὲ μή: “otherwise”; the regular phrase in introducing the second of two alternatives, even when, as here, the μή is pleonastic. We should say, “if he do.”

63E. έα... χαίρειν αὐτόν: “heed him not,” or perhaps, “tell him not to worry.”

πέρεθεν τι Ἰδῆ: “I guessed as much.” πάλαι μοι πράγματα παρέθεια: “he has been bothering me for a long time.”

τὸν λόγον ἀποδούναι: “render my account” (rationem reddere).

IX. 64Α. κινδυνεύοντι... ἐπιτηδεύοντι: “other men seem to forget that all those who engage with sincerity in the study of philosophy do nothing but,” &c. κινδυνεύοντι, lit., “run a risk,” here, as often in Plato, means little more than “seems likely.” In the present case the passage is made obscure by the use of the personal instead of the impersonal, and by the substitution of the δή clause for the more ordinary participle with λειτήναι. Cicero expresses the sentiment (Tusc. Disp.), Tota philosophorum vita commentatio mortis est. So, too, La Philosophie est l’apprentissage de la mort.

ἀποκάθευνε τε καὶ τεθάναι: “dying and death.” One gives the process, the other the result; “one being the act of emancipation, the other the consequent freedom” (Geddes). We have not in this edition followed the Bodleian MS. in the “graphical peculiarity” of spelling ἀποκάθευνε; so too with ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαί.

64Β. γελασεῖοντα: “disposed to laughter.” Other ἔδεικτα terminations are -σιαω, -ιαω, -ωω, as στρατηγιαω, θανατω (four lines
PHAEDO.

lower); verbs in -ω have, however, other meanings. See G. § 130, Note 1. For the form -σειω cf. the Aeolic Aorist.

οἴμαι γάρ ἄν: ἄν cannot go with the present and future tenses of the indic. (G. §§ 207-8); it is simply put in thus early to warn the hearer that the main thought is to be conditional. This transference of a word to another clause is called Hyperbaton.

tοὺς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀνδράτους: “my own countrymen,” i.e., the Thebans, whose “crass” minds were thought unfit for philosophy. The latter part of the sentence seems to refer back to the eagerness of the Athenian public to rid itself of Socrates.

λελήθασιν (where we would naturally expect λέληθε): made personal.

μὴ λεληθέναι: note the transition from οὐ λελήθασιν to μὴ.

καὶ οἶνον θανάτου: an allusion to the definition of death as a deliverance, which Socrates had in his mind at the time.

εἰπώμεν ... ἡμᾶς αὑτούς: “let us address ourselves to each other” (hortative subjunctive).

64C. τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ... ἀπαλλαγήν: this is the pith of these chapters, which show how death is a release from prison, and what the release means.

tοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι: the two clauses beginning with χωρίς give what τὸ τεθνάναι is, as regards body and soul respectively.

ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἤ: this deliberative subjunctive is rare in the third person and of the substantive verb. Some editions therefore read ή: for this, cf. note on 63D.

σκέπαι ... σκοποῦμεν; note that in good prose σκέπτομαι is not used in the present and imperfect, while σκοπέω, σκοπούμαι are used only in those tenses. σκοπέω = I look; σκοποῦμαι = I consider.

εἰναι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρός: “the task or the duty of a philosopher.”

64D. τὰς ἡδονὰς: the pleasures are ranged here much in the same way as they are definitely classified in Cicero De Finibus 1. 13, which compare with this passage for its account of the disturbing influence of desire: (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural but not necessary, (3) neither natural nor necessary. That classification is, however, an Epicurean one; Plato himself usually divides into necessary and unnecessary. οἶνον: “for example”; the word does not affect the construction of the sentence.

θεραπεῖας: “luxuries.” In all this there is a Socratic shrug of the shoulders, for to see S. washed or in a new garment or with sandals was accounted a marvel. This indifference to the comforts of life deepened with the Cynics into a positive affectation of discomfort.

64E. ἄπολύων: perhaps a pun on the name of Apollo, the Deliverer.
65A. μετέχει αὐτῶν: supply καὶ ὑς from the preceding δ, it being unusual to repeat the relative in Greek. Note μηδὲν and μηδὲ, generic; cp. G. § 283, 4.

ἐγγύς τι τείνειν: either "nearly aims at death," or "verges pretty closely on death." Cf. for the popular sentiment that life without pleasure is a sorry affair, Sophocles Antigone 1165-1171.

ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων: μηδὲν, generic use with participle; cf. G., § 283, 4.

αἵ διὰ τοῦ σώματος: i.e., the pleasures which arise by means of the bodily senses. For this popular distinction, cf. Sully's Outlines pp. 475-80.

X. τῆς φρονήσεως: the ordinary distinction between φρόνησις (prudentia) and σοφία (sapientia) is that given in Cicero, De Off. i. 43; the former is verum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia, the latter is verum divinarum et humanarum scientia. The latter is, in fact, intellectual wisdom: the other practical wisdom. But the line is not drawn very sharply in Plato, for, from his radical doctrine that virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance, it followed that wisdom in the one sphere was inevitably bound up with wisdom in the other. To Aristotle, on the other hand, who envisaged virtue as a habit resulting from a succession of similar acts, the man with a well-trained power of thought (σοφός) might well be different from the man with a well-trained power of conduct (φρόνιμος). Φρόνησις is variously translated: prudence (too narrow); thought or intellectuality (both implying with us a contrast to action, which φρόνησις does not), and insight (which is a part only of φρόνησις); wisdom, with the prefix practical where necessary, Englishes it best.

65B. οἶον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω = οἶον simply, = Fr. par exemple, for instance.

οἱ ποιηταὶ . . . θρυλοῦσιν: "as the poets are ever dinning into our ears." The earlier philosophers wrote in verse. On this fallibility of the unaided senses a line of Epicharmus is quoted by the commentators—

νοὺς ὀρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει: τᾶλλα καὶ ῥφιλά.

ἀντι: viz., the senses of hearing and seeing, which are much less "corporeal" than the others (see Sully, Chap. v., pp. 121-30).

αἰσθήσεως: here Aristotle modifies the sharpness of Plato's distinctions. To Plato the things of the world perceived by the αἰσθήσεις were mere shadows of the real things, τὰ ὄντα, ἰδέας, comprehended by νοῦς. The shadows and the faculties which dealt with them were alike unreliable: real knowledge, ἐπιστήμη, was only possible when the soul was unimpeded by the body, when λόγος or νοûς was unencumbered by the senses. [See diagram in M.A.P. pp. 54-58.] Aristotle, on the other hand, "treats knowledge as a development
from the impressions of sense, but recognises that sense, as such, does not give us knowledge" (Wallace). See too Sully, Chap. ix.

σχολή: "not at all," lit., "at leisure"; cf. "I'll trust by leisure him that mocks me once" (Titus Andronicus).

65C. λογίζεσθαι: (1) to calculate, (2) to consider (in a general way), (3) to reason, as we say logically.

tοῦ ὄντος: "what is really true." The really-existing is distinguished by Plato, following Parmenides, from their unreal images, τὰ φανόμενα, which are known to us only from the fleeting impressions of sense. The later Latin and Scholastic writers invented a present participle for esse to translate it, ens = τὸ ὄν; and the corresponding nouns in both languages are derived from the substantive verb—οὐσία, essentia. Our representatives of these last—substance and essence—have acquired strangely different meanings.

δίκαιον αὔτό: "abstract justice"; the same thing as the ἰδέα τοῦ δίκαιου, from their participation in which alone the things we call just are just.

ἀγαθόν: ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is in the Republic the coping-stone (θρίγκος) of the world of ideas. See Introduction, § 4, ii.

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων . . . ἐκαστὸν ὄν: "and, in a word, the 'being' of all other things which have an individual existence." The last clause is really put in to explain οὐσία, which had not yet been recognised as a regular philosophical term and so needed explanation.

65E. ὅς ἄν . . . παρασκευάστηκαί: note that in this sentence ἄν goes closely with the ὅς, whoever. In the next sentence but one we get ὅστις . . . ὑπὲρ in much the same sense. Note, too, that in these two sentences the apodosis is similar, viz., ἄν with the optative, but that the second has the more regular protasis, viz., the opt. without ἄν; see G. §§ 227; 232, 4.

αὔτὸ ἐκαστὸν: "each thing as it really is." διανοηθήναι: the correlative to αἰσθάνεσθαι—to comprehend, as distinguished from to perceive.

τοῦ γνώναι: genitive after ἐγγύτατα.

αὕτῃ τῇ διανοᾷ: the distinction drawn in the Republic between νοῦς and διάνοια (M.A.P. pp. 54–55) is not kept up here.

66A. εἰλικρινεῖ: "pure." The word, which is sometimes spelt with an aspirate, is derived either from εἶλη, the sun's rays, or from εἶλω, roll. In the latter case the idea is that of rolling a sieve about and so separating good from evil: in the former it is that of examining and testing by the sunlight; cf. our phrase, "not bearing daylight."

On the predicative position of the adjective outside the article, see G. § 138, Remark.

θηρευεὶν τῶν ὄντων: cf. 66C infra. Life to Plato is a long, stern chase after Truth.
NOTES, 65B—66E.

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ἀληθείαν τε καὶ φρόνησιν: Truth and Wisdom are respectively the result and the means of the aforesaid hunt.

XI. 66B. παριστασθαι: "suggest itself." δὸξα: "opinion" merely, here. It also has a special technical meaning in Plato (M.A.P. pp. 54, 55). Note ὅτι introducing a direct speech and translate by inverted commas.

κινδυνεύει τοι ὠσπερ ἀτραπός τις, κ.τ.λ.: "it seems then that one might say a small pathway leads us out of the difficulty in this consideration by the aid of logical reasoning: that, &c." Taken thus, the pathway of reason is contrasted with the highway of the senses (Geddes). In this case the second ὅτι introduces a clause explanatory of σκέψει, and ἐν τῇ σκέψει would be clearer if altered to εἰς τὴν σκέψιν. For this sense of ἐκφέρει Wagner well compares Αἰαξ 7:—

εὖ δὲ σ' ἐκφέρει

Κυνὸς Λακάνης ὡς τις εὐρίνος βάσις.

Schleiermacher transfers the words μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ... σκέψει to after ἐχωμεν. In that case the second clause introduced by ὅτι is coordinate with the first clause so begun; ἀτραπός refers to the "short way" of death and μετὰ τοῦ λόγου seems to mean "with our theory."

οὐ μὴ ποτε: οὐ μὴ with the aorist subjunctive and all persons of the future, save the second singular, express a strong negation; with the future 2nd singular, a strong prohibition. The former use is sometimes explained by the ellipse of a verb of fearing; but see G. § 257.

ἀσχολίας: the Greeks regarded labour as illiberal and mechanical (βαναυσὸς) and sought σχολή for the higher pursuits of philosophy, &c. To secure this leisure for the few Plato and Aristotle were ready in their ideal states to make the mass of men serfs and slaves.


tο λεγόμενον: "as the saying is," or "as the story goes"; adverbal.

66D. αὐτὰ ... αὕτη: this is equivalent to "We must with the soul unimpeded look on things as they really are." Cf. De Finibus 1., Chap. 13.

66E. ἐρασταλ: In the Phaedrus and the Symposium we are shown how a philosophic ἐρως for abstract beauty can be developed out of love for the beauty of sensible objects. Introduction, §§ 2, 4.

φρονήσεως: an instance of inverse attraction (above, note on 60D, and G. §§ 153–4), the subject to ἐρται being wrenched from its proper case by the intervening relative ὅσ.
δυοίν θάτερον (= το οτερον): “one of two things takes place.” The verb is omitted in the apodosis as also in the protasis. τελευτήσασιν: “when we are dead,” agreeing with ἢμᾶς, possessive dative understood with ἐστιν.

67A. ἐν ὧν ἔν ἔνῳ = ἔως ἔνως: “so long as we live.” οὕτως refers to this condition, which is restated in a different form four lines lower down in the words ἔως ἔν... ἢμᾶς, where ἔως ἔν means “until.” G. § 239, 2.

ὀτί μάλιστα... ὅτι μή: note that ὅτι is from ὅτι. It is written thus or with comma (ὁ, τι) to distinguish it from ὅτι the conjunction, that. In both cases here given ὅτοι might be substituted. Translate, “as much as possible,” and “except.”

ἀναπτυλώμεθα: “infected”; cf. ἀνάπλέα, 83D. So too ἰμπλεί in Livy.

μετὰ τοιοῦτων: i.e., καθαρῶν, either persons or things.


παντός γε μάλλον: the genitive depending on μάλλον.

XII. οἱ: the demonstrative correlative to the interrogative ποῖ; It must be distinguished from the enclitic οἱ early in 67C (personal pronoun), and from both οἱ (definite article) and οἱ (relative pronoun).

κτήσασθαι: notice the aorist infinitive after an expression of hope; it is said to denote greater certainty than the more usual future. If the aorist be used it is generally helped out by ἐν. But the aorist loses in the other moods the past sense which it has in the indicative, and mainly dwells on the definiteness or unity of an action or state. It is highly appropriate here: “to obtain once for all.”

γίγνεται: supply καλ ἐμοὶ before καλ ἀλλιφ ἀνάρι, κ.τ.λ.

67C. παρεσκευάσθαι: middle. Observe the perfect infinitive denoting the completion of the action.

κάθαρος δὲ ἐίναι: the accusative would be more usual, as in 74A, for συμβαίνει is generally used impersonally. But preceding ἄρα ὅu as they do, these words lie outside the construction of the sentence, and the nominative is quite natural.

ἀπερ πάλαι... λέγεται: parenthetical; the reference is to 64C.

τὸ χωρίζειν defines ποῦτο, above. It is much the same as ἀπαλλαγή in 64C, save that there the idea of “escape” from the φρουρά just mentioned is fresh in the minds of the speakers.

67D. ἐκλυμένην: “freeing itself,” not “freed.” The process seems hardly completed even with death.

μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι: “especially—in fact, they alone are—anxious.”
79. τὸ μελέτημα . . . τῶν φιλοσόφων: cf. above, 64A, to which passage reference is made in the words ὅπερ ἐν ἄρχῃ ἔλεγον.

67E. οὕτω sums up the phrase παρασκευάζοντα . . . τεθνάναι.

εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληται . . . συνόντος αὐτοῖς: the main protasis goes down to ἔσχεν; the clause τοῦτον δὲ . . . ἄγανακτοίνεν is either (1) a kind of sub-protasis to the first (hence the change of moods, for which cf. Vergil, Aen. 1. 46), or (2) a misplaced noun sentence coordinate to εἰ μὴ . . . ὤσεν, κ.τ.λ., and, like that, predicate to ἀλογία. Both τυχεῖν and ἀπηλλάξασθαι depend on ἐλπίς, ἣν δὲ φρονήσεως being parenthetic.

ὅτε finds in the following τοῦτον its antecedent. Connect συνόντος αὐτοῖς.

68A. ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μέν: answered by φρονήσεως δὲ, four lines lower down. The general sense is clear enough: "Have people for purely human love done . . . and shall not the lover of wisdom . . . ?"

νιέων: for the forms in use see G. § 60, 21.

πολλοὶ δὴ: e.g., Alcestis for Admetus, Orpheus for Eurydice, Achilles for Patroclus. (Geddes.)

τῆς τοῦ ὅψεσθαι: the genitive is in apposition to ἐλπίδος.

ἐντεύξεσθαι: "attain"; depends on ἐλπίδα.

ἀλλὰ ἦ: "save," "except."

68B. εἰσνῦ: observe, not εἰσίν. ὀἴσεθαί γε χρή: sc. that he would go willingly.

XIII. τεκμήριον: "proof," much stronger than σημεῖον. The latter would mean that, given a man troubled at the prospect of death, we should not expect him to turn out a true philosopher: the former implies that such a feeling is a sufficient test of the man.

ὅτι ἐν ἴδης = ἐὰν τινα ἴδης. We should transfer the indefiniteness to the main clause: "any man you saw."

οὐκ ἄρ′ ἦν: "he was not, after all"; ἄρ′ ἦν, of a fact which was always true, but the truth of which is only just recognised.

68C. φιλοσώματος . . . φιλοχρήματος . . . φιλότιμος: i.e., he cared for either bodily pleasures, or money, or honour, though not necessarily to such an extent as to be called sensual, covetous, or ambitious.

ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία: "what is called courage." The expression implies that Plato is using the word in a conventional sense. It is one of the four cardinal—as they were first called by S. Ambrose—virtues of the ordinary Greek classification, which is first found in Pindar, and which is adopted, for instance, in Cicero, De Fin. 1., ch. 13–16, and in Plato's Republic. In the latter treatise a definite sphere, both in the individual and in the State, is assigned to each. σοφία is the virtue of the ruling class and of the rational part of the PHAED.
soul (τὸ λογιστικὸν); ἀνδρεία, of the warrior class and of τὸ θυμοειδές; σφοροσύνη, of the working class and of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν; δικαιοσύνη exercises a general superintendence of the others, seeing especially that each of the three classes in the State, and each of the three parts of the soul, “minds its own business.” As Phocylides says, Justice, or Righteousness, contains all virtue:—

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συναλλαβῇ πᾶσιν ἄρετῆ 'στιν.

Professor Geddes quotes the following from Ruskin:—“Temperance, the principle of desistence; Courage, the principle of resistance; Justice, the principle of assistance; Prudence, the principle of consequence.”

ἐπτοήθησαι: “quiver,” “tremble,” usually with fear, here with desire.

ἄρ' οὐ repeats the οὐκοῦν with which the sentence opens.

68D. έθελεις: the future, θέλησεις, which is found in some MSS., would be more correct to balance δέξει. ἐγνώσαι: “analyse,” or, perhaps better, “form a (right) conception of.”

ἔταν ὑπομένωσιν: “when they do face it.”

68E. οἱ κόσμιοι = οἱ σῶφρονες.

ἀκολασία: “licentiousness,” “intemperance,” the vice corresponding to σφοροσύνη. From a privative and κολάζω, punish, akin to κολοῦω, prune. The idea is “not kept in order.”

69A. ὁ = τοῦτῳ ὅ, a somewhat unusual form of attraction (note, 60D).

μὴ γὰρ: supply ὅρα before μὴ; and for this ellipse in strong negations, cf. the ellipse of ὑπάνω before ὅπως in strong assertions, e.g., Medea, 609. The ensuing subjunctives down to καθάρμια τίς ἦ in 69C are all affected by this μὴ. In translating, divide this long period at φρόνησις and τοιοῦτον.

ἀλλαγή: “interchange.”

ἡδονᾶς . . . καταλλάττεσθαι: epexegetical of αἰτή.

πρὸς ἄρετὴν . . . πρὸς ἡδονᾶς: translate the first πρὸς “with respect to,” the remaining four by “(in return) for.”

καταλλάττεσθαι: “to interchange,” especially used of money, as διαλλάττεσθαι is of the relations of man to man.

τὸ νόμισμα ὅρθον: “the sterling currency.” νόμισμα has the meaning also of “custom.”

69B. φρόνησις: epexegetic of ἐκείνο. For the meaning, see above on 65A.

τοιοῦτον . . . καὶ μετὰ τοιοῦτον: “at the price of, and in conjunction with, this,” the first τοιοῦτον being genitive of value; G. § 167.

ἀνούμενα: note (1) the passive use of this deponent verb, not unusual with the present tenses, but in the case of this verb more
commonly expressed by ἐωνημένα; and (2) the inapplicability of the word, φρόνησις not being given away to secure the possession of virtue (Geddes).

χωρίζομεν δὲ φρονήσεως: observe the characteristic fulness of expression for the sake of clearness. He has begun by saying what virtue is not (μὴ γάρ... νομίσματα); he goes on to say what it is (ἀλλὰ... τοιοῦτον); he now repeats in other words what it is not (down to ξηρ), and once more what it is (down to τις ἤ). οὐκαγαρφία: (1) "scene-painting," (2) "rough sketch," (3) "illusion" (Geddes). Either of the two last meanings suits this passage.

ἀνδραποδώδης: "slavish," for being the outcome of natural impulses such virtue might reside in a slave, whereas the truer virtue, formed by the training of the soul, is for the free man alone. Compare the "social and civil virtue" spoken of in 82A (where see note).

69C. τὰς τελετάς: "the Mysteries," especially those connected with Orpheus and Demeter. They aimed at promoting great purity of life. The word is connected with τέλος, either (1) referring back to an original payment, or (2) expressing the consummation of a religious process.

καθαρμός: the result of the act of purification (κάθαρσις).

αἰνίττεσθαι: "express obscurely"; though αἰνέω = "to tell," simply.

ἀμύητος: from a privative and μύω = to be in a state in which eyes and mouth are closed (μω). Cf. our word mum, which also is onomatopoeic. From this word mysteries is derived, the initiated being subject to all manner of penalties if they divulged the secrets which had been imparted to them. Translate, "uninitiated and unpurified."

ναρπηκοφόροι: "wand-bearers," i.e., mere conformists to the worship of Bacchus, not heart-worshippers or "inspired (βάκχοι). The quotation is from an Orphic line:—

πολλοὶ μὲν ναρπηκοφόροι, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι,

which is parallel to the Christian phrase, Many are called, but few are chosen.

69D. ὅν δὴ: "amongst whom"; partitive genitive. We should put the ἀλλὰ clause first and translate, "I have in all ways striven to be accounted," &c.

εἰ δὲ ὀφρώς... ἕνυσμαν: not a hypothetical sentence; but εἰ = "whether," and introduces a noun clause depending on εἰσοδευθα. The reading ἕνυσμαν = "achieved for myself." Note the change of number: the coming fulness of knowledge is for all men.

ταύτ' οὖν... ἀπολογούμαι: S. has thus "given a reason for the hope that was within him," for which he was asked in 63A, B.
69E. εἰ τι οὖν ... εἶμι ... εὖ ἂν ἔχοι: note the irregular sequence of moods, the indicative expressing "confidence that he was more convincing." Cf. 70D; G. § 220. τιθαυωτερος refers back to Chap. viii., 63B.

XIV. 70A. πολλήν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει ... μή: "occasions much doubt in the many lest." Note the οὐδαμοῦ and οὐδὲν after this μή. This is a polite and veiled form of expressing Cebes' own doubts.

εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη: such an asyndeton (absence of a connecting particle like δὲ) is highly unusual in Greek.

ἀσπερ ... κατινδ ... οὕχητα ... διαπτομένη: there is an obvious allusion to the line of Homer which gives the popular conception of the state of the soul after death:—

ψυχή δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἥπτε καταδὶς
φεκτο τετριγυία (Π. xxiii. 100).

ἀν: Attic Attraction; cf. note on ἀν, 60D.

70B. παραμυθίας ... καὶ πιστεώς: "reassurance and proof"; the one appealing to moral, the other to mental, conviction.

ἐστὶ: "exists"; notice the accent.

καὶ τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν: i.e., that the soul not only exists, but is something more than the gibbering, bloodless shade Homer pictured it. As Aristotle would put it, the soul is always an activity (ἐνέργεια), not a mere potentiality (δύναμις).

βούλει διαμυθολογώμεν: such an ellipse of ὡς after βούλει is quite common; cf. θάμεν οὖν βούλει, 79A. See G. § 256. Perhaps better explained by change of construction like ὄσον ὁ δράσον: "do you wish it?—am I to do this?"—a deliberative subjunctive like τοιῶμεν above.

οὐκοῦν γ' ἂν οἴμαι: the ἂν of course goes with εἰπεῖν; cf. note, 64B.

70C. κωμῳδιοτοίους: besides Aristophanes in the Clouds, b.c. 423, the comic poets Ameipsias and Eupolis had violently attacked Socrates. The last called him τὸν πτωχὸν ἄδολος χη, a nickname which Socrates practically adopts as a title of honour by using the word.

ἄδολος χῆ: "prate." The word seems to come from ἄδος and λέσχη, meaning to talk to satiety.

οὐ περὶ προσηχόντων: the usual order for περὶ οὐ προσηχόντων.

XV. τῆδε πη: Geddes calls the argument worked out in this and the two following chapters the Cyclical Argument: it turns on the idea that the transition from life to death implies the transition from death to life, just as one half of a circle implies the other half. See note, 72A.

εἰτ' ἄρα ... εἴτε καὶ: the ἄρα appended to the first εἴτε conveys a hint that that is really the correct alternative.
NOTES, 69E—71A.

παλαίδς...λόγος: i.e., of the Orphic poets and Pythagorean philosophers, both of whom—according to Herodotus, ii. 123—got the doctrine of metempsychosis from Egypt.

eισölν...εκέλ: connect these words, as ενθένδε with ἀφικόμεναι.

ἀλλα τι ἦ = ἀρα οὗ = nonne. Lit., “would the souls suffer ought else than be in Hades?”—a regular mode with Plato of asking a question to which the answer “yes” is expected.

70D. οὗ γάρ...μή ούσαι: “for they would not...if they were not.” μή is used because the participle is equal to an ei clause. G. § 283, 4.

tοῦ ταύτα εἶναι: “of this being so.”

μή...σκότηε: note that this and μή σκέψη are good Greek, while μη σκέψαι and μη σκόπης are bad; G. § 254.

κατά πάντων ζώων: this conception of the solidarity of all forms of life is noticeable in a thinker so early as Plato, more especially as he not a materialist in any sense of the word. So too the soul (which, is to noted, is rather “principle of vitality” than our “spirit”) migrates alike through vegetable and animal kingdoms. Cf. too 94 283a.

εὐλλήβδην: “in a word.”

εἰδώμεν: from οἶδα, know; the ordinary reading is ιδωμεν, 2nd aor. subjunctive of ὧδω, see.

ἀρ’ οὐνωσί: ἀρα is not usual in indirect questions.

70E. γίγνεται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία: this is the keynot these chapters, xv.-xvii. We see the principle working in π π instances (69E-71B); so, nature being uniform, we must infer that applies also to the matter in hand in which we cannot usually see life and death.

μυρία: “countless”; μύρια = 10,000. “The regular number the regular accent.” (Farrar).

71A. καὶ μήν: “and moreover”; introducing an additional ment.

δῶ γενέσεις: see note on τῇδε τη, 70C. It is explained by following words, ἀρὰ μὲν...τοῦ ξέρον. γένεσις (like it γίγνεσθαι) expresses either the cause, the method, the fact, result of a coming into being. It may thus mean source, race, age, creation (a group of phenomena, as well as the act); but its important meanings for us here are those which cover the modes of passing from one to another form of existence: general production, transition, process. Of these, the first suggests, too strongly, the idea of creation (and Plato’s τὸ μὴ οὗ = our “rather than our “nothing”); the second almost implies a procreator (which seems un-Platonic, see Introduction, §§ 2, 4). the last two are to be preferred in translating this passage.
71B. κάν εἰ μὴ = καὶ δὲν εἶ ἀναγκαίον (supplied from below) εἰ μὴ. Translate, "although."

ἐνιαχόν: "sometimes"; usually of time.

γοῦν = "at any rate."

XVI. 71C. τὸ ἔγρηγορέναι . . . τὸ καθείδειν: observe carefully in translating that these, like τὸ τεθνάναι and τὸ ζῆν, are states of existence, whilst the processes or transitions thereto (γενέσεις) are denoted respectively by ἀνεγέρπεσθαι, καταδαρθάνειν, ἀποθνῄσκειν, and ζῆν.

μεταξύ: after its case.

δυοῖν δυναίν: "since there are two of these."

συνήγαγαν: (1) "union," (2) "pair," (3) "one of a pair of correlatives," as here. οὐ δὲ μοι: sc. ἑρεῖσ.

71D. ἰκανῶς σοι: sc. εἴρηται.

φῆς: pres. indic. of φημί, while φῆς is pres. subj. and φῆς is ethical for ἐφησα. 

71E. τοῖν γενεσέοιν: observe the masculine forms, though γενεσίς is feminine.

αὑτῇ χωλῇ ἔσται ἡ φύσις: which is taken as a final argument in the supposition that there is no process from death unto life. We think of Nature as perfect; we rather regard her as struggling onwards that which is fittest to survive, and so essentially imperfect.

72A. ἐδόκει: viz., in 70 C, D.

αἱ ποι: "exist somewhere."

ἐν δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι: the infinitive in this relative clause may be explained either (1) as a case of attraction to the remaining infinitives (cf. the attraction to optative, &c., and G. § 235), or (2) as ag. confusedly on ἀναγκαῖον.

II. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄει ἀνταποδίδοι τὰ ἔτερα: "for if the one not always to correspond to the other in its coming into existence; i.e., "if the one process were not ever alternating with the other." Hence the whole argument is sometimes known as that from δοσις.

ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιώντα: the idea of a cycle was as prominent amongst the ancient thinkers as that of progress is in the 19th century. For instance, in the Republic, Plato thinks of the history of states as like κύκλος αὐξανομένη; and it is largely owing to the absence of any conception of continuous development that his notion of things in a state of transition (τὰ γεγονόμενα) arises. It is, too, that in this chapter Plato evidently assumes a something like our conservation of energy—that there is a
fixed quantum of soul in the universe, and that what seems to us a
new creation is really only the passing into a state perceptible by us
of something previously existent.

ἀνακάμπτοι τάλιν...καμπὴν ποιοῖτο: "revert again to the
former nor make a reflex course." The metaphor is from the διανύον
δρόμος, a race-course in shape like a hairpin, two parallels (κάλα)
joined by a semicircular turn. In this circuit of being, life is the
visible, death the invisible, κάλον; we can see the connecting link at
one end (ἀποθυόσκειν), but not at the other (ἀναβιώσκεισθαι)—Geddes.

tελευτώντα: "at last."

tό αὐτὸ σχήμα: without the second transition, from death to life,
all would become dead. The argument is put conversely in the
Republic—that all would become immortal. Both are regarded as
reductiones ad absurdum.

πάντ' ἄν λήρων...φαίνοιτο: "all things would prove the sleep
of Endymion to be rubbish, and it would appear valueless." Observe
that (1) πάντα is subject to ἀποδείξειν (Aorist Dorist for ἀποδείξαθαι;
(2) Ἐνδυμίων must be supplied as subject to φαίνοιτο; (3) τόν Ἔνδ. =
tά περὶ τοῦ Ἐνδυμίωνος λεγόμενα. For Endymion, see Index.

† Instead of πάντ' ἄν...ἀποδείξειν, some follow MSS. in omitting
ἄν, or substitute the future ἀποδείξῃ. But the ἄν is necessary, and
could hardly be understood from the second clause, though the
opposite is common.

72C. οὐδαμοῦ ἄν φαίνοιτο: cf. our own racing phrases: "Eclipse
first and the rest nowhere," and "not in it."

καθέδειν: epexegetic to ταύτῶν, which is to be taken with ἐκείνῳ.

κάν εἰ: this is somewhat different from the similar phrase in 71
(see note): the ἄν here being simply anticipatory of the ἄν in the
apodosis.

tο τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου: for Anaxagoras see M.A.P. p. 19, and Inde.
His influence on Socrates is fully shown below, Chap. xlv. The
words συγκρίνεσθαι (blend together), διακρίνεσθαι (keep distinct), see
like ἐκκρίνεσθαι (sift out), to have been borrowed by Anaxagoras from
Empedocles (M.A.P. pp. 17, 18).

μεταλάβοι...ἀποθάνοι: optatives by the influence of the sur-
rounding optatives in protasis. G. § 235.

72D. μὴ οὐ: after the notion of preventing implied in τίς μηχ
It is used much like the Latin quin, quominus, after verbs of hinder-
refusing, denying; G. §§ 263, 283. N.B.—Where μὴ would be
with an infinitive depending on a positive verb, μὴ οὐ is emp
when that verb is negative or equivalent to a negative, as here, τ
μηχανί; expects the answer "no," and hence is virtually neg-

ἐστι τῷ δυντι: "are actual truths," "it is a fact that."
XVIII. 72E. κατ’ ἐκείνον γε τὸν λόγον: either "talking about that," or "according to that theory."

ἀνάμνησις: "reminiscence," which in the Laws is defined as ἔπιρροή φρονήσεως ἀπολειπόντως. The post-existence of the soul having been proved by the argument from the generation of opposites, the pre-existence of the soul is now shown to follow from the Platonic theory of cognition. We come into the world with our general notions—which, amongst other things, Plato’s ἰδέαι are—lose them at birth, and gradually recover them; hence, the soul must have lived and known them before. The theory is worked out in Plato’s Meno; for some account of more modern theories of knowledge, see J. S. Mill, Logic, Book II.; Sully’s Outlines, Chaps. ii. and vii.

73A. πρὶν... γενέσθαι: observe that πρὶν with the infinitive can come after the negative sentence εἰ μὴ ᾗν only because the limitation applies to the past; if it were a future contingency, we should have πρὶν ἄν with the subjunctive.

ἀδάνατον ἡ ψυχὴ τι ἔσοκεν ἔναι: contrast the construction in 62D.

ἐν μὲν λόγῳ... καλλίστῳ: "in one single argument, and that a most beautiful one."

ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾶ: on this, of course, the whole test of the theory turns. Socrates excelled herein; in his own phrase, he practised his mother’s profession of midwifery (μαεντική τέχνη) and brought men’s thoughts to the birth. This is just what Plato means by Dialectic—the talitha cumi whereby our sleeping knowledge is raised to life.

αὐτοί: "of themselves"; cf. Latin ipsi, and a similar use, 63C, note.

ποιήσειν: the future infinitive after οἷς τε ἔναι is αἱ ἀπαξ λεγόμενον, the closest parallel being the future with κινδυνεύει. Some accordingly render to ποιήσαι.

ἐπειτα: answers to ἐν μὲν above; others read ἐπεῖ τοι.

Συγγράμματα: "mathematical figures." The slave in the Meno is shown, by a careful series of questions, to possess a large latent knowledge of mathematics. Besides Plato, Descartes and Leibnitz stand out amongst philosophers as attaching high importance to thematical truth, as being little affected by the senses.

3B. κατηγορεῖ: may either be impersonal (which lacks authority) take τις as its subject. The word means (1) accuse (with the geni-), (2) indicate, (3) predicate (in logic). Here it either has the nd of these meanings, or = "it is evident."

ἐφαμ ἄν: not of course the optative of polite request, but theative followed by ἄν = ἔδω.

μαί παθεῖν: "I require to myself experience the effects"; which more forcible than μαθεῖν, the reading of the MSS.
άναμφηθήναι: in apposition with αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο. For a similar case of apposition of the infinitive sans article, cf. 72C, καθεύθειν.

73C. ἐγέρων ἐννοήσῃ οὐ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη: "conceive the idea of something else of which the knowledge is not the same." Note the μὴ, expressing the indefiniteness of the thing alluded to, whereas οὐ would have implied a certain second thing. For this reference to what has been known, since Locke, as the association of ideas, see J. S. Mill, Logic, Book VI., Chap. iv.; Sully, Outlines of Psychology, Chap. vii.

73D. τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν: "their beloved," Lat. deliciæ.

tοῦτο: refers to the following words, as τὸ δὲ more usually does.

ἐγνωσάν: aorist of indefinite frequency, differing from the imperfect of frequency, which has its place in a narrative or series of dependent sequences, as absolute from relative (Geddes).

τολλάκισ: either often or perhaps; cf. above, on 60E.

τοιαύτ’ ἐν εἶ: sc. "if one cared to look for them." The optative potential.

γεγραμμένον: "painted." The order of the meanings of this word is: (1) scratch or grave, (2) draw, (3) paint, (4) write.

XIX. 74A. ἀφ’ ὀμολογо... καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομίων: Aristotle's classification is, more so, more complex—ἀφ’ ὀμολογο καὶ ἐναντίου καὶ τοῦ σύνεχου ("contiguous"); cf. also Mill and Sully, loc. cit. ἀφ’ ὀμολογο —the picture of Simmias reminding us of Simmias himself is an example of this.

eἰτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο... ἐκείνου: the verb is intransitive, τι being an adverbial accusative, and ἐκείνου representing that with which τοῦτο is contrasted; cf. ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου, 74D.

ξύλῳ: dative after ἴσον, understood.

пеρὰ ταῦτα πάντα: "over and above all this," or perhaps "compared with." Both meanings easily flow from the root notion of περὰ, alongside of—the one of vertical, the other of horizontal proximity.

αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον: "abstract equality," or equality itself, as distinguished from equality as it appears (φαίνεται) imitated in the things perceptible by the senses. As is hinted lower down, 75A, and fully explained in the Timaeus, &c., abstract equality is the model or exemplar (ἴδεα) which particular equal things struggle to imitate as their ideal. Plato's later word for this is μίμησις; earlier—e.g., in the Phaedo—he uses μέθεισ, κοινωνία (participation). Introduction §§ 2, 4.

There is thus, in Plato, a certain vagueness in describing the connection between the ideas and things. In the Timaeus he has to postulate a δημιουργός to bring together the ideas and the matter which they "inform," or make to be something. There, too, he identifies his ideas with the numbers of Pythagoras. This vagueness, and use o
terms which cannot be understood, constitutes the most striking mystic element in Plato's system. Mysticism has been defined as a "frank desertion of all logical procedure"; and so, though Plato never went such lengths in this as the Neo-Platonists, he is said to be a Mystic in so far as he used terms which he could not or would not define, and let Fancy fill gaps in his thought which the exacting would fain see filled by Reason.

74B. αὐτὸ δὲ ἐστὶν: "know what it is," lit. "know it, what it really is," *i.e.*, know its essence (*oūsia*), as distinguished from the *συμβεβηκότα* (or accidents) which accompany its concrete embodiments.

λαβόντες αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην: Mr. Archer-Hind points out that this does not mean that the knowledge of the idea is derived from the particulars, but that the knowledge that we possess of the idea is awakened by the perception of the particulars.

ἐξ ἄν: repeated in ἐκ τοῦτων, in the next line.

ἐκείνο: *i.e.*, abstract equality, "which is quite different from equal pieces of wood, &c."

† τῷ μὲν ἵσα... τῷ δὲ οὖ: v.l., τοῦτε μὲν... τοῦτε δ' οὖ. In the first case the allusion is to the difference of men's conceptions of equality; in the second, to the variance in a single man's mind at different times. The point insisted on is the fixity of the idea of equality as a standard, as contrasted with the uncertainty of its application. Distinguish ταύτα, τὰ αὐτὰ = "the same things," and ταὐτα, "these things."

αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα: there can be but one ἰδέα τοῦ ἵσου; how then explain the plural? It may (1) be a mere looseness of expression (Astell); or (2) refer to the idea as it presents itself to different men (Olympiodorus); or (3) arise from the consciousness that one equal thing implies another (Heindorf).

ταὐτά τε τὰ ἵσα: "these equal particulars."

The passage from οὖκοῦν ἦ ὁμοιότατον down to πάνυ μὲν οὖν has been rejected by several editors as irrelevant and an interpolation.

74C. ἐκεῖ ἄν: "as long as," "whenever," not "until," as in 59E, where see note.

74D. περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄξοις: "about the equality in logs, &c." μὲν δὲ: in 74A. In this sentence, having shown how the particular instances of equal things serve to recall the idea of equality, Plato proceeds to show that similar ideas must exist in our minds before we can observe equality in particulars: προειδότα ἐκείνο ὧν φησιν αὐτὸ οοσεικέναι (74E).

This is what is now called an Intuitionist or *a priori* theory of knowledge, in contrast to the Experimental or *a posteriori* theory. See Mill, Logic, Chaps. v.–vii., on experimental and necessary truths.
† ἐνδεί τι ἐκείνου τῷ μὴ τοιούτον εἶναι: "does it fall short of that (idea of equality) in some respect, in so far as it is not like equality itself." The sense is the same if the accusative τό be read instead of the dative τῷ (Geddes). With the reading τοῦ τοιούτου εἶναι (Schanz) take the genitives in apposition, and translate, "fall short of that, i.e., of being like the idea." Madvig's ἐκείνῳ τῷ τοιούτου εἶναι = "is there lacking aught to that attribute of resemblance to equality."

βούλεται: of inanimate objects, see note, 60B, and cf. ὀρέγεται, 75A.

75A. ὀρέγεται: for other words, besides ὀρεῖς, used by Plato to describe the relation of the particulars towards the ἴδεαι see 74A, note. "The ability to perceive the defect," notes Geddes, "implies the ability to conceive the perfect."

ταύτων δὲ πάντα ταύτα λέγω: "I say the same of all these"; i.e., all the senses suggest the universal idea underlying the particulars of which they have perception.

75B. τοῦ δὲ ἐστιν ἰσον: the substitution of a relative clause for a noun after the article is a common Platonic idiom.

ἐκείνῳ ἀνάλογων: "to refer to the ideal as a standard." This is again in direct opposition to Mill's standpoint that repeated experience of equal things enables us to arrive at the abstract notion of equality: it comes to the assertion that you cannot classify and arrange facts without a principle of classification. As Kant put it: "axioms do not come from experience, they are in experience."

† ὅτι προθυμεῖται... φαιλότερα: bracketed as a gloss on ἐκείνος, &c., by Hirscher, Schanz, and Archer-Hind.

γενόμενοι εὔθύς: "immediately after birth."

75C. πρὸ τούτων: i.e., before the exercise of the senses of sight, hearing, &c.

XX. ἐγενόμεθα ἐχοντες: "be born in possession of the knowledge."

75D. ἐπιστραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο δὲ ἐστι: "mark by the name of absolute," or "stamp the character of essence." Another reading τὸ δὲ ἐστι, which has the same meaning.

ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν... ἀποκρινόμενοι: describes the Socratic method of discovering truth by means of systematized conversation, or dialogue. Hence the name διαλεκτική, "the science of ideas," as it appears in the Republic. As time went on, Plato's dialogues approximated more and more closely to monologues, generally put into the mouth of Socrates, supported by a cast of κωφά πρόσωπα. The method fitted well in with the theory of ἄνάμνησις, and suited Socrates' habit of sifting men's conceptions of things with a view to attaining the underlying truth, but its animation was liable to be unreal and misleading, and it easily led to the negligence or avoidance
of difficult points. In Aristotle Dialectic has already sunk from its high place: it is πειραστική περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική.

καὶ εἶ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα: “if in every instance of our receiving it we have not forgotten”; taking ἐκάστοτε with λαβόντες, as it is contrary to the sense of the passage to take it with ἐπιλελήσμεθα, “for it has been forgotten at birth” (Archer-Hind).

eἰδώτας αὖ γύνεσθαι: “we must needs be born with this knowledge”; depends on ἀναγκαῖον, supplied from previous sentence.

λήθην...ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν: elsewhere defined by Plato as μνήμης or ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος.

75E. περὶ ταῦτα: i.e., the things of sense, often used in opposition to ἐκεῖνα, the ideas. Having proved in Chap. xix. that knowledge of the ideas preceded birth, Plato gives in 75E the second of two alternatives regarding it, the first being in 75D. Either (1) “we are born in full possession of such knowledge and retain it through life, or (2) “we lose it at birth and afterwards regain it.” The second is adopted because a man cannot give an account of it unaided.

πρὶν εἴχομεν: πρὶν = πρότερον. It is usually preceded by the neuter article in this sense. Perhaps, however, γενέσθαι has dropped out after the word.

οἰκεῖαν ἐπιστήμην: “our original (or innate) knowledge.” Note that ἐπιστήμη is the result of the process μάθησις, of which ἀνάμνησις is the method.

δυνατὸν...ἐφάνη: in 73C.

76A. ἀλθόμενον τι: of which the following three participles are explanatory.

ἐτερὸν τι: the antecedent to both ὁ and ὁ, and expressing the underlying idea; τοῦτον and τοῦτο referring to the thing perceived. Translate, “To form from this a conception of something different, which he had forgotten, and with which what he perceived was associated.”

ὁπέρ λέγω: like our “as I say,” refers back to a previous statement; see 75D, E.

δυνότα ἐτέρα: “we have one of two alternatives,” the second being the one adopted; see note περὶ ταῦτα, 75E.

οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἡ: the phrase is sometimes written οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἡ, which more clearly exhibits its origin as an elliptical phrase for οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν ἡ; cf. the note on τῷ ἄλλῳ ἡ, in 63D.

ἀνάμνησις ἢν εἴη: observe the optative to express the result supposing the second of the two alternatives. Translate, “in that case learning is reminiscence.”
XXI. 76B. εἰληφότες ἢμεν: “we were in possession”; the periphrasis expressing the mental state better than the simple perfect.

ἐλέσθαι: middle like aἰρέω, three lines above. N.B., aἰρέω = “I take; aἰροῦμαι = “I choose” (take for myself).

δούναι λόγον: “to give an account” or “reason.” The phrase becomes technical in Plato for δούναι λόγον τῆς οὐσίας = Aristotle’s τὸ δρᾶς καθόλου (Μ.Α.Π. p. 28, note 3) = “to give a definition of the essence of a thing” (find its differentia), or “state the principle of its existence.” On Definition, see Mill’s Logic, Book I., Chap. VIII.

μη... οὐκέτι... οὔδείς: for this intermixture of οὐ and μη see G., § 283.

αὔριον τηρικάδε: “at this hour to-morrow.” In answer to a similar expression of despondence, Socrates reassures the brothers in 78A.

76C. οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσι: “all, then, do not seem, &c... ?” ἄρα οὐ δοκοῦσι would mean, “do not all then seem... ?”

γιγνόμενοι: “at the moment of birth”; the only time left for the acquisition of the ideas if they were neither ante- nor post-natal.

76D. εἰεν: “be it so,” “good,” “granted”; the particle usually allows a point of the opponent preparatory to showing its absurdity.

ἐχοντες: the word is used in the Theaetetus to express conscious as opposed to unconscious knowledge. It is there contrasted with κτάσθαι, and the two states are compared respectively to having a bird in an aviary and in the hand.

ἀρτι: in 76B.

οὐδὲν εἰπὼν = φλωρῶν, ὑθῶν, the opposite of τι λέγειν. Simmias gives up the hypothesis introduced by εἰ μη ἄρα, 76C; for, as Socrates hints, we cannot both gain and lose the knowledge of the ideas at the same moment.

XXII. 76E. ἀναγκαῖον: here the apodosis begins.

οὕτως... οὕτως: “just as... so.”

† ὑπάρχουσαν... ὁτίως: Mr. Archer-Hind brackets these words as spoiling the sense, for there is no meaning in saying that the ideas themselves are our own. If ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα ἀπεικάζομεν is a pointless repetition, ταῦτα has to be taken in a different sense to that which it bears in the rest of the passage. Bracketing these words—the infinitive εἰλα will depend on οὕτως ἐχει—at the beginning of the chapter, translate: “If that which we are always talking of exists—absolute beauty, &c.—just as this actually exists, so did our soul exist before we were born.”

εἰ δὲ μη ἐστὶ ταῦτα: “if these ideas do not exist,” or, weakening the verb and reading μη ἐστι, “if this is not so.” Note the irregular optative in apodosis, expressing the absurdity of a denial of the
existence of the idea. Note that in the previous line \( \tau \alpha \nu \tau a \) = the things perceptible to the senses.

\( \epsilon i \mu \eta \tau a \nu \tau a , \sigma \nu \delta e \tau \alpha \delta e : \) i.e., the pre-existence of the soul (\( \tau \alpha \delta e \)) and the existence of the ideas (\( \tau a \nu \tau a \)) are complements the one of the other, neither being able to stand if the other falls. The sentence is an admirably compact illustration of two common distinctions—between \( \delta \tau o s \) and \( \delta \delta e \), and between \( \delta \nu \) and \( \mu \eta \).

\( \epsilon i \zeta \kappa a l \nu \kappa a t a f e \gamma i \) \( \delta \lambda \gamma o s \) \( \epsilon i \) \( \tau o \) : “the argument makes for a good port, viz., the proof that,” &c.

XXIII. 77A. \( \tau i \) \( \delta e \) \( \delta \eta \) \( K e \beta \eta i \) : sc. \( \delta \delta e k i \), implied in the \( \epsilon \nu r a \gamma e s \) \( \delta \nu \), above.

\( k a r t e p \alpha \tau a t o s \) \( \alpha \nu \theta r o \tau \alpha \) \( \pi r o s \) \( \tau o \) \( \alpha \rho i o t e i n \) : see 63A for a similar remark about Cebes, and Chap. xxxvii. for a practical illustration.

XXIII. 77B. \( \epsilon \nu \epsilon \) \( \epsilon \) \( \sigma t a i \) : the argument from \( \alpha \nu \delta \mu \nu \eta i o s \), thinks Simmias, proves the pre-existence of the soul; more proof (\( \pi r o o - \alpha p o \delta e i t a i \), 77C) is needed that the soul continues to live after death. This is given in Chaps. xxv.-xxviii.: eternal ideas imply an eternal soul.

\( \epsilon n e \) \( s t i k e n e v \) : “still stands in our way.” \( \epsilon n e \) \( s t a i o s \) (Lat. \( i n s t a n t i a \)) was Aristotle’s technical term for an “objection” raised to an argument.

XXIV. This chapter is especially adduced as evidence by those who deny that \( \alpha \nu \tau i p \alpha \delta o \tau o s i s \) and \( \alpha \nu \delta \mu \nu \eta i o s \) are two distinct demonstrations of immortality. They may, however, be fairly regarded as two distinct, though complementary arguments in favour of the theory,
the only proof being what we call argument (5). Introduction, §§ 4, 5.

δοκεῖσ: observe the singular, καὶ Σιμμίας being added to the subject by an afterthought.

ηδέως ἂν διαπραγματεύσασθαι: "would gladly thrash this argument out." The ἂν goes with this infinitive only, not with δεδέναι. The ἂν with the infinitive equivalent in indirect speech to ἂν with optative or secondary tenses of indicative. The context will decide as to which mood is to be taken. G. § 211.

δεδέναι τὸ τῶν παιδῶν: "to fear the fear of children." The verb is followed by the indicative with μὴ here, "because what we fear is, not lest the wind should blow the soul away, but lest it is a fact that it does so" (Archer-Hind). This use with the indicative enabled the Greeks to express shades of meaning the Latins could not. Cf. Farrar, Greek Syntax, p. 184, note; and Goodwin, § 218, note.

77E. νηνεμία: "calm" (νή, ἄνεμος).

ἐν τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παις: "perhaps there is some child within us," not "amongst us." It became a stock phrase for the irrational part of the soul.

φοβεῖται: N.B., φοβεῖ = I terrify; φοβοῦμαι = I fear.

τὰ μορμολύκεα: "goblins," or "bogies"; ugly masks used to frighten children.

ἐπάδευ... ἔως ἂν ἐξεπάγητε: "to sing charms... until you have charmed away the child that is in you." ἔως with ἂν and aorist subjunctive = Latin future perfect.

78A. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη: such an expression of comprehensive feeling towards non-Greeks may be held to be in Plato's mouth a word of acknowledgment for what of good he had picked up in his travels outside the Grecian world. Yet doubtless he would have thoroughly agreed with Epicurus' opinion that none but Greeks could be philosophers, for in the Politicus he expressly distinguishes the Hellenes from other nations round the Sea as possessing τὸ φιλομαθές. Xenophon in his Cyropaedia and Aristotle in his Ethics (οἰκείον ἄπασ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπῳ καὶ φίλον, VII. 1) are almost the first to hint at what the Stoics made a leading part of their system—the conception of Humanity as a whole.

ὁς... ὁ τι ἂν: ὁς = "since." Connect ἂν with the verb, not with ὁ τι. G. § 207.

εὐκαρπότερον: "more appropriately." Schanz reads ἀναγκαιωτέρον: "there is no cause which has such a claim on your purse."

μετ' ἀλλήλων... μᾶλλον ὑπὲρ δυναμένους: observe the expression of hope put into Socrates' mouth that his teaching should be kept up. His followers were not, however, to "make disciples," but to find teachers.
78B. *eι σοι ἡδομένω ἐστίν*: this dative of remote reference may be referred to G. § 184, 3, and cf. Quibusque bellum invitatis aut cupien-
tibus erat (Tacitus, Ann. I., c. 59).

XXV. ἦ δὲ ὅ ὑψικράτης: "said he, *i.e.* S."; a survival of the
time before article, relative, and demonstrative were discriminated.

*ἐαυτούς* = ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς or ἀλλήλους.

*πότερον ἢ ψυχή*: which of the two the soul is, *i.e.*, liable to disper-
sion or not.

78C. *συντεθέντω τε καὶ συνθέτω*: "that which has been formed by
composition and is thus a compound." *φύσει* may be taken either
with these words or with ἀροσήκει.

μὴ τάσχειν ταύτα: *i.e.*, διατέθηκαν ταύτη ἤπερ συνετέθη.

κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὁσαύτως: "the same and in the same state." κατὰ ταύτa = "in the same plane." κατά with accusative represents
*horizontal* motion; with genitive, *vertical* motion.

τὰ δὲ . . . κατὰ ταύτα: *sc. ἔχοντα* from previous ἔχει.

ταύτα δὲ εἶναι: observe that δὲ here has the force of δὴ,* being a
resumptive particle emphasizing the previous clause; cf. τῶντο δὲ in
81B. It is closely parallel to δὲ in *apodosis*.

ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν λόγῳ: 75D, where see note on Plato's *Dialectic*.

*ἡ* λόγον διδομεν τοῦ εἶναι: "of the existence of which we give the
proofs," or perhaps better, "the definition whereof we give as
*Being.*" In the first case *ἡ* depends on *εἶναι*; in the second, *τοῦ
eλαι* is epexegetical and might just as well be the accusative, *τὸ εἶναι,*
as Madvig reads.

78D. *αὐτὸ ἐκαστόν, ὅ ἐστιν, τὸ ὅν*: "every individual reality (or
entity) that exists." The following μὴ is the interrogative particle
(*nom* ) expecting the answer *No* (G. § 282, 2).

*οὐδαμή* οὐδαμῶς: "in no manner of fashion," the former properly
expressing *way* (locally), the latter *mode.* Note that such an accumu-
lution of negatives do not in Greek cancel one another, save where
they belong to different predicates, and in cases like that given in
G. § 283, 8.

τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν: "what of the many men," &c. *περι*, *about,*
would be more precise but less Platonic. After τί δὲ, not only the
genitive but also the nominative and accusative are found with this
meaning. *καλῶν* seems to spoil the sense.

78E. *τῶν ἐκείνων ὁμωνύμων*: "things which are called by the same
names," *i.e.*, "equal" or "beautiful."

οὕτε αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς . . . κατὰ ταύτα: this conception of the phenomenal
world as in a state of ceaseless flux, Plato took from Heraclitus of
Ephesus (M.A.P. pp. 4-7), whose watchword was πάντα ἰδι, "every-
thing is like a river which changes so quickly that one could not step
twice, perhaps not even once, into the same river." Translate: "They never at all, roughly speaking, preserve any constant position towards themselves or towards each other."

79A. κἂν ἄψαιο: "could you not both touch," &c.; potential use of optative.

ὅτι ποτὲ ἄν ἄλλω: N.B. ὅτι from ὅτις, ἄλλω from ὅτις.

τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογίσμῳ: διανοία is here used in the general sense of mind, not in the special sense in which it is used in the Republic (M.A.P., p. 55, note).

λογίσμῳ: instrumental dative.

XXVI. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει: cf. the similar omission of a conjunction in Latin such phrases as Fac abeas. This phrase had probably its origin in the hortatory use of the subjunctive; Θῶμεν = "let us lay down," and then βούλει was added = "do you wish?" Cp. οἷς θ' δράσον, passim. The position of the words is unusual; hence some insert εἰ before βούλει.

ἀείδες: "invisible" (from α and εἰδω), not "formless" (Stallbaum). This chapter contains a simple summary of Plato's distinction between the ideal and the phenomenal worlds which is itself the guiding notion of his metaphysics. For his picture of the former he was almost as much indebted to Parmenides the Eleatic (M.A.P., pp. 15, 16) as to Heraclitus for the latter (note on 78E). But what each of those philosophers took for a complete analysis of the universe, Plato regarded as only true of one portion, and wove together their contrary hypotheses into a harmonious theory. Introduction, §§ 2, 4.

Θῶμεν: hortative subjunctive.

79B. ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σωμά ἐστι: the genitive has been variously taken as depending on the words that follow, or those that precede it. If the former, ἄλλο τι simply = nonne (cf. 63D, note); if the latter, the division is exhaustive—"Is there aught else of us but body and soul?" The second construction suits the reply οὔτεν ἄλλο better. In the first case translate: "Is not one part of ourselves body, the other soul?"

παντὶ ... τῷ ὀρατῷ: the first dative is masculine and governed by ἡλιον, the second is neuter and governed by ὀμοιότερον.

οὗ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων γε: sc. ὀρατόν.

ἀορατον . . . ἀείδες: Plato seems to prefer the latter word as suggesting a connection with "Ἀδήνας (cf. esp. 80D), which he would have us believe to be, like the invisible, the sphere of true existence (Archer-Hind).

ὀμοιότερον ψυχῆ σώματος: σώματος, genitive after the comparative.

XXVII. 79C. τάλαι ἐλέγουμεν: in 65-68. Had the discussion immediately preceded, the present would be used.

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"becomes dizzy" (έλαω); \( \tau οιόυτων = \pi λανωμένων \), &c. As we should say, the mind adapts itself to its environment.

79D. \( \epsilon ζήν αυτή \): "it is permitted to it so to do." Liddell and Scott write this present subjunctive of \( \epsilon λεστή \) as \( \epsilon η \).

\( \pi επαναται \): N.B. \( \pi άω, "make to cease"; \( \pi ανομεια, \) intransitive, "to cease."

\( \pi ερι \ \epsilon Κείνα \): sc. \( \dot{o} \sigma σα \). For \( \pi ερι \), see G. § 191, VI. 5.

\( \dot{a} τε \): note use of \( \dot{a} τε \) with participle, where we use finite verb, and ep. \( \kappa ατέρπ \).

\( \pi άθημα \): "condition." For \( \phi ρόνησις \), see note on Chap. x., 65A.

\( \kαλώς \ \kαλ \ \άληθή \): for this collocation of adverb and adjective, Geddes compares Terence, Adelphi, 609, \( \text{Et recte et verum dicis.} \)

79E. \( \piάς \ \dot{α}ν \ \muοι \ \dοκεί \): \( \dot{α}ν \) going with the infinitive by hyperbaton; and note personal use of \( \dοκεί \) where we should say, "it seems that every one would," &c. If \( \sigmaνχωρήσατο \) be read, \( \muοι \ \dοκεί \) is parenthetic.

\( \dot{ε} λω \ \kαλ \ \pαντί \): "altogether." Geddes compares the legal phrase \( \text{all and whole.} \)

XXVIII. \( \kαλ \ \τήδε \): the soul has been shown to be like the ideas, as being both invisible and changeless; its superiority to the body is now shown by the fact that it rules it. \( \text{Auriga membrorum anima.} \)

80A. \( \dot{ο} \ιον \): "so to speak."

\( \tauάδε \): i.e., (1) \( τ\phi \ \muεν \ldots \psiνχήν \), (2) \( τ\phi \ \dε \ldots \sigma\wma. \)

80B. \( \psiνχήν \): this is simpler than the MSS. reading \( \psiνχή \), which would require the repetition of \( \sigmaμβαίνει \). For the construction in that case, cf. 67C, note.

\( \dνότητα \): usually "unintelligent," "silly"; here "unintelligible," "not the object of intelligence."

XXIX. \( \dot{η} \ \dot{ε}γγύς \ \tauι \ \τούτου \): these words imply a consciousness that the argument is not quite thorough. It may prove, as Cebes points out in Chap. xxxvii., that the soul lasts longer than the body, but not that it is immortal. This notion of a \text{limited} immortality was taken up by the Stoics, who imagined a series of cycles of existence, each ending with a conflagration (\( \dot{ε}κπύρωσις \)).

80C. \( \tauο \ \sigma\wma \ldots \ \dιαπνείσθαι \): all amplifying \( \tauο \ \muεν \ \dρατόν \). Translate the two last infinitives, "to fall away and evaporate"; the last word, seeming less appropriate to the body than to the soul, is usually omitted.

\( \dot{ε}πιεικώς \ \dot{συνχύν}ν \ \chiρόνον \): "a fairly long time." To this the words \( \kαλ \ \pανυ \ \μάλα \) below refer back: "a very considerable time indeed."
NOTES, 79C—81A.

χαριέντως ἔχων: “in good condition,” i.e., fresh, plump, and vigorous.

ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὠρῇ: “at a like time of life,” i.e., at a vigorous time of life. τοιαύτῃ simply standing for χαριέσσῃ; cf. above, 79C.

συμπεσόν: “fallen in.” “shrank in,” as the body naturally does on being disembowelled. ταριχευδέν: “embalmed.” The word is also used of other means of preserving perishable matter—smoking, pickling, salting. τάριχος, salt fish, like our stock-fish, is applied to a dullhead.

οἱ ἐν Διυππυρῳ ταριχευθέντες: a full account of Egyptian processes of embalming is given in Herodotus ii., 86–89.

ὀλιγον: “nearly”; genitive of ablation, δεῖν being understood; the full phrase is δεῖν ὀλιγον δεῖν, so that it wants but little. ἀμύχανον δυσομὰ χρόνον: “an inconceivable time”; cf., in Latin, immane quantum.

80D. σαπήν: 2nd aorist passive subjunctive of σὴνω, I make rotten; σήπουμαι, I become rotten, mortify.

ἀειδῆς, εἰς “Αἴδου: see note on 79B and cf. 81C. The derivation here suggested seems the right one, the only difficulty being the aspirate. It is at any rate better than that in Plato’s Cratylus, from a intensive, and εἴδέναι, meaning the god who knows all. For the matter in hand, cf. 63B.

αὐτῆ δὲ δὲ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη, κ.τ.λ.: resumes the opening words of the sentence, ἡ δὲ ἰσχυρὰ ἄρα: “does a soul like this of ours,” ἡμῖν being Ethic dative.

διαπεφύσημα: the perfect is emphatic, denoting the immediate result of death on the soul.

πολλοῦ γε δεῖ: “far from it.” For the sentiment, cf. Chap. xii.

μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος: μηδὲν on account of the hypothesis.

80E. ἐκοῦσα ἔλαι: “willingly”; see note on 61C.

συνηθροισμένη: equivalent to our colloquial “keep to oneself.”

μελετῶσα ἄεὶ τοῦτο: the recurrence to this point leads S. to remind his hearers of their previous talk about it (64A, 67D). On Cebes showing by his πανταπαί γε that he remembered what had been said, S. returns to his point, and sums up his remarks from πολλοῦ γε . . . ἄεὶ τοῦτο in the words οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα.

81A. ἄγριων ἐρωτῶν: “wild passions”; always in Plato implicitly contrasted with the philosophic ἐρως whose yearning after Truth is depicted in the Symposium.

κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων: see note 69C. In such connexions κατὰ usually means against, here simply concerning, like Latin de, down from (e.g., Plato’s time); cf. Aristotle, ὅσπερ ἔρημαι κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν.
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by a very natural anacolouthon for the dative, as strictly speaking it should be, being co-ordinate with ἀπηλλαγμένη. A similar instance is quoted from Thuc., VII. 42: τοὺς μὲν Συρακοσίους κατάπληξες ἐγένετο... δρῶντες. Besides, in this case the participle may refer back to the subject of ἀπέρχεται. Archer-Hind, however, considers the nominative a solecism, and thinks that in the quoted passage of Thucydides there is a constructio ad sensum, since τοῖς μὲν... κατάπληξες = οἱ Συρακόσιοι διεπιλάγησαν. This reason cannot be alleged in this passage; hence he reads the dative.

XXX. 81B. γεγονητευμένη: “bewitched.” γόης is one who shrieks (γοάω) enchantments, a charlatan.

μηδὲν ἀλλο... ἄλλ’ ἦ: the ἄλλα introduces the contrast to μηδὲν, the ἦ to ἀλλο; cf. 76A, note. οὗ: the genitive relative is made to serve asl. with γοάω, πλοι, &c.; cf. 65A, 82D.

οὕτω δὴ ἐχοσαν: recapitulates the whole of the previous sentence: “Do you think a soul like this...?” From ἄτε τῷ σώματι... φεύγειν describes in what way the soul is μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος: (1) by what it does to the body (ἄτε... χρήσατο); (2) by what it does to itself (τῷ δὲ... φεύγειν). The clause τούτῳ δὲ refers to τῷ δὲ... αἴρετον; for the resumptive δὲ see note, 78C.

81C. ἐλικρινή: see note, 66A.

dιειλημμένη γε: “interpenetrated,” still governed by οἷς. “The soul’s substance is as it were adulterated with a material alloy” (Archer-Hind).

αὕτη: connect either with ἐνυφαίνον (ingrained) or with ἐνυφώναι.

ὁσπερ λέγεται: observe how Plato takes a piece of folk-lore to illustrate his own deeper doctrine—that the soul which does not keep itself aloof from things of earth, becomes of the earth earthy, and so visible.

81D. κυλινδουμένη: “hovering,” “flitting,” or “prowling around.”

καὶ ὠφή: kal emphasises the ὠφή, “actually,” “even.”

αι μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθείσαι: generic μὴ; cf. G. § 283, 4.

εἰκὸς μέντοι: “it is indeed likely”; μέντοι here used in eager or positive assent; often = “however.”

καὶ οὗ τί γε... εἶναι: note the emphatic negative, and that εἶναι depends on εἰκὸς.

τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς... κακῆς οὔσης: “their former. behaviour, for it was bad.” τροφῆς usually of physical sustenance, not, as here, of moral conduct (ἐξίς).

81E. τοῦ ἐνυφαίνοντο τοῦ σωματειδοῦς: “the bodily form that clings to them.” This material form causes desires which cannot be satisfied till the soul has once more united itself to a body.
XXXI. eis toiauta ἡθη ὑπον τοτ' ἀν ... τὐχωσιν: “to creatures having just such habits as they actually practised during life.” On this doctrine of Metempsychosis, see above on 70C, M. A. P. p. 89. In the myth of Er the Armenian, which closes the Republic, the way in which the previous life affected the soul’s choice of a new one is elaborately worked out. The soul might enter, not merely into animals, but into vegetables (note 70D); hence Horace’s jest to Iccius (I. Epp., 12, 21)—Seu pisces seu porrum et caepe trucidas. The word μετεμψύχωσις is not itself classical, Herodotus (II. 123) using ἐσθήσαν and περίλυσις.

γαστρομαγγίας ... φιλοσοφίας: “all sorts of gluttony, crime, and drunkenness.”

μή διευλαβημένους: “who have not taken heed to their ways.” So too εὐλαβής, careful, is the stock word in the N.T. for a good man (Attic, σπουδαῖος).

82A. ἱεράκων καὶ ἱκτίνων: “falcons and kites.” ἱκτίνων is from ἱκτίνος, which has heteroclitic accusative singular and nominative plural, ἱκτίνω, ἱκτίνινος. Distinguish from ἱκτις, ἱκτίδος, a marten.

† τοῖς ἄν ἄλλοσε φαίμεν: “where else can we say that souls go?” So Stallbaum. If ἄλλοσε φαίμεν be read, ἄν goes with the infinitive, to which the uncertainty contained in the particle seems less appropriate than to the verb of assertion.

ἀμέλεια: properly the imperative of ἀμελεῖ σε; lit., “don’t bother” (about elucidating it any further), and so “doubtless,” adverbially.

καὶ τάλλα, ἄν ἐκαστα τοῖς: “where each of the rest would go.” ἄν goes with the verb, not with ἦ (as in G. § 207, 2).

κατὰ τὰς ... τῆς μελέτης: “according to the similitude of their pursuits.”

τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν: “the public and civil,” or “popular and social, virtue,” which wins a man the praise of respectability. Such virtue is called σκιαγραφία τίς in 69B, where see note. It is the virtue which is practised because it pays best or because it happens to be more natural; it is utilitarian or impulsive, whilst the virtue of the philosopher is the result of what Aristotle would call moral choice (προαίρεσις), in other words, of the knowledge of what is good and of the love therefor (φύνησις, ἔρως). Only those who are virtuous in this last way “walk with God” (Chap. xxxii.). Mr. Archer-Hind has an Appendix on the subject which repays reading.

ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ: kind of hendiadys for “philosophic reflection.”

82B. ἄνδρας μετρίους “good honest men,” “worthy citizens”—the kind of people who wear top-hats and black coats on Sunday.

† XXXII. 82C. ἀλλ' ἦ τῷ φιλομαθεί: “except to the lover of learning,” who is in the Republic expressly identified with the φιλό-
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The phrase is rather awkward: hence, instead of ἀλλ' ἦν, some read ἀλλὰ (sc. θέμις ἐστὶν) or ἀλλὰ ἦν. In the latter case ἀλλὰ will be in apposition to φιλοσοφήσαντι.

ὁ ἑταίρης: singular though two persons are addressed, as in ὦ φίλε, 80E; cf. too 77D.

οὖ τι οἰκοθαριάν . . . φοβοῦμενοι: i.e., in the language of to-day, "not from utilitarian motives." The point has been previously discussed in 68D, E, 69A: δι' ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονίσθαι, &c.

ἐπετα: recalls τοῦτων ἐνεκκα after the statement of the reasons which do not actuate the philosopher.

82D. οἷς τι: the relative suits in case only μέλει, but is made to serve also as the subject to ζῶσι in the next clause; cf. 81B.

† σώματι πράττοντες: "working for the body." The first word is unaltered, the second is Ast's conjecture for the MSS. πλάττοντες (moulding), which some editions retain, reading either σώμα τι or σώματα. Stallbaum, who reads πλάττοντες, compares Latin fingere vultum, inessum.

χαίρειν εἰπόντες: literally, "bidding farewell to," and so "turning one's back on," "despising."

ἀυτοῖς: goes both with εἰπόντες and κατὰ ταῦτα: "to them," and "the same way as they do."

XXXIII. 82E. τοῦ εἴργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα: really the subject of ἐστὶν, but attracted into the principal clause as object to κατιδοῦσα (prolepsis). This is very common in Latin and Greek, especially when emphasis is to be laid on the subject of the relative clause.

ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστὶν . . . τοῦ διδάσκαλον: "this strong imprisonment arises from desire, so that the bondsman may be most of all an abettor in his bondage"; i.e., desire enslaves the soul; the soul knows this, and, consequently, if it does not fight down desire, it helps to make itself bond, not free. Other renderings of the first part are to take δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστὶν (literally, "is by way of desire") as a periphrasis either for ἐπιθυμεῖ or for ἐπιθυμεῖται. The ὁς ἄν μᾶλιντα clause is variously interpreted as (1) expressing the object of the desire, or (2) the manner in which it works. In (1) translate "(so) that" as if ὁς were ἄστε ἄν; in (2) "in which case."

τοῦ διδάσκαλον: ordinary genitive after a noun. If the MSS. τὸ be retained, the dative goes with the preposition in ξυλήπτωρ.

83A. ὥπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκοντι: repeats the γιγνώσκοντι of 82D; recapitulates the earlier part of this long sentence 82D–83B, which must be broken up in translation. The principal verb is γιγνώσκοντι; down to the end of 82E describes the condition of the soul as observed by philosophy; this is summed up in οὗτος ἔχουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν (83A). In παραμυθεῖσαι and ἐπιχειρεῖ we are told what philosophy does; in
NOTES, 82c—84a.

εὐδεικνυμένη, πείθουσα, and παρακελευνομένη how it does it. The infinitives χυλλέγεσθαι, ἀθροίζεσθαι, πιστεύειν, and ἤγείσθαι depend on παρακελευνομένη; χρήσθαι depends on ἀνάγκη, and εἰσάγει on ἤγείσθαι.

πείθουσα δὲ κ.τ.λ.: "persuading her to withdraw from their jurisdiction, as far as she is not compelled to make use of them." μή: generic use.

αὐτὴν αὐτῇ... αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν: observe the accumulation to add force to the exhortation in favour of isolation. For the use of αὐτή cf. that of ipse in Latin, as in ipse suo gladio cecidit.

83B. δι' ἄλλων: "by other means," i.e., of the senses. ἐν ἄλλωσ ὀν ἄλλο: "varying with varying conditions."

εἶλαι δὲ τὸ μὲν κ.τ.λ.: "such a thing belongs to the perceptible and visible world."

οὔδὲν τοσοῦτον: tosoouton does not here express greatness but littleness, as tantum sometimes does in Latin. Translate, "does not merely suffer such harm as one might think," &c.

οὖν: "as for instance." These are examples of the evils which seem great to the μέτριοι ἄνδρες, but to the philosopher seem light compared with the πάντων μέγιστον κακόν described below.

83C. ἐπὶ τῷ: "at something." The greatest evil is the mistake of thinking that the reality and truth of things is proportionate to the intensity of feeling they cause.

83D. προσηλοῖο... καὶ προσπερόνα: from ἡλος (nail) and περόνη (pin of a brooch), respectively.

ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι: σώματι dative on account of ὁμο—dative of resemblance.

ὁμότροπος τε καὶ ὁμότροφος: "have the same moods and manners"; an example of paronomasia.

ἀναπλέα: this feminine form of a compound of πλέως is Ionic, and is rare in Attic. For the meaning, cf. 67A, note.

ὁστερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι: "grows again as if sown."

83E. ἀμοιρὸς τῆς... συννουσίας: for this genitive of ablation after adjectives compounded with the privative a, see G. § 180; cf. ἀγευστὸς κακῶν.

XXXIV. οὐχ ὃν οἱ πόλλοι ἐνεκά φασίν: sc. κόσμωι εἶναι καὶ ἄνδρει, i.e., because they know the eternal results of vice, not because they fear its immediate disadvantages; cf. Chap. xiii.

ἡ σὺ οὐιμ; sc. "that the popular view is right?"

84A. ἑαυτὴν λύειν: ἑαυτὴν refers back to the soul of the philosopher, to which also the following αὐτὴν and ἑαυτὴν refer, ἐκείνης meaning φιλοσοφία.
PHAEHO.

ἀνήνυτον ἔργων . . . μεταχειριζομένην: “and so make the work of philosophy of none effect—weaving a kind of Penelope’s web the reverse way.” With this reading, the participle agrees with “the soul,” and Πηνελόπης depends on ἵστον, though Prof. Geddes makes it governed by ἐναντίως. If the MSS. μεταχειριζομένης be retained, translate, “perform the abortive task of Penelope who wove, &c.” ἐναντίως: because the Soul weaves and reweaves the web of sin which Philosophy unravels.

γαλήνην: “a calm,” “respite”; metaphor from the weather. τούτων referring to the pleasures and pains which represent the stormy winds that toss the soul.

ἀδὲ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα: “devoted thereto”; cf. πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἤν, 84C, and Horace’s totus in illis.

tὸ ἀδόξαστον: “the absolute”; lit., “that which is not a matter of opinion, and so is certain.” In the Republic δόξα and ἐπιστήμη are the faculties whereby the world of sense and the ideal world respectively are apprehended.

δος μή: may either be final (“that it may not”), in which case it is epexegetical to ταῦτα γε, or be taken with φανερός (“lest it be”). The latter is more probable, as it makes the answer to Cebes’ objection in 70A more pointed. For these two uses of δος μή, see G. §§ 216, 217.

XXXV. 84C. πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἤν: “was wrapped up in the foregoing discussion.”

ός ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο: “as far as could be seen.” A pleonastic expression, like ὁς ὅπως φανέρετο in Eur. Heracl. Main.: literally, it means “as he seemed to look on, judging by appearances.”

μῶν μή: “what we have said does not . . . does it?” μῶν μή: = num? μῶν οὖ; = nonne? μῶν is a Dorian contraction for μή οὖν.

ὑποφίλας καὶ ἀντιλαβᾶς: “doubts and objections.” ἀντιλαβῆς (cf. ἀντιλαβῆς in 87A, ἀντιλαμβάνεται in 88D), is a metaphor from the wrestling-ring; lit., “a place to catch hold of to trip an adversary.”

οὐδὲν λέγω: “I hold my tongue”; an expression of apology for the interruption, quite different from the use of οὐδὲν λέγειν commented on in 76D.

αὐτόι = ulro: “of your own accord.” Other uses in 63C, 73A.

84D. φαίνεται βελτινὸν ἄν λεχθήναι: “could have been better put.” If the ἄν be omitted, as in the MSS., the infinitive must be ascribed a dictative force, “must be said.” (Geddes.)

καὶ ὅσ: demonstrative, as in ἦ δ᾽ ὅσ, 78B, &c.

βαβαί: Latin papae! an expression of surprise—“Well I never!” ἦ ποι: “surely, methinks.”
84E. διάκειμαι: taken by some as subjunctive (which would be διακέμαι), but is more probably indicative. "Verbs of fearing, followed by μη with the indicative, express an ironical doubt of what the mind is really sure." (Sidgwick.) See too on 77D. It is particularly appropriate here. Simmias had expressed a fear—μη σου ἀνέδει: Socrates gently reproves their inability to understand his present cheerfulness.

τὴν μαντικὴν: accusative of respect. The swan was the bird of Apollo, the God of Light; the raven was his as the Destroyer. The notion of "making a swan-like end, fading in music" has become a commonplace of poetry. Cf. Tennyson's poem, "The Dying Swan."

85A. παρὰ τὸν θεόν: cf. above, 69D, E.

tοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων: may either be taken as genitives governed by καταψεύδονται, "speak falsely of" (G. § 171), or the first genitive may go with δέος, and the καὶ be taken as emphasizing the verb; "go so far as to calumniate the swans."

θρηνοῦντας . . . έξέδειν: "sing a dirge at their death"; the idea is dying away (or off) in music.

ὁγοι: ὠγοι seems the more correct Attic form for the subjunctive.

η τε ἄνδρων καὶ χελιδόν καὶ ο ἐπού: "nightingale, swallow, hoopoe." Note that one article does for both: the first two nouns, being alike feminine.

ά δή φασι: "which they say"; the italics giving the force of δή. The neuter is used in reference to ἄρσεν above.

85B. τὰ ἐν "Αἴδου ἄγαθα ἄδου: another pun on Αἴδου, but less significant than that in 80D, where see note.

ὁμόδουλος: regarded like ἰέρος below as a noun and so taking a genitive, not a dative, after it.

ἰέρος τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ: Socrates regarded himself as Apollo's, both (1) as the god who had said by the mouth of his priestess at Delphi that he was the wisest of men, and had thus (as Socrates explains in the Apology) given him as his life's occupation the task of showing others their ignorance; and (2) especially on his death-day, "when men are most wont to possess Apollo's gift of prophecy."

οὗ χείρον . . . έχευν: "in the prophetical art I have from my master, I am no whit less worthy than they"; χείρον έχευν being the usual use of έχευν to express condition. Others read χείρον (or contracted χεἴρα): "that I have from my master the gift of prophecy not inferior to them"—by brachylogy for τῆς έκείνων, "theirs."

ἔος Ἀθηναίων ἔωτιν ἄνδρες ἐνδέκα: for the allusion, see above on 58C. ἔως by itself is somewhat unusual with the subjunctive (see above, on 50E), but expresses well enough the limited time at disposal. Many, however, insert αν, some also οφ, to make the sentence conform to grammatical rules: others (better) regard ἔωσιν as indicative.
85C. τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἶδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βιω: cf. Simmias’ doubtfulness in 107A. The impossibility of knowing all completely in one lifetime was in fact one of Plato’s (τὰς δὲ πειρὰς καὶ σοὶ) chief inducements to believe in the continued existence of the soul either in body, after body, or elsewhere. It was his only way to escape out of Xenophanes’ cry of despair:—

δόκοι δ’ ἐπὶ τάσι τέτυκαται.

μὴ οὖχι: this is a somewhat strained example of the use given in G. § 283, 7, though μαλακός εἶναι ἄνδρός is only a semi-negative expression (= unworthy).

καὶ μὴ προαπίστασθαι: this makes nonsense if taken, as it looks, as simply co-ordinate with the previous infinitive. It may be regarded as (1) parenthetic, being equivalent to μὴ προαπίστασθαι; or (2) negated by the previous μὴ οὖχι: “not to not leave off,” = “to desist.”

πρὶν ἀν ... ἀπείπη: “faints”; cf. our phrase, “swear off.” For πρὶν ἀν, see G. §§ 239, 240. μαλακός ἄνδρος: predicative, or possessive, genitive, G. § 169. εἶναι: depends on δοκεῖ, five lines above.

ἡ μαθεῖν ... ἣ εὑρεῖν: the four alternatives seem to be (1) to learn the Truth from others, (2) to find it out for oneself, (3) to take the nearest approximation thereto amongst men, (4) to accept some divine message. To Simmias, the Mystic, the fourth seems the best, and he expresses himself accordingly: δεῖν διαπράξασθαι one of the first three εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο, &c.

eι ταῦτ’ ἄδυνατον: observe the singular adjective in the predicate.

85D. ἐπὶ τούτου ... διαπλεύσαι τὸν βιον: “to embark on this, like one who encounters danger on a raft, and thus to sail through life.”

ἡ λόγου θείου τινός: if this “divine message” is the “stronger conveyance” meant, &c. must be omitted, as &c. = aut., not vel.; in other words, it introduces an alternative thing, not merely an alternative expression or synonym.

πρὸς ἐμαυτόν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε: the two brothers were talking over their difficulties in 84C.

XXXVI. 85E. ἤ δὴ: “in that, you know, one might,” &c.

tὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον: sc. as in 80B.


86A. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἢ κατάξη: there is no proper apodosis to this sentence, but the meaning is clear enough. As in 80D, the speaker wanders off into amplification, and comes back to the point in ἤρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, 86D. κατάξη: from κατάγγυμι. οὖν with temporal particle and aorist subjunctive, as noted before, = Latin future perfect.
διωσχυρίζετο... ὀσπερ σὺ: “insist on the same argument as you do.” Observe the use of ὀσπερ instead of καὶ after τῷ αὐτῷ.

οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανή... ἀπολομένη: parenthetic, the ensuing ἀλλὰ φαλὴ being, like διωσχυρίζετο, governed by εἰ, as is shown by the absence of ἀν. We again get a kind of apodosis in 86D. γὰρ in this case does not give a reason for a previous assertion, but shows why that which follows is not mentioned before, like the Latin num.

διερρογούσων τῶν χορδῶν: “when the chords are completely broken.” The perfect denoting the completeness of the action, and the continuance of the result.

ὀμοφυὴ τε καὶ ἔννεφη: “of the same nature and kin with.”

86B. καὶ γὰρ οὖν: yet another parenthesis.

ὑπολαμβάνομεν: it is not quite clear who the “we” are. Simmias and Cebes were, if anything, Pythagoreans; but the notion that the soul was ἄρμονία τις (86C) seems to have been not Pythagorean but Eleatic. It was a popular belief (cf. 88D, 92D), “a semi-poetic metaphor which, though serviceable as an illustration, is infelicitous as a definition.” (Geddes.) “The word ἄρμονία is generally used to denote a succession of musical tones, not their simultaneous accord (συμφωνία), as here.” (Archer-Hind.)

ἐντεταμένου... καὶ συνεχομένου: “bound tight and held together.”

86C. τὴν μὲν ψυχήν... ἀπολάλεναι: “the soul must needs straightway perish.”

καὶπερ ὀνεαν θεισάτην: note καὶπερ almost invariably takes a participle, expressed or understood; cf. ἄτε.

τὰ λειψάνα: “the remains” (λειπαν).

ἐως ἄν ἢ κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατασαπῇ: “until it be burnt up or utterly decayed.” Note the force of κατα; for ἐως ἄν, see on 59E.

XXXVII. 86D. διαβλέψας: either “looking straight before him,” or “through the company.” The first rendering refers to Socrates’ piercing glance from under his shaggy eyebrows; cf. ταυρηθὸν ὑποβλέψας, 117B.

ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου: either “attacks our argument,” or simply “takes the question in hand.”

προσώδειν τι: “to say aught that harmonizes with the truth”—a word suggested by the subject of conversation, music. Cf. too 92C.

86E. ὑπερδικεῖν: “to plead for”; this, like συγχωρεῖν above, depends on χρῆναι. ἔαν δὲ μὴ takes the place of a second ἧ.

θράττον = τάραττον, “disquieting.”
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ : sc. as at the end of Chap. xxiii. The argument from composites (xxv.-xxvii.), in fact, simply makes the immortality of the soul or "something like it" (80B, note) highly probable, but does not prove it.

ότερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν . . . ταύτων ἐγκλήμα : i.e., "be open to the same charge," the doubt whether ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάναμεν ἦτο ξοταὶ η ἤψυχή, 77B.

87A. οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι : "I do not retract my admission," lit., "take back my move, as at draughts." μὴ οὐχί : see G. § 283, 7.

ἐπαξθῆς εἰπεῖν : "speaking with exaggeration," "if it is not exaggeration to say so" (lit., "burdensome," "too much for the facts of the case to support").

τῇ Συμμίου ἀντιλήψει : stated in the previous chapter. Simmias, starting from the notion that the soul is a harmony, imagined it to be no more lasting than the body. Cebes thinks it proven that the soul lasts longer (παλυχρονιώτερον) than the body, but does not see why it should therefore last for ever.

ἀν φαίη : potential optative. For the unusual position of the particle ἄν, cf. 102A.

87B. ἐν τὶ λέγω : "if what I say is well founded." For λέγειν τι, cf. 63A. εἰκόνας : "a simile."

ὀμοίως . . . ὡσπερ ἄν τις : "in much the same way as a man might say," &c.; not "as if," which would require ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ, as read by some. The Simile of the Weaver which follows is very elaborate—The Soul : the Body : : the Weaver : his Garments. The Weaver wears out many of the garments he has himself made, but the last of these survives him. May it not be the same with the first two members of the proportion? Is it not conceivable that the Soul should outlive many of the bodies it weaves to clothe itself withal, and yet ultimately be itself worn out? And, in that case, may not Socrates' soul have reached the limit of its existence and be about to perish with him? And, if so, does not the very possibility of such a thing cut away Socrates' ground of confidence from beneath his feet? This idea of partial immortality was later adopted by the Stoics; note 80B.

λέγοι : with this verb, παρέχοιτο, ἀνερωτήθη, οἶοιτο are all co-ordinate, and ἄν must be supplied with each from the ἄνα with which the sentence opens.

ἐστι ποι ὅσος : "maybe still exists somewhere." The reading σῶς for ὅσος makes better sense, but it is quite like Plato to express dubitatively what he feels quite certain about.

παρέχοιτο, ἀνερωτήθη, οἶοιτο : optatives coordinate with λέγοι, the ἄν being only used with λέγοι. 

θοιμάτιον = τὸ ἰμάτιον, a kind of cloak or mantle worn over the χτών (tunic). Its nearest equivalent in Latin is pallium, but it is also used to translate the distinctively Roman toga.
87C. ἐν χρείᾳ τε ὁντὸς καὶ φορομένου: "which is constantly in use and being worn."

τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: sc. γένος. With πολύ is to be understood πολυχρονιστέρον.

τὸ γε ὀλγοχρονιστέρον: γε lays an emphasis on the preceding word, but, if the word it emphasizes has the article, the γε goes between the article and the word, as a rule.

κατατρίψας καὶ ύφηνάμενος: Hysteron Proteron; the grammatical name for putting the cart before the horse. Cf. Latin moriamur et in media arma ruamus (Vergil).

87D. οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον: "yet for all this a man is not a whit inferior to, or weaker than, a garment." Note οὐδὲν τι adverbial; μᾶλλον, pleonastic with the comparatives.


περι αὐτῶν: i.e., concerning the relations of soul and body.

μέτρια λέγειν: "to speak reasonably."

ἀλλὰ γὰρ = Latin sed enim. Sed (haec res ita habet) enim: "but (this is so), for."

πολλὰ σώματα . . . ἔτη βιωῆ: Cebes allows here that the soul may wear out many bodies in one lifetime (the soul being represented as weaving and renewing its garment, the body); later, in 88A, he makes the further concession that the soul may survive through several lives.

ῥέοι; the key-word of the whole philosophy of Heraclitus (see note on 78E), which Plato accepted as perfectly true of the body and of the world of sense generally, but totally untrue of the soul and of the ideal world with which it—and it alone—was fitted to move in and deal with.

87E. ὀπὸτε ἀπολλύωτο: optative of indefinite frequency; G. § 213. Obs. (3)—cf. our "he would say" for "he used to say." Of this character also the foregoing optatives ῥέοι, ἀπολλύωτο and ἀνυφαῖνοι partake, though they are in the first case conditional.

τυχεῖν ἐξουσαν: "happen to have." Note τυγχάνω used with participle; used much like an auxiliary verb.

τούτου μόνου πρῶτερον: τούτου μόνου, comparative genitive after πρῶτερον; cf. Latin prīus with ablative.

τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀνθρενίας: "its natural weakness." ἐπιδεικνύοι: either (1) optative in reported speech, or, more likely, (2) optative with ἄν co-ordinate with μέντι ἄν ἔτη, four lines above. We have had an instance just before (87B) of Plato's omission of ἄν when several optatives are co-ordinated.

σαπέν διολχοῖτο: "decay and vanish." Note the Greek fondness for using participle and finite verb where we should use two finite verbs.
tha
dhre
ein: as Socrates does in 63C. It is in fact from his cheerfulness that the dialogue springs; 63A, B. Note ὧστε with indicative = actual consequence (negative ὀὐ); with infinitive = natural consequence (negative μῆ). Here we have indicative ἀξίων = ἄξιόν ἔστι, and hence ὀὐπω.

88A. πλέον ... ἦ ὁ σὺ λέγεις: "grant to an opponent even more than you at present propose." Cebes seems to be still addressing his brother, as in 87C. Some strike out the ἦ and translate, "to one who says what you say." The πλέον is specified in the clauses δοὺς αὐτῷ ... αὐθίς, which, after the parenthesis ὀυτω ... ἀντέχειν, is summarized in δοὺς ταῦτα.

ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἠμᾶς χρόνῳ: "in the time before we were yet born."

ἐνιὼν ἐτε ἐναι: sc. τὰς ψυχὰς. εἰναι, like the three following infinitives, depends on καλέσαι.

αὐτῷ: i.e., the soul.

μηκέτι συνχωροῖ: "should refuse to further allow that it does not labour." The mood is still affected by the ἐτε with which 88A opens. So too φαίη, five lines lower down. All three conditions are resumed in the new protasis, ἐτε τοῦτο ὀυτως ἐχει, which immediately precedes the long-deferred apodosis, οὐδὲν προσήκει.

μή οὔ πονεῖν: μή οὔ because the verb on which the infinitive depends is negative; cf. below, μὴ οὔν ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν. G. 283, 7.

μηδένα φαίη: μηδένα used, not οὐδένα, on account of the clause being a protasis.

88B. οὐδὲν ... ὅσ ἄν: connect closely. This sentence brings Cebes to his point: unless the soul is eternally indestructible, there are no grounds of confidence in any sort of future life. θαρρεῖν θάνατον: forcible phrase for "to be confident about death."

ἀνάγκην εῖναι: loosely dependent on προσήκει, three lines above.

ἐν τῷ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαξέχει: "in its impending disjunction from the body." The emphatic word is νῦν: the death which lies before us may, for all we know, bring destruction for soul as well as body.

XXXVIII. 88C. τοῖς προείρημένοις λόγοις: i.e., those which appear as Arguments (1), (2), (3) in § 5 of the Introduction. The dative is governed by ἀποστίαν, which would more naturally take a genitive. In the next clause we have εἰς, &c., by way of variety.

μῆ ... εἴμεν ... ἦ: more or less similar varieties of mood are quoted from Thucydides III. 32, VI. 96. The change expresses, with a nicety it is hopeless to reproduce, how much less important a thing was the distrust of the hearers of the argument than the despair of mankind must be, if Cebes happens to be right.
NOTES, 87E—89C. 119

toióútv ov ti légenv prós émuvtov épérхētai: “a desire to say something of this kind to myself came over me.” toióútv refers to what follows, more generally toiénte.

túni ónu; a question answered by Socrates in the two following chapters.

ós gáp σφόδρα . . . λόγον: λόγον, case of attraction of the nominative to kanatapéptwvν into the relative clause and into the case of the relative; cf. Vergil’s urbem quam statuo vestra est.

. 88D. θαυμαστῶς . . . ἀντιλαμβάνεται: “takes a wondrous hold on me”; cf. on 84C.
tó ἀμονίαν . . . τὴν ψυχὴν: explanatory infinitive to λόγος.
tov ἄποθανόντως: depending, of course, on ψυχή, not on the verb. δς μὲ πείσει: the relative with the future indicative and the future participle are both used to denote a purpose in Greek; cf. G. §§ 236, 277, 3.

μετῆλθε: “overtook”; in English idiom, “met.”

88E. ἐυθηλὸς τι ἐγένετο ἀχθομένος: “showed at all that he was driven to straits.” Or τι may go with ἀχθομένος. Note construction of ἐυθηλὸς and δῆλος with participle. ἐβοήθει: “supported.”

ηγάσθην . . . παραγενόμενος: “delighted at being in his company.”

89A. ἐκεῖνος: properly subject to ἔχειν, but attracted into the relative clause; cf. supra, 88C.

ἐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως: “affably and approvingly.”

ἀπεδέξατο: “listened to,” not, as in 85C, with the idea of approbation.

ἐπετα ὡς εὖ: “thirdly.” When ἐπετα is used for “secondly,” it is more commonly followed by ἐτι δὲ καὶ (Wagner).

ἀνεκαλέσατο: “rallied.”

89B. χαμαίξηλον: sc. δίφρον, “a low stool.”

ἀυχένι: “neck,” whereas τράχηλος is generally used of the “throat.”

ὁποτε τύχοι: “at times,” optative of indefinite frequency.

τὰς καλὰς κόμας ἀποκέρει: “you will cut off these beautiful tresses.” ἀποκέρειν, to crop the hair, is the opposite to κομάν, to grow the hair long. At Athens, as in Greece generally, youths wore their hair long till they became full citizens on attaining their eighteenth year. It was a sign of grief to crop it, as at Rome it was to let it grow long (promittere capillum).

ἀναβιώσασθαι: “revive it”; here transitive, usually neuter.

οὐκ ἀν γε ἐμολ πείθη: ἂν here is not the particle, but = ἐάν.

89C. ei σὺ eiήν: “were I you.”
lypho 'Arqéiōi: who in B.C. 546 vowed they would crop their hair, never to grow again till they should recover Cynuria (Thyrea), just conquered by Sparta. The story is told at length in Herodotus I. 82.

ánkamаchómenos: "fighting again"; ανα having the force of again as in ἀνακομίζονται.

πρός δύο λέγεται οὐδ’ ὁ Ἃρακλῆς οἶός τε εἶναι: a proverb which answers to our Union is strength. In his battle with the Hydra, Heracles was worried by a crab sent by Hera, and had to call his friend Iolaus to aid him.

ἐως ἐτὶ φῶς ἐστὶν: for at sundown (μέχρι ἦλιου δυσμῶν, 61E) Socrates must drink the hemlock. The indicative is quite natural, as the time is both definite and present. Cp. note on ἐως ἐστίν, 85B.

XXXIX. 89D. μισόλογοι: Socrates saw at a glance (δὲσωs ἀσθετό, 89A) that this is precisely what his hearers were in danger of becoming; hence his earnest warning in this and the next chapter.

μισήσας = μισήσαι, which would be more usual after μεικτόν ἢ. Geddes compares οἰον ἢ νοσήσας, 83C.

89E. θαμά προσκρούων: "through frequent disappointments," lit., stumbling; or perhaps, "through often taking offence."

ἀνεν τέχνης... τάνθρωπεα: "without knowledge of human character." To be ἄνεν τέχνης is the great cause of instability in Plato's eyes: it is because it rests on impulse or convention only, not on τέχνη, that ἢ δημοσική καὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρετῇ wins his dispraise (82A, note). ὀσπερ ἔχει: after ὠντως.

90A. σφόδρα: by position seems to go with ἀλλίγους, by sense rather with the adjectives which come before it. It is the extremes which are few, as Socrates turns aside to explain, down to 90B. The Greeks rather liked things strictly in moderation: μηδὲν ἄγαν.

tά μὲν ἀκρα τῶν ἐγχάτων: "the extremes of opposite qualities."

90B. ἄγαν: "contest." Note the accent.

τάνυ... φανηνα: here ἄν φανηνα represents the optative with ἄν = "would appear."

ἀλλὰ ταυτῇ μὲν: "it is not in this way, however, that, &c." Socrates returns to the point—the analogy of origin between Misology and Misanthropy. The second ἀλλὰ explains why he had digressed, following Phaedo's question, τάς λέγεις; in 90A. The third ἀλλὰ might be more appropriately δὲ, answering to ταυτῇ μὲν.

ἡ: the apodosis, expressing the disgust of the amateur disputant, never comes. Hence some omit the ἡ; but cf. XXXVII. for similar anacolutha.

οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους: "those who deal with contradictory arguments"—a sly hit at the Sophists of the baser sort, and at
the Schools of Heraclitus, Antisthenes, and Euclides; the followers of this last (Megarics) paid much attention to Logic, and were so contentious that they soon came to be called oi εριστικοί. Cf. too 91A, 101E.

90C. ὁσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ: the narrow strait, afterwards bridged, between Boeotia and Euboea, from which the present name of the island (Negropont) is derived. The irregularity of its currents, which, according to Livy (xxviii. 6), changed seven times a day, made it a type of instability to the Greeks. Cf. Iphigenia in Tauris, 6.

ἀνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται: “are tossed up and down.”

δυνατού κατανοήσαι: “capable of being understood”; cf. ἄξιας ἀποδίεξασθαί, 92D. In Greek we generally find the active infinitive after such adjectives, though English prefers the passive; cf. the French usage.

90D. ἀσμενος: “without any misgiving.”

διὰ τὸ παραγίγγεσθαι: “through assisting at, being present at.”

λοιδορῶν διατελέῖ: διατέλεω takes participle; “continue to.” Cf. G. § 279, 1.

XL. 90E. μὴ παρώμεν: “let us not admit” (παρίμη). ὄς . . . ὅτι: the former introduces an allegation, the latter a fact.

ἀνδριστέον: “ought to quit us like men, and strive to be sound.”

σοὶ . . . τοῖς ἄλλοις . . . ἐμοί: datives of the agent after the impersonal verbs in -τεον; cf. G. § 281, 2.

91A. οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονείκως: an allusion apparently to the rough-and-ready-ness of the Cynic School, whose leader Antisthenes is called ὑψιμαθής by Plato, ἀπαίδευτος by Aristotle.

ἀμφοβητάον: “dispute,” lit., ἀμφίς, βάλν, stand on both sides.

ὅτη μὲν ἔχει: sc. ταῦτα. Depends on ὃν φροντίζουσιν.

δόξει . . . δόξῃ: for this variety of construction, cf. G. § 217. The future with ὃπως after verbs of striving is the most usual construction.

εἰ μὴ εἰς πάρεργον: “except that may happen by the way,” πάρεργον being the stock word for what is not the main business in hand, but merely incidental, and so worthy of less attention. Cf. the American commercial term “side-show.” Some alter εἰς to εἰ, and quote the parallel nisi si.

91B. θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς: “only mark how selfishly”—parenthetical.

ἀλλ’ οὖν τοῦτον γε τὸν χρόνον: “— well then, for this time, at least.”

ὁσυρόμενος: “with lamentations”—a thing Socrates disliked; see 60A, 117D. Wagner prefers to read ἥ or μή before the participle: “than if I made lamentation.”

ΦΗΑΕΔ.


Socrates' ignorance will perish with his body, because he will then either rise to the life immortal or for ever cease to be: in the first case he will know all; in the second he will be incapable of even being ignorant.

91C. φρουτσαντες Σωκράτους: this verb when used to mean paying heed to, with genitive, is commonly found in negative or quasi-negative sentences. In a like spirit Plato prefaxes his attack on Homer in Republic X., and Aristotle his on Plato in Nich. Eth. I., with the remark that Truth must be regarded before friends: the philosopher must be no προσωποληπτής.

εἰ δὴ μὴ: εἰ δὲ μὴ becoming a stereotyped form of expression, used even if εὰν μὴ precedes. Cf. 63D, note.

ὁσπερ μέλιτα κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν: as, according to the comic poet Eupolis, Pericles did. ἐμαυτόν: observe that some read εαυτόν, for which see the second note on 101D.

XL. φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος: "if I do not show that I have remembered it"; 58A, note.

ὀμος . . . ὡν: "though it is"; cf. ἄτε, 79D.

91D. ἐν ἀρμονίας εἴδει: in the species, or class, labelled ἀρμονία. In this and the following chapters Socrates makes a threefold refutation of Simmias' objection (above, chap. xxxvi.). See Analysis, Introduction, § 5.

Κέβης μοι ἔδοξε: in Chap. xxxvii., especially 88B. Note the sequence ἀπολλύοντας after ἔδοξε; G. § 244.

αὐτὸ τοῦτο . . . ψυχῆς ἐλέθος: "just this—the destruction of the soul." This is an echo of Cebes' words in 88B.

ἀδεὶ ἀπολλύουμεν οὐδὲν παύεται: "never stops being periodically destroyed."

ἄλλα: ἦ = ἄλλα ἦ: simply adjectival, not the same as ἄλλ' ἦ in 76A, &c.

συνομολογείτην δή: the words of the narrator, Phaedo.

91E. ἐκείνον τοῦ λόγου: Chaps. xviii.—xxiv.

ἀναγκαῖος ἔχειν: "it is necesssary"; ἔχειν with adverbs denoting a state.

92A. θαυμαστῶς οὐς: "wonderfully"; cf. ἀμήχανον ὄσον, 80C.

ἐμμένοις οὐδὲν λόγω: "I abide by it as I do by no other argument"; i.e., more than by any other argument.

τὸ ἀρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι . . . συγκεῖσθαι: epexegetic to ἢ δὲ ἢ οἴνοις. συγκεῖσθαι is the regular Attic for the perfect passive of συντίθημι, and = the later συντεθεῖσθαι.
NOTES, 91B—93A.

ἀποδείξει γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος: “allow yourself to say”; so too in 96E. The genitive absolute might be more simply replaced by the accusative, as also in ὡς δεδιότων, 77E.

92B. ὡς πρότερον ἣν ἀρμονία ... συνεθήναι: this is the pith of the argument contained in this chapter. A harmony must come into being after that which causes it.

† ταύτα σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν: “what you say comes to this.” Others, reading ὦ ταύτα, translate, “you advance contradictory propositions.” Note, ταύτα = “these things”; ταύτα = “the same things.”

† ὃ ἀπεικάζεις: “to which you compare it.” There is another reading, ὃ ἀπεικάζεις: “as you represent it.”

ἀνάρμοστοι: “unharmonized,” “discordant.”

92C. ξυνώδω: “harmonious.” Observe the datives after πρέπει, cf. below, and 92D, after ξύνοιδα.

μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὑρετεῖας: “with a certain amount of probability and speciousness.”

92D. διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις: Aristotle in the Prior Analytics formulates a method of proof, rhetorical rather than strictly logical, based on εὑρίσκω—i.e., on premises which are maxims generally true. To this method he gave the name of enthymeme, and in it the major premis was usually omitted, as going without saying.

ἀλαξόσων: “cheats”; from ἀλάσσω, I wander: cf. our use of vagabond. Aristotle makes ἀληθεία (truthfulness) the virtue lying in the mean between the vices εἰρωνεία (saying less than one might) and ἀλαξωιέα (saying more than one should).

φυλάττειν: distinguish φυλάττειν τι: “to guard something”; φυλάττεσθαι τι: “to be on one’s guard against something.”

ἀξίας ἀποδείασθαι: for the use of the active, cf. above, 90C.

† ὠσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ... τοῦ δὲ ἐστὶν: (1) “just as her substance really exists, taking its name from the absolute existence”; or (2) “inasmuch as the substance, &c. ... belongs to her” (i.e., is cognized by her)—taking αὐτῆς as possessive genitive. (3) Others read αὐτῆς for αὐτῆς, and translate, “just as the very substance that takes the title of absolute existence really exists.” In any case the main point is that the soul stands on the same eternal level as the eternal verities or existences that it alone comprehends.

XLII. ἄλλως πῶς ἔχειν ... συγκέπται: “to be different from the conditions of the substances of which it is composed.”

93A. ἥγεσθαι γε προσήκει αρμονίαν: contrast the construction with προσήκει in 92E above (ἀρμονία ... προσήκειν ... ἔχειν). This sentence really contains the hint which is elaborated in the following
chapter, and constitutes the third argument in disproof of the assertion that the soul is a kind of harmony.

The chief points in the argument of this chapter, which is much more complicated, are:—(1) there are degrees of harmony, varying with the materials whence it emanates; (2) there are no degrees in soul. Again, (3) there are virtuous souls and vicious souls, and virtue is a harmony, while vice is a discord; therefore, (4) a virtuous soul is more harmonious than a vicious soul. But (4) is inconsistent with (2), therefore its opposite must be true; in other words, all souls are equally virtuous, which we know to be absurd. Hence the supposition that the soul is a harmony again fails us.

πολλοῦ δε: "is far from," with the infinitives κινηθῆναι, &c.

ἐναντία: adverbial accusative, going, like ἐναντιωθῆναι, with τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. Cf. the frequent adverbial use of πολλά.

οὕτως... ὧς ἄν ἄμοσθῇ: "just in the way it is put together" (however that may be).

μᾶλλον... καλ ἐπὶ πλέον: "more and in a greater degree."

93B. μᾶλλον... καλ πλεῶν: "to a greater extent and fuller." Note the collocation of adverb and adjective; cf. καλῶς καλ ἀληθῆ, 79D.

ἐι δ’ ἤττον: answering to ἄν μὲν μᾶλλον, the change of mood, &c., being simply for the sake of variety.

καλ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον, κ.τ.λ.: "that even in the smallest degree one soul to a greater degree and more than other souls, or to a lesser degree and less, is this very thing, namely 'soul.'"

ψυχὴν: "i.e., a soul," in apposition to αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

93C. τῶν οὐν θεμένων... τὴν κακίαν: "what will any one of those define the soul as a harmony say that these things are that exist in the soul—to wit, virtue and vice?" lit., "will say that these being what exist in the soul." τῶν θεμένων is partitive genitive.

ἐξαν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄρμονία οὕτη: "possess, itself a harmony, some other harmony within it." In the Republic, Justice, the architectonic virtue, not only is itself a harmony of the three parts of the soul, but keeps harmony amongst them.

προωμολόγηται: early in 93B.

93D. ἄρμονίαν ἄρμονίας: Socrates simply substitutes this word for what, according to Simmias, was its equivalent, viz., soul, and thus shows that the concession amounts to a contradiction.

τὴν δε γε... ἡμῶρθαι: still depending on προωμολόγηται: "equal harmonies are equally harmonised."

ἐστιν ὃ τι: the interrogative form answering to the demonstrative ἐστιν ὃs.
NOTES, 93A—94D.

93E. τούτο δ’ αὖ πεπονθύησα: "under these circumstances, then."

μετέχοι ἂν: observe that in the exactly parallel sentence below, 94A, another tense of the optative is used in much the same sense, ὑποτενοῦν ἂν μετάσχοι (G. § 202). If the soul be a harmony, one soul has just as much virtue and vice as another; or rather, may we not say (μᾶλλον δὲ γε ποὺ) that vice does not exist at all?

94A. οὖδε γε δῆτον . . . κακίας: sc. ἂν μετάσχοι.

καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος: "that our argument would have come to such a pass." Observe the change to a personal construction with δοκεῖ. The πάσχειν ἂν here represents ἑπασχέον ἂν, as we see by ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἡν.

XLIII. 94B. τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων: partitive genitive depending on ἐμεθ’ ἐς τι. The sway of the soul over the body has been discussed in 80A.

φρόνιμον: for the meaning and importance of this in Plato’s eyes, see 66E and 82A (note).

πότερον συγχροσύναν: "And how does it rule? By yielding, &c."

94C. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν: i.e., in 93A.

ἀμονικάν γε σύσων: "that is (ἡς), if it is a harmony."

οἷς ἐπιτείνουτο . . . σύσα: "to the tensions, relaxations, vibrations, and other modifications of the parts of the instrument wherein it resides." (Geddes.) The optatives are frequentative; cf. G. § 233.

ἄλλο ὅπωσὼν . . . ἔκεινα = ἄλλῳ φιλινινῷ πάθει δ ἔκεινα πάσχοι (Wagner).

ἐπεθεῖαι: the force of ἂν, three lines above, lasts out till this verb.

φησὶ τις: τις, like the French on, used to avoid the passive.

ἀλίγον: see note on 80C.

94D. τὰ μὲν . . . διαλεγομένη: illustrates the πάντας τρόπους.

ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις: this and the following datives are made so by influence of διαλεγομένη, though they also go in sense with the two preceding participles.

οἶν ποὺ: "As Homer, you know, has done"—with particular reference to διαλεγομένη. For this playful way of "citing Homer to his purpose," cf. Plato’s use of the popular superstition about ghosts, in 81D.

οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα: in Odyssey, xx. 17. For the accusative ("of Odysseus"), cf. τὰ δρατά . . . λέγομεν, 79B.

ἡμῖναπε: "chid"; reduplicative aorist from ἐνίπτω.

κύντερον: "far worse"; from κῦων: "more shameless," and so "more miserable." For the development of the word compare our use of the word pariah.
The occasion on which Odysseus said this was the sight of the suitors rioting in his house: the "other far worse thing" was his adventure with the Cyclops.

94E. ὡς ἀρμονίας σύνης: cf. the genitive absolute with ἀποδέξεις, 92A. ὡς with genitive absolute denotes the condition on which the agent acts; cf. ὡς θέλοντος, Soph. O.R. 3.

οἷς ἀγεσθαί: "of a nature to be influenced by."

ἡ καθ' ἀρμονίαν: "for a harmony": cf. use of κατά in καθ' ἀνθρωπον μελέτων φρονεῖ: "he holds thoughts too high for man."

σὺ μοι... ἐξευρήσειν: note personal use of δοκεῖσθαι where we should use the impersonal, and cf. use of δίκαιος, δήλος.

XLIV. 95A. τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας... ἦλεα πως: "Theban Harmonia has, it seems, turned out fairly propitious to us." It is a kind of expression of farewell, Λαός being the proper address to a god, χαίρε to a mortal. Having playfully likened Simmias to the heroine of his native city, Socrates naturally enough labels his brother Cebes with the name of her husband Cadmus.

ιλασώμεθα: "obtain his favour."

θαυμαστῶς... ὡς παρὰ δόξαν: for a similar arrangement of words, see 99D, 102A.

† ὅτε ἡπόρει: others read ὅτι or ὅ τι: "saying that," or "in what respect, he was in doubt."

χρήσασθαι: "refute, dispose of his argument": lit., use, deal with.

95B. τὸν λόγον: the subject of the εἰ clause is put by προλέψεις as accusative in the principal clause.

βασκανία: "envy." Latin fancinum, our derivative from which (fascinate) we use rather of the evil eye, whilst the ancients thought rather of the evil tongue (connected with βάζω, speak, use spells). The idea of the gods feeling "envy" (φόβος, &c.) towards men who boast or think too highly of themselves is familiar enough (cf. esp. Sophocles' Antigone, 127; Agamemnon, passim), but Plato elsewhere shows that he does not seriously like the notion. The same idea runs through the tale of Polycrates in Herodotus.

"Ομηρικός ἐγγὺς λόγος: "drawing nigh—to use the Homeric phrase"—or perhaps, "as Homer's heroes do." Cicero uses the word to describe Homer's method of narrative: ὄστερον πρότερον, ὄμηρικός.

tὸ κεφάλαιον: "the chief point"—or rather, series of chief points, resume.

ἀξίοις ἐπιδείξθηναι: "you demand a further proof."

95C. ἀποθανόν: nominative by the common Greek idiom by which, when the subject of the infinitive is the same as that of the
verb on which it depends and is omitted, adjectives and participles referring to the subject are put in the nominative. G. § 136, note 3.

ἐν ἄλλῳ βιω: “in any other walk of life”; cf. Chap. xii. Observe that βιος often means much more than ζωή—mere existence as an animal. βιοῦς: 2nd aorist participle of βιω.

ἡλίθιον: “foolish”; connected with ἄλαμμα, wander (cf. our drive).

θάρρος: cognate accusative.

τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν: “as for showing, &c.” The sentence down to γενέσθαι is summed up in πάντα ταύτα.

μηνύειν ἄθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ: this infinitive depends on κωλύειν; then the construction changes to ὅτι with tenses of the indicative at first, then in 95D with the optative (ζωή... ἀπολλύοντο). For these varieties in indirect discourse, see G. §§ 241, 242.

ἄλλα γὰρ... ἀθάνατον: “for all that, however, it was, you thought, none the more immortal.”

95D. αὐτὸ δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπων σῶμα ἐλθείν: subject to ἀρχὴ ἦν. Cebes had not put it so precisely in 88A.

πρὸς γε τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι: “so far as our individual apprehensions are concerned.”

95E. ἐξεπιτήδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω: “I purposely repeat it often.” ἀνά in composition often has this notion of beginning afresh and doing over and over again.

ὑνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς: for ὑνα with final sentences, see G. § 216. ὑνα must be repeated before προσθῆς ἡ ἀφέλψ unless they be taken to depend on βοῦλει, as in 79A. The latter way leaves the τε in εἰ τέ τι βοῦλει unexplained.

XLV. περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς: “generation and corruption,” “development and decay.”

96A. τὰ γε ἐμὰ πάθη: it is disputed whether this account which follows is (1) true of the historical Socrates, (2) true of Plato himself, (3) simply a picture of what would be the normal history of a thinker in the later part of the fifth century B.C. Grote favours the first view; and it is at least likely that Socrates would have at least studied the earlier Physicists before calling them fools, as Xenophon says he did (Mem. I., 1. 11). Aristophanes’ picture of Socrates in the Clouds may be a caricature: it is not necessarily a baseless fabrication.

δὲν ἄν λέγω... περὶ δὲν λέγεις: observe the contrast between the comparative uncertainty as to what Socrates is about to say and the certainty about what precisely Cebes had said (Chap. xxxvii.). If with some editions περὶ ἄν ἄν λέγης be read, allowance is made for the possibility that Cebes has not quite had his say; cf. οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, 95E.
χρησει: "you will apply it."

ἀκουε τούνων ὡς ἑρόντους: "I am going to begin: listen!" ὡς (cf. supra, 94E) gives the supposition on which the agent acts.

τερι φύσεως ἱστορίαν: "Natural Philosophy," "Physics"; ἱστορία meaning first enquiry, then its possible result, knowledge (ὅδα, ἐλθώ). A brief account of these early speculators will be found in the edition of De Finibus, Book I., uniform with this (Introduction, § 4); a fuller one in M.A.P. pp. 1–20, than the reading of which there could be no better preparation for the reading of these chapters, xlv.–xlvii. The subject of their investigation was, in Xenophon's words, ὡς ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμους ἑφ. The only ones to whom Socrates alludes are (1) several of those whom we class as the Early Ionic School, whose distinctive characteristic is the mechanical development of the world from a primal unity, στοιχεῖον; and (2) Anaxagoras, who, discontented with the fanciful theories of causation found in his predecessors, introduced an efficient cause. Socrates takes no heed of the thinkers who most nearly approximated to the scientific ideas held to-day, Heraclitus and Democritus.

ὑπερήφανος: se. αὐτή ἡ σοφία, to which τὸ εἰδέναι is epexegetical.

τὰς αἰτίας: i.e. the causes not only of existence, but of origin and cessation—why a thing begins, and continues, and ends.

ἀνω κάτω: asyndeton. The words are coupled by καὶ in 90C.

96B. τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν: an opinion of Anaximander, to whom they seemed amongst the earliest manifestations of his principle, τὸ ἀπειρον. Later, it was taken up by Anaxagoras.

σηπεδόνα: "decay," "putrefaction," "fermentation"—as in the process of digestion.

συντρέφεται: "are put together and come to life."

τὸ αἷμα ἐστὶν ὑφὸ φρονοῦμεν: as in Empedocles' line:—

ἀἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιον ἐστὶν νήμα.

ἡ ὁ ἀήρ: which was the στοιχεῖον of Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia.

ἡ τὸ τῦρ: which was the protagonist in the philosophy of Heraclitus, himself a protagonist (M.A.P. pp. 4–7).

ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλος: which the learned doctor Hippocrates regarded as the means whereby we grasp things external. Refining on Pythagoras, Plato in the Timeaus localizes the intellect in the head, the passions in the abdominal parts, the spirit (τὸ θυμοεῖδές) in the heart.

λαβοῦντις τὸ ἡρμεῖν: "when they have settled down into a quiet state." Plato, holding ἐπιστήμην to stand quite apart, had much less sympathy with such theories on these processes of knowledge than Aristotle had. For modern views, see Sully's Outlines, Chap. ii.
κατὰ ταύτα: “in the same way.” The reading κατὰ ταύτα, ‘accordingly,’ perhaps gives better sense. Notice the variety of construction in this series of dependent questions—ἐστίν . . . γίγνοιτο . . . γίγνεσθαι; cf. on 95C above.

96C. ἀφύης . . . ὡς οὗδεν χρῆμα: “more unsuited to such consideration than anything in the world”; cf. the use of εἰπέρ τις ἄλλος where we would say "more than any one else." Here Socrates is represented as finding them unprofitable: Xenophon says he regarded them as impious.

ἀπέμαθον: “unlearned.”

96D. καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις . . . προσγένηται: “appropriate additions are made to each of the other parts also.” The allusion is, perhaps, to the theory of Anaxagoras, that things are made up by the aggregation of similar atoms (δύοιομερῆ), which, unlike those of Democritus, were qualitatively different.

μετρίως: “reasonably”; cf. above on 82B.

ὁπότε τις φαίνοτο: frequentative optative; G. § 232, 4.

† αὐτῷ τῇ κεφαλῇ: “just by the head”; v.l. αὐτοῦ = “than the small man.”

96E. διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσθέιναι: the genitive would be more usual: ‘‘by two,’’ lit. ‘‘by the fact of addition of two to eight,’’ αὐτοῖς referring to ὁκτώ.

περὶ τοῦτων τοὺ: simply ‘‘of any of these things,’’ lit., with regard to.

ὁς γε οὐκ ἀποδεχόμαι ἐμαυτόν: “seeing that I do not even feel satisfied.” The point about which Socrates feels this hesitation is whether, if A is added to B, A becomes two by the addition of B, or whether A + B = 2, simply by addition; i.e., whether A and B were two before that arithmetical process.

97A. θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ: note εἰ after verbs of wondering. G. § 228.

ἀρα . . . ἢν: “was after all,” of that which was true all the time, but only now recognised to be so; cf. 68B, note.

δύο γενέσθαι: sc. τοῦ, depending on αἱρέω.

τοῦ πλήσιον ἄλληλων τεθήναι: the genitive is explanatory of ξύνῳδος.

97B. αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρω: “jumble up a fashion of my own,” or “make a hotch-potch of my own.” Others translate “work up,” as bakers work up dough, but this meaning is by modern grammarians now confined to the kindred word φυτρᾶω.

XLVI. ἐκ βιβλίου . . . ἀναγιγνώσκοντο: “some one reading from a book written—so the reader told me—by Anaxagoras.” The book was τὰ φυσικά; for its author, see on 72C and Index.
97C. νοῦς ἀστιν ὁ διακόσμων: this is a quotation from the epoch-making dictum of Anaxagoras, πάντα χρήματα ἢν δύμοι· εἰτα νοῦς ἔλθων αὕτα διεκόμησεν, the first half of which has been before quoted in 72C. Previous thought had been Monistic; i.e., had postulated a primal unity which produced of itself the multiplicity of things: even Heraclitus had got no further than to speak of λόγος, a law which ordered the ceaseless change of the universe (note 78E), and which, though he called it Zeus, was a god in things not external to them. Anaxagoras transformed this λόγος into a divine intelligence, and for the old self-developing unity gave a hint of the Dualism of Mind and Matter, or, in Aristotle's phrase, introduced the efficient cause. [On this, see our note De Finibus, Book I., Chap. vi., § 18.] Though Aristotle joins in Plato's complaint that Anaxagoras did not follow out his clue and treated his νοῦς too much in the style of a deus ex machina, Anaxagoras' dictum was to both the landmark in pre-Socratic philosophy.

πάντων αὑτῶς: Professor Geddes notes that this does not extend so far as to include Creation, which was a distinctly Hebrew notion. When Aristotle says of Anaxagoras μηχανῆ χρήμα τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, he means forming the world out of chaos, not creating it out of nothing.

δὴν ἀν βαλεοσα τιλ: the idea is that, as Aristotle says (Politics I.2), οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ φόρος ποιεῖ—i.e., Nature has a purpose in everything. But if Nature be directed by a divine intelligence, that purpose must be the best, and the means adapted best thereto. This phrase is the essence of teleological views of the universe, that each thing has a distinct purpose in the world, and is possessed of the qualities which are best suited for the attainment of that purpose. This view is the antithesis of the mechanical view of thinkers like Empedocles, and to some extent modern Evolutionists, the keynote of which is the absence of any definite aim save existence and the survival of what is fittest to secure it.

† 97D. περὶ αὐτοῦ: MSS. περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνων, "the particular object of his enquiry."

τὴν αὐτήν... περὶ αὐτῶν: alluding to the current maxim or principle that the "Science of Opposites is the same"—e.g., Politics, the science which treats of the well-being of States, has a chapter on the theory of revolutions.

κατὰ νοῦν: "on the lines of reason," or, if ἐμαντῶ be taken closely with it, "to my mind." The Greek suggests both without committing itself to either.

ὥς φράσειν: note the change of subject, Socrates being the subject of εὑρηκέναι, Anaxagoras of this infinitive.

πλατεία... στρογγύλη: "flat or round." The first was the idea of Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Democritus, while Anaximander regarded it as cylindrical (κυλινδροειδῆς), and Thales much
the same (ὡςπερ ἔλων, floating in water). Pythagoras seems to have been the first to think the earth "round,” strictly speaking—σφαιροειδής.

97E. ἐν μέσω: all these earlier systems were Geocentric. Plato at first accepted this—e.g., in the Republic (Book X.) he figures the earth as wound round an adamantine bar, like a distaff, ἡλακτή, round which the sun and planets revolve each twenty-four hours. Later, in the Timaeus he adopts the Pythagorean astronomy, which made a central fire—"the hearth of Zeus"—the centre of the universe.

ἐλ φαίν... ἐπεκδιωγήσωσα: sc. φιμη. Observe the moods in protasis and apodosis, as in ἐλ... ἀποφαίνωτο, παρεσκεύασμην immediately after. The sequence is irregular. The more usual form of apodosis after ἐλ φαίν (the optative with ἔν—G. § 224) would obviously enough give a false meaning: the question is not so much what Socrates would think, but what, as a matter fact, he did think, whenever such and such assertions were made. The optative has, in fact, a frequentative meaning (G. § 213, 3). (Or perhaps the collocation may be explained as the correlative in historical tenses of ἔν τι φη, σιμαι in the primary (G. § 242, 3.) In 99A there are two good examples of the types of conditional sentence which it is most difficult to keep distinct—mere supposition and impossibility of condition, as Farrar calls them.

ποθεσómoνεσ: conjecture for the MSS. ὑποθήσομενος, “supposing,” “making hypotheses as to.”

98A. τροπῶν: “revolutions”—not from τρόπος, way, nor from τροπός, thong, but from τροπή, turning—especially of the sun (solstices).

ἀν ποτε... φιμη: The ἀν is to be taken with infinitive ἐπενεγκεῖν: "I did not think... he would have brought."

ἐπενεγκεῖν: note the four aorists with κ—κνεγκα, κα, κηκα, κάκακα.

ἀποδίδοντα: distinguish ἀποδίδομι (= “to give away, assign”) and ἀποδιδομαι (= “to sell”).

98B. πολλοῦ: genitive of price; G. § 178.

ὁς τάχιστα... ἦ: the ὁς τ ’ ἦ is generally omitted.

XLVII. ἧχωμι φερώμενος: “from such great expectations was I hurled down.” Or possibly (as Wagner), “starting from such a hope, I was sailing along, when.”

ἀνδρα: either “a man who does not use his mind at all,” or “the man,” meaning Anaxagoras. In this case we should more naturally expect the article.

† οὐδὲ τινας αἰτιὰς ἐπαιτώμενον: would make sense if written as co-ordinate with αἰτιώμενον, in contrast to χρώμενον, rather than as a supplement to it: “a man who, instead of using mind as the cause throughout, hauls in (ἐπὶ) other causes to order things.”
98C. ἄσπερ ἄν: sc. πάσχοι, supplied from πεπονθέοι above. The following ei goes with λέγω in the second and eleventh lines below. Down to the second ἐνθάδε κάθημαι depends on the first λέγω. The real reason—according to Socrates—begins with ἄμελήθρας, at the end of 98D.

διπυάς: "joints" (of a limb); regarded as breaking the continuity of the bones, while ἄρθρον regards them as knitting the frame together. (Archer-Hind.)

τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οὗ... ἀνάεσθαι: "whilst sinews are capable of being stretched and relaxed." Later, νεῦρα = nerves, but these were not discovered till the time of Galen—500 years later.

98D. αἰωρομένων: "suspended"; also used metaphorically, ἐν κινδύνῳ αἰωρομένων (Thucydides vii. 78). ξυμβολαῖς: "ligaments."

ποιεῖ: used with the infinitive οἷον τ’ ἐλιναί.

98E. ἦν ἄν κελεύωσιν: "their commands, whatever they be"; cf. ἄρτιν ἄν τάτητ, below in 99A, for a similar dubitative phrase where there is no possible doubt whatever. They seem to express Socrates' readiness to fulfil all and any claims of the State on him, even if more exacting than they had in point of fact been.

νῇ τὸν κύνα: τὸν Ἀλυστίτων θεόν, as is explained in the Gorgias. It was Socrates' pet oath. This form of oath seems to have been used to avoid taking the name of the deity, so Socrates used the oath νῇ τὸν χήνα and τὴν πλάτανον; cf. the Birds of Aristophanes, i. 521.

99A. ἦ περὶ Μέγαρα ἦ Βουσώος: to one of which neighbouring states Socrates had been urged to escape in the Crito.

αἰτία μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν ἀτοπον: in the Timaeus Plato calls them ἐναυτία.

πολλή καὶ μακρὰ: the same usage as the Latin multi et boni patres.

99B. τὸ γάρ μὴ διελέοθαι... αἴτιον: the predicate is expressed by shrug of the shoulders. The drift of the passage is the wide gulf between the presuppositions of things and their causes. See J. S. Mill, Logie, Book III. Chap. ν. The infinitive is an infinitive of exclamation; cf. Birds, 5; τὸ δ’ ἐμὲ κορώνη πειθόμενον... περειλθεῖν: "fancy my not being able to...

ψηλαφώντες: "groping," "fumbling." Some connect the word with ψάφω, touch; others with ψάλλω and ἄφω, the idea being that of feeling about the strings of an instrument for a right note.

ἀλλοτρίων ὀνόματι: "wrong," as belonging properly to something else. δίνη: "vortex." Empedocles "conceived the earth to be kept in its place by the rapid rotation of the universe, just as, when a cup of water is whirled swiftly round, the water remains in the cup." (Archer-Hind.) It is this notion that Aristophanes travesties in the Clouds, when he makes Δίνος ἀντὶ Διὸς the ruler of the worlds.
упо тοι ουρανοι μενειν: "supported by the heavens." Or the prepositional phrase may go with δινη; in which case translate μενειν, "remain fixed."

ωσπερ καρδότω πλατεία... υπερειδει: "puts the air under the earth as a basis as under a flat kneading-trough." This was the view of Anaximenes, followed by Anaxagoras and Democritus, and, like the preceding notion, made fun of in the Clouds.

την δε τοι... ουτω νυν κεισθαι: "the force whereby things are so disposed as to be maintained in the best manner possible." τεθηναι gives the act, κεισθαι its abiding result: αυτα = the elements of the universe.

99C. τούτων "Ατλαντα: the genitive depends on the comparative—than the real Atlas, the efficient cause which supports things, as Atlas supports the world; cf. Vergil, Aeneid IV. 482:—

"Axem umero torquet stellis ardentibus aptum."

δεν ευνδειν: the same pun occurs in Plato's Cratylus.

το δεν φαίνεται δεσμός είναι: translate "the binding." Note δεω when it means to "bind" usually contracts in all forms; δει, "it is necessary," only contracts -εε and -εει. G. § 91.

αυτός ευρειν... παρ' ἄλλον μαθειν: in strong contrast, as also in 85C.

99D. τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν: a proverbial phrase whose meaning is defined in a variously-quoted fragment of Menander:—

ὁ δευτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δήπον λεγόμενος,
ἀν ἀποτύχῃ τις οὐριον κώταισι πλεῖν.

Its significance here is much disputed. It may be taken as simply (1) "my second voyage in quest of the cause of things," or (2) "the second-best course." Prof. Geddes thinks it means that "having failed in his first voyage, under the guidance of the Physicists, Socrates says that he set out by himself on a second voyage of discovery in search of a solid Basis of Being, not by gazing on the outward world of Matter, but by meditating on the inner world of Thought." To this Mr. Archer-Hind objects that the second meaning given above is that invariably given to the proverb elsewhere, and that Socrates could never think of his method as inferior to that of the Physicists. He accordingly interprets it by the light of 99E, and thinks that Socrates, "since he despairs of actually grasping the eternal ideas, of which all natural phenomena are symbols, endeavours to form from (an examination of) those symbols, mental concepts (λόγοι) or universals, which shall represent those ideas to him: they are the ideas as reflected (εἰκόνες) in his intelligence." The former interpretation is the more obvious, and after all there is no pointed reference to the proverb: the latter is truer of the historical Socrates, whose εἰναι were logical conceptions—as indeed they remained in Plato's earlier dialogues—rather than ἰδει, having an existence by themselves, apart from and above the particulars.
βούλει ... ποιήσωμεν: see 79A, note. Observe the abrupt transition from a narrative to an interrogative.

XLVIII. ἀπείρημα: "I was exhausted." For the word, cf. 85B; for the perfect, cf. G. 205, 3.

ηλιον ἐκλειπτοντα: "an eclipse of the sun."

tά ὄμματα: this accusative after a passive verb, the extent of whose action it limits, is quite common in Greek; cf. τὴν ψυχήν τυφλωθεῖν, three lines below. G. § 160.

99E. πρὸς τά πράγματα: if the second interpretation of δευτέρος πλοῦς in 99D be adopted, πράγματα must be held to refer to the ideas, and ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων taken in a metaphorical sense! It is no wonder, therefore, that Mr. Archer-Hind should regard the sentence as spurious.

ἔσως μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰκάζω, κ.τ.λ.: "perhaps this, then, in a certain way bears no resemblance to what I compare it!" The subject referred to is τὸ ἐν λόγοις σκοπεῖν.

100A. ἐν εἰκόσι: N.B., not εἰκοσι, but the dative plural of εἰκών. What else might εἰκόσι be? Both ἔργα and λόγοι are in different ways reflections of the ideas.

ἔργος: "external results," i.e., the intellectual world is not a bit more a shadow than the external.

ἀλλ’ οὖν δὴ: "anyhow," "however that may be."

ἐκαστοτε λόγον: "the reason, or principle, in each instance." The first book of the Republic illustrates this practice of Socrates. The question is, What is Justice? Several folk’s ideas on the point are examined: the accidentals are eliminated, and the residuum regarded as the λόγος of justice, whereby whatever or whoever claims to be just may be tested as by a standard. This particular example of the method is fully analysed in M.A.P., pp. 67–73. Note that there is no idea of verification—see J. S. Mill, Logic, Book III., Chap. xi.

ἄδ' ἄν μή: μὴ used because the relative is indefinite; G. § 283, 4.

XLIX. 100B. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν: "I proceed to try."

ἐν τῷ παρεληφθέντι λόγῳ: especially in Chap. xix.

πολυθρόλητα: "well-worn subjects"; cf. on 65B.

ἐπιδεῖξεν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν: "discover and demonstrate"; an instance of Hysterion Proteron.

100C. ὡς διδόντος ... περαινοῦν: "since I grant you this, you would not be hasty in drawing your conclusion." Or perhaps better—taking the optative as a polite request, G. § 226, 2—"assuming that I grant you the premisses, please be quick in drawing your conclusion."
τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνως: "what comes next to that." The dative is curious with ἐξῆς, seeing that the word is related to ἐχεσθαι, which takes a genitive—e.g., 100D, end.

tὰς ἀλλὰς αἰτίας τὰς σοφάς: i.e., of the early Physicists, who called themselves σοφοί (sages), until Pythagoras assumed the more modest name of φιλόσοφος (searcher after wisdom).

χαίρειν ἐδω: "I dismiss from my mind."

100D. ἀτέχνως: "artlessly"—see note on 59A.

ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία: see Introduction, §§ 2, 4, and note 74A, for some account of the Ideal Theory, which is still in its infancy in the Phaedo. The ἰδέαι are substantive essences and the only true causes, but they are not yet grouped together, as in the Republic, under the guidance of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Nor is the causal connexion, the mode whereby "this bed"—to use Plato's own example in Republic X.—came from the "absolute essential bed," at all elaborated in the Phaedo: it is simply δητ ἐκ τοῦ δητος, "some way and somehow," ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ ὅτι διασχυρίζομαι. That is discussed in the Parmenides, &c., but Aristotle complains that it was never done thoroughly. See note on Plato's Mysticism, 74A.

† προσγενομένη: applies to both the preceding nouns if the third εἴτε be cut out, and roughly sums up the alternatives to the modes denoted by those two nouns if the εἴτε be retained. Some prefer to alter to προσαγορευομένη.

100E. τῇ κεφαλῇ: "by a head": the dative really expresses the degree of difference, but is taken as though it were instrumental or causal.

101A. οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι: the words put into Cebes' mouth go down to τὴν συμφρόντητα. ἢ ὅτι must be supplied thrice: μείζον (ἐστὶ) δια, ἐκαττόν (ἐστὶ) ἢ, ἐκαττόν (ἐστὶ) διά. Each of the διὰ τοῦτο are explained by the following words introduced by διά, in each case.

101B. τέρας: "monster"—i.e., absurd.

101C. μεγάλα ἀν βοῶς: observe the change from the negative interrogative, to the positive, potential.

γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχόν: "coming into being save after having partaken":—note the change of tense in the participles.

ιδίας σύστασις: "special essences."

τῆς δύνασις: "duality."

κοµµψεις: "affectations."

παρεῖς, κ.τ.λ.: "leaving it to wiser men than yourself to answer."

101D. τὸ λεγόμενον: "as the saying is": adverbial; cf. 66C.
τὴν σειαντοῦ σκιάν: for σειαντοῦ here, as in 78B and 91C (notes),
many read ἑκαντοῦ, the reflexive of the third person being regarded as
equally applicable to the other persons. σκιὰ = "shadow."

† ἐξόμενοι... ἔχοιτο: "clinging to... attack." Observe (1) the
sudden use of the verb in almost an opposite sense; (2) that the second
use is quite unparalleled. Hence many omit the clause εἶ δὲ τις...
ἔχοιτο, or substitute ἐφοιτο for the latter word.

tοῦ ἀσφαλόσ: the neuter adjective used as a noun with a genitive
depending on it, so common in the speeches of Thucydides.

ἐὸς ἀν... σκέψατε: mark especially the variety of construction
four lines below, ἐως... ἔλθασιν. The latter is the more usual con-
struction, being in protasis, as it were, to a clause like ἄν διδοίης, but
the former may be paralleled by Sophocles, Trach. 687, &c. "Where
ἐως ἀν would have the subjunctive in Oratio Recta, the ἄν may be
retained in Oratio Obliqua, although the optative is substituted for
the subjunctive." (Hermann.) More usually the ἄν is dropped; cf.
G. § 242, 3.

tὰ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης ὁμηθέντα: "the results, or conclusions, that flowed
therefrom." The meaning of the passage is that you form a hypo-
thesis from an examination of certain facts, test other facts by that
hypothesis, but the hypothesis itself by comparing it with some more
comprehensive hypothesis, or higher generalization (τὸν ἄνωθεν); and
so you ultimately climb up to "something satisfactory." Later in
his life Plato discovered his ἰκανόν τι in αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, i.e. the ἰδέα
tοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—see 74A, note.

φαίνοντο: frequentative optative—"whichever from time to time
appeared."

101E. οὐκ ἂν φύοιο: (1) "you would not get yourself into a
muddle." It might also (2) be translated as a passive—"drift"; or
(3) be altered with Schanz to φύοισι—i.e., "you would not confuse
arguments in favour of your hypothesis, with arguments proving
deductions therefrom."

ἀσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ: see on 90B.

κυκλώτας: "throwing into confusion," by stirring up.

ἀρέσκειν: Socrates' aim was not to please his vanity, but to satisfy
his mind; cf. too 91A, B.

102A. εἰ τῶν φιλοσόφων: φιλοσόφων, partitive genitive.

ἄν... ποιός: for the position of the particle, cf. ἄν φαλη, 87A.

τοῖς ἀπούσι: see Introduction, § 3 (2). The break in the narrative
indicates, as above, 88C, that a crisis has been reached.

L. 102B. εἶναι τί ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν... ἵσχειν: this had been
partly allowed en passant in 74A, and was now, after the fuller state-
ment in Chap. xlix., again accepted by Socrates' auditors. The ideas
are the true αλταία περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, talked of in 95E. That is the hypothesis which is not to be attacked, and with which the immortality of the soul is to be shown to be consistent, or rather from which the latter must necessarily flow. The argument in this and the following six chapters is the pith of the Phaedo: for other Platonic proofs of the theory of immortality, see Introduction, § 4, 1.

εἴδη = λόγοι, here, as often elsewhere in Plato. Aristotle treated the latter as a Platonic term, and adopted εἴδος to express (1) form as distinguished from matter; that which, impressed on matter, made thing what it was; (2) a species. τάλλα = the things of the phenomenal world, as in the Parmenides, &c.

ός τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται: "taking the words in their literal sense." The chapter begins with a criticism of the ambiguities of every-day language. The ordinary methods of predication are misleading: when we say Simmias is taller than Socrates we don’t mean what we imply—viz., that Simmias, as such, is taller than Socrates, as such—but that Simmias partakes of the idea of tallness more than Socrates does that of shortness. "Hence," says Mr. Archer-Hind, "we observe that (1) two opposite ideas may co-exist in the same subject, although (2) such opposite ideas cannot combine with each other, either (3) as they exist absolutely in nature, or (4) as they are manifested in concrete particulars."

102C. πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖνον μέγεθος: "relatively to the size of Simmias"; πρὸς = "looking towards," and so "comparing."

ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει: "takes the name." Synonym lays stress on similarity of meaning, Eponym on identity of origin: Synonyms are correlative, while an Eponym is derivative.

τοῦ μὲν τῷ μέγεθε. . . ὑπερέχων: "since he is intermediate between the two—exceeding the shortness of the one by his own tallness, but yielding to the other a size that exceeds his own shortness." With Madvig’s conjecture ὑπερέχων for ὑπερέξων, translate: "presenting an example of smallness by the superiority of the one (Phaedo) in tallness, and in the case of Socrates supplying an example of size that surpasses the other’s small stature.

102D. ξυγγραφικῶς: (1) "like a scrivener," "in lawyer-like fashion"; (2) "in the style of a legal document"; or, possibly (3) "like a historian"; (4) "like a book" (of history). Anyhow it means with abnormal precision.

ἀλλ’ οὖν . . . γε: "well, at any rate."

ἐθέλειν: with an impersonal subject, cf. above 60B, 74D, notes. Also cf. τετολμηκε, 102E.

αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος . . . τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος: the absolute Magnitude of the idea . . . the relative magnitudes of its concrete embodiments.

This sentence is the important one in the chapter: the principle it establishes is shown not to be contradictory to that of the generation PHAED.
of opposites (above Chaps. xv.—xvii.) in the next chapter, supplemented in Chap. 111., strengthened in liii., and applied in liv. to the soul. See Introduction § 5—sub Argument (5).

102E. ὥστερ ἐγώ . . . ἐκείνο δὲ: i. e., if Socrates receives smallness, a small Socrates arises, involving no change of personality; if greatness receives smallness a small greatness arises, which is absurd.

103A. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι: "under these circumstances"—i.e., when a contrary idea approaches.

LI. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν: cf. Chaps. xv.—xvii. on the generation of opposite from opposite. Socrates easily shows that it is quite a different thing to say, as there, that "hot water is generated from cold water," and to say, as here, that the "idea of hot can never admit the idea of cold." As Aristotle would put it, the former implies merely a change of accidents, the latter, of essence.

παραβαλόν: "bending down his head"—to listen carefully, as was his wont (cf. 89A), to the diffident objectors.

τὸ διαφέρον, κ. τ. λ.: "the difference between what is said now, and what was said then."

103B. ἐπονομάζοντες τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα: "calling them by the name of the ideas; but now about the ideas themselves, through the presence of which these named things have their name."

ἀν ὅδε εἴπεν: ἀν instead of ἄ attracted into the case of its antecedent τοῦτων; cf. 60D, note.

103C. οὐ τι λέγω . . . ταράττει: it was a characteristic of Cebes' to be easily upset; cf. note on 77A, and Appendix, s. v.

LI1. ἐτὶ δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε: μοι serves both as ethic dative with σκέψαι and as indirect object to συνομολογήσεις. The τόδε which is worked out in this chapter is that an idea refuses to admit not only an opposite idea, but also an idea which partakes of that opposite idea—e. g., the idea of three excludes that of even, though not itself opposite to even.

103D. ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν: in Chap. 111., 102D, E.

103E. ἐστίν ἄρα . . . ὡστε: "it is then the case that"; cf. 93B for ὡστε introducing a truth depending on ἐστίν.

ἀξιοῦσθαι: "is considered worthy."

† τοῦτο τοῦ ὄνοματος: v. I. τοῦ ἐαντοῦ ὄνοματος and τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοτι . . . ὡστερ ἦ: "but something else also—something which is not the idea itself, but which always retains its shape
so long as it exists." Observe μορφή used as equivalent to ἐδος, without the metaphysical associations which even then that word had acquired.

ἀρα μόνον ... ἀπολείπεσθαι: "does this apply only to the odd—for this is the point—or is there something else which is not the odd, but which must, along with its own name, always be called odd as well, seeing that its nature is such that it can never be wanting in oddness." For instance, three has no opposite as such, but it has the μορφή of oddness, and so can never combine with the opposite of oddness, i.e., evenness.

104A. τοῦ περίττον: genitive of separation after ἀπολείπεσθαι; G. § 174.

προσαγορευτέα: passive verbal in -τέος, expressing necessity; "must be called"; cf. G. § 281.

ὁντος οὐχ οὔπερ τῆς τριάδος: by attraction for οὐχ ὀπέρ ἡ τριάς ἐστιν. For a similar attraction of a relative clause, cf. Sophocles Αίας 487, §—πατρός, εἰπέρ τινος σέβοντος. On attraction generally, cf. 60D.

ὁ ἡμιον τοῦ ἄριθμοῦ πᾶς: "the entire half of the set of numbers"—the στίχος τοῦ ἄριθμοῦ (rank) of which oddness was the common attribute, as evenness of the other half. This division of numbers and the word στίχος are from Pythagoras.

104B. ἐκείνα τὰ ἑναντία: "mutual opposites," which had formed the subject of Chap. l.: this chapter is devoted to opposites contained by opposites.

ἀλλὰ καὶ, κ.τ.λ.: "but all these things that, though not opposite to each other, always contain opposites, are not likely to receive that idea which is opposite to the one existent in them." ἐστικε δεχομένων: lit., "are like those receiving"; cf. ἐστικε σπεύδοντι, Protagoras, and passim; see too 62D, note.

ἀπολλύμενα: observe the change of case from δεχομένων, above. It is as if φαίνεται had preceded, a constructio ad sensum, as in 81A.

104C. οὐκ ἀρα μόνον ... ἐπάντα: this sentence sums up the chapter, and should thus be compared with 102D, E, to gather its advance on the first position taken up, and with the sentence beginning ὅπα ὑ in 1054, which marks the next step forward.

LIII. βούλει σοῦ ... ὄρισώμεθα: cf. 79A note.

† 104D. ἀ δ θὶ ἐν κατάσχεγγα ... αὐτῷ δεῖ τινος: "which, whatever they occupy, compel that thing not only to retain its own idea, but also the idea of some opposite." The v.l. ἐν δῇ τινος, omitting αὐτῷ δεῖ, expresses much the same thing in a rather less clumsy way.

οὐ μόνον τρισχὴν εἶναι ... περίττοις: for the assimilation of the predicative adjective to the preceding dative cf. G. § 136, note 3 (b).
epi to toioUton deta... av ellhov: "to such a thing, then, the idea opposite to that form by which this is made what it is could never come." E.g. to three things (tpia) the idea of even, being opposite to that of odd, could never come.

h periTT= h tou periTTw morph, or h periTTpTtis, which last some read, denying such a phrase as h periTT (sc. ide) to be Plato-like.

amovra tou arToiv: adjectives compounded with negative prefix a-take the genitive; cf. 83E, note.

d toionv ilegou dhitasvai: "as to what I said was to be defined, viz."

-toiva... evantioi being epexegetical, and thence to pamaTallla illustrative. The sentence is then broken off abruptly, and with 6pia dh Socrates sums up first the definition in the protasis ei ouTas dhxiei, then the conclusion he deduces therefrom in the words following, down to dexasvai.

to yap... episvei: "for it brings its opposite."

105A. allai kai ekievo... dexasvai: "but also that which brings a contrary with it to that which it approaches, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it." For instance, the triad, which brings with it the idea of odd, will never admit the contrary of odd, i.e. even. ekiev may go either with episve or with evantioi, probably the former.

ou yap xeirop pollaKis akouven: this was one of the advantages of the dialogue as a medium of philosophical discussion. The main point or the difficulties could be gone over repeatedly, and clearness and thoroughness thereby attained; cf. 95E.

† avto allw evantioi: the sense is better if ouk be inserted before evantioi.

to hmuoloi: "half as much again"—i.e., 1/3 and all other fractions having 2 as denominator.

105B. tritnmporoi: "a third"—i.e. 1/3 and all other fractions having 3 as a denominator. All fractional forms which have a numerator commensurable by the denominator—two and its multiples in the first example, three and its multiples in the second—are excluded in this sentence; the gist of which is that these fractions will never receive the idea of whole, inasmuch as they bring in with them the idea of part or fractionality, which is contrary to whole or integrity (Archer-Hind).

† LIV. mh moi... allai mmpoumenoi eme: "do not answer just in the words in which I ask you, but follow my example." Others read av... allw allw with the same sense, but in clearer if clumsier form. As Prof. Geddes puts it, Cebes is to give the species, not the genus, in his answers.

par' hym to prwtov ilegou aptokrivos: "besides that other answer the safer one, that I mentioned at first," in 100D.
The soul cannot receive death.

One point must be added to this. On the approach of that which is opposite (death) to what it brings with itself (life), the soul must either (1) perish or (2) retire (102E). Now, in this case ἀπὸλλυσθαί = δέχεσθαι ὁ ἐναντιόν, which the soul cannot do: it therefore has to withdraw.

106A. ὀπότε ... ἐπήει: observe the use of the imperfect without ἄν to express iteration, like the more usual optative, as in ὀπότε ἐπαγάγοι, four lines above. G. §§ 233, 206.

106B. τεθνηκώς: of the death of the soul, not like τὸ τεθνάναι in Chap. ix., 64C, of the separation of soul and body. "ψυχή here means principle of life; and a dead vital principle is a contradiction in terms." Archer-Hind.)
106C. ἦμιν ὕμωλογηταί: the agent is generally expressed by ὑπὸ with genitive after passive verb; by the dative after perfect and pluperfect passive, rarely by the dative after other tenses; cf. G. §§197, 188, 3.

πρὸς τῷ ἀδάνατος ἐναι: “in addition to being deathless”— ἀδάνατος nominative because referring to ὑψὸς, the subject of the finite verb.

106D. τοῦτον ὑπὸ ἐνεκα: “as far as this is concerned.”

σχολή γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δὲχοιτο: μὴ seems to be used here instead of the ὅβ which one would naturally expect to give an indefinite general sense to the proposition. As Mr. Archer-Hind puts it, the last three words = εἰ ὅβ μὴ δὲχοίμενον φθορὰν: or, as Prof. Jebb explains, a similar phrase in Sophocles’ Antigone, 685, “the sentence is equivalent to a relative clause with an indefinite antecedent.” Note, too, the unusual collocation of tenses in these conditional sentences: instead of the optative, we have εἰ with the future (= μέλλει δέχεσθαι).

The underlying idea is the same as that underlying 72B, where see note—viz., the conservation of force. Other things may make way for their opposites; if soul, the vital principle, does, we have the sleep of Endymion over again, as in 72C.

LVI. ἂν ὕμωλογηταί: potential optative.

ἀδιάφορον: “incorruptible.”

106E. καὶ ἀνώλεθρος: “indestructible to boot.”

107A. εἰς ὑπτινὰ τίς ἄλλον καὶ τὸν ἀναβάλλουτο: Mr. Sidgwick has given in his editions of the Choephoroe and Agamemnon what is now generally accepted as the correct explanation of optatives similar to the present one. His view is that these optatives are optatives of remote deliberation (cf. esp., τοί τις φύγοι, Plutus, 438), and that they are not potential optatives with the ἂν omitted—e.g.,

Agam., 620, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαμι τὰ ψευδὰς καλά. Cho. 172, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι σεῖμαι.

The peculiarity in this sentence is that the optative is used instead of the subjunctive after a primary tense; this use of the optative expresses the remoteness of possibility. We have an instance just below in ὅτι ἄκοιστο of the deliberative subjunctive.

τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ἂν οἱ λόγοι εἶσθιν: “the magnitude of the subject of discussion.” Compare the similar despondency of Simmias in 85C, and see Index, s.v.

107B. τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας: i.e., the hypothesis regarding the relation of ideas and phenomena (102B), on which the whole of this proof of the immortality of the soul rests.

ἐπισκεπτέα: as though αἱ ὑποθέσεις had preceded. To get rid of such an anacoluthon some read ἐπισκεπτέαν. G. §281.
LVII. 107C. ἐν φ' καλοὺμεν τὸ ἣν: "during which we speak of life"—i.e., as opposed to pre- and post-natal existence. The sentiment is something like that of Antigone, quoted on 61E.

δόξεν ἄν...ἀμελήσει: the optative would be more usual in the apodosis, after ἄν with the optative in protasis; (G. § 224). But the Greek conditional expressions are very flexible; and this particular is quite natural when one remembers how like a future in form and meanings δόξεν ἄν is; see, too, on 106D.

ἀπαλλαγή = ἀποφυγή three lines lower; cf. 64C.

ἐρμαῖον: "windfall," "godsend." An unexpected slice of good luck, as when a traveller finds something by the wayside, and offers it to Hermes as the god of wayfarers (Scholiast). For the sentiment, Prof. Geddes compares Caesar's speech recommending imprisonment as a more severer punishment for the Catilinarian conspirators than death, which was aerumnarum requies.

These words contain a hint of the later Christian plea for immortality based on the Moral Government of the world by the Creator. There is so much injustice in the world that we must believe "a new world to be called into existence to redress the balance of the old." See Introduction, § 4.

107D. παϊδείας καὶ τροφῆς: "education and training." The latter word more usually expresses bodily sustenance.

tῆς ἔκεισε πορείας λέγεται: the tradition is based, thinks Olympiodorus, on our instincts, on the legends and oracles of the gods, on the mysteries, and on the god within us.

Here begins a νεκυία which goes on to the end of Chap. LXII. Similar myths are found in the Republic, Bk. X., Phaedrus, and Gorgias. Socrates explicitly says in Chap. LXIII. that it is not to be regarded as demonstrably true, but at least approximately so, and accordingly to be accepted by every good man. Plato's fondness for myths and analogies has often been attributed to his consciousness of the weakness of his argument, and he has been accused of over-readiness "to throw the arch of fancy over streams too deep for reason to ford."

ὁ ἐκαστοῦ δαίμων...εἶλήξε: "the daemon who was assigned to each man while he was alive." In the Republic each man chooses his own daemon. If the two statements must be reconciled, we may say that each man chooses his kind of life and has a suitable daemon assigned him by Lachesis as φύλακα τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποφληρωτὴν τῶν αἴρεθέντων. Such a daemon was, in the words of Menander,

εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγώγῳ τοῦ βίου.

Compare the Roman belief that each man had a genius and each woman a juno, and the semi-Christian notion of a guardian-angel.

πορεύεσθαι...πορεύσαι: N.B. "to journey...to convey."
107E. περιόδοις: "revolutions." Just below, in 108A, it = Latin ambages, "roundabout way." The duration of a cycle was variously estimated. Empedocles put the maximum at 30,000 years, Herodotus at 3,000, which Plato, in the *Phaedrus*, accepts for the philosophic spirit, but fixes it for ordinary purposes at 10,000.

ἐν Ἑλεφόις Τήλεφος: Telephus was a king of Mysia, son of Hercules and the nymph Auge. He was wounded by Achilles at the siege of Troy. Learning from an oracle that he could only be healed of his wound by Achilles, he presented himself before Agamemnon (exul et pauper.—Horace) in beggar's guise. Through Agamemnon's mediation, Achilles consented to heal him by the rust of the spear. This subject has been treated by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the Roman writers, Ennius and Attius. The play mentioned here is not extant.

108A. ἐν ἴδπικοιν ἔδει...ἀν διαμάρτρων: "would be no need...could go astray." For these two uses of ἐδεί, see G. §§ 222, 224. The protasis to ἐν διαμάρτρων is contained in the genitive absolute μᾶς ὅσα οὐσία: = εἰ μία ὄδος εἰς; cf. G. § 226.

ἀπὸ τῶν δόσιων τε καὶ νομίμων: "from our present rites and ceremonies"; especially from the fact that offerings were made to Hecate where three roads met—hence her names, Τριακάς, Τρίβια.

οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα: "is familiar with its surroundings"; for is not the life of the philosopher μελέτημα βανατοῦ (Chap. xii.)?

ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν: in 81C, D.

108B. τούτων ἀδελφά: "deeds akin thereto." The construction is poetical, like ὅθιπερ (for ὃπερ) three lines above. But then the whole passage is poetical.

ξυνέμπτορος: "fellow-traveller."

108C. ἔχομεν...γένωνται: "entangled in all kinds of difficulties, until certain periods are fulfilled."

φίλησεν: "settles"; a kind of gnomic aorist.

οὐτε δόσῃ: "nor so small as" is thought by certain contemporary Sophists, &c.

言ってνος: generally supposed to refer to Anaximander, who constructed the first map of the world. The idea that it is neuter and refers to Socrates' δαμάκινον σμαίνων is discountenanced by the very nature of that curious internal voice of Socrates, which was prohibitory of acts, not suggestive of facts (M.A.P. p. 31, note.)

LVIII. 108D. Ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη: who this skilful person was it is not quite clear. Some think the proverb alludes to Glaucus, the sailor's god and wizard of the sea; others refer it to the Samian artist of that name, who, according to Herodotus, was the inventor of soldering (κόλλησις).
χαλεπώτερον ἢ κατὰ, κ.τ.λ.: "too difficult for."

εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην: "if I did know it."

μοι δοκεῖ: parenthetical, ἐξαρκεῖ (suffices) being the verb to δ βίοσ.

108E. εἰ ἔστιν . . . οὖσα: "if the earth is in the midst of the heavens and is spherical." For other early opinions, see on 97D, E. Note the difference between μέσος with the article preceding, and μέσος without the article. ὁ μέσος οὐρανός would be "the middle heaven"; cf. G. 142, 4, note 3, for a similar use of ἀκρος and ἐσχάτος.

δεῖν: after ἄς; cf. ὅτι . . . ἦςεν, 63C and 109B below for similar attractions of relative or dependent clauses in Oratio Obliqua into the construction of principal sentences.

πρὸς τὸ μὴ τεσσεῖν: "to prevent it falling"; lit., "with reference to its not falling."

ἀνάγκης: "constraining force."

109A. ἀλλὰ ἰκανὴν . . . τὴν ἱσορροπίαν: "but that the homogeneity of the heavens and the equilibrium of the earth itself are sufficient to hold the earth up." Like Anaximander he conceived the density of the atmosphere to be "equal itself to itself in all directions": if so, why should the earth be forced any whither?

ἱσορροπίαν: derived from ἴσος—equal, μορί— the turn of the scale.

ὁμοίωσ 5' ἑχων ἀκλίνες μενεῖ: "its conditions being similar all round, it will remain immovable."

τάμμεγά τι: very large indeed, if the world as Plato knew it was but one of the many basin-worlds of the earth—cf. ἐν σμικρῷ τινι μορίῳ.

τοὺς μέχρι . . . Φάσιδος: "from the Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles." The Phasis is the name of two rivers in the region of the Caucasus; (1) the Rioni, which flows through Colchis into the Black Sea (at the mouth of which stands Poti); (2) the Passin-su, or Aras, which flows easterly through Armenia, and, joining the Cyrus (Κωρ), enters the Caspian Sea some miles south of Baku. The Pillars of Heracles stand at the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea, τὴν θάλασσαν, just below. These were the limits of the world as known, save by hearsay, to the Greeks of Plato's time: writing after the conquests of Alexander, Aristotle substitutes the Indus for the Phasis as the eastern limit.

109B. ὄσπερ . . . βατράχους: "like ants and frogs round a pool."

παντοδαπά: explained by the two following words—"varied in shapes and sizes."

εἰς ἄ ἔνεργον ἐκεῖναι: see above on, δεῖν 108E; cf. ἄν . . . ἄνοιμως below, and ἐφι, ἐπείδη οὗ ἐκβηναι τὴν ψυχήν, πορεύεσθαι μετὰ τολλῶν; Plato, Republic x.

τὴν ὀμίχλην "mist," "fog."
καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ: Origen said this idea of Plato was a distorted plagiarism (παρακονή) from the Hebrew prophets. Briefly stated, Plato's theory as to "the shape of the earth and its parts" comes to this:


109C. ύποστάθμην: "sediment." ταύτα: i.e. water, fog, and air. ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς: "on the top, or surface, of the earth."

ἀστέρ παι: ἕν ἐί: ἕν goes with ἑν understood, not with the protasis (cf. 71B, note). It is thus the third kind of conditional sentence; G. § 224.

109D. ὣρακως ἑν: for the form, cf. ἀκηκώς ἑν three lines below. This has not quite the same force as the perfect optative; it emphasizes the "being in the condition of one who has seen" (cf. note, 76B).

But such phrases as this, the common use of the substantive verb and perfect participle in the oblique moods of the perfect passive, the use of various periphrases to express different shades of futurity (ἔσομαι δειπνῶν, μέλλω δειπνεῖν, &c.) are the beginnings of the normal process in language from synthesis to analysis: the necessity of numerous verb forms is avoided by the use of auxiliaries.

ἐκδύς καὶ ἀνακύψας: "emerge and pop up."

παρὰ σφίς: though the subject it refers to is singular.

ὡς διὰ τούτου . . . χωροῦνα: accusative absolute. The accusative absolute, very common in the case of impersonal verbs, is very rare with the participles of personal verbs, except when the participles are preceded by ὡς or ἄστερ.

τούτου: ἐκ. τοῦ ἀέρος.

† τὸ δὲ ἐλνια τοὐτοῦ: "And this is so because," &c. The MSS. read ἐλνια ταύτων, which does not make sense; others ἐλνια ταύτων or δεινότατον. Schanz omits the last two words, retaining τὸ δὲ in its Platonic use as a particle of transition: "but the truth is that."

ἐπὶ ἑξαχατον τὸν ἄρα: cf. μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ supra, 108E.

109E. οὕτως ἐν τινα: takes up what has been said since ἐπει, εἶ τις; so too κατιδεῖν repeats the previous κατιδεῖν. In the MSS. there is no ἕν with the first κατιδεῖν, but the mistake is probably due to a mistake of a copyist owing to the repetition of the letters ἐν in ἄνακύψατα.

ὁ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἱχθύς ἀνακύπτοντες: "the fishes in the sea popped out of it"; cf., for a similar pregnant use, ὁ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐφυγόν; also 57A.

εἰ ἡ φύσις ἰκανή εἶ: cf. 99D for the imagery.

110A. διεφθαρμένα . . . καὶ καταβεβρωμένα: "corrupted and corroded."

ἄλμης: "salt." οὐραγγεῖς: "caverns."
NOTES, 109B—111B.

110b. δὲ αὖ... διαφέρειν: “those on the other hand would manifestly still more excel ours.”

LIX. 110B. λέγεται: observe how careful Plato is to emphasize the fact that this is a myth, not a statement of fact: cf. εἰ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν (“if one must tell a myth”) just above, and the opening words of Chap. lxiii.

ἰδεῖν: “to look at”—epexegetic to τοιαύτη.

διαδικάσκοντοι σφαίραι: “parti-coloured balls”; literally, “balls covered with twelve different pieces of leather.” There may be an allusion to the Pythagorean theory that the earth corresponded somehow to the shape of a dodecahedron; or perhaps there is a reference to the twelve signs of the Zodiac.

110C. ἀλουργή: “of genuine purple,” from ἄλς and ἔργω; lit. “wrought by the sea.”

χρωματὸς τι... φαντάζεσθαι: “the very hollows display a kind of colour, for they glitter amidst the variety of the other colours, so that the form of the earth appears one unbroken variegated surface.” οὕσεχές seems to be equivalent to an adverb, qualifying ποικίλου.


δὲν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε... μόρα: “whereof the stones so greatly prized here—cornelians, jaspers, and emeralds, &c.—are but fragments.”

110E. οἴδεν δ τι οὗ τοιοῦτον εἶναι: for the infinitive in relative clause cf. 109B above. This particular phrase may be explained as a construction according to sense—οἴδεν δ τι οὗ being equal to πάν.

σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης: “putrefaction and brackishness.”

τοῖς ἄλλοις ἵπποις: not that stones are animals. but simply by Greek idiom for our “besides.” So, too, Herodotus speaks of the Massagetae “slaughtering an old man and many other sheep” with him; and cf. the French use of vous autres Anglais.

111A. ἐνί λόγῳ: From this to the end of the chapter is the conclusion of the whole matter, as is also mentioned in 109B, note.

111B. ἀὴρ: note the breathing; = ὃ ἀὴρ.

κρασίν: “temperature.” Plato, in the Timaeus, regards the climate of Athens as no small aid to her greatness; and Aristotle also insisted strongly on suitable climatic conditions for his ideal state.

εἰκόνις = αὔτοὶ five lines lower down.

† φρονήσει: “intelligence.” So MSS.: others read ὀσφρήσει, “smell.”

ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει: “differ in the same degree.”
aiσθήσεις . . . συνοπτίας: "the sensible presence of the gods and communion with them face to face."

τούτων ἀκόλουθων: "of a piece with this."

LX. 111C. τοῖς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας: observe the change of construction from the infinitive as used above.

ἐστι δ' ούς: "others."

111D. τούτους δὲ . . . πολλαχι: "all these, in many places, have borings into one another beneath the earth."

111E. ὁσπερ ἐν Σικελία . . . ποταμοὶ: "as in Sicily there are the streams of mud flowing before the lava"—which Plato may have himself seen on Aetna before the date of this dialogue (Introduction, §§ 1, 2).

ὁσπερ αἰώραν τινά: "a kind of oscillation, as it were." The word is used to express a motion like that of a see-saw or a swing, to both of which games it is applied. It is of course the subject of κυνείν. The ὁσπερ is used just like Latin quasi, to introduce the uncommon metaphor.

112A. βέβεθρον: "abyss." The quotation is from Iliad viii. 481.

Τάρταρον: originally the son of Aether and Ge, but even so early as Homer the name of a place as far beneath Hades, as Hades below the earth. Plato here makes it a vast hollow, running right through the earth, as far as the midst of which by natural gravitation all rivers of the earth, both on the surface and underground, flow, whence they are forced back along their channels by the alternate oscillations of the place. Aristotle criticises the whole theory in his Meteorologica, without however understanding it.

τοῖούτῳ . . . ῥέωσιν: "just like the earth through which they flow"; = γῆνονται ἐκαστοι τοῖούτοι, οἵ καὶ ἡ γῆ ἐστι δι' ἃς ἄν ῥέωσιν.

112B. πυθμένα: "bottom." βάσις: "foundation."

ὁσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων . . . τὸ πνεῦμα: "as the current of respiration of those who breathe is exhaled and inhaled."

112C. τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον: "the region which is popularly known as lower"; implying that Plato did not accept the distinction between higher and lower as an absolute, but merely relative distinction.

τοῖς κατ' ἐκείνα τὰ ῥέματα: either (1) "to the neighbourhood of those streams" (Cope), or (2) "by means of the channels" (called διερτῶν below) "communicating with these subterranean rivers" (Geddes). Ast and Archer-Hind bracket τοῖς.

ἐκείθεν . . . δεῦρο: for instance, supposing the aforesaid chasm is traversed by the axis of the earth, ἐκείθεν would represent the southern, δεῦρο the northern atmosphere.
ἐπηνύλειτο: “pumped up,” by the reflux of Tartarus.

πάντα δὲ . . . ἐκροῆς: “all flow in at a lower level than the efflux.”

112D. καθεύτα . . . ἐμβάλλει: “descend . . . discharge”; both used intransitively.

112E. ἀναντε . . . μέρος: “to both sets of streams the side of the globe opposite to that to which they belong presents a steep ascent” (Geddes).

LXI. τέταρτ’ ἄττα βέψατα: the original description of which is in Homer, Odyssey x., 511–515. Plato adapts them to his purpose, as later still Milton also does (Paradise Lost, ii., 574–81).

ἐξωτάτῳ βρέον περὶ κύκλῳ: “round in the outermost circle.” For the phrase περὶ κύκλῳ (lit., “round a circle”), some read περὶ or περι (adverb).

113A. οὐ οί τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαί: the subject has been glanced at (Chap. LVII.) and is applied more fully in the following chapter. The physical geography of the nether world naturally precedes its political, or rather psychical geography.

τυνάς εἴμαιρμένων χρόνους: “certain allotted periods.” For various rough estimates, see on 107E; for the principle of allotment the following chapter.

εἰς τᾶς . . . γενέσεις: “the races of living things.” We have heard of this process before in Chaps. xv. and xxxi., where see notes.

τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐμβάλλει: “midway between Oceanus and Acheron issues forth a third stream.” Note that Plato regards the rivers as discharging into Tartarus—and from this point of view uses ἐκ and ὑπ' throughout the passage—not vice versa.

ξένουσαν . . . πηλοῦ: “boiling with water and mud”—a genitive of material; G. § 172.

113B. κατωτέρῳ τοῦ Τ.: “into a lower depth of Τ.”—partitive genitive like ποῦ γῆς;

εἰς τόπον πρῶτον: πρῶτον should be followed by ἐπειτα, but after the long explanation of Στὺγιον, the verb ἐμβάλλει is repeated instead (end of 113C).

ὁ κυνάς: “lapis-lazuli,” or perhaps some other stone of a cold-blue colour.

δὲ δὴ ἐπονομάζουσιν: the ironical δὴ; cf. supra 112C.

113C. Στὺγα . . . Κωκυτός: observe that Styx is a lake, and, unlike the other two lakes—the Acheruntian and the boiling lake on the Pyriphlegethon— is on the surface of the earth. Elsewhere it is a river, with terrible powers, an oath by which is the most binding of oaths: in Homer, the Cocytus is a backwater of the Styx.

ἐξ ἐναντίας: “from the opposite side.”
LXII. 113D. ὁ δαίμων: cf. 107D and note.

diēdikάγαντο; "receive judgment"—a gnomic aorist, cf. 108C. The souls are here divided into four groups: (1) respectable, 113D; (2) lost, 113E; (3) criminal, 113E, 114A, B; (4) (a) holy, 114B, (b) purified by philosophy, 114C. The several fates and distinctions of these are: (1) Acheron till cleansed; (2) Tartarus for ever; (3) Tartarus till forgiven; (4) (a) surface of the earth; (b) same place, but bodiless for ever. There is a slightly different prospectus in Chap. xxxi.

μέσως = μετρίως. These are the hum-drum people who confine themselves to "social and popular virtue" (82A, note). In the words of Tacitus they possess "medium ingenium magis extra vitia quam cum virtutibus" (Hist. i. 49).

Ἀχέροντα: the river of purification (καθαρόμενοι) rather than of punishment, though that too is bestowed there.

113E. ἀνιατός ἕχειν: "to be incurable."

ἱεροσυλίας: "acts of sacrilege."

δέν οὕτωτο ἐκβαίνουσιν: this doctrine of eternity of punishment is not formally stated in the Phaedrus, and is rejected in the Timaeus. In the Republic and Gorgias it is retained, not so much by way of retribution to the sufferers, but of example and warning to others. Christians seem not to agree on the point.

μεταμέλον αὖτος: absolute in construction. Translate, "penitent"; for this accusative absolute, cf. G. § 278 and supra, 109D.

114A. ἐναυτὸν: so too at Athens, involuntary parricide was punished by a year's exile (ἀπεναυτισμός). τὸ κύμα = ἡ αἰώρα of 111E.

πατραλοίας: lit., "parricides"; here simply of maltreatment.

κατὰ τὴν λίμνην: "into the lake"; contrast the meaning of κατά with the rivers just above, "down."

114B. † διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὅσιον βιάναι: "who appear to have lived with distinction as concerns sanctity." βιάναι is to be taken twice—both with δόξωσι and with πρὸς (Stallbaum). This is unusual; the principal other readings are: (a) διαφερόντες, (b) δόσιον, (c) insert προκεκρισθαί ("deemed") after βιάναι.

114C. τὴν καθαρὰν οὐκησιν: "see above, Chap. lviii."

ἐπὶ γῆς: "on the (true) surface of the earth"; cf. 109C.

ἀνευ σωμάτων: "without earthly bodies," and so free from the discomforts mentioned in Chap. xiii.

ἀν διηλιθάμεν: ἀν for ἀ attracted into case of antecedent τοῦτον.

ῶστε μετασχεῖν: ὦστε with infinitive = natural result; with indicative = actual result.
καλὸν γὰρ...μεγαλὴ: "chiasmus." The ἀγάν is life; its ἀθλον, "bliss unending"; its penalty, "eternity of woe." It is noteworthy that "to Plato immortality was a hope, not a dogma."

LXIII. 114D. τοιαύτ' ἄττα: the point is that the good come off better than the wicked; the details of arrangement do not matter to us.

ολομένω σύντωσ ἕχειν: goes both with πρέπειν and with ξειον.

ἐπάθειν: an echo of 77E.

καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω: "I have been long expanding": note use of πάλαι with present, like the Latin jamdudum, and cf. G. § 200, note 4.

114E. καὶ πλέον...ἀπεργάζεσθαι: "and as having thought that they would do more evil than good"; "make bad worse." For the sentiment, cf. above, Chaps. xiv., xxx. θάτερον is a Pythagorean euphemism for κάκον.

ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἄληθείᾳ = φρονήσει, the fourth cardinal virtue (see on 68C). "ἐλευθερία is that state of liberation from the body which enables the soul to grasp ἄληθεια. (Archer-Hind.)

115A. καλεῖ...ἡ εἰμαρμένη: a concluding smile at the idea of a melodramatic death for him. There could hardly be a better example of the Socratic εἰρωνεία, or faculty for blending the serious with the joyous, truth with "chaff" (in the modern sense), than this passage, which couples together lofty ethical theorizing with the less usual ethical practice of thoughtfulness for the women.

ἡ εἰμαρμένη: "Fate" (μελορμα, to receive one's portion). The word was later adopted by the Stoics as their special watchword of opposition to the Epicurean theory of free-will.

νεκρον λούειν: epexegetical to πράγματα παρέχειν. This operation was generally done by a relative, not, as at Rome, by a professional pollinctor.

LXIV. εἰεν: "good," "so much for that," "to change the subject."

115B. ὅ τι ἂν σοι...ποιοίμεν: "by doing which we could most greatly gratify you."

ἐπιστέλλεις: the proper word for dying injunctions.

ὁσπερ κατ' ἵχνη: cf. Socrates' exhortation to Simmias at the end of Chap. ἵνι. ὁσπερ, Latin quasi, cf. supra, 111E. ἤν of course depends on μὴ θέλητε.

πολλὰ...σφόδρα: "make many earnest promises at the present moment."

115C. οὐδὲν πλέον ποίησετε: "you will gain nothing."

θάπτωμεν: deliberative subjunctive, which in the beginning of 115D is put straight into Oratio Obliqua—ἐρωτᾶ δὴ πῶς με θάπτῃ.

ἐάντερ γε: "that is, if." ἐρωτᾶ δὴ: δὴ, ironical.
ός ἐγὼ εἰμὶ: "that my real self is that Socrates." Contrast the feeling in Homer, where the corpse is regarded as the real man, whose "ghost flits away to Hades, bemoaning its fate." (E.g., II. xxiii., 362.)

115D. εἰς μακάρων δή ... εὐθαμονίας: cf. θέαμα εὐθαμόνων θεατῶν,
111A, Chap. viii., &c.

ταύτα: sums up the preceding part of the sentence; ἀλλως: "to no purpose."

ἐγνώσασθε ... ἡγυνάτο Κ.: "be my sureties to Crito in a way just opposite to that in which he was my surety to the diestas." Crito, Critobulus, Plato, and Apollodorus had offered bail for Socrates to the extent of 30 minae.

ἡ μήν: the usual particle in strong asseverations, oaths, &c.

115E. καιόμενον ... κατοριντόμενον: both these modes of burial, cremation and inhumation, are covered by the general word βάπτειν: both were practised at Athens at the time.

προτίθεται ... ἡ ἐκφέρει: "he lays out or carries forth Socrates." Immediately after death, an obolus was put in the mouth of the corpse as a ναῦλον for Charon, and the body was washed and sumptuously robed. The πρόβεσις usually took place on the second day after death; the ἐκφορά on the following day. At Athens all burials were performed beyond the walls, just as it was ordained at Rome also by the XII. Tables, and noisy lamentation was discouraged. The regular funeral ceremonies came to an end on the ninth day after burial, with the sacrifice called ἐννατα. At Athens dark clothes were worn in token of mourning: for other modes, see 89B and note.

tο μὴ καλῶς λέγειν: Socrates closes this personal discussion as he had begun it (κατ' ἵχνη, &c. in 116B) by showing that his chief interest lay in his disciples following in his train. Slovenly modes of expression blur or blot the truth.

eἰς αὐτὸ τούτο: sc. τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.

πλημμέλει: properly, "out of tune"; πλῆν, μέλος.

καὶ βάπτειν: may depend either on χρῆ or on φάναι.

LXV. 116A. ἀνίστατο εἰς οἶκημα: for a similar constructio praeg-nans, cf. 57A, note. ὃς λουσόμενος: "to bathe"; see G. § 277, 3.

116B. τὰ παιδία: the name of the eldest, called a μειράκιον in the Apology, was Lamprocles; of the younger ones, Sophroniscus and Menexenus.

αἱ οἰκείαι γυναῖκες: "the women of his family." The expression is supposed to be the source of the legend that Socrates had a second wife, named Myrto, who was the mother of the two younger children.

ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν: for Socrates' motive in so doing, see 60A, 117D.

116C. οὐ καταγινώσκατι ... καταγινώσκω: "I shall not have the fault to make against you that I make against others."
NOTES, 115c—117c.

- The nine state-officials annually chosen by lot, who had once exercised all the powers of the king, but who by this time had sunk to be mere city magistrates, with more dignity than solid power.

† χαλεπανεῖς: note the v.l. χαλεπανεῖς.

116D. ἀστεῖος: “courteous,” like the Latin urbanus derives its meaning from the polished manners of town life; and “brutal” is the stock epithet of jailers in all ages.

ἀποδακρύει: ἀπό = “bitterly” in an intensive sense; cf. ἀποχωλῶ, “to lame utterly.”

116E. ἔτι τοῖς ὀρεσι: i.e., Mount Cithaeron, the range parting Attica from Boeotia.

ἐτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ: “there is still time” (lit., room); impersonal.

καλ ἐγωγε . . . οὗ ποιήσω: “and it is natural that I should abstain from so doing.”

117A. κερδαίνειν: so the MSS.; but the present does not seem to harmonize so well with the following future infinitive as the v.l. κερδαίνειν, which some read.

γέλωτα ὀφλῆσειν: “become a laughing stock”; lit., “incur the debt of being laughed at.”

φειδόμενος . . . ἐνόντος: “being chary when the vessel is empty”; an allusion to a proverbial phrase from Hesiod.

LXVI. 117B. σου βάρος: note the position of σου, which goes, of course, with σκέλεις.

αὐτὸ ποιήσει: “it will take effect of itself.”

διαφθείρας . . . προσώπου: “changing colour or expression.”

ταυριθδὸν ὑποβλέψεις: “looking proudly, fixedly, or with bent brows” are the various interpretations of this similitude. The most obvious translation, “fiercely,” does not suit the passage; and the other renderings all fit in with the bull-like look of Socrates’ prominent eyes.

πρὸς τὸ ἀπουσπείσαι τινι: “in regard of its fitness for a libation”; probably to Hermes, the ψυχοπομπὸς.

117C. καὶ γένοιτο ταῦτη: optative of wish.

ἐπισχύμενοι: “putting it to his lips”; sc. τὴν κόλυκα. The active would mean offering a draught to someone else; others, however, prefer to translate, “holding his breath.”

ἐύχερῶς . . . ἐξέπειν: “readily and calmly drank it off.”

κατέχειν: “refrain”: more usual with a direct accusative, as in 117D below.

PHAED.
"not in drops" (a negative, στάζω)—i.e., "in flood";
sc. ἄκωντι.

απέκλαμον εμαυτόν: for the accusative, cf. ἀποδακρύει me, 116D.
The force of ἀπό is the same (= "bitterly") as in ἀποδακρύει.


κατέκλασε: "overcame," "made all break down." πλήν γε: γε explanatory; "that is, except Socrates." ὁ θαυμάστω: "my dear friends!"

τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν: "make any fuss of this kind." The word comes from πλημμελής (πλήν, μέλος), the opposite of ἐμμελής, and so, "out of tune."

ἐυφημία: the common euphemism for silence, the surest way of not saying anything wrong being to hold one's tongue; cf. favete linguæ.

117E. ὑπτίως: "on his back." Latin supinus; opposed to πρηνής, pronus.

118A. ψύχοντο καὶ πηγνύτο: "was growing cold and stiff."
"Hemlock," says Prof. Geddes, "is classed amongst the sharply-narcotic poisons, the effects of which show themselves in clogging the vital action and gradually seizing on the powers of motion and respiration."

For the curious contraction of the second word, from πηγνυτό, cf. the form διασκεδάνυται in 77B. Some read πηγνύτο here as διασκεδάνυται there, considering them optative and subjunctive forms respectively.

καὶ αὐτός: i.e., Socrates.

τὰ περὶ τὸ ἤμρον: "the parts about the waist."

ένεκεκάλυπτο: "for he had covered his head"—as, according to Suetonius, Julius Caesar did in the hour of death.

ὁ Κρίτων . . . ἀλεκτυόνα: these words have been variously taken as a token of respect and of scorn for his country's gods, but they are better regarded as a kind of votive offering to the God of Healing for the impending release from life's long infirmity.

ἐκνήθη: "he quivered." The word does not mean the convulsions of death, which would be σφαδέω.

καὶ δὲ . . . ἑστησέν: "his eyes were fixed;" lit., "and he fixed his eyes," the δὲ referring to Socrates.

LXVII. τῶν τότε ὁν ἐπειράθημεν ἄριστον: "the best of his contemporaries that we had to do with." The expression τῶν τότε displeases many who remember—as Plato did not—that the scene of the Dialogue is placed soon after the death of Socrates. The dialogue
was actually written later (Introduction, § 3), and at the time of writing Socrates’ death was a long-past memory (Grote). Amongst the proposed amendments are Wytenbach’s τῶν πάποτε (which is somewhat sweeping) and πάντων, τότε ὡς ἐπειράθημεν (Heindorf), &c.

In the latter case ἀλλας is contrasted with τότε (= the day of his death); with the existing text it supplements ἄριστον.

Prof. Geddes notes that the virtues on which Xenophon lays most stress at the end of the Memorabilia are σωφροσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, and εὐσέβεια. And this was the man who fell a victim to a γραφὴ ἄσεβειας—a charge of heresy in faith and morals!
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.

MAINLY BIOGRAPHICAL.

Acheron: One of the four rivers described in 112E, 113D.

Acherontian Lake: into which the rivers Oceanus, Acheron, Pyrithlegethon, and Cocytus flow; 113A, B, C; 114A.

Aegina: 59C. An island and city in the Saronic Gulf, called by Pericles "the eyesore of the Piræus," as being a great naval rival to Athens.

Aescharines: 59B. An indigent pupil of Socrates. When he first came to Socrates he said, "I am poor, and have nothing else to give you, so I give you myself." He wrote Socratic dialogues, which have perished. The three dialogues extant which bear his name are doubtless spurious. He lived at the court of Dionysius the younger for some time, till the latter's expulsion from Syracuse in 357 B.c., when he returned to Athens. Has been called an "all-producing babbler." See Introduction, § 7.

Aeschylus: 525–456 B.C. Quotation from his Telephus, 107E.

Aesop: 60C. Supposed to have flourished 570 B.C.; was, according to most accounts, a Phrygian of servile origin, and passed into the hands of several masters. His first master, Demarchus, lived at Athens. He was sold afterwards to a Samian named Iadmon, who freed him. To extend his knowledge, he directed his attention to foreign travel, and is said to have visited Persia, Egypt, Asia Minor and Greece. At the invitation of Croesus he stopped some time at Sardis. He came to Athens during the tyranny of the Pisistratidae, but returned afterwards to Lydia. Being sent by Croesus on a mission to Delphi, he managed to enrage the Delphians and was thrown down a precipice. The vehicle of Aesop's instruction was the fable, which was at that time the most powerful means for rebuking the faults of great men. The extant fables which pass under his name were shown by Bentley to be spurious; many of them appear Latinized in the verse of Phaedrus.

Anaxagoras (499–427 B.C.): 72C and 97B, notes. Born at Clazomenae, in Ionia, he came to Athens 480 B.C., and taught there for thirty years. He was the friend of Pericles and Phidias, and the tutor of Euripides. His innovations, especially in astronomy—he regarded the sun as an incandescent stone, and the earth as a flat cylinder, supported on air—served as a pretext for political foes who wished to strike a blow at Pericles through the indictment of his intimate friend: a charge of impiety was brought against him;
and, but for the eloquence of Pericles, he would have paid the penalty of death. He had, however, to pay a fine and leave Athens. "One spot is as near Hades as another," he said, as he retired to Lamp-sacus, where he died about 427 B.C. According to him the world consisted in the beginning of an indefinite number of "seeds" (σπέρματα), all qualitatively differing, from which sprang the different sensible substances. Wood was compacted of particles of wood, bone of particles of bone, and so on. These original particles were called τὰ δύοαμερὴ στοιχεῖα, and Lucretius, in the first book of De Rerum Natura, call his doctrine "homoeomeria." He was the first to introduce an immaterial cause—viz., νοῦς—to set in order these confused first particles. Herein lay his chief contribution to Greek thought; the important sentence summing up this notion is twice alluded to in the Phaedo (see reff.): "δύοι ἴν πάντα χρήματα εἰς νοῦς ἐλθὼν διεκόσμησεν αὐτά." Unlike the earlier Ionics, he could not conceive matter moving of itself; hence he introduced an intel-ligent, pure, passionless Reason, which sets things going. And so Aristotle says of him: "Ἀσπερ νῆφων ἐφάνη, παρ' εἰκῇ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον." His position in Greek Philosophy is indicated in M. A. P., p. 19; Introduction, § 6.

Antisthenes: 59B. The founder of the Cynic sect; was born about 420 B.C., and fought in the battle of Tanagra (426 B.C.); his first lessons in Rhetoric were learned from the Sophist Gorgias; but, disgusted with his futile labours, he attached himself to Socrates, especially admiring the ascetic portion of his master's doctrine. After Socrates' death he set up a school at a place outside the walls of the city called Cynosarges, from which it is most probable that the name "Cynic" was derived. According to some authorities, however, the name comes from κύων, and was applied on account of Antisthenes' snarling manner: the Cynics bit their friends for their good. His great principle was self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια). Virtue was wisdom. There was only one God, who is invisible. The worship of this deity consisted in a life of virtue. His school in itself was of no lasting importance were it not that out of it rose the famous discipline of the Stoics. (See M. A. P., pp. 35-39; Introduction, § 7.)

Apollo: 88B.

Apolldor us: 59A, B, 117D. A native of Phalerum; one of the most enthusiastic disciples of Socrates; was surnamed δ ἄπνωκας, from his nature, which was disposed to tears and lamentations. He was one of those who went bail for Socrates.

Argives: 89C, note.

Aristippus (fl. 380 B.C.): 59C. A native of Cyrene; was a dis-ciple of Socrates and founder of the Cyrenaic sect. He flourished about 392 B.C. He was the first disciple of the Socratic School who took money for teaching; gained the favour of Dionysius at the Sicilian court; the date and particulars of his death are uncer-tain. Plato's allusion to him in the Phaedo is generally considered
to convey a censure of his conduct, as his absence in Aegina was not, the story went, of necessity. He dwelt exclusively on the practical side of his master’s doctrines, maintaining that it was impossible to attain objective knowledge. He was the typical voluptuary among philosophers, and as such is often cited by Horace: he was quite a straightforward Hedonist. Pleasure—“a gentle movement” of some sense—is the real thing which makes life livable; and the pleasure of the moment is the only sort we can be sure of, so we should take it as it comes. The later Hedonistic schools—e.g., Epicureanism—introduced many modifications in the theory. See M. A. P., pp. 39–41; Introduction, § 7.

Asclepius: 118A, note. A son of Apollo; the God of Healing.

Athens: 57A, 85B, 98E.

Atlas: 99 C. A Titan who made war on Zeus, and was punished by having to bear the heavens on his shoulders; later rationalized into the mountain group in N.W. Africa.

Boeotia: 99A.

Cadmus: 95A, note. The founder of Thebes, a semi-mythical personage, over whose true history there reigns a great deal of uncertainty. According to the legends, he was the son of the Phenician king Agenor, who sent him to seek his sister Europa, carried off by Zeus. On arriving at Boeotia, he slew a dragon that had devoured his companions, and sowed the teeth by Athene’s order. From these sprang up armed men (σταφυλιάδες) who slew each other with the exception of five—who became the ancestors of the Thebans. The Cadmeia, afterwards the citadel of Thebes, was then built. After ruling the city for some time he withdrew in consequence of the death of his grandson, Pentheus. He then became King of Illyria, where he and his wife Harmonia (q.v.) were finally transformed into serpents. Tradition states that he introduced writing and the Phenician characters into Greece. The story is one of the many indications that prove the Semitic origin of Thebes; the name “Cadmus” has been connected with a Phenician word signifying “the aged one” or “the Oriental.”

Cebes: passim, especially 59C, 60C, 61D, 62C, 70A, 72E, and Chap. xxxvii. A native of Thebes, where he had attended the lectures of the Pythagorean Philolaus (q.v.), and a young disciple of Socrates. He is credited by some with having written the extant allegorical treatise of the Tablet (Πνεύματα)—one of the three attributed to him in antiquity; but there are indications in the work which tend to show that it dates from a more recent period. He is one of the chief interlocutors in the Phaedo. “The intellect of Kebeus is bright and keen as a sword: he has an admirable faculty of seeing the point, and making straight towards it, he possesses the invaluable quality of always knowing exactly what he himself means, and he will not put up with any haziness
of thought in others. He is notable for πραγματέα [63A], for tenaciously clinging to the question till it is sifted to the very bottom: he is the hardest of all mortals to convince, yet perfectly open to conviction when once a satisfactory argument has been found. It is always Kebs who, at every important point [see refs.], influences the course of the dialogue.” (Archer-Hind.)

Cleombrotus: 59C. An Ambraciot who, like Aristippus, neglected to come over from Aegina to say farewell to Socrates. The only thing known about him is that he committed suicide, in consequence of reading the Phaedo: according to some because it gave so charming an account of the future life; according to others, for grief at having deserted a master who “spake as,” surely, till then, “never man spake.”

Cocytus: 113C, 114A. One of the four infernal rivers.

Crito: 59C, 60A, and especially 115B, C, D, E. A wealthy Athenian citizen, one of Socrates’ most intimate friends. Plato has given his name to one of the Dialogues. In this we are introduced to him as trying to induce Socrates to escape from prison. In the Phaedo he performs the last offices for his friend. He is said to have been the father of four other Socrates present—Critobulus, Ctesippus, Epigenes, and Hermogenes (s.vv.); but only the first is known to have been his son.

Critobulus: 59B. A son of Crito: is better known from Xenophon’s works than from Plato’s. He is one of the chief interlocutors in the Oeconomicus, Convivium, and Memorabilia of Xenophon.

Ctesippus: 59B. Came from the demus of Paeania. Generally associated, wherever mentioned in the Dialogues, with Menexenus (q.v.).

Delos: 58A, Note, 59E.

Echecrates: 57A, 88E. Spoken of by Diogenes Laertius as one of the last of the Pythagoreans. Introduction, § 3 (2).

Egypt: 80C.

Endymion: 72C. A shepherd or hunter of Elis, or according to another legend, King of Caria. He lived on Mount Latmus, and was so esteemed by Zeus that he was admitted to Olympus, and immortality and eternal youth were given to him. Whether for an insult to Hera, or through the love of Selene (by whom he had fifty children), he fell into the eternal sleep here alluded to.

Epigenes: 59B. Son of the Athenian Antiphon, one of the disciples of Socrates mentioned by Xenophon and Plato. Contemporary with him there is another Epigenes, too, the son of Crito (q. v.), besides the Athenian comic poet.

Euclides of Megara (fl. 390 B.C.): 59C. Was the founder of the Megaric School, from which ultimately the Sceptics sprang (Introduction, § 7). He applied himself to philosophy at an early age,
and learnt the art of discussion from the works of Parmenides. The fame of Socrates brought him to Athens, where he became an ardent disciple of Socrates, who, however, did not quite approve his fondness for controversy, which degenerated into quibbling. This was a characteristic of the School which he set up in Megara soon after he had witnessed his master's death, and which won for it the name of Ἐρωστικός or Διαλεκτικός. (There is, probably, an allusion to them in 90 B.) They dwelt on the logical side of Socrates' teaching, their special points being: (1) their habit of attacking not the premises, but the conclusion (usually by means of a reductio ad absurdum); (2) their dislike of the analogical arguments that Socrates loved. In Ethics their ideal was ἀπάθεια, and their tendency was to regard all virtues as varieties of φρόνησις. In this insistence on the unity of virtue, there are traces of the Eleaticism which was Euclides' first influence in philosophy. For the position of the school, see Introduction, § 7.

Euenus: 60D, 61B, C. A native of Paros, was a σοφιστής as well as a poet, mentioned several times in Plato as an acquaintance of Socrates. The Apology (20B, C) informs us that he professed to teach ἀπερτῆ for the fee of five minae. As some of the sixteen epigrams still extant, attributed to him or his contemporary namesake, point out, he was one of the last of the old elegiac school of poetry.

Euripus: 90C, note.


Harmonia: 95A, note, and sub Cadmus. Daughter of Ares and Aphrodite, and wife of Cadmus, king of Thebes. On the day of her marriage, she received from her husband the fatal necklace he had obtained from Europa. According to another account, she was the daughter of Zeus and Electra, and was carried off from Samothrace by Cadmus. She followed Cadmus after his expulsion from Thebes, and was finally changed into a dragon and translated to Elysium.

Hellas: 78A.

Heracles: 89C. A Greek version of the Phenician sun-God Baal Moloch; the son of Zeus and Alcmena; through Hera's hatred had to do the famous twelve labours for Eurystheus, king of Argos.

Heracles, Pillars of: 109A.

Hermogenes: 59B. A disciple of Socrates, present at the death-scene. There is a doubt as to whether he was a son of Crito or of Hipponicus: probably he was an illegitimate son of the latter. He is a chief interlocutor in the Cratylus of Plato, and Xenophon quotes him as an authority for much of the information concerning Socrates' death which he obtained after his return from Asia.

Homer: 94D, 112A (quotations). Allusion to his method, 95B.

Iolaus: 89C. The great companion and friend of Heracles.

Menexenus: 59B. A son of Demophon, of the demus of Paenania, rich, and a warm admirer of Ctesippus (q.v.). A funeral oration bearing his name appears amongst the extant Dialogues attributed to Plato.

Oceanus: 112E. In Hesiod, the son of Heaven and Earth, and father of all river-gods and water-nymphs. In Homer, the god of the river which was thought to run round the earth; later, that river itself (as here), or the outer waters, like the Atlantic, beyond which no land was known to lie.

Odysseus: 94D. The son of Laertes, husband of Penelope (q.v.), and King of Ithaca. Professed to have a world-wide reputation for craft and subtlety; the hero of the Homer's Odyssey.

Paeanius: 59B. A member of the deme of Paenania, which belonged to the tribe Pandionis, and lay on Mount Hymettus, E. of Athens.

Penelope: 84A. Wife of Odysseus, King of Ithaca, who was one of the most important leaders of the Greek expedition against Troy. A type of wifely faithfulness. For twenty years she waited the return of her husband, resisting the importunities of the various kings and chiefs who sought her hand and consumed her substance. To put off the pressing demands of the suitors she promised to marry one when the web she commenced was completed. During the night she used to unravel whatever was woven during the day. The Odyssey ends with the return of Odysseus, and the slaughter of the suitors.

Phaedo: 57A and passim, especially 89B, 102B, C. One of the favourite pupils of Socrates; was born in Elis. In the capture of his native town by the Spartans he was seized and sold as a slave at Athens. Socrates took a fancy to the youth, and got Cebes to ransom him. Plato's dialogue describing Socrates' last day is named after him, though he is said to have stated after reading the dialogue that he never heard Socrates hold the discussion that Plato attributes to him. He was himself the reputed author of dialogues bearing on Socrates. On the death of his master he returned to Elis, and founded the Eliac school of philosophers, which under his successor, Menedemus, blended with its kindred school of Megara. Introduction, § 7.


Phaedonides: 59C. A Theban disciple of Socrates, coupled by Xenophon, as by Plato, with Simmias and Cebes.

Philolaus: 61D. Believed to have been born at either Tarentum or Croton, and to have flourished B.C. 500-400; holds a central position between Pythagoras and Plato, who is supposed to have drawn largely from him for the Timaeus. He is said to have been
the first to publish in a literary form the teachings of Pythagoras, but the fragments attributed to him are doubtless spurious. Before Socrates' death he left Italy, and settled at Thebes, where in all probability Simmias and Cebes attended his lectures (Phaedo, loc.cit.). He was the first who maintained the diurnal motion of the earth round its axis.

**Phliasii**: 57A. Citizens of Phlius, a Dorian town lying in the N.E. angle of the Peloponnesse, about equidistant from Sicyon, Corinth, and Mycenae. By some said to have been the birthplace of Pythagoras.

**Plato**: 59B. See Introduction, §§ 1, 2.

**Pyrophlegethon**: 113B. One of the four infernal rivers.

**Sicily**: 111E, note. Introduction, §1.

**Simmias**: 59C and passim, especially Chaps. xxxv., xxxvi. A Theban philosopher, and a pupil first of Philolaus, then of Socrates, who found him very stimulating (Phaedrus). He took part with his brother Cebes (q.c.) and Crito in trying to procure the escape of Socrates. He is one of the main interlocutors in the Phaedo. "He is somewhat dreamy and prone to mysticism; he is intelligent and sympathetic, but not free from vagueness; he is apt to be misled by superficial likenesses, e.g., on the subject of harmony; and he sometimes λανθάνει ἑκατὸν οἴδεν εἶπόν, as in 76D." (Archer-Hind.)

**Socrates** (470–399 B.C.): passim. The son of Sophroniscus, a statuary, and Phaenarete, a midwife. He was born in the deme Alopece, just outside Athens, somewhere between the years 471 and 469 B.C. Commencing life as a sculptor, he soon abandoned this profession, and betook himself to the task of educating others, a duty which he considered was imposed upon him by Heaven. He taught no positive doctrine save that virtue is knowledge, chiefly making use of the interrogatory method in proving the ignorance of men who imagined they were wise (note 85B). He served with distinction in several campaigns, and was present at the siege of Potidæa (432–29 B.C.), at Delium (424 B.C.), and at Amphipolis (422 B.C.). His upright and fearless character was strikingly shown on two important occasions. As President of the Prytanes during the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusæ, 406 B.C., he was the foremost opponent of the motion for their execution, and persevered in his resolution, though deserted by all his colleagues. Again, when ordered by the Thirty, 404 B.C., to go to Salamis along with four others to bring back Leon he obstinately refused to take part in this disgraceful act.

Alcibiades, Critias and many others of the eminent men of the day reckoned him as their friend. In 399 B.C. he was accused by Miletus, a poet, Anytus, a wealthy tanner, and Lycon, a rhetorician, of irreligion and immorality: "he did not worship the gods worshipped by the State, but had introduced other strange deities; and he corrupted the youth." The first charge was based upon the fact that Socrates refused to accept that portion of the Greek mythology
which attributed immorality and base passions to the gods. The rider to this charge—religious innovation—had reference to the special prophetic warning voice which bade him refrain from any wrong act he was about to commit. This, however—whatever it was (M. A. P., p. 31, footnote)—was no deity: Socrates himself speaks of it as δαμόνιον, δαμόνιον σημεῖον. The second count in the indictment rested upon several circumstances. Alcibiades and Critias were friends of his; the State institutions were brought into disrepute, it was said, by his doctrines; obedience to himself rather than to their parents was inculcated in the youthful circle that came to listen to him.

These charges served as a peg for his enemies to hang their hatred on; and these enemies were not few in number; his elenchus, his interference in the business of other people, and political causes had made him an object of dislike to many. We see an example of his unpopularity in the Clouds of Aristophanes, where he is regarded as a "Sophist." Yet he differed from the ordinary run of Sophists in two important respects—he would take no fees for his teaching, and his criticism (ἐξέτασις) was not merely destructive; whatever he questioned, he never questioned the value of truth and goodness.

The trial resulted in his condemnation by 281 votes to 220. His high tone of defence irritated his judges. He might have escaped with a slight penalty, by making a moderate counter-proposition to the punishment of death demanded by his accusers. Instead of doing so, he claimed a reward for the benefits he had conferred upon the State, and, though induced at last to propose a trifling penalty (30 minae), plainly showed that he regarded the issue with indifference. And so he was condemned to drink the hemlock by a heavier majority of dicasts than had found him guilty. The sailing of the sacred ship to Delos in commemoration of the heroic deed of Theseus caused the execution to be postponed for thirty days. Though urged to escape by Crito, he refused, and continued to converse with his friends every day till his last hour came. How he talked, and what he did on his death-day, is the subject of the Phaedo.

The authorities for Socrates are—to say nothing of Aristophanes—Plato and Xenophon. These depict him in very different lights—the one as an acute speculative thinker, the other as a homely practical gospeller to the Athenians: a very convincing sketch of him drawn from them all will be found in the Introduction to Mr. St. George Stock’s edition of the Apology (Clar. Press). Many other disciples besides Xenophon and Plato wrote of Socrates or dialogues in the Socratic vein; but these have perished. Some of the Schools of Philosophy which sprang more directly from his teaching are grouped together in Introduction, § 7. See too p. 165.

Styx and Stygian Lake: 113C. Parts of the infernal river system, described in Chap. lxi. (q.v.).
Tartarus: 112A, D; 113B, C, E; 114A, B. The huge gulf traversing the earth, into which the four infernal rivers flow. The perpetual dwelling-place of souls that have sinned past forgiveness; the temporary dwelling-place of certain other evil-doers until they are forgiven. Chap. LXII.

Telephus: 107E, note. A character in a play of Æschylus, which takes its name from him. The son of Heracles and Auge; brought up in Arcadia; became king of Mysia; married Astyoche, daughter of Priam; was wounded by Achilles, and in return for being cured by him showed the Greeks the way to Troy.

Terpsion: 59C. A Megarian disciple of Socrates, is an interlocutor in Plato's Theaetetus, where he is again associated with Euclid.

Thebes: 59C, 92A, 95A. The chief city in Boeotia, some forty miles by road to the N.W. of Athens.

Theseus: 58A, note. The national Athenian hero, a son of Aegeus, King of Athens. He was left at Troezen with his mother, Aethra, till he was strong enough to raise a stone of gigantic size, beneath which lay his father's sword and sandals. He now journeyed to Athens across the Isthmus of Corinth, which was at that time infested with robbers, whom he succeeded in exterminating. His most memorable achievement was that alluded to in the text, the delivery of Athens from the tribute of seven youths and seven maidens paid every nine years to Minos, King of Crete. On the return voyage the pilot forgot to hoist the white sail, which was to have been the signal of success, and Aegeus, thinking his son had perished, threw himself into the sea. Theseus now ascended the throne. He is said to have divided the citizens into classes, to have welded together the loosely-federated townships of Attica into one state, centering at Athens (συνοικισμός). Besides this, he took part in many heroic adventures, but was at last expelled, and murdered by King Lycomedes of Scyros.

Xanthippe: 60A. The wife of Socrates. Is generally held as the type of a shrewish wife, but probably this account is due to the invention of later ages. In the Phaedo we find her represented as an affectionate woman.

Zeus: 62A, and frequently in oaths and asseverations throughout.
NOTE ON THE SOPHISTS.

Sophist is a term which originally expressed any sort of mental or artistic skill (e.g., Solon, Pythagoras, and the Seven Wise Men were all thus labelled), but which, somewhat after about 450 B.C., became the special name for a class of migratory professional teachers who sprang up in Hellas. Neither their methods nor their matter were strictly original: their critical methods they adopted from Zeno the Eleatic, their matter they adapted from previous thinkers (Introduction, § 6). The Sophists popularized whatever positive result in the way of knowledge their predecessors had attained. Or rather, perhaps, finding little agreement existing in regard of the speculative matters heretofore discussed, they put such things aside, and turned their attention to giving well-to-do young men a practical education such as would enable them to get on in life. They were University Extension Lecturers (without the University to be extended) who gave instruction in the "subjects of the day"; in another sense, they were "crammers" who coached men in the art of expressing their thoughts (Rhetoric). What men thought did not so much matter (for there was no such thing as universal truth); but what each man thought to be true or right was right and true for him. This notion—which we call the doctrine of Relativity of Knowledge (though that phrase has other meanings) and which was put in a nutshell in Protagoras's dictum that "(Individual) man is the measure of all things"—was the one common point in their teaching which enables us to speak of them collectively as Sophists. As a consequence of this theory they declined to accept the received ideas about God, morality, scientific truth, &c., not merely because there were no such common notions existing at the time, but also because there could not, as they thought, be any such common notions. They regarded such questions as merely matters of opinion, and are thus called Sceptics—people who thresh without any expectation of getting grain.

As professors of wisdom without the reality, as men who made the worse cause appear the better, and as, moreover, taking money for their teaching (the second point common to the Sophists), the Sophists were attacked by Plato, Aristotle, and other Socratics, and thus acquired a bad name in history down to the days of Grote. The earlier Sophists, whom Plato himself speaks of with respect as original thinkers, were jumbled up with the more or less unprincipled purveyors of second-hand knowledge who came after them. Yet it is amongst these earlier Sophists that Socrates must be ranged so far as regards his contemporaries. He did not take money for instruction; he did hold that beneath men's conflicting opinions there lay a basis of truth, which it was the chief duty of man to discover: none the less, in so far as he made men think out the grounds of their traditional belief, and stimulated thought at Athens as his fellows did wherever they went, he was a Sophist. That he was a positive teacher, not a negative critic, did not strike Aristophanes and the normal Athenian: to them he was not, as to us, the Inspirer of all Philosophy since his time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Greek Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>57A</td>
<td>ἐπιεικ., πίνω.</td>
<td>1. To be kind toward, 2. To fear</td>
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<td>58A</td>
<td>ὑστερμένη, στέφω.</td>
<td>1. To step, 2. To place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>σωθείει, σώζω.</td>
<td>1. To save, 2. To heal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>εἰσώ, ἐάω.</td>
<td>1. To enter, 2. To eat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60D</td>
<td>ἱππω, ἔω.</td>
<td>To ride, to be horse</td>
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<tr>
<td>61A</td>
<td>ἀπειθήσαι, ἀπειθ.</td>
<td>1. Not to believe, 2. To swim</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>ἀρχήκας, ἀκούσ.</td>
<td>1. To hear, 2. To find</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>διῆγατο, διαίτ.</td>
<td>1. To talk, 2. To eat</td>
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<tr>
<td>62A</td>
<td>θάτω, εἴδω.</td>
<td>To see, to be noticed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63B</td>
<td>πειραθῶ, πειράω.</td>
<td>To test, to try</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>ἔδον, εἴδω.</td>
<td>1. To see, 2. To eat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64E</td>
<td>τετράφθαι, τρέψω.</td>
<td>To be hurt, to turn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>ἀφεστάναι, ἀφίστημι.</td>
<td>1. To be away, 2. To remove</td>
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<tr>
<td>65C</td>
<td>ἔστα, ἔσω.</td>
<td>To be about, to be inside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>ἐφίησο, ἐφάπτω.</td>
<td>1. To see, 2. To touch</td>
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<tr>
<td>66A</td>
<td>τευξόμενον, τυγχάνω.</td>
<td>1. To have, 2. To understand</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>ἐγκηδεύμενη, ἐγκ.</td>
<td>1. To be ready, 2. To teach</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>προσπέσωσιν, προσπίπτω.</td>
<td>1. To meet, 2. To descend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>ἐγγεσθαί, εἴδω.</td>
<td>To see, to find</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67C</td>
<td>ἔθησα, ἔύιζω.</td>
<td>To see, to turn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>διαβεβληται, διαβάλλω.</td>
<td>To divide, to translate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68A</td>
<td>ἦρων, ἔρω.</td>
<td>To be noble, to love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>ἀποδεικνύσαι, ἀποδύσκω.</td>
<td>To prove, to show</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>ἐπτοῆσαί, πτερ.</td>
<td>1. To be carried, 2. To fly</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>δεδεινά, δεῖδω.</td>
<td>To see, to find</td>
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<tr>
<td>71C</td>
<td>ἔγγορηρέναι, ἔγειρω.</td>
<td>1. To rise, 2. To get up</td>
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<td>72A</td>
<td>ἰδε, ὄραω.</td>
<td>1. To see, 2. To know</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>κατακαλωθῆναι, κατακαλλάκχω.</td>
<td>1. To call down, 2. To distinguish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>μεμαθηκέναι, μανθάνω.</td>
<td>To learn, to teach</td>
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<tr>
<td>73E</td>
<td>ἐπελελυθότοι, ἐπιλαλθάνω.</td>
<td>To come out, to call</td>
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<tr>
<td>77A</td>
<td>πεπέσθαι, πείθω.</td>
<td>1. To persuade, 2. To think</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>ἐξεπάστη, ἐξεπάσσω.</td>
<td>To find, to pass</td>
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<tr>
<td>78B</td>
<td>ἔρεσθαι, ἔρομαι.</td>
<td>To be seared, to be hot</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>διακαθηθῆναι, διαρέω.</td>
<td>To pass through, to cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79D</td>
<td>ἔξει, ἔξεστι.</td>
<td>To be seen, to be able to see</td>
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<tr>
<td>80D</td>
<td>σαπή, σήπω.</td>
<td>To sleep, to be found</td>
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<tr>
<td>81B</td>
<td>μεμισσάξαμεν, μιαίναι.</td>
<td>To mix, to be dark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>ἐνδεσθαίναι, ἐνδύω.</td>
<td>To put on, to put</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83B</td>
<td>ἠσθή, ἠσμάω.</td>
<td>To feel, to be sick</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>προσηλθοί, προσηλή.</td>
<td>To join, to be joined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84C</td>
<td>ἀποκονχήστε, ἀποκναίω.</td>
<td>To unhide, to appear</td>
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<td>85A</td>
<td>γεγηθότες, γηθέω.</td>
<td>To be hit, to be struck</td>
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<td>86A</td>
<td>κατάξη, κατάγυμνη.</td>
<td>1. To take, 2. To wrap</td>
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<td>86A</td>
<td>διατέμη, διατέμνω.</td>
<td>To divide, to cut</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>ἐντεταμένην, ἐντείνω.</td>
<td>To add, to increase</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>κράδη, κεράννυμι.</td>
<td>To cut, to wound</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>κατακανή, κατακαίω.</td>
<td>1. To cut down, 2. To kill</td>
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<td>87B</td>
<td>ἦμπειρετο, ἦμπειρω.</td>
<td>To be skilled, to be wise</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>ἀνερωτήθη, ἀνερωτάω.</td>
<td>1. To ask, 2. To be asked</td>
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<td>88C</td>
<td>ἡμισθεσθαί, ἔρω.</td>
<td>To be shared, to be taken</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>καταπέστωκε, καταπίπτω.</td>
<td>To fall, to be dropped</td>
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<tr>
<td>90B</td>
<td>ἔφεστάμην, ἔφέτοιμο.</td>
<td>1. To prepare, 2. To be prepared</td>
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<tr>
<td>91B</td>
<td>δέσαι, δέωραι.</td>
<td>To see, to find</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>ὑπομνήςατε, ὑπομνημόσυν.</td>
<td>1. To remonstrate, 2. To argue</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>ἐφάτην, φημί.</td>
<td>1. To speak, 2. To be heard</td>
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<tr>
<td>96A</td>
<td>τευξόμενος, τυγχάνω.</td>
<td>To have, to come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>ἐγκηδεύμενη, ἐγκ.</td>
<td>To be ready, to teach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>προσπέσωσιν, προσπίπτω.</td>
<td>1. To meet, 2. To descend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>ἐγγεσθαί, εἴδω.</td>
<td>To see, to find</td>
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<tr>
<td>97C</td>
<td>βιαός, βίω.</td>
<td>To live, to be alive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98B</td>
<td>ἦσθι, εἰμί.</td>
<td>1. To be, 2. To exist</td>
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<tr>
<td>99A</td>
<td>πεισόμενος, πυθάνομαι.</td>
<td>To persuade, to be persuaded</td>
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<td>100A</td>
<td>ἀπεμνημόνευκα, ἀπομνη-</td>
<td>1. To remember, 2. To be remembered</td>
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<tr>
<td>102C</td>
<td>πείσεθαί, πάσχω.</td>
<td>To convince, to suffer</td>
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<tr>
<td>102B</td>
<td>διέλθητε, διάρέω.</td>
<td>To pass, to go through</td>
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<tr>
<td>103B</td>
<td>ἠμβέθαι, ἀπτώ.</td>
<td>To be with, to be close</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>εἰσεβάτων, ἔθω.</td>
<td>To enter, to be present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108B</td>
<td>ὑμείγεν, ἀπτώ.</td>
<td>1. To be mixed, 2. To be together</td>
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<tr>
<td>110B</td>
<td>καταβεβρωμένα, καταβι-</td>
<td>To be divided, to be separated</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>κατεδηδεσμένοι, κατεσθίω.</td>
<td>1. To be bound, 2. To eat</td>
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<tr>
<td>111C</td>
<td>ἀναπτεταμένους, ἀναπε-</td>
<td>1. To develop, 2. To grow</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>συντετραθησθαί, συντετράπω.</td>
<td>1. To be surrounded, 2. To be surrounded</td>
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<tr>
<td>113A</td>
<td>εἰμαρμένους, μερόμαι.</td>
<td>To imagine, to be whole</td>
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<tr>
<td>116A</td>
<td>ἡγῆ, ἡγέομαι.</td>
<td>To rule, to govern</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>εἰπετο, ἐποιμ.</td>
<td>1. To speak, 2. To make</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>ἐνεγκατό, φέρω.</td>
<td>1. To install, 2. To carry</td>
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<tr>
<td>117A</td>
<td>ὄφλησεν, ὁφλισκάνω.</td>
<td>To cover, to enclose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>ἀποσπείσαι, ἀποσπένω.</td>
<td>1. To separate, 2. To divide</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>πετακότα, πίνω.</td>
<td>To throw, to throw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>ἤσχυνθημεν, αἰσχύνω.</td>
<td>To be ashamed, to be afraid</td>
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November, 1890.

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